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THE RELATIONS BETWEEN BYZANTIUM AND THE WEST IN THE REIGN







This study is sua account of the various ways in which
relations between the Byzantine Umpire and the West developed
during the reign of John V Ralaiologos, 1341-1391• There is
an extensive literature (of which a selection is given in the
bibliography) on special aspects of the subjects} the thesis
completes and corrects this literature on several points and
draws the various aspects together in a manner not previously
attempted* After an introductory chapter describing the pro¬
blems which faced John V at his accession, emphasising the
significance of the great losses of territory sustained by
the empire between 1341 and 1354 and outlining the importance
of the West in John V* s foreign policy, there are three main
sections dealing with i) The formal negotiations concerning
the reunion of the Churches of Constantinople and Rome,
ii) The individual and intellectual contacts between Bast and
West, iii) The commercial relations. There is also an Appendix
dealing with the problem of the coinage of Constantinople
during the period - a problem which throws light upon the
financial position of the empire in relation to the West. The
substance of these sections may be summarised as follows.
i) During the reign of John V the problem of obtaining
western military aid for Byzantium was closely linked to the
question of the reunion of the Churches of East and West.
Tliis topic lias previously been the subject of a work by
0. ilalecki, Un Urnpereur de iiyzance a Rome; ving;t ans de travail
pour 1*union des eglises et pour la defense de 1*empire d'Orient.
(Warsaw, 1930)* This important work retains much of its value
as a systematic account of the successive phases of the union
negotiations, but in the present section it has been examined
in the light of recent research and a number of changes in
points of fact and interpretation are suggested.
it is proposed that John V s first contact with the papacy
in 1355 'was a more serious and thoughtful plan than is generally
supposed and that it led to the emperor* s personal conversion to
the Roman Church in 1357 (twelve years before Halecki dated the
event). The failure of this initiative to produce substantial
military assistance from the West caused John V to make a per¬
sonal approach to King Louis of Hungary in 1366. The breakdown
of the negotiations which took place in Hungary is considered
in the light of evidence unavailable to lialecki and doubt is
case on the sincerity of King Louis in his dealings with John V.
Similarly it is now possible to be more precise about the next
phase of religious negotiations which followed the expedition
to Byzantium in 1366 led by John V* s cousin, Count Amadoo of
Savoy. The existence of parallel sets of egotiations, between
John V and Amadeo on the one hand and the ex-emperor Jolm
Kantakouzenos and a papal legate Paul on the other, and the
relationship between them, elucidates both John V s decision
to visit the Pope in Rome and also the papal legate's agreement
that the West should meet the East in an oecumenical council.
This is a most important incident because it illustrates the
difference in the Byzantine and Roman approaches to the matter
of Church reunion, and represents the closest rapprochement
between the two sides in the period.
The visit of John V to Rome in 1369, which iialecki saw as
the central episode in the emperor* s relations with the West,
is interpreted in a different light. The religious aspect of
the journey was not the emperor* s conversion, but siraply a
positive and dramatic reaffirmation of his A. -rsonal faith des gtie.
to remind the West of his previous concessions ancl his empire's
plight# The disappointment of these hopes, which John V exper¬
ienced on his subsequent visit to Venice, is examined with refer¬
ence to recent research. "he years which followed John V s
return to Byzantium in 1371 are marked by an increasing depen¬
dence on the Ottoman Turks and a growing disillusionment with
the West. However, the plan for Gliurch union and military aid
was energetically pursued by Pope Gregory XX until 137&, arid
John V did not finally turn his back on the West until the Great
ochisra made the prospect of aid remote and the power of the
Turks made further hopes of resistance vain.
ii) The second section of this study is concerned with a
comparatively neglected area of contact between Hast and West -
the individual and intellectual links. The existence of a body
of Dominican Friars in the empire is considered in relation to
the personal contacts which they made with individual Greeks,
and the special qualities, particularly their knowledge of Greek,
which gave thera an Important r$le to play in assisting the growth
of mutual understanding between Byzantines and Latins. The most
outstanding consequence of their work was the translation into
Greek of many western theological works, especially those of
Thomas Aquinas. The translation© were made principally by
Demetrios kydones, John V* s chief minister, who owed both his
knowledge of Latin and ills access to western manuscripts to the
Dominicans. The part played by other individuals in creating
links between Byzantium and the west is considered in the light
of the careers of Barlaam of Calabria and Simon Atumano, converts
and bishops of the Koman Church, Paul the Latin Patriarch of
Constantinople, John Laskarls Kalopheros, cosmopolitan merchant,
adventurer and union advocate, Anne of Savoy, John V* s mother,
and Francesco Gattilusio, John V* s brothar-xu-law and Genoeao
ruler of the island of Lesbos, finally the West's impact upon
Byzantium in religious affairs is examined with reference to
the lives and writings of 13emetrios and Prochoros Kydones, and
Nellos and Nicholas Kabasilas. The fir^t two members of this
group accepted western theological teachings wholeheartedly
and attempted to persuade their compatriots to see the Latins
;xb co-heirs of the Byzantines' political and religious past, %?ho
could be learned from and admired. The success of their efforts
is seen in the careers of Neilos and Nicholas Kabasilas who,
while guarding their Greek orthodoxy closely, felt themselves
able to express appreciation of certain aspects of Latin theology,
of which previous Byzantines had been ignorant, and gained an
understanding of western teaching and usage which few Byzantines
had sought to achieve.
iii) The third section of the study deals with the commer¬
cial contacts between Byzantium and the West and their political
consequences. The western colonies in the empire are examined
to show their relationship with Byzantium. The position of the
Genoese of Pera emphasises the increasing independence of their
colony from the empire, seen in the appointment of their offic¬
ials, their duties towards the emperor, the jurisdiction over
their colony and the coinage of Pera. however, in the daily
conduct of affairs there were substantial links between Pera
and Constantinople in their commercial life and in the co-opera¬
tion of the Greek and Genoese authorities over local taxation.
An examination of the Venetian colony in Constantinople shows
how its geographical situation and the nature of its tirade tied
it more closely to the empire than the Genoese colony. The
colonies of the Catalans, Prove^als and Anconitans are also
briefly studied and the links between the Catalans and the Genoese
in the later part of the i>erxod are brought ou*-.
Finally the parts played by the Venetian and Genoese
colonies in the political affairs of Byzantium are considered
and the relationship between their policies and the nature of
their colonies is emphasised. The primary concern of the Vene¬
tians was to maintain political stability and profitable trading
conditions in Byzantium for as long as possible. To this end
they consistently refused to become involved in local Byzantine
politics and used their influence to minimise tho damaging
effects of the empire* s civil disputes. Nevertheless they sought
to use all the non-violent means at their disposal, chiefly
economic pressures, to improve their situation in Constantinople.
A further part of their policy, which was of great benefit to
Byzantium, was to obstruct the aggressive designs of the empire's
enemies. The Serbs, the Hungarians and the Turks all sought
Venetian help against Byzantium and were refused. The Genoese,
on the other hand, played a more active part in Byzantine
politics, but a distinction has to be made between the authori¬
ties in Genoa, which generally pursued a policy similar to
Venice's, and the government of Pera, which regularly used its
economic and military strength against Byzantium and Venice in
the search for greater commercial power. Although Genoa and
Venice had laore interest in the survival of tho eastern empire
than anyone except the Byzantines themselves, neither was willing
to antagonise the Turks by giving extensive military aid to
Byzantium.
A briof conclusion summarises the results of the enquiry.
Despite the considerable novelty and interest of several develop¬
ments in the relationship between East and West, the weakness
of the empire as a rosult of the territorial losses of the l3^Cs
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THE INTERNAL CONDITION OF BYZANTIUM UNDER JOHN V.
The territorial recovery of the Byzantine empire in the
years after Constantinople was recaptured from the Latins
in 1261 was a slew and painful process. The Estiperors
hichael VIIX, Andronikos II and AndronlkOB III had to ward
off the threat of western retaliation against the reborn
1
empire, while seeking to expand their possessions • The
efforts of these first three emperors of the douse of Palaio-
logos were gradually successful, By the time of Andronikos
III* e death in 13kl, Byzantium had absorbed the independent
Greek principalities which had survived the Latin Empire,
and controlled a broad sweep of territory to the west of
Constantinople, including Albania, Epirus, Acarnania, Aetolla,
Thessaly, Macedonia, Thrace, the central southern Pelo-
ponnese and many islands in the Aegean. On the other hand,
the Byzantines had met with no success in Asia Minor.
The Turks had overrun the areas which Jtad remained Greek
under the Empire of Nicaea, and Constantinople* s authority
in Asia xvas restricted to a few isolated towns such as
iierakleia on the black Sea and Philadelphia. In the south
of the Peloponnese the Imperial possessions based on Mietra
were cut off from the rest of Byzantium by a patchwork of
Angevin, Catalan and Venetian territories. Nevertheless,
by 13^1 the restored empire appeared to oe secure and even
expanding. It could be regarded as a coherent economic and
administrative unit centred on a Greek heartland. Under
1. General accounts of this period are found in D.M.Nicol,
The last centuries of Byzantium 1261-1433. (i^ondon, 1972);
G. Osfcrogorsky, * The Palaeologi*, C.M.L.. vol.IV, The
byzantine Empire. i, 331-387 •
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Andronikos XXI and his energetic first minister John Kanta-
koiizanoa the condition of the empire gave reason for hope for
the future«
i) The political divisions of the empire l?Ul-1391»
however, the death of Andronikos XIX was a turning-
point for Byzantium, The progress of recent years was eclipsed
by the emergence of old and new problems which were never far
from the surface in the restored empire but which had a more
disruptive effect in the years following 13^1 than ever
before. Host seriously the political unity of the empire was
shattered by rivalry and civil war. Audronikos XIX had
himself set the pattern for this development by his struggle
against his grandfather from 1321 to I32d, but the bitter*
xiess arid devastation caused by that conflict were minor in
comparison to the divisions which appeared in Byzantine
society after 13^1.
At the time of his father's death, John V was a few
days from his ninth birthday^", bis right of succession to
the imperial throne was not challenged by any political group,
but fierce competition for the regency ensued, John itanta*
kouzeaos, who had controlled the government under Andronikos
XXX, attempted to preserve an atmosphere of continuity. He
wrote to the provincial governors and tax collectors instruct¬
ing them to carry on their duties as before, he moved into
the imperial palace but refused to adopt the title of euperor.
litis apparent modesty thwarted the ambitions of a former
supporter of Kantakouzenos, Alexios Apokaukos, who chose to
pursue his personal advancement by opposing Katfcakoazon.os'
1, John V was born on id June 1332. For this date see
it~J .Loenertz, * La chronique breve de J-352', part 2, U,C ,P.
30, (I9t>4), b'J-bk; but cf» P.Oharanis, 'An important
short chronicle of the fourteenth century', 13., 13, (193&),
3hk. -
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right to the regency. %'hile Kantakouzenos was away fro 2
Constantinople, Apokaukos with the help of the Patriarch
Kalekas managed to persuade John V* s mother Anne of bavoy
that Kantakouzenos was a dangerous political rival to her
son.* s imperial rights. Thereafter the capital turned rapidly
against Kantakouzenos; his friends were dz'iven out front Con¬
stantinople and Ms propercy was confiscated.! the Patriarch
Kalekas was appointed regent by Arm a of Savoy. in reply
kantakouzenos had Miasolf proclaimed e.aperor in Didymoteichos
on 26 October 13**1 • Thus within four raonths of Andronikos
.ill* ® death the empire was split into two opposing factions,
and Constanthiople was set against the provinces whore
Kantakouzanos rallied his supporters.
The dispute quickly developed into an open conflict
in which both sides enjoyed periods of military success.
oth Apokaukos and Kantakouzenos solicited the assistance
of foreign powers, large areas of the empire were devastated and
much property, particularly in the larger towns, was looted,
in mid-13^5 Alexias Apok&ukoe was murdered by political
prisoners held in Constantinople. This event helped to
turn the tide of the civil war in Kantakouzenos* favour.
The regency lo3t its moving—force with Apokaukos. Cities
and individuals began to declare themselves openly for
Kantakouzeuos. As she saw the end approaching, Anne of Savoy
dismissed the Patriarch Kalekas, and on 2 February 13*^7
Kantakouzenos entered the capital and was accepted as co-
emperor with John V.
it was arranged that for the next ten years Kantakou¬
zenos should reign as the senior* emperor and thereafter should
share the government with John V on equal terms. The pact
was sealed by the marriage of John kantakouzeenos* daughter.
4
Helena, to John V. This plan had. much to recommend it. The
energy and military skill of Kantakouzenos -were qualities
which the empire greatly needed. However, the youthful
ambition of John V was not satisfied with the solution. He
frequently threatened aggressive action to gain more indepen¬
dence. Eventually, in 1352 he attacked the territory which
had been assigned to Kantakouzenos' son Matthew around
Adrianople. John Kantakouzenos hurried to restore the posi¬
tion, calling on the Ottomans for assistance, while John V
relied on the help of Serbian troops. The issue vas thus
decided entirely by outside forces and the Ottomans won tlie
day for the Kantakouzenoi.
in 1353 Matthew Karttakouzeaos was proclaimed emperor
and he was crowned the following year. John y was relegated
in the imperial hierarchy and his name was omitted from the
customary prayers and acclamations. In the face of this
public humiliation John V planned a further attack on the
regime of John Kantakouzeuos. With some assistance from a
Genoese adventurer, Francesco Gaitilusio, he forced his way
into Constantinople on 22 November 1354. An agreement for
the joint rule of John kantakouzenos and John Talaiologos
lasted uneasily for a while but on 4 December Kantakouzenos
abdicated his imperial rights in favour of John V*"«
The voluntary and peaceful abdication of John Kantakouzenos
did not, however, bring an and to the political divisions
within the empire. Matthew Kentakouzenoa continued to oppose
John V from his territory around iihodope until handed over
to iiis rival by the Sorbs in 1357 when lie was lado to renounce
1. For this date see A.Faxller, * Note sur la ohronologie du
regne de Jean Cantacuzene* , k, :.. 29, (1971), 293-302;
D.H. IIcol. The last centuries, p.253*
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iiia claim to the imperial throne. ills brother, Manuel
Kantakouaerxos, resisted the attempts of the government in
Constantinople to re aova him from his appanage in the beio-
pormese, which lie continued to rule independently of the
central administration until his death in I38O, Matthew,
■who had joined him in hi.stra, survived to control the province
for a further two years.
In addition to the problems caused by the Kantakoufconol,
John V during his personal rule had to face a succession of
challenges irons within hie own family. In particular his
eldest son .indronilcos IV made repeated attacks attempting to
hasten his inheritance. In 1373 Andronikos joined Saudji,
the son of the Ottoman Sultan hurad, in a. concerted revolt
against their fathers. The threat from this alliance was
only stifled by common military action between the Lyssan tines
and Turks. In punisiiment for this revolt Andronikos was
imprisoned, partially blinded and his rights of succession
were annulled in favour of John V* e second son ianuel.
however, the political career of Andronikos was not
finished. in 13?6 the Gonoese, in their search for a weapon
to counter the Infliienca which the Venetians appeared to have
over John V, found in Andronikos an excellent tool to assist
their plans. After Andronikos had escaped from his prison
in a monastery, he was helped by both Genoese and Turkish
forces to storm Constantinople and capture hie father. Hie
usurpation lasted three years during which the Genoese used him
and the empire as pawns in their struggle against Venice, i ©aco
between John V and Andronikos was not made until 13di, and the
terms agreed restored the rights of Inheritance of Andronikos IV
and his son John ViX. Uvea tiiis sot element failed to bring lasting
6
tranquillity to the imperial house. Manuel £1, whose hopes
of succession load bean overridden in 13&1. removed himself
to Theasaionica where ho ruled independently of Constantinople
and attempted to reverse his father1 s policy of rapprochement
with the Turks. -Andronikos IV and John VII also made further
efforts to seize the empire from John V. In 1363# a few
months before his death, Andronikos made an unsuccessful
attack on his father, arid in 1390 John VII managed to win
control of the capital for five months.
John V was in possession of Constantinople when he died
on 16 February 1391 • :• uus son and grandson, Manuel IX and
John VII, were not present. They had been summoned to servo
the Ottoman bultan and to assist hie army in laying siege
to Philadelphia, the last surviving Byzantine town in Asia.
This pathetic situation at the end of John V1 s life was
largely due to the domestic struggles which had punctuated
his long reign, dissipating the empire1 e energies and re¬
sources and tanking the Palaiologoi increasingly dependent on
the political support of the Turks, liven during the periods
of family peace the empire was politically fragmented by the
need to satisfy the rival claims of the members of the ruling
house to a share in the government of Byzantium. Thus in
13^3, while John V ruled in Constantinople, he had to accept
the virtual autonomy of Andronikos XV on the Sea of Marmora,
Manuel II in. Thessalonioa and his fourth son. iheodore in the
Peloponnese. The empire, as NjLkephoroa Gregoras described
it, was like 1 a ship, tossed on the waves, without a rudder
or a navigator1 ,i
1. Gregoras, xvii,l»I£,i*44,
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The immediate price of the internal divisions of V'yzantium,
especially oX' the conflict between kanlakouzenos and the regency
in Constantinople between 1341 and 1347» vas an extensive loss
of territory. Between the death of Andronikos ill. and the
beginning of Joim V s personal rule in 1354, the empire lost
about half its lands. The conquests which had given the e rpire
a solid basis in central Greece wore quidely undone. The
chief beneficiary of Byzantium* s political confusion was the
Serbian empire of Stephen laisan, whose help was solicited by
both sides in tho civil war. Without fighting a major battle
he was able to annexe the whole of Macedonia (apart from
fhesaalonica), Albania, Epirue and Thessaly. Bis kingdom was
doubled in size snd he could boast to the Venetians that he
1
was master of ' almost the whole Roman Empire* . Meanwhile
the Bulgarian Tzar, John-Alexander, acquired a large tract of
land on the upper Taritza, including I'hllippopolis, merely on
the unfulfilled promise of aiding Apokaniens* faction. Like¬
wise the Genoese profited fro-a the uncertainties and exhaustion
of the empire to seize control of Chios in 1346 and to fight
for an expanded colony In Pera in 1348-1349# Kantakouzeno s *
Turkish allies occupied the fortress of Tzympe near Gallipoli
in 1352, and in early 1354, when the walls of Gallipoli were
destroyed by an earthquake, they took control of the city
without opposition. Gallipoli, which was used by the Turks
as a crossing point from Asia to Europe, was restored to the
empire by the crusading expedition of John V* s cousin Count
Araadeo of Savoy in 1366, Only tart years lator, however,
1. * Stephanas del gratia Sorvie, iiioclie, Ohilrainie, Ze tie,
Albanie ©t maritime regionis rox, noc non Bulgaria imperii
partis non modic© partioope, et fere totius imperii Romanic
doiainuB* , 15 October 1345, . . 2, p.276.
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Andronikos XV surrendered the town to the Turks again as the
price of the Gttoraan assistance he had received in his usur¬
pation of John V.
The Byzantine losses in central Thrace in. the 1360s are
also directly attributable to the events of the civil war.
host of the damage scene to have been done by bando of Turks
who canie to the area originally as allies of Kantakouzenos.
Didymoteichos foil to them in I36I. Adrianople was also
talcen while John V was away in Italy in 13*5$? • Two years
later a Turkish ar.iy utterly defeated the Serbs near Adrianoplo
opening up eastern Europe to the Ottoman advance. This battle,
by destroying the power of the Serbs, gave the Byzantines an
opportunity to absorb some territory to the north of Thessa-
lonica. The conquests made in this area lasted only briefly
and were the only significant victories won by Byzantine
arris in John V & reign.
After the Turkish successes in Thrace the Byzantine empire
was mostly confined to coastal strips? on the Black Sea, the
Sea of Marmora and the Aegean. Thessalonica was cut off
from Constantinople. After Manuel XX directed an aggressive
campaign against the Turks from Thess&louica in the early
13<i0s the city suffered, from their close attentions and fell
In. 1387• Only the imperial possessions In the Peloponnose
enjoyed long periods of peace and they survived John V* s
reign intact. This fact more than any other allowed the
province to become the centre of the Byzantine cultural
acjiieveaonts of the last years of the empire.
ii) The religions and social divisions in Byzantium.
The political disunity of the Byzantine e>-tpire in the
.-lid-fourteenth century was intensified by other problems
which were in part stimulated by the civil disputes. Byzantium
9
was also divided religiously and socially. The religious
controversy or the early years of John V* s roign concerned
a question which was so eaotoric that the ferocity of the
arguments on both sides is surprising. The persistence of
the dispute undoubtedly owed something to the manner in which
the supporters of the two sides divided largely along political
a® well as religious lines. Laymen and theologians in the
empire differed sharply on the question of whether the activi¬
ties of certain monks, called the ' hesychasts* , were orthodox"1".
These monks believed that their personal meditations, aided
by special ascotical techniques, allowed ihe'-t to perceive
the Divine Light which shone on the disciples on Mount Tabor.
They were attacked, chiefly by a monk of Italian, origin,
iarlaam of Calabria, on the grounds that such claims to a
personal experience and knowledge of God were incompatible
with orthodox apophatic theology. Earlaan* e main weapon was
ridicule of the physical exorcises with which the hesychasts
assisted their meditations. Two councils held in Constanti¬
nople in 1341, the first presided over by Andronilcos XXI and
the second, after his death, by Kantakouzenos, asserted the
orthodoxy of the hasychasta and theii chief spokesman Gregory
Pal as tas .
Although barlaaif s reaction to this defeat was to return
to Italy, the dispute did not and there. Kantakouzenos'
support for the hesychaste associated the roligious contro¬
versy with the growing political split between liira and the
regency under the Patriarch Kalekas. Kalekas' antipathy
towards heeychas <1 grew with bis political opposition to
Kantakouzenos. After Kantakouzeno s* supporters had been
1. On hoaychasm see in particular J .Meyendorff. Xntroduction
a 1* etude de ure^oiro falamas, (Paris, 1939) •
driven from the capital, Kaiekas arranged for Gregory ialamas
to be imprisoned and later excommunicated. The revival of
Kantakouaenos* political fortunes caused a cliauge in the
regency*s attitude towards hesychasm. Anne of Savoy dismissed
the Patriarch Kalekas, Palamas was freed from prison and one
of his supporters, Isidore, was appointed to the patriarchal
throne. Kantakouzenos* eventual victory sealed the official
acceptance of hesychasm. '.two councils were held in 1351
which pronounced the couplet© orthodoxy of Palamas and a
declaration was issued excommunicating those who held contrary
views.
Although the hesyohast controversy was greatly intensi-
fiod by its association with the political division of the
time the supporters of ibantakouzohos were not uniformly
Ixesychast . honetrios Kydones is an outstanding example of
the fact that byzantlne political and religious groupings
cemot bo thought of in 'party* tens, he was introduced to
government servico by Kaatakouzsnos whom he supported through
the darkest hours of his campaign against the regency in
Constantinople. On haiitakouzenos1 victory he became chief
minister to the emperor although never sharing his enthusiasm
for heaychasm arid often writing against the monks who prac¬
tised it. Furthermore, he survived kantakouzonos• abdication
and served Jolm V also as chief minister, becoming the domin¬
ant influence on imperial politics until 1371 when he resided
his official position. he remained in contact after this date
with many of the mo at important figures in the empire, forming
a close fri@ndsn.tp with manual XX. .lis letters and speeches,
1. On the question of politico-religious alignments see,
D.h.hicol, mho last centuries, pp.220-222.
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which covar the whole reign of John V, are one of our most
important sources for this period.
The social division in Byzantium was largely an economic
one wliich was exacerbated by the devastation of large areas
of countryside by the warring factions and their allies,
and by the crushing load of taxation which fell principally
on the poor©*" classes in the towns and villages1. the civil
war encouraged the division of the empire along social lines.
Kantakousoios, after his exclusion from Constantinople, drew
mch of his support from the landed aristocracy to which
ho himself belonged, iis opponents were able to stir up
popular hatx-ed against this wealthy minority whoso interest
in political power seemed to stes from personal greed rather
than legitimist sentiment, Such propaganda was immediately
successful in the larger Byzantine towns where the inequality
between rich and poor was most evident. stimulated first
by Apokaukos in Constantinople, outbursts of anti-aristo¬
cratic rioting occurrod spontaneously in other towns of
Thrace amid. Macedonia, fhessalonica suffered in particular.
The governor of the city had first declared for Kantakouzanos,
but violent demonstrations against him and the aristocracy
followed and a popular group, whose aenbers called themselves
the Zealots, seised control of the government of the city
and, after a period of frenzied destruction, administered
Thessalonica as an independent republic. Kantakouzenos
likened the sitnation in the town to an enemy occupation.
Long after the outbursts of violence had played them¬
selves out the social arid economic inequalities in the empire
X. On the social divisions in. Byzantium seo particularly.
iJ, Jharanls, 'internal strife in Byzantium during the
fourteenth century', _r», 13, (1940-1941), 208-230#
continued to act in a divisive manner, The central ^veRt"
ment became identified with the oppressiveness of the rich
because of its heavy tax demands, and * the poor, not being
able to endure the cruelty and inhumanity of the tax gatherers
and the continual violence and injuries of the powerfxxl,
clamoured against those in authority and the anay* . The
most radical of Byzantine raid-fourteenth century writers was
Alexias Makrembolites who for a time had worked under John
Kantakouzsnoo* financial officer Patrlkiotos, In all his
writings, and particularly in his Dialogue between the rich
and the poor and an. unpublished fitscourso on the reasons for
the Turkish expansion, he emphasised the theme Of the oppression
of the poor and defenceless citizens of the empire by the rich
and the government• The rulers of the empire and its eccle¬
siastical leaders were almost worse titan the Turks j they
p* ate up* people and derived nost of their wealth by robbery",
iii) Political despair arid religious doubts,
The works of Alexios Malcremboli tea represent, although
in an extreme fona, a literary development which was shared by
many other writers of John V* s reign. The political decline
of i'yzantiuja and the miseries and degradations of its inhabi—
tants were a common theme among authors of the second half
of the fourteenth century, The future patriarch Philotheoa,
reviewing the state of the empire in 1352, estimated that
the Byzantines controlled only between ten and twenty cities
and strongholds, and added that these were * daily besieged
and at their last gasp*. In his Dialogue between tho rich
1, Gregory Jalauias, citod by P.Charanis, * internal strife*,
p.223,
2, I, Sevcenko, 'Aloxios iakre abolitos and his "Dialogue
between the ilich and the Poor"' , ibo rn ik 1 fxdova, 6, (i960),
187-228, especially p,l'37«
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anc( the poor. iakrerabolites makes the rich excuse their lack
of social action on. the grounds that * now ••• not a province
is left to us ... it is we who are now enslaved toy all those
peoples which were under our sway' , The historian Nikephoros
Gregoras described the empire as a corpse being jumped at
timo arid again by dogs"'". Also Demetrios Kydones, complaining
near the end of John V* s reign, of' the constant political
squabbles, remarked tliat the contested prise was only 'a
shadow of power* , and that the result, of the situation was
2
that both sides had to serve the barbarian".
hot even Constantinople, which in previous centuries
had stood inviolate above the occasional tidal-waves of
political disaster, was immune from the misery which afflicted
the empire. * Is our city, of which we are so proud, any
bettor off than those which have been laid waste?* asked
a©. ietrios Kydon.es. ♦ It is the metropolis of misfortune and
3
suffering, instead of being the capital of subject citios' .
iakrenbolites wrote a lament on the collapse of a cupola of
Saint Sophia in 1346, calling it 'the last and most severe
calamity in the long series of tribulations which the empire
has suffered*, and proclaiming that it foretold * the end
h.
of the empire and of the world* .
This form of overstatement is a common feature of the
writing of this time. It stemmed, however, from a genuine
anxiety and confusion. Byzantium was seen as an embattled
1. Philotheos (Kokkinoa), Historical discourse on the siege
and capture of Herakleia by the 77atins7~ ed. G . iriantafil 1 ig
aucl a . Grappu to, Anecgota raeca o coTIlcibus maniasoriptis
] iblio fchecae rilarci. T~t ( Venice, lt>7k). p". 43. i- .Sevcenkb,
*Xioxios ;fakrVaboliies* , p.213, lines 14-16. Gregoras,
jti,3» 1*535* These quotations and others similar are cited
by X. Povcenko, * The decline of Byzantium seen through the
eyes of lis intellectuals* , D.O .X'.. 15, (1961), 169-186,
especially pp.172-173.
2. .U. hydpnep, vorrespoudaace. ed. R-J .Loenertz. letter 442,
lxnos 42—44.""*1 "
3. 0, j'.ydones, Apologia, ed. G.lercati, hotizie, p.374,
lines 39—64,
4. A * t'ikrembolites. Lament on the collapse of tot.Sophia, ed.
3 .Kourousis, * .7TTJ. '57. fr>w'J'-lV/O'l235*
fortress, with its inhabitants crowded into the big cities,
uprooted from their homes, tlieir lives disrupted and their
fears increased by the apparent inevitability of the approach¬
ing end. Dometrios kydones described Constantinople, whose
beauty and pioasuras had once been the envy of the whole world,
as a mere prison for its inhabitants, its gates shut all around,
its ports empty of visitors* Those who did come brought
only alarming rumours, and inside the city there was only
clamour, poverty and tears, while outside only death, fire
and destruction could be seen. * Shut up like beasts, we await
the final blow*x• Gregory Palamas expressed much the same
feeling of the isolation and encirclement of ihessalonica
whose citizens felt themselves surrounded by predators. ' bhen
the enemy go away we enjoy the walks in front of the town
for a short while, but we do not abuse the freedom, feeling
the time limited* .
The Greeks were in no doubt about the decline of their
empire. The realities of the situation were only too evident
to them. But when it came to an. analysis of the causes of
their misfortunes and a decision on how to counter them, the
problems seemed too great to understand or combat.
On one point the Byzantines had little doubt. The
successes of the Turks were due not so much to their profic¬
iency with arms as to the moral deficiencies of the Greeks
themselves. The most common explanation of any disaster was
1. 5'ajcntEp ra 0TipCa h(xtak\eia06vtocq, tt|v £oxoctt\v
cxvaufeveiv h:\tiyiiv.1
i).hydones , hy jbouleutIkos lloualais, h.P »G., 154, 968a}
also 10O4c.
2. 'K&v £tu Katpov ccvaxwp^acoatv ot tco\6;hoi, xp&heqa tcpoq
3(pax^ toiq Ttp& toO acteoQ nEpiTtatoiQ ? <x\\'ov kaxaxpwvie0a
tov Katpov tt)q xpi^COQ OUVEOTaXu^VOv OpGOVTEQ.'
G.Talaiiie.s, ho illy 19, i., 1. G . « 151, 264a.
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1* because of our sins' . To many this was sufficient explana¬
tion, but Alexios Makrembolites said what he thought some of
the sins were, He attributed the Byzantine defeat at sea at the
hands of the Genoese in 13^9 to the maltreatment of the poor,
the widows and the orphans in the empire. He contrasted this
behaviour with the moral superiority and humanity of the
Turks, many of whom, despite their abominable faith, were ' like
true Christians in their deeds and lacked only the name of
Christian' • In their ignorance the barbarian Turks destroyed
painted icons, but the Greeks, by exploiting the poor, des-
2
troyed • the living icons of God' •
The implications of this situation were far-reaching. If
the Turfcs were the agents of God's just vengeance it seemed
to imply some degree of divine approval for them. God had
not merely withdrawn his favour from the Byzantines, which in
view of their manifest sins was entirely comprehensible, but
apparently He had transferred it to the Ottomans. The Byzan¬
tine equation of a strong empire with a true faith, which had
served so assuringly for so long, became now a matter of grave
concern, Was not the whole disaster a clear manifestation
of the victory of a superior faith over a deficient one?
This possibility certainly occurred to some Byzantines,
rlakrerabolites added a short note to a treatise conventionally
entitled •a demonstration that our fate and imprisonment are
a result of our sins', which gave as a subtitle 'a refutation
1. I. Sev&enko, 'The decline of Byzantium', pp.179-1&H; see
also L. Oeconomos, •L'etat intellectuel et moral des
Byzantins vers le milieu du XlVe siecle, d' aprfes une page
de Joseph Pyyennios', Melanges Ch.Diehl. 1, 225-233«
2. I, Sevcenko, 'Alexios Makrernbolites' , p.196.
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to him -who, seeing the holy icons in captivity and troubled by
reasoning, says that the true teaching is tliat professed by
the people of Agar1 Other writers also remarked on this
state of affairs. Denietrios Kydones referred to the ' flood'
of people drawn off into unbelief, leaving 'not one of us who
2
has not openly deserted to the enemy' . John Kantakouzenos
compared the steadfastness of Christians living in infidel
lands with the willingness of Byzantines to go over to the
other side . Also Barlaam of Calabria, after his return to
the West, spoke disparagingly of the Greeks' firmness in faith
4
when faced with the sect of Mohammed .
it is not easy to find solid evidence of this tendency
among the Greeks, but the degree to which the Turks wore gain¬
ing acceptability in Byzantine eyes is somewhat borne out by
the appearance of a Turcophile party in Constantinople.
According to a speech of Demetrios Kydones in 1366 this group
advised understanding with the enemy, visited them, drank
with them and • received as the price of our betrayal sheep,
5
oxen, horses and money* . Others, who did not act as propagan¬
dists for the Turks, nevertheless played a part in weakening
the empire's resolution to defend itself. While Manuel XI was
conducting his policy of aggression towards the Turks, some
prominent people in Thessalonica • do not hesitate to proclaim
openly that the attempt to free our native land from the Turks
(>
is clearly to war against God' . This was said in spite of tho
Xbld.. p,197» n.64.
2. D. Kydones, Apologia, Notizie. p,374, lines 46-49.
3. J» Meyendorff, 'Projets de concile oecum^niquet un dialogue
inefdit entre Jean Cantacuz&ne et le lrfgat Paul' , D.Q.I3..
14, (I960), 176 lines 289-291.
4. Barlaam of Calabria, Pro Latinls, M.P«G., lpl» 1264a.
5. D. Kydones, Symbouleutikos Romaiois, M,P.G.. 154, 1006a.
A very similar passage appears in a letter from Kydones to
John V written in 1373, see Correspondance, ed. K-J.Loonertz,
letter 117, lines 22-26.
6. D. Kydones, Correspondence, ed, R-J.Loenertz, letter 324,
lines 39-42.
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fact that in its early stage Manuel* s policy provided the
Byzantines with their only encouraging successes against the
Turks in John V* s reign.
iv) The search for salvation.
The z*eligious doubts and political defeatism caused by
the success of the Turks did not completely undermine the
Byzantines' will to resist. Most Byzantines found it impossible
to believe that they would see the end of the empire and many
looked about them to see from where their salvation might
coue. The alternatives open to them were limited and raised
many different problems,
a) The Orthodox world
The natural direction for the Byzantines first to look
for help was towards those areas which had most recently been
part of the empire and which shared with Byzantium its most
vital characteristic, adherence to the orthodox faith. These
areas were Gerbia, Bulgaria and, to a lesser extent, itussia1.
On two main counts it was confidently expected that aid would be
forthcoming from these countries. In the first place the
struggle which the empire faced was not merely one of political
survival - it was for the security of the centre of the orthodox
faith, the hub of the Lmpix'e of all Ohristians, a symbol and a
reality which the Byzantines believed would be of the utmost
importance to all those who shared their faith ,
The inhabitants of these countries were, as kydones put it,
* men like us, devoted to God, who have often shared many things
1. On the bonds between Byzantium and eastern Burope in the
last centuries of the empire see in particular, D.Obolensky,
The Byzantine Commonwealth. Gastern Europe, 500-14 j3.
(London, 197l)t pp.237-271. bee also D.A. Zakythinos.
D^me'trius Gydones et 1* entente balkauique au XiVe siecle* ,
La Grece et les Balkans, (Athens, 194'/), pp.4^-56,
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in coition with us'\ men whose natural emotions should lead
them to the defence of Byzantium
in the second place, if natural emotion based on orthodox
solidarity was not sufficient, it could not be ignored that
the threat affected all the Balkans, that Serbia and Bulgaria,
at any rate, were directly faced by exactly the same crisis as
Byzantium* Their political past just as much as their reli¬
gious beliefs should make it clear that their interests lay
in the same direction as the empire's,
Serbia
Xrx Serbia the prospects of alliance appeared particularly
bright, for that country had for some time been set on an active
policy of Byzantinisation. Its court life, political organiza¬
tion, and official titles were all founded on the Byzantine
pattern, and under Stephan Dusan especially the work of
making Serbia a mirror of Byzantium went ahead in the confident
2
expectation that the imperial glories would follow . • lie lias
renounced his barbarian \tfay of life and embraced the customs
3
of the 1 tomans' remarked Gregoras .
however, this trend in Serbia was full of danger rather
than hope for Byzantium, The area in which Duilan was encourag¬
ing the outward forms of Byzantine life, the area between
Skoplje and Christoupolis, was tjie land which had most
recently been part of the empire and which had been seized by
1. ''AvSpumouQ ouoCouq riuiv, hoci rep 8eq> Ttpoaxeiyi;vouQ, xou
tcoWwv £v tioWoiq xaipoiQ Ttpayu&TCDV xexoi vo)vt|k6t(xq run v.'
D. iiydones, Symbouleutikos homa io is. M ,P ,G., 154, 972c.
2. On the political, religious and cultural relations between
Byzantium and Serbia see, G.Cetrogorsky, 'Probl&mes des
relations dyzantino-serbes au XXVe si^cle' , kXXXth inter¬
national Congress of Byzantine Studies, (Oxford, 19^7),
pp.41-55; see also the supplementary papers of G.Soulis
and B.kreici^, ibid. PP.57-05.
3. Gregoras, xv,ijXX,746-747•
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the Serbs while Byzantium was distracted by its civil wars.
This action showed clearly the 'irection in which Dusan's
ambitions were leading him. Xt was not out of regard for the
Byzantine emperors that he adopted the double-headed eagle as
his emblem and was represented on coins, seals and the frescoes
of Decani and Lesnovo wearing full imperial regalia with the
nimbus. Xn 13^5 Dusan assumed the title of Emperor of Serbia
and Romania - it was a direct challenge to the Byzantine empire
which indicated that his ultimate ambition was to take over
the government in Constantinople and -bat he had no plans of
co-operating with it in a joint defence against the Turks.
Xn January 1346 Dusan offered an alliance to the Venetians for
a campaign to ' acquire the empire of Constantinople' and,
although rejected by them, he continued to do all he could
without their aid to bring the provinces of Byzantium under his
control. Clearly to Dusan war against the Turks appeared of
secondary importance to the acquisition of Constantinople.
The notion that the Serbs' aid would be forthcoming
because of their adherence to the orthodox faith and their
consequent regard for the safety of the empire, was no more
than a pious hope. Xn fact one of the most significant symbols
of Serbia's independence and of Dusan's assumption of the
imperial title was the creation of the patriarchate of Serbia.
V
Dusan's knowledge of Byzantine political theory made clear to
him the necessity for every thorough-going empire to have an
independent patriarchate. Thus the influence of Constantinople
in religious matters by no means acted as an encouragement to
the Serbs to help in its preservation, not least because the
Byzantine reaction to the establishment of the Serbian patri¬
archate had been to anathematize the Serbian Church. Further-
v
more, Lusan' s commitment to the Orthodox Church was not so total
as to prevant him from contemplating coxiversion to the Roman
Church for political advantage* he was aware that conversion
would win him moral authority in the eyes of western Christen¬
dom for his planned attack on the Creek schismatics* however,
in his domestic policy, Du&an showed himself to be utterly
out of sympathy with the ' Latin heresy' , opposing marriages
between members of the Roman Church, whom he called * half-
believers' , and his Orthodox subjects. xt was this side of
Jerbia* s character which encouraged the Byzantines to persist
in their hopes of a pan-Orthodox alliance.
The threat to Byzantium from Serbia passed in 1355 with
the death of Stephen Dusan. The empire, which he had been
able to dominate, split into many independent principalities.
Byzantium was able to draw minor benefits from this develop¬
ment, but the prospect of an orthodox alliance came no closer.
In 1363 the Patriarch Kallistos visited Serres to negotiate
with Dusau's widow, but his sudden death there and subsequent
rumours of poisoning merely increased the Byzantines' distrust
of the barbs'*".
The oerbian principality of berres was ruled over by
John Ugljesa who continued Du^an*s policy of preserving
Byzantine forms in government. Under his influence the author¬
ity of the Byzantine patriarchate was restored over Serres in
1360 and over the whole of berbia three years later. In I371»
as the decisive clash between the Serbs and the Turks at the
battle of the Maritza approached, Ugljesa again raised the
possibility of common action between Serbs and Greeks. But
John V was away from the empire at this time, and the moment
1. On the embassy of Kallistos see, kantak. iv,50till,36U-362•
passed. After the battle the power of Serbia, both as a threat
and as an ally, was utterly destroyed,
Bulgaria
nuch the same considerations served to make the Bulgarians
seem both a natural and a most unlikely source of aid to the
Byzantines. 'ihey also shared the Orthodox faith but likewise
were in conflict with the ecclesiastical authorities of Con¬
stantinople, having their own patriarch in Tmovo whose part
in the consecration of the Serbian patriarch and the imperial
coronation of Stephen Busan had done nothing to Improve relations.
The Bulgarian patriarch further strained the community of reli¬
gion of which Byzantium expected so much, by daring to conse¬
crate Theodore t as metropolitan of Kiev and All Russia while
the incumbent, who held his authority from Constantinople, was
still alive - ' a most stupid and illegal act1 according to a
Byzantine patriarchal document^.
Like the herbs the Bulgarians had a political background
which owed much to Byzantium, but they also had shown in which
direction their most immediate objectives lay by talcing advan¬
tage of the empire's weakness to attack its towns, taking many
and with incomparable cruelty transporting their inhabitants
and imposing on them charges heavier even than the Turks could
invent, as kydones commented, in destroying these towns they
2
only made the task of the Turks easier . Nevertheless, the
Byzantines continued to hope for Bulgarian military co-operation,
in 13pl it seemed that some progress was being made. King John
Alexander of Bulgaria, under pressure from Turkish forces in
Thrace, agreed with John Kautakouzenos to share the expenses of
1. pp.350-351.
2. On the hostile attitude of Bulgaria to the empire see,
D.Kydones, uymbouleutikos iiomaiols. .*-1.i ,0.. 15^, 373-970.
On the imperial pretensions of Bulgaria see, D.Obolensky,
The Byzantine Commonwealth, pp.24p-24o.
a fleet to prevent the Turks from crossing from Asia into
Lurope at will, however, the Bulgarian contribution for the
enterprise never arrived"''*
Despite this setback, John V in the first years of his
personal rule also regarded bulgaria as an ally worth culti¬
vating and many embassies were sent to promote friendship.
Indeed the seal appeared to have been set on tills part of the
Balkan alliance in 1355 by the marriage between John V* s eldest
son and heir, Andronikos XV and ltyratza the daughter of John
Alexander. The intention of this marriage alliance was obvious
enough, indeed the synodal act confirming the marriage stated
that it was planned • for the conservation and profit of
Christians, Greeks and Bulgars, and for the detriment of the
2
infidels1 . But such hopes were vain, Kydones not only con¬
sidered the marriage infamous and demeaning but showed how
useless it was, 'for when need arose they provided neither
3
ship, knight, nor simple soldier, nor a single penny* .
The Bulgarians' lack of good faith towards Byzantium was
given even more striking proof by their action taken against
John V on his journey back to Constantinople from Hungary in
13b6. John V had been to visit King Louis of Hungary in Buda
in an effort to muster help for the empire. The negotiations
in fact failed, as will be seen later, but John V had to endure
further humiliations from the Bulgars who refused him passage
through their country, and forced him to stay in the Hungarian-
held town of Vidin until his release was secured by the cru-
4
sading expedition led by Auiadeo of Savoy .
1. hantak. iv,22|XXX,l62-l65,
2* X, pp.432-433.
3« AXXoc TiiQ^xpeCaQ^KCtXoOaTic;, ou vouiv, oux oux otcXCttiv
<|h\ov, ouk 6f3oXov eva TtpoeivTo.1
Liymbouleutikos no riaiois, M.P.G., 154, 97^ab.
4. ibid. 9'7bc.
23
In 1367 John Kantalcouzenos, in debate with a legate
from the pope, summed up the Byzantine government1 s attitude
towards its Balkan neighbours. He dismissed the Serbs and
the Bulgars as little better than the Turks, for although
they were orthodox, they coveted the Byzantines1 material
wealth and threatened their existence. They pillaged and
provoked wars with the empire, and even in negotiations
showed the dishonesty of their intentions^". If Byzantium
required outside assistance against the Turks it clearly
had to look elsewhere.
b) The West.
Once it was clear that the special relationship between
Byzantium and its Balkan neighbours, based on common faith
and a common political background, was not a sufficiently
cohesive influence for the creation of a united front against
the Turks, the only other direction in which the Byzantines
could look for aid on the scale which their plight demanded
was to the West.
The involvement of western Christendom in the salvation
of the empire raised a number of major problems for the Greeks,
The first was the difficulty of persuading the West to lend
its support. it was fruitless to appeal simply to Christian
brotherhood when the western Church, in its most temperate
moments, considered Greek orthodoxy to be an unfortunate error,
2
and often more outspokenly as a damnable heresy .
However, the Byzantines were confident that limited
aid would be forthcoming from the West to preserve the material
1. J, Meyendorff, *Projets de concile', pp.170-171, lines 45-52.
2. On the attitude of the Avlgnonese Papacy to the Byzantine
Church see especially W. de Vries, ' Oie Pftpste von Avignon
und der christllche Oaten*, 0.C.P.. 30, (I9b4), b5-12b.
benefits which the trading cities of Italy received from
Constantinople remaining in Byzantine hands. The privileges
which the Venetians and Genoese had won from the Greeks would
be lost if the Turks took the City, since the merchants would
find themselves faced by a government strong enough to make
its own terms. The Byzantines were not too proud to niake a
virtue out of their own impotence in world politics1.
However, if such considerations would maintain Venetian
and Genoese interest in the fate of Byzantium, militarily it
would do no more than assure the empire of naval support.
The maritime resources of the Italian cities were vital to
any enterprise aimed at providing help for Constantinople,
but if the Turks were to be pushed back sufficiently to guaran¬
tee the security of the Byzantine empire, then forces on land
as well as sea were required,
Tliis was the root of the problem facing John V. No
single westoni nation had the political interest or the mili¬
tary resources to provide the necessary array. It was important
to obtain the help of the western powers generally, and to
make tho appeal for* aid to an authority which commanded wide
respect. The only way to awaken a sufficient part of western
Christendom to the empire' a plight was to involve the papacy
and to hope for the preaching of a crusade against Byzantium*s
enemies. But this was less easy than it sounded. Moreover
it raised an entirely now matter, * for religious questions are
always interwoven in negotiations with Home. Either the dis¬
cussion is chiefly about these or, in order to appear more
persuasive, the embassadors bring forward precisely this point,
aware that without mention of this they might not receive a
gracious hearing, because neither for money, nor marriages, nor
1. i>ae below p.2l2-.
any other worldly goods would the ambassadors of the Church
agree to the alliance; only discussions about dogmas beguile
them and draw them to agree to the proposal'^ •
The fact that in negotiations with the Vest the questions
of military aid and the reunion of the Churches of Constanti¬
nople and Rome were inseparable was recognized by most of
the political leaders in Byzantium, but it raised serious
doubts in the minds of many Byzantines about the suitability
of the Latins as a source of assistance. The Byzantine Church
in particular could not be expected to co-operate in a plan
in which the price of the empire's political survival seemed
to be the surrender of its faith. This was especially true
because the authority of the Church of Constantinople had
stood up to the political reversals of the empire much better
than had the authority of the emperor. Although the growth
of Serbia and Bulgaria had been followed by demands for in¬
creased ecclesiastical independence, the influence of the
Byzantine Church continued to be felt beyond the empire's
boundaries through personal and monastic links which assisted
the re-establishment of Constantinople* s patriarchal supre¬
macy in these countries in 1371 and 1379* fhe Church could
claim to exercise some spiritual authority even over the
Christians in Moslem territory. The Patriarch Neilos, writing
to Urban VX in 13^4, claimed that although 'we suffer from
the Turics.... we have full liberty to receive letters and to
send replies and messages, to elect, ordain and send out
bishops wherever we wish, and to deal with all ecclesiastical
2
affairs unhindered even in the lands of the infidel' .
1. Letter of D.Kydones to Manuel XX, 1384-13"Correspondance,
ed. R-J.Loenertz, letter 3°2, lines 69-75* cited G.T.Dennis,
The reign of Manuel XI in Thessalonica. 1382-1367. (Rome,
I960), p.140,
2. M.M. IX, pp.86-67. The difficulties of the Byzantine Church
in Asia are brought out strongly by S.Vryonis, The decline
( contd. )
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Although Neilos was undoubtedly exaggerating the undiminished
authority of his patriarchate, it is certainly true that the
Byzantine Church was able to exercise influence where the
emperor had none, anu consequently was under less pressure to
.,iake rapid agreement with the west.
The lack of enthusiasm for the West shown by the Greek
ecclesiastical hierarchy was shared by the monk®, who thought
that orthodoxy was a better safeguard against the Turks than
tho arms of schismatics1, and by the vast tnajority of the
Byzantine people, in 1366, when a cm tiding expedition under
Ainadeo of Savoy was approaching Constantinople with practical
assistance by Byzantium, Demetrios Kydones had to deliver a
speech to the people of the capital to persuade them to accept
the Latins' aid. Even with the immediate prospect of appar¬
ently disinterested western help it was difficult to make the
Greeks forget the defeats and humiliations which western arms
had brought to the empire, particularly in 1204 and more
recently in the Genoese wars of 1348 and 1352,
Throughout John V% s reign the policy of reliance on western
military aid was unpopular among the Byzantine people. When
the union of the Churches was made a precondition of this aid
it was totally unacceptable. On two occasions John V refused
invitations to visit the West on the grounds that his policy was
so unpopular among his subjects that he could not be sure of
2
the security of his throne . The Bishop of Durazzo, who was
of mediaeval helienism In Asia Minor and the process of
Xslamizatlon from the eleventh through the fifteenth
century, (Los Angeles. 1971), pp.283-350.
1. rioWocQ ruiv vfjaoov reOedueQa afjviEpov uno tov ndnacv teXouoocq
Hal x"nQ Tiarivoaouv poriQeCotc icap'auxou y.T| TuyxdvouaaQ,
d\\'dcv6pcx7tp6L^oufevaQ toiq exQpotQ tou axauppu tpu Xplptpu.'
J.Darrouzfcs, 'Conference sur la priinautj/ du pape A Constan¬
tinople en 1357' , R.S.B.. 19, (l96l).
2, Letter to innocent Vi, 1357, i" J.^met, The life of 3t,
Peter Thomas by Philippe de M^zleres, i'extus et studla
historlca Canuelitana. 2, (Borne. 1954). p.76. ilea sage to
A:riadeo of Savoy, 1367. J.bervion, Gostez et croniaues de la
mayson de Lavoye. ed. P.B.BollatI, 7rurxn, itfyp), pp.152-
153.
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a secret sympathiser with the Roman Church, confirmed tliis in
conversation with a Dominican., saying
it is not possible that there can. ever be union unless
such force Is used that we do not fear the people;
either the emperor can use his power for this or the
Roman Church might send an array against the City, from
fear of which the people would not dare rise up.
Then •••• with this intervention, we will announce
clearly to them that what we believed to be false
and heretical is true and catholic-*-.
The question of the reunion of the Churches of East and
West was not of itself a stumbling block in the negotiations
for military aid. The unity of the Church was an ideal held
as strongly in Byzantium as it was in the West but most Greeks
could not accept the pope's claim to final arbitration In
matters affecting the dogmas of the Christian Church and they
rejected his demand that the Greeks should return to the
2
unity of the Church ' as a son to his mother1 . They insisted
that true union could only be achieved through an oecumenical
council, in which the pope would meet the patriarchs of
Constantinople, Antloch, Alexandria and Jerusalem on equal
terms. This point was made to the pope himself by Barlaam
of Calabria in 1339• He realised that Pope Benedict XII had
failed to draw the correct conclusion from the utter failure
of Michael VIII's attempt to force his people into union with
the Koinan Church, and he gave him a clear account of the
situation; 'If anyone says that these subjects were decided
upon by a general council at Lyon at which the Greeks were
present, let it be known that nobody will ever persuade the
Greek people to accept the conclusions of that council except it
be done by another council. For the Greeks who took part in
1. T. ivaeppeli, 'Deux nouveaux ouvrages de Fr.Philippe de
JLncontri de P«£ra O.P.', Arch, Praed.. 23, (1953), 176-177.
2. Kaynaldus, ann, 1365, no.22, p.120.
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that council were sent neither by the four patriarchs who
govern the eastern Church nor by the people. They were sent
only by the emperor who tried to impose union with you by
force and not with general will'
The background to this fundamental division between
East and West is well known2. But in the fourteenth century
the papacy* s refusal to meet the authorities of the eastern
Church on the terras they demanded was not simply based on the
familiar ecclesiastical arguments with which both sides in the
schis. i fortified their positions. Despite Barlaam* s warning
it was generally assumed in the West that Union could be
achieved without the need for a council. It was believed
that the Byzantine emperor* s authority over the eastern Church
was sufficiently great to allow him to proclaim union by
decree. The emperor* s control over the dally government of
the Byzantine Church was noted by many western visitors to the
empire. The Dominican Philip Incontri, writing in 1359*
r-scorded that • the emperors have so subdued the patriarchs
that they depose them when they wish and they install whoever
they want whenever they want. For in ray time, from 1312 to
the present day, only three patriarchs have died in office
3
while five or six have been deposed* J•
Statements of this sort which were received in the West
never set out the limitations to the emperor* s ecclesiastical
power which, by the fourteenth century, were generally un.der-
1. kaynaldus, ann.1339, no.21; cf. no.23.
2. For a suramary of the eastern and western standpoints see
D.*i.Eicol, 'Byzantine requests for an oecumenical council
in the fourteenth century* . Annuariura Ilistoriae Concili-
orum, 1, (1969) , 70-71.
3. T. Kaeppeli, 'Deux nouveaux ouvrages' , p.172. For similar
accounts of the emperors* power over the church see
Ps.-iirocardus, Directorlum ad passaglum faciendum iiecueil
des historians cTes croxsa'o'os, "clocumenT's"'anaeiilans', iT,
(Paris, 19Uo ). pp «44'2-3: The 'bondage's'''"and travels of Joliaiux
uchiltberger. translated by J.B.Telfer. Tiakluyt aoc'ioty.
no. r?:'i. ( Lon'<4on. 1879). d.8 3: D.Kydones. Apologia. Hotizie,
PP. 373-374.
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stood in Byzantium*1. Furthermore, emperors occasionally played
on the papacy's misapprehensions and, by volunteering the
conversion of their people, convinced the West that the
imperial domination of the government of the Church extended
to decisions of dogma.
A striking illustration of the West's belief in the
emperor' s power over the Byzantine Church is found in the
text of a debate held in Constantinople in 1367 between John
Kantakouzenos and the papal legate Paul. The legate argued
at first as though he believed that even the ex-emperor would,
by virtue of his office, have sufficiexxt influence over the
decisions of the eastern Church to secure its conversion by
his personal example. Paul suggested that Kantakouzenos was
' like a roasting spit on which everyone is suspended like
2
meat, and whenever you make a move they turn with you' .
This was not mere flattery, but represented a belief widely
held in the West about the emperor's powers in church affairs.
From the West's point of view the concentration of ecclesiasti¬
cal power in the hands of a temporal ruler, hard pressed by
political adversity, promised to make the tasxc of reunion
considerably easier. ±>fot only did it suggest that if this
oxie man could be convinced of the righteousness or advantages
of the itornan Church then all else could be achieved simply
by his authority, but it seemed also that such a conviction
could be instilled more readily in a secular ruler than in a
1. For a late fourteenth century statement of the emperor* s
powers in church government see, V.Laurent, ' Les droits
de 1' empereur on matidre eccle'siastique. L* accord de
,1380-1382' , 13t J1959) 5-20.
2:.: 1loct xpeia. ttjq rcov tcoWcov auveXsuaecuQ (o IIocu^oq)
ecpri, ae^uovov £*tTuj hou evxeuOev to Tiav £x£p5cxva* aoup\tcp
koci yap eoiKotQ ev $ Tr&vreQ^uScmep xp£a aviipTT)vrau, kcxi
o0ev civ au hi vtiBeCtiq, holhci vol auv aol arp^cpovTai,." '
J.ueyendorff, 'Projets de concile', P.O.P.. 14, (i960), 1?4,
lines 172-175. For Kantakouzenos' attempt to correct Paul's
misapprehensions see lines 166-201.
religious leader whose first responsibility was to the
integrity of his faith.
The Byzantines had attempted to correct the West's
illusion but the belief the.# union, could be achieved through
imperial decree remained strong, and since from the viewpoint
of the western Church this method was greatly to be preferred
to the uncertainties of an oecumenical council it is not
surprising that the papacy clung to it. Throughout John V s
reign it remained the principal presupposition behind papal
initiatives towards union and much greater efforts were made
to secure the conversion of the emperor himself than to
convince the Byzantine Church and people of the righteousness
of the Roman Church and the benefits which would flow from
reunion,
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FORMAL NEGOTIATION i> CONCEDING HIE REUNION OF THE CHURCHES
OF CO NSTANTINOPLE AND ROME IN THE REIGN OF JOmN V.
A. John V and Innocent VI.
Soon after John V entered Constantinople and became sole
emperor on 4 December 1354, lie came into contact with Paul,
the Latin Bishop of Smyrna, who was on an unofficial visit to
the city. As a result of his Galabrian background and his
service in the East, Paul had acquired an understanding of
the Greeks and a knowledge of the situation of the Byzantine
Empire. He was also an ardent unionist who wished to make a
personal contribution to the reconciliation of the Churches
of East and Nest"'". In the course of the union negotiations
up until his death in 1371» Paul constantly exerted his
influence to bring Greeks and Latins together, but his rela¬
tionship with John V was never closer than in 1355 when he
collaborated with the new emperor in the formulation of his
first appreeeh to the Vest* This first contact took the form of
" ' ' ^ ' •' " • ..'-'v.
an imperial letter addressed to Pope Innocent VI on 15 December
1355. Its composition may well have taken the better part of a
year, and it was clearly the result of prolonged discussion.
It laid a now foundation for negotiations between the emperor
and the Roman Church based on the inter-relation of the questions
of military aid ior uyzautiuxa and cnurcn reunion*
i) John V«q Chrysobull to Xnnocqnt VI, lg December 1355*.
The Byzantine approach to the Papacy in 1355 must have
come as something of a shook to Innocent Vi who had had no
1, 11 February 1364, Pierre Aineilh wrote to Urban V about
Paul's preference for work overseas in the cause of union,
'ipse (Paul) potius affectat vestram sanctitatem servire
in partibus ultramarinis in quibus, preteribus temporibus,
magna fecit et adhuc confidic et sporat majora et dura-
biliora fienda' . La corrospondance de Pierre Ameilh, arche-
veque de Naples puis d' Embrim (ijbj-i'job Tr ed. . "rose,
(raris lb72; pp.1/1-172. For a fuller consideration of
aS a 6otweeji east and west see below pp.68-
2. Published in A. Theiner and F. iklosich, lonu tenia s;<ec-
tantia ad unionem eccleslaru i. no .C, pp .25-33 (Greek,,
33-37 (Latin). Latin also in Tautu ID, pp.151-155*
F. OSlarer. He-esten.5* no• 3052• 0. lialecki, bn e.iperour,
p. 31ff*
previous contacts with Joirn V* Just as Clement VI had been
taken rather by surprise by the emergence as emperor of John
VI Kantakouzenos, whom he initially regarded as a rebel and
a usurper* so innocent VI must have felt that the unpredict¬
ability of Byzantine imperial affairs was not a good omen for
the great work of the union of the Churches* However he was
to find that the change was not without its advantages, for
whereas Kantakouzenos had entirely welcomed the theory of
Church union but baulked at the Papal plans for achieving it ,
John V put forward none of the reservations which had impeded
progress under his predecessor* The procedural objections
were cast aside, the previous insistence on the convocation
of an oecumenical council was forgotten, and Jolm V appeared
to consider the union of the Churches in the same light as
tichael VIXX had done and as the Papacy had never ceased to do.
John proposed that he should declare his personal obed¬
ience to the popa and the Roman Church and that he should do
all that he could to persuade his subjects, both cleric and
2
lay, to follow his example , under the direction of a papal
legate whose authority should also extend to ecclesiastical
appointments, John further suggested that, should it happen
that not all the Greeks would follow him willingly within six
months, then a degree of coercion should be employed. The
difficulty of this plan, as John admitted, was that the duration
of the schism between the Churches of Constantinople and Rome
had so hardened the hearts of his people that they could not
1. For Kantakouzenos1 views on Church union see R-J.Loenertz,
'Ambassadeurs grecs aupres du Pape Clement VI (l3*kJ)'»
O.C.P*. 1,). (1933). 178-196. See also Kantak. iv, XIX,
33-U2.
2. * Item quod faciaut toto posse taeo et toto conatu quod oouies
populi sub nostro imperio constitute et nostrae iuris-
dictioni subiecti sive sint laid sive clerici, cuiuscun-
que conditionis et status aut dignitatis existant, erunt
fideles, oooedientos. reverentes et devoti eide i domino
summo pontifici et exus succeasoribus1 . Tautu 10, p.lpl.
easily be torn fro a their customs and be directed on a new
path without some powerful incentive. The emperor proposed that
a fitting and effective inducement would be the provision by
the fapacy of a military force, to be placed under imperial
command for use against his Turkish and Greek enemiesj at
once a demonstration of the West* s good faith and a scarcely
veiled threat against the empire's internal dissidents. The
suggested composition of the force was fifteen transport
ships, five galleys, five hundred knights and one thousand
footsoldiers, the whole being at the disposal of the emperor
for six months while the programme of conversion was taking
place.
John V was certainly aware that his plan could not be sure
of commanding immediate respect at the Papal Curia. Rome had
had previous experience of the difficulties faced by any
Byzantine emperor who volunteered the conversion of his
entire people, and doubt must inevitably have been cast oil
the sincerity of an emperor whose objectives seemed so overtly
political. Accordingly John V added many details to the bald
outline of his project, designed to convince the pope of
the seriousness of his proposals. He offered to send his
second son Manuel to the poj>e as a guarantee of his good
intentions, and promised that if he should happen to fail to
carry out all the projaises made, the i the imperial dignity
and authority should automatically fall upon Manuel under
the adoption of the pope, in whose hands effective government
of the Byzantine Empire would legally be placed.
Provision was also made for machinery whereby the Pope
would be able to cover his financial losses if John should
back out of the project after the flow of aid had begun,
without sending Manuel to *ome. Innocent VT was empowered to
order the collection of up to *1-000 florins for each galley-
he sent to the empire, and was free to raise the money from
goods belonging to any Greek, either in Constantinople or in
any other place under the emperor's jurisdiction, however,
should John fail to keep his word because his power and not
Ixis will was lacking, he promised that he xvould personally
visit the Curia and would, together with the pope, supervise
the recovery and conversion of tils empire from exile.
furthermore, in order that the conversion of Byzantium
should be based on firm foundations, it was suggested in the
Bull tliat John's eldest son and heir, Andronikos, should be
given a Latin teacher, and that three colleges should be set
up to teach Latin letters to the sons of Greek magnates. The
importance of an early Latin education for the eradication of
the Greek faith had already been recognised by Raymond Lull
and by the writer of tho Uirectorium ad pasua^ium faciendum.
who had suggested the institution of such schools on the
grounds that when Greek had been entirely replaced by Latin,
the Byzantines would be less likely to return to their old
errors and would have access to the truths revealed in the
works of western writers^".
li) To what extent were JoJm V's plans feasible?
Despite all these safeguards and intimations of sincerity
however, John's plans have often been regarded as a totally
naive excursion into the realm of world politics by a young
and completely inexperienced ruler, unconscious of the limi¬
tations of his own authority and impelled by fear for his
1. Direotoriun ad passa;;ium faciendum in itecueil dea histori
ens des croisades, documents armenlensT 2 , (IS)06 )9 pp.3b / ff
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domestic security, rather than by any genuine desire to seek
tho union of the Greek and Homan Churches. "barker refers
to 'this fantastic plan.' and 'these fatuous proposals' ;
but under a resolute e iperor they were not, from a practical
point of view, entirely foolish.
Certainly it was quite unrealistic to suppose that the
population of Constantinople would voluntarily be converted
to the Latin faith \fithin a period of six months, but if the
military resources provided for in the plan could have been
delivered there was so ie reason to think that John could
have x3I*©ssec^ scheme to its conclusion* it is clear from
the chrysobull arid his subsequent actions that John V had no
personal objections to conversion, and he was supported and
encouraged by other Byzantines in the City xvho thought as he
did. Furthermore the military force which he had proposed
could not have been resisted by any faction within the empire
and, in its actions against external enemies, would have
provided the emperor with the means to rally enthusiasm for
his pro-western policy* Xt was also undoubtedly ovor-opti-
mistic to allow only six months for the defeat of the Turks,
but other military planners of the times, whose expeditions
depended on the employment of mercenary troops, showed similar
optiiiism. King Louis of Hungary, when negotiating with Venice
for the liire of ships for an anti-Turkish expedition which he
briefly contemplated in 13^6, also thought that he would
p
require them for only six monthsThe forces engaged for
Auadeo of Savoy's crusade to iyzantium in I366, although
nominally hired for a year, achieved all their military
successes within five months of winter campaigning . The
1. J. Barker, harmel XX. p.5»
2. wetter from Venice to Hungary 10 arch 1360, l.b.d. j.rl..
h, no. 148,
size of the expedition suggested by John seems also to have
been decided upon after some thought, for it was neither 30
big as to be utterly impossible to raise, nor so small as
to be militarily useless. Indeed the force which eventually
readied Byzantium under Amadeo* s command, was of very similar
composition and size to the one requested by John in the
chrysobull1.
Any doubts which Innocent VI may have load about John* s
sincerity must have been considerably alleviated by the fact
that the emperor had been encouraged in his initiative by
twelve prominent men, both Byzantines and westerners, who had
confirmed Jolin' s good faith in letters to the pope. Among
those who wrote, and who in return received letters of thanks
from Innocent noting their co-operation in the matter, were
Francesco Gattilusio, John V*s brother-in-law and the Genoese
ruler of the island of Lesbos, Lancelot de Castro, the Podesta
of Pera, Maximos Kalopheros, a Byzantine monk who was later a
convert to the Roman Church, three members of the Metochites
family, which had for three generations favoured moves for
union, all of whom held high official positions, and George
Tagaris, a brother of Paul Tagaris who, in the course of a
chequered career, was appointed Latin Patriarch of Oonstanti-
2
nople . furthermore the text of the Chrysobull stated that
it had been discussed and drawn up with Nicholas Sigeros,
who earlier had been an ambassador to the Roman Curia
1. J. Delaville le uoulx, La France en orient au XiVe siecle.
(Paris 1886), pp.145-148.
2. The letter from innocent VI to Francesco Gattilusio is
published in L. Wadding, Annales birioru.i. 8, p.130;
also in Tautu 10, p.173* The letter to Maximos Kalo¬
pheros is in TsSutu 10, pp.174-175* 0. Jsalecki, Un
ampereur. pp.43-49*
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for John. Kantakouzenos, and with Paul, Bishop of Smyrna, who
carried the bull to Avignon and presented it to Innocent VX.
iii) innocent VX1 s reaction to John* s chrysobull.
With such impressive references John V s initiative
clearly had to be taken seriously, and Innocent's reaction
to the hull, if cautious, at least showed that he was hopeful
that something substantial could cotne of it. however, it
could not be ignored that the Byzantine emperor had so far
done nothing, but had merely outlined what he jjroposed to do
if given sufficient encouragement. John had demanded military
aid in order, among other tilings, that the project of union
might be pushed through* Such an enterprise nattirally required
some time to organise, and Innocent wished, before any final
stop vjgtq taken, to assure himself more fully of John V's
position and state of conviction. This was innocent*s first
contact with the emperor and he can have had little faith
oven in John* s ability to survive in Constantinople until
further steps could be taken.
Nevertheless the pope was sufficiently convinced of the
possibilities of the plan to put the machinery for raising
military assistance slowly into motion. On 17 July 1356,
before ho even replied to John* s bull, the pope wrote to the
loaders of those editerranean powers which were capable of
mustering substantial military forces, Cyprus, Venice, Genoa,
and the Order of the Hospitallers in Rhodes^*. These letters
were all idential and showed clearly how the Papacy regarded
the situation. No reference was made to the precise details
of the Byzantine e tperor* s proposal, but those features of it
i. O. 1 alecki, op.cit. pieces justificatives no.l, pp.353-359.
which Innocent regarded as important were mentioned in the
letters. Thus it was announced to the Mediterranean powers
that Joiin V had, through his ambassadors, abjured the schism,
acknowledged the truth of Rome*s teachings and recognised
the primacy of the Ro>nan ~ee. It was emphasised that although
this state of affairs was undoubtedly encouraging, it did not
make the e iperor a member of the western Church1 and was
insufficient to confer on his empire those benefits which
such membership would bring itfith it. In the letters John was
referred to merely as 'raagnificus princeiis' and he was not
granted the full title given to kings of tho Roman faith
* carisai.mus in Christo filiu3 nosier' • In short fche chrysobull
could not by itself alter tho ¥est's attitude towards tho
2
Byzantine Empire •
The Mediterranean powers were info railed that John was to
be encouraged to go a little further and to take the one
vital step which would assure him of a place among the princes
of western Christendom in the eyes of the pojje, and which
would ox>en up all the advantages of such a position to his
empire. This full acceptance could be gained if John would
repeat his abjuration and submission to Papal nuncios who
were to be sent to Byzantium. Innocent required that the
profession of faith be made not in a letter but by the e iperor
personally, not through ambassadors but 'with the conflrtna-
3
tion of his own voice' • Once this had been done John would
1. 'Ex quo nos ingenti leticia et exultatione perfusi, cupien-
tes tarn salutare tamque acceptuui deo negotium votlva
torminatione corapleri. . .' Xbid. p. 358 .
2. Oil the significance of fciie change of title see 0. Jalecki,
op.oit. p.139• Although the modes of address are not com¬
pletely stereotyped the appearance pf the words ' filius
noster' is a sure sign of membership of the Roman Church.
3. 'Attestation© vocis propriae', ibid, p.35u.
be regarded as a member of the Ro tan Church, and Innocent
accordingly charged the Mediterranean poxvers to give the
empire 'as much aid and favour as possible ... against the
hostile attacks of the Infidel Turks' when they should hoar
that John's personal suai ission had been received 'ore
,1proprxo' *
That Innocent should at this time have written to the
military powers of the Bast, alerting thei to the prospect
of the emperor's conversion and the possibility of subse¬
quent action against the Turks, was a clear demonstration
that he took John's initiative seriously, Nothing could be
done immediately to provide military aid for Byzantium for
two reasons; John was not yet fully a member of the Roman
Church, and it would take time to organise the forces necess¬
ary for such an undertaking. But the pope had set the machin¬
ery in motion for settling both these difficulties,
Xn a letter dated 21 July 1356 Innocent reminded John
of all he had so far promised, and informed him that he was
2
considered to have taken 'the first steps in his conversion* .
hut salvation, the pope commented, comes not from what is
begun but from what is carried through, and although this
letter does not specifically mention it, this undoubtedly
refers to the need for a personal submission to a special
representative of the pope. Innocent <rgad the emperor to
complete his conversion and to ask help of Cods 'God xfill
1. *Postquam idem imperator rocognitata et confessata per
dictos nuncios suos ore proprio ratificarit et approbarit
et de ratifications ac approbations huiusmodi per dictos
episcopos vel eorum alterum fuerit tibi ,abita facta
fides, o one quod potoris auxilium o.memque favore t pre-
fato imperatori .... iapendas et prestos' . ibid. p.359*
2. ' haec. . . . tuae conversionis lnitla, Iiaec devotionis pri.a-
ordia, haec firma fldex fundamenta huiusasodi litterae tu.ae
coutinebant' . Innocent's letter is pu lished in L,. addin
Anriales .liaoru i, 3, pp.I2/-12 * Raynaldus arm .1356, nos.
33-3'i; Tautu 10, pp.155-1158.
move the Christian princes to come to your aid to lay low
the persecutions of the infidels and bow the necks of your
rebels' •
John V s plan was in essence being' carried through,
although in a modified form. In place of the safeguards and
money guarantees. Innocent sorely demanded a profession of
faith ' ore proprio' , and although tho size of the military
force and the date of its arrival could not be guaranteed,
the prospects of its appearance had improved considerably.
The first steps had been takon, not only towards John's
conversion but also in the provision of western military aid.
iv) The embassy of Pater Thomas and the conversion of John V.
innocent VI' a reply to John V's chrysobull may not have
been quite as enthusiastic as the emperor had wished; cer¬
tainly all the laborious details of the emperor's plan were
ignored in the pope' s answer. Yet on the other hand Innocent
did not neglect the topic which was undoubtedly of paramount
importance in yzantlne eyes at this time - the question of
western military aid for the empire* John wa assured that
once the business of union had heen satisfactorily completed,
he could rely on the assistance of western Christendom; that
a little more progress in the religious sphere could bring
him ail that he had wished for.
The legate sont by innocent to receive John V*s verbal
profession of faith was Peter Thomas, a man characterised by
aiecki as hard and inflexible, unsympathetic to the .'iyzantine
mind and to the empire's plight, whose attitude towards
schismatics had already been demonstrated at the expense of the
berfos and was later to be seen in his forceful methods in
Crete. Certainly in contrast to the Calabrian Paul, who
assisted John V in the composition of his chrysobull of 13:>5»
Peter Thomas appears a much more uncompromising character,
and there is little doubt that he owed his appointment to
thi s fact»
Our main source of information about Peter Thomas* s
activities in Byzantium is, however, one that is very sympa¬
thetic towards him - his 'Life' written by his friend and
companion Philippe de Mezieres' , But if the characterisation
appears rather too glowing, the chronicle of events seems
largely accurate. .hat Philippe de mezibres had to say about
the relations between the Papal legate and the Byzantine
emperor is explicit enough, he described Peter Thomas*s
meeting with John V while the emperor was on campaign arid
how John and his chief men, although too busy to give the
legate their full attention, were impressed by his personal
example, his abstinence and his teaching. -hen the emperor
returned to Constantinople accompanied by Peter Thomas, who
never stopped preaching, he ' became true, catholic and obed¬
ient to the Roman Church, acknowledging the articles"of faith
one by one,...with his hands in those of brother Peter, pro sis-
ing to observe and cause to be observed as far as possible
what pertains to the holy homan Church and to depose the
faithless Greek Patriarch, the enemy of Church union, and
to appoint a catholic* • furthermore the emperor, * fcaniquam
1. 0. Sialeeki, op,cit. pp.70-71. Peter Thomas* s approach
to the question of union on traditional western lines
e erges clearly in a debate he conducted with a Byzan¬
tine monk iri 1357 • boe J. Durrouzos, * Conference sur
la primaut<? du Pape A Constantinople en 13 37' , H.b.D.
29f (1761), 76-109 ^
2, Philippe do M^ziereg„The life of Saint Peter Thomas ed.
J. SiP.et, {Textus et studia histories Carraelitaua. 2.
Rome 1954"^" ~ "
fidelis catholieus et devotus' received holy communion from
i
Peter Thomas .
This account of Philippe de Mezieres reveals that John V
did exactly what innocent VX had asked him to do. He took
that one further1 step which the pope had said would make him
a member of the Roman Church and a worthy candidate for
western military aid; he iado an oral profession of faith,
in the presence of the pope* s special envoy. Halecki, however,
remained sceptical, taking the phrase 'ore proprio' in
innocent's requirement for full conversion, to mean a public
declaration of J lis acceptance of the Roman faith, and he
2
argued that John did not fulfil this demand *
There is, however, no evidence that innocent did mean,
by 'ore proprio' , a public profession, and in any case John's
letter to innocent dated 7 November 1357, informing the pope
of the steps he had taken under Peter Thomas' s direction,
makes it clear that his profession was not made in private,
lie stated that his promises had been made 'with the advice
and consultation of our barons' , and that he had given his
3
oath to Peter Thomas ' in the presence of many bishops' hut
iialecki still considered that even this fell short of what
the pope wished for, and he pointed to the lack of further
byzantine-Papal communications and the failure of any western
military aid to arrive in the empire, as proof that innocent
1. ♦ Ipse imperator factua est verus catholieus et obediens
ecclesiae Romanae articulos fidei sigillatim confitendo,
et sanctam ecclesiam RoiJiattam ease taatreai suam asserendo;
et iioc in aianibus ipsius Domini Pratris Petri tactis
manibue ad sancta Dei evangelia iuravit, omnia etiam
promittens observara et facere obsorvari pro posse quae
ad sanetan ecclesiam Romanam pertinent, nocnon patriarcham
Graeohuia perfiduia et unitatis ecclesiae inimicum promisit
deponi et unum allau catholicum oligi debere' . ibid.
pp.74-75.
2. 0. iialeckij op.cit. pp.54 and ji,3, 62.
3. ' <Ju.ii consili'o 'et1 3eliberatioue baronura nostroruin ....
prnesontibus episcoxiis multis' . John V's,letter is luiown
only from its inclusion in Philippe de iezieres' Life of
(contd.
was still not satisfied that John had yet demonstrated his
sincerity in conversion, and could not, on the strength of
his actions so far, be considered a full member of the Roman
Church1*
However, Maleckiwas unaware that there exists some
strong evidence that innocent VX thought that John V had,
as a result of Peter Thomas1 a embassy, taken all the steps
which he had been asked to take, and furthermore that the
pope set about answering the appeals for help which John had
reiterated in his letter of 7 November 1357 On 11 May 1359
innocent Vi wrote to his legate in the Aast, instructing
him to help, and bau'se the faithful to help, the emperor in
the recovery of his lands and rights from the 'iurks and the
other enemies of the Christian name* this was to be done,
the pope said, because John V had, on Peter Thomas' s own
avowal, sworn to obey the Reman Church and had promised to
try to make others do likewise, and also in order that the
emperor should adhere more firmly to this course of action
o
as he saw himself assisted by the Church".
The most significant feature of this letter was the
title by which innocent referred to John V* lie used the
formula reserved for the princes of western Christendom,
1 carissinius in Christo filius nosier1 - a firm seal set on
the acceptance of John as a true member of the Roman Church.
This was the first lontion of John V in a Papal letter since
Peter Thomas's visit to Byzantium in 1357, and it was the
first time that the emperor had been granted tiiis style
St. Peter Thomas, pp.76-79* Also published in Tautu 10,
pp.SOO-202. The tone and fori of the letter as recorded
by dsieres --.re perfectly consistent with a genuine
imperial letter.
1. 0. iialeciti, op *cit. p.60,
2. This letter is cited by J. Smet in. his edition of The
Life of »t. Peter Thomas, Appendix p, PP• 206-212•
instead of his former title *saagnificus princeps' . Clearly
la May 1339 Innocent Vi did regard the Byzantine emperor as
a ae ibor of his flock, and in that capacity considered him
deserving of all the military encouragement that Peter Thomas
could raise on his behalf*
or the provision of military aid to the empire Innocent
VX did not look to tho great princes of the West because,
despite all that Barlaaia had reported about the harmonious
order of the Latin world, their Interests and martial energies
wore fully committed to local and Internecine struggles. lie
turned instead to the League of b iyma, a composite force of
the powers of western. Christendom with colonial and co me.v-
cial interests in the Bast. In larch 1357 the League, which
had fallen into abeyance as a result of the hostilities betv^een
derioa and Cyprus, was reconstituted"' * Under an agreement made
by Venice, Cyprus and the Hospitallers, each party was to
contribute 'JOOO florins a year and two galleys for five years
to a league operating 'in the lands of Romania' for the 'defence
and safety of Christians and their lands •«. and for the des-
2
traction of tho Turks and other' infidels' . Although the
offices of Captain of Smyrna and Papal legate, which had been
united* wore separated, J eter Thomas as legate still retained
important responsibilities for the war against the infidels,
and his jurisdiction extended not only over the Latin foot-
1. On the organisation of ■western military forces foi" the
capture and defence of Smyrna see P. Lo serlo, L1 Krai rat
tl'Audin. Hyzance et 1'Occident, Recherches stir * La geste
d' mar gac.f, {Paris 1357)^ pp *>Vodo3 Also A .o. a tiya.
..he crusade is the later middle a-res. (London 1933),
pp,i.qo--lRS.
2. 1 In partibus Ro aniae versus furchiam, ad doffensione ! et
tuitionetu Christianorum et terrarum, locorua ot possessi-
onuw per ipso3 dotontoi'u.a,,. ot ad destructionen Turoorum
et alio ram infideliura* . D, Y-.u«, la, pp.35-37*
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holds in the eastern Mediterranean ?>ut also over the Patri¬
archate of Constantinople• In Nove mber 1359 the pope atigmented
the forces of the league by equipping net? galleys at his own
expense for a three-year term. He also ordered that tne
preaching of the crusade be renewed in Cyprus, Romania,
Italy and elsewhere and that a tenth of all ecclesiastical
t
revenues for three years be put aside to finance it .
In 1359* according to liesiereo, one of Peter Thomas' s
first actions in conjunction with the forces of the league,
was to visit Constantinople with several galleys as * he had
p
earlier promised to do' , Come time later, but before the
end of 1359* the galleys of the league joined together with
imperial naval forces in an attack on Laiapsacus, a Curklsh-
3
held town on the Asian shore opposite Gallipoli. The expedi¬
tion had little practical effect, for having destroyed the
town's fortifications the force withdrew, but several facts
of considerable importance had been demonstrated in the
process, In the first place the potential value of western
arms had been brought hone both to the Turks and to the
Byzantines, but jo re significant still the armed forces of
western Christendom and the >yzantine empire Iiad at last
acted in concert against the infidels who were directly
threatening the Greeks, The legate and the league had demon¬
strated their concern not only for the eastern members of
the Roman Church but for the fate of the Byzantine empire.
A situation which had always presupposed the conversion of
the emperor to the Roman faith had finally materialised, with
the clear indication tliat John V was now an accepted convert,
4-• The lii'o of it, Peter Thomas. ed, J, ^met, Appendix j, p .210.
' Ipse aatou logatus, "privilegiis apostolicls r-uaitus. , • •
ad partes sibi iniunctaa veult, et officio suae legationis
fun oris ... Constantinopolim vonit, ot imperatoreja contra
Turoos .juerram facientea ec adiutorio indigentem ipse loga-
tus plurlmarura galearum associatus visitavit, ot sxctit el
prius proiaiserat confortavi. ibid. p. ->4.
3. ibid, pp.85-96.
B. John V mid Urban V - a fresh start in the relations
between the apt re and the WQbt,
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The death of InnoMut VI in September 1362 signailed
a radical change in the attitude of the i-apacy towards the
uyxantine .Umpire and particularly towards John V. While it
is certain that in 1339 innocent had regarded the emperor as
a * son of the Mcmmhi Church*( and accordingly had considered
the empire a worthy recipient of western military aid, there
is no doubt that by 13'uU , when direct correspondence between
the a;spire and the papacy was rasuued, the new pop®» Urban V,
did not see John V in the sa»e light as had his predecessor.
John had only briefly enjoyed the title of ' carissitaus
in Chriato filius nostar' • Whom Urban V wrote to him on
16 October 1364, in answer to a letter offering Byzantine
participation in a papal crusading venture, he addressed him
as * ra&gaifico viro Johanni lalaeologo imperatori Graecorua*
iliuatri*, which is similar to the title used in the letters
of innocent VI before the mission of fetor Thomas to dyaumfciur'i^.
Likewise there was no ignoring the implication of a letter
sent by br;>an to John V on 1 July 13b6t when the emperor was
visiting the hongarian king in buda; the pope made a very
clear distinction between the positions held by the two rulers,
in papal eyes at any rate. The contrast between the title
* aagnifico viro* ,xvon to John V, and • Christiauiseisaum et DflNI
a iantisa.1 princlpem, charisaitoust videlicet in Christum
2
filium nostrum L idovicuxi' could scarcely be missed * Cven
1. haynaldus, ann. 13b4, no«2?» p.lU3.
ibid, aim. 13b6, no. p.123J xaatu 11, pp*170«l'A•
Uroan* s Most coneiliatory letter to John V before L^oj began
• your higimese and the clergy and people of <roeee are erring
damna >ly from the holy : toman and ailversal Church' .
What had caused this radical change in the tone of
papal letters referring to Jyassntium? Was it merely that
Urban was aore exigent than Innocent, or was It possible that
the new pope, whose earlier career had not tied him oloeely
2.
to the curia at Avignon, lacked the necessary information
about the previous negotiations and his predecessor* a atti-
tude to John V? Urban* e ignorance seems to be an insufficient
explanation, £or Peter Thomas, whoso role as an inter, ediary
between Avignon and Constantinople had been so important in
the later years of innocent VI* a pontificate, was still alive
and in contact with the papal curia, it seems most likely
that the new pope, feeling that no real progress had been
made since the embassy of peter Thomas, considered John V
to have forfeited his membership of the jvoman Church by his
efforts
failure to ;=iake strenuous/to convert the mass of ;ya;ancino
people. In Urban* s eyes uohn'ts membership of the Nosaan Churoh
depended not only oxi the profession made to the papal legate,
but also on the promises he had made regarding his future
actions, in his letter to Innocent VI in November 1357» Jolm
had excused himself from taking immediate steps to implement
his promise because of the instability of his political
situation. 'Not all are faithful to ae and many plot against
me' , he wrote, 'but if you send me the aid I seek, x shall
carry the project through and nobody will gainsay it, for i
1. * Ida serenitas ac clerua et populus Graeciae a grenio
sacrosane tae uoraanae et aaiversalis occlociae. • • dnona-
bilitar devietia' , vaynaldus, aim.13^5, no.22, i>.12U;
vautu 11, pp.122-123*
2. Urban was a compromise candidate for the papacy; before
his election he was papal nuncio in the Kingdom of Naples.
G. 'ollat, The i'oi>0 3 at wl.nou. ( English translation,
9th edn., 19^3) p.52.
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know that if your locate cot ;oe with galleys and aid, all will
submit and be faithful to you* . John also added thai the
patriarch should not be a cause for any concern since he
would be deposed and replaced by someone known to be faithful
to the Koaum Church*"•
'these promises had not, however, been Kept. The legate
had arrived in Constantinople, the galleys had cone, but
there is no evidence that Joloi saado any effort to use this
expression of western good faith to oncourage his people to
follow his example in abjuring the schisa. The Patriarch
:v&llisto8 remined in office, opposing the JLotia alliance
and building up his contacts with the rest of the Orthodox
world. i.-hen he died in , erres in 13b 3 he was actively
engaged In air attempt to find an alternative to western aid
2
and to strengthen the Orthodox cause • The ©lection of his
successor, Philotheos, was opposed for a time by Jolin but
on purely political grounds, and after they had been reconciled,
the emperor played his customary role in the ceremony of in¬
duction. iJiilotheos could scarcely be described as * faithful
to the iouan Church*; he attempted to neutralise western
influences in the empire and secured the reconversion of many
Byzantines who had joined the nomad Church. In 13©7 he refused
even to meet the representative of the papacy, Paul the Latin
3
Patriarch of Constantinople*^• it is true that the military
1. 'Nunc uijteu hoc facere non possum quod totus populua
oboediat, quia omn&s nvn sunt ,'d.hi fideles uec n|»a<tl»l
et naultl insidiantur ut hebeant occasioned contra me....
Solo enim quod si venerit legatua vaster cum galeis et
adiutorlo quod quaero, omnea subicientur et erunt
fidelee vebls*• Philippe de azieres, the life of >aint
i'eter Thomas, ed. J. •; iot,p^7fc*79j Tautu 11, g.2Ci.
2. 'CH TtpEc^eCa 6e t[v, coote t6v rcpoQ iXX-fiXouQ itoXsiiov kogtoc-
0£1t6vouq wal dv^cppovfiaajToec;, tolq £v 0p$nij 3ocp(3&poiQ
£TCi06a0ai hcckmc, koci tt^v 'PuhiaCcDv wau Tpi3iXu)v Kotouai
kou Xtit^oh^voK; oaTiu^patKantak.iv, 301XXX. 300-302.
3. Wiilotheos was elected by the synod probably on 12 Feb¬
ruary 13b^# while John V was away besieging .leseabria.
(contd.)
aid w.ilch the e ipire had received was scarcely of* the magnl-
tude which had been anticipated in the clirysobull of 1355»
and that the passage of time did little to stabilise the
emperor's political position, especially when the union of
the churches was such a live issue in Byzantium* but from
a papal point of view it must have seemed as though John V
had failed to honour his promises and that very little had
in fact been achieved by Peter Thomas's presence in the empire1
Urban V had by no means given up all hope of the project,
and in April 13^5 sent a very conciliatory and encouraging
letter to John. V. Xt was made clear that the pope considered
that the emperor and his subjects were still in schism, but
not irrevocably. Urban announced plans for the formation
of a naval league involving both the metropolitan and colonial
enoose, the Marquis of Montferrat and the Hospitallers. The
enterprise was conceived on a larger scale than the League of
Smyrna had been and, according to Urban's letter to John,
was allied sx>oc±fically at the protection of the emjjire from
But he was not enthroned until 3 October 1364 because of
John V s refusal to recognise him (date in M*. l.X. p.443).
On the causes of John's behaviour and hemetrios Kydones'
peacemaking activities, see R-J.Loenertz, •Demetrius
Cydon&s X. De la naissance & l'annee 1373' $ 0. C. P. 36,
(1970J 61. .antarc.iv,jO; XXX, 3^3 tries to play down
John's dislike of Phiiotheos. For reconversions under
i'hilotheos see below p..2.08, For Philotheos' attitude to
Paul see J. Meyendorff, 'Projets de concile oecum^nique
en 136/, un dialogue inedit outre Jean UantacuzVie et ie
l^gat Paul', D.O.P., 14 (l^eO) 170 lines 16-21. For
Phiiotheos generally see D.T.C., 12, pp. 1493-1309.
1. An indication that John V had made no atte lpt to influ¬
ence the attitude of the Byzantine Church towards the
West is found in a synodal act of Octo >er 1364, M.h.I.
pp.450-453* The bishops and Patriarch here declared
their loyalty to the E> iperor-appointed-by-God, the lawful
successor to the throne otc. and 'the defender and pro¬
tagonist of the undefiled do ;.'as of the holy ^Church of
od' . ('{m£p tt[q ayCcxc; tou 9eou £wk\r|aCoc<; koci tgov
eiXiKptvoov Soyhdrcov U7tepy,otxoi5vTd re next, (iyajvi^ouevov.1)
This expression does not indicate any suspicion in the
minds of the iishops that John V was a threat to their
orthodoxy.
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the Turks * Furthermore, its formation was not dependent on
the previous achievement of Church union. However, its
establishment was in jeopardy as a result of conflict between
Cyprus and Genoa, but it was hoped that a restoration of
peace in the West and fresh efforts at popular conversion
in the Bast would lake the realization of tho League possible1.
Although a peace treaty between Cyprus and Genoa was signed
on the same day as Urban' s letter was dated, nothing came of
the plan# since the military enthusiasm of the West was
diverted by the crusade against Alexandria led by Peter of
Cyprus. However# Urban's initiative revealed his conviction
that the Impetus of union negotiations had been lost and
that a fresh start was required.
i) John V in Hungary.
The fact that direct negotiations between the papacy
and the empire had for the moment returned to the situation
which had prevailed before 1337# and that much of the old
ground would have to be recovered before any further progress
could be made, was as apparent in Constantinople as it was
in Avignon. Spurred on, perhaps, by the realization that the
conditions in the West made the provision of military aid from
the traditional mediterranean sources unlikely, John V decided
that his next appeal should be made to another quarter, to
King Louis of Hungary.
This decision had several meritst Hungary was much more
bound up in the immediate fate and fortunes of the Bast tlian
were Cyprus, Venice, Genoa or the papal curia; King Louis
1. liaynaldus, arm.1365, no.22, pp.120-121. 0. halecki,
' t empereufi pp.J9-102. A.K. Bszer, Das abenteuerliche
beben. des Johannes Laskaris Kalopheros, (Vies >arien
1969) P.23.
\:vs the empire' s nearest neighbour belonging to western
Christendom and be was a ember of the House of Anjou with
many fa dLly connections among the nobility and royalty of the
West. Also, the efficiency of his lilitary forces had only
recently been demonstrated at The expense of the Bulgarians,
lut ti..i: last fact also illustrated the two greatest defects
of the ungarian King as an ally of the empire. Mis campaign
against Vidin had revealed that he was more interested in
talcing advantage of the weakness of his -alkan neighbours,
than he was in joining the a to present a common front to the
Turks. Furthermore, his actions in forcing conversion to the
Ko lan Church on 200,000 Orthodox inhabitants of the Julgarian
province, requiring even Prince Straciiair to be subjected to
the humiliation of a second baptism, indicated that a powerful
secular ruler was much more dangerous to the integrity of
the Eastern Church than the pope himself*".
The visit to Buda egan as a humiliation; in the winter
months of early 1360 John V, accompanied by his two younger
sous, set out by sea to the mouth of the Danube on a trip
which no previous Byzantine emperor could have contemplated,
lie went as a suppliant, unadorned with imperial dignities
and surrounded neither by an impressive circle of courtiers
p
nor by an army in search of conquest • i-f John thought that
!• u0x Tffg OuYYpCotQ pr|£ d6ewQ touto Ttotet, zt, ou ctv ep&HTicre
View koXXoOq, uexac tcov aXXoov 5e not tov tou (3otoi,X£u)Q
BouXy&pojv tou 'A.Xe£&v6pou ui6v.'
J. heyendorff, ' Projets de concile' ,
D.0.P.. 14, p.l73» lines 144—146• ' Ad petitionem
Christianissimi ac devotissi li regis Hungarlae, vicariua
eus Bosniae ad illara patria 1, rewno ac vicariae contl-
guaa, octo fratros nostri ordinis sibi subditos destlna-
vit; qui infra quadraginta dies ultra ducenta faillia
hoininum baptizorunt', L. Wadding, Ann1 os ■inorun. J,
pp.230-231•
2. The date and circumstances of John's journey are given
y ~hort chronicle 47, p.Bl, line 2b; D. ...ydones,
-,-yuhouloutiKos Mo.naiois. .P.P.. 134, col. lOOOd. The
journey is also referred to at length in a 1audat£/j",
(cont
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after such a beginning his situation could only improve, ho
was to be disillusioned. If ho thought he could bypass the
papal for mula of union before aid, he was to be disappointed*
If there was a difference between, the negotiations in Buda
and those previously conducted directly with the papacy, it
was only in the increased severity of the demands made by the
• .ungarian kin;;.
Jy appealing to a secular authority the Byzantine e iperor
must have hoped that the preconditions demanded by the papacy
for the provision of military aid from the West could in some
degroe be diminished. bat the pope's influence could not so
easily be circumvented. Urban V indeed supported the initia¬
tive in iuda, but in his many letters of support to prominent
people in Hungary, he never neglected to emphasis© the relation¬
ship between the union of tho churches and the giving of mili¬
tary aid. The alliance between Byzantium and Hungary was
designed, so Urban1s letters exhorted, 'to load the Greeks
back to the unity of the holy Roman Church and to exterminate
the infidel Turks'^. This order of priorities was clearly the
poe i to John V by John Katakalon, commissioned by Polv-
karpos, Metropolitan of Adrianople, written in late 1366.
The poem is published in full by A.M. Tlandini, Uatnlo in
codlcu s t ;arm .scriptor'm bibliothecae Iodiceae Ln> re itlanae.
(Florence 1769) PP»37^-377; and in part, with brief
commentary, by E.A. Zachariadou, • The conquest of Adrian¬
ople by the Turks', »tudi Venez ia.nl, 12, (1970 ), 211-217 ♦
Bee also the manuscript note "'EreXeuu>0t). . .. xotra ttjv 0'
tou MaprCou utivoq, rni£pqc y' ttiq e' Cv6. tou ^qwoq'etouq. ..
o7i6re nal o EbaeP^araroQ npdcTtaTOQ aytoQ T|y,&v' au0£ vttiq
nal ^occtuXeuq, o na\aio\oyog, aniE&fihEi, 6ia
to Xa^Etv PbuuaxCav uitEp rajv XpiaTiavoov £v rij tujv
(OuYYa?)pa>v x&pa.'fhe weexday and the inciication snow that
the year should be ao)OE^1366-1367) • Bp.P. Lambros,
■JabvloiUo of the Oreo v i.tanuscripts on i x? ni t Athos, I,
(Ca ibrid,;o 1 >93) p.310.
1. 1 >to redaction© Grocor.ua ad sacrosanct© Romane ecclesie
unitatem et pro exter dnatione infideliurn Turchorura',
kutortca Vetera . aiui ■o:i.aij(Uu.i;;aria;ii sacram ill .strantia. 2, ed.
A . Theiner, ("iiome 1 '<00 ), no .14 3 . Bee also ibid. nos. 141,
143, 1-4. On rban V and Louis see O, halecki, Jn o.;nex'-
onr, pp. 124-137*
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one adopted by the Hungarians also. John V seems to have
been so alarmed by the conditions for aid which were px^esented
to him that he sent an embassy to Urban at Avignon to obtain
confirmation of his position regarding them, including the
vexed question of the necessity for the Greek converts to
undergo a second baptism. 1 e can at any rate assume that this
was the purpose of the embassy in view of the replies sent
back to John by rban. On 1 July 1360 Ur an wrote three
letters to John V in iSuda; two concerned the form of the
emperor' a religious submission, the third was ;ore political
in tone. Urban made no ention of the need for a second
baptism, setting out only those articles of faith to which
John was required to subscribe find the oaths of obedience
which he had to take"*". however, it is known from Kantakouzeaos'
debate with Paul in Constantinople in 13"7» that Louis made
the act of rebaptism an essential precondition for military
aid, and that the Byzantines found the idea totally unaccept¬
able".
The demand for rebaptism was a new one which distin¬
guishes the negotiations in Uuda from any of the other formal
contacts between Constantinople and the West on the latter of
Church union. It is also a useful indication of the underly¬
ing ambitions which affected King Louis' attitude towards
1. Itaynaldus, ann.1360, nos.4->, pp.123-124; Tautu 11,
pp.170-1/O; O. lialecki, og. ext.. p.j . no .7 • p • 3^6 •
2. 'Autov tov (3aai\£a tov ui6v ]x0l> (John Kantakouzenos referring
to John V) ^wetae £upiaK6y,Evov kocI £iyrouvTa |3oTi0£i,av rtapa
rouxpriYO(; Kara to5v aoePoov rtoXAa Karrivd^Kacev auroQ re ,
o pTi^ v<a\ T|^ "t"nP auxoii nat oi toutcov apyovtEQ cxvaPartrtcat
aur6v re kai touq iiet'cxutou eitcovteq <I>q aWoTpSrcooQ ou
6uvlue0a Po^0£tav 6ouvaC 001 dev uri touto rtp6x£pov
y £VT|Tat • j, Moyondorff,
'Projets de concilo', P*173» lines 147-152. On the impor¬
tance of tliis aspect pf the <uda negotiations see
G. loravceik, ' Vizantij slcij e iuperatory i ich posly v g.
buda' , (* Lo;• ompereurs do yaance et leure amhassadenrs
a Buda') in Studia Byzsantlna. (Budapest 1967) PP* 341-358.
French summary pp. 357 -35k •
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Church union in general and the negotiations with the Oyaan-
tlnes In particular. The practice of rebaptiaing converts
from one Christian group to another was not unknown in the
Balkans in the fourteenth century. Generally it was confined
to heretical sects such as the liogomils who, however luch
they considered themselves to have been properly baptised,
were held by ecclesiastical authorities in both Fast and West
to be in need of rebaptisra. The rebaptism of the kilgars of
Vidin, which had been performed by eight Franciscans at Louis'
direction, was justified on the grounds that they observed
neither the Greek nor the ho nan rite fully. Bartholomew of
Alverna, the Vicar of Bosnia, even cited Joim V as aa authority
who approved of Louis' actions in Vidin, saying 'John, the
Bi.iperor of Constantinople, when he visited the king, said in
the hearing of manyj "the king did well to baptise those Slavs
because they follow neither the Greek nor the Roman foitn"^.'
While Joiin V was prepared to abandon the hogomils to such treat-
lent, it was clear that neither lie nor his people could submit
to it themselves.
When the eastern Church in oeroia under Stephen Dusan
had, for a time, forced rebaptis i on its converts from the
Roman Church, the practice was formally concerned in the West,
v 2
and Dusan promised the pope that it would cease". Officially
1. ' Johannes i operator Con 31an tino po1i tanua, quando ad regem
venit, dixit audientibus multis; "bene facit rex baptizare
istos Solavos, quia nec Graeoam nec homanam formasi sequ-
nntur" •' D. Lasi(£, *Fr. Oartiiolomaei de Alverna, vicaril
oanae 13o7-l407f quaedam soripta hucusque inedita*,
Arcliivuiii Franciscanum liistorioum. 33 (1962) 7^-73. Cited
by P. Wirth, 'Die ilaltung Kaiser Johannes V. bei den
Verhandlungen mlt ivdnig Ludwig von Ungam z x >uda in
Jahre L366' , . 56 (1953) 271-272.
2. ' Stephanus, qui se cesarom seu regem Raxie facit coiui liter
no iuari, nonnallos christianos in eius regno habitantes
per vim et violencia i ad eius porfidiam et infidelitaten
traliat, ipsosque proter et contra formam occlesie faciat
(contcl.)
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iio i© and Constantinople accepted the validity of tlx© ordina¬
tion of each other* s priests and acknowledged the efficacy of
the sacraments which they administered. The Vicar of Bosnia
lade this clear in a letter to his clergy, re lading them that
those who had been baptised according to the Greek rite required
no further baptism1. The demand for rebaptism struck at the
very roots of the ilyzantine Church - to deny the validity of
an eastern baptism not only condemned all the Byzantines of the
last thousand years to eternal hell fire, but placed the Greeks
o
on the same footing as pagans, infidels and heretics • No pope
had ever gone so far as to declare that the Byzantines were
utterly outside the Christian community, but this was the
implication of the stand which Louis was taking.
There is no doubt that Louis was aware that the precon¬
ditions for military aid which he was demanding were more rigor¬
ous than those which the pope himself required. Urban V had
written to John in Buda setting out the form which his conver¬
sion ought to follow and t^e question of rebaptisci was not
baptizari in christians fxuei non modicum detrimentum' .
25 ay 1350» letter of Clement VX to Louis, King of
hungaryj .i. . 3» ©d. o. Ljubic, 110.263, p.18b.
bee also V.il.H.« 2, ed. A, Theiner, pp.11—13» 16;
Jirectoriu.i ad ,>assa -Au;a faciendum, in Hecueil des histor¬
icen s dos croisades, documents amaniens, 2, p.' 28; J.Smot,
Ti e Tife of hat. 1 eter Thorns, Appendix 2, p • 193,
1. * Si formam istarn Oraecorum sorvarent, scilicet "Baptizatur
servus Christi in nomine etc." numquau aliquem baptizare-
tiius' . D. Lasic, loc. clt. Xn a letter to Greek priests,
o November 1367» Urban V recognised the efficacy of Jyzan-
tine ordination, • Jo quibus ex debito assusapti per vos
prelationis officii obligastis vos Deo redder© rationem'*
Tautu 11, p.206. O.Haleoki, Un e;»iiereur, p.l67» n.l. ?or
regory XI on the problem of rebaptism see Tautu 12,
PP #1>2-1>3•
2. 'ojq 6ff9ev ocvoo(Pe\ouq ovtoq tou fmer^pou ^cxn:TLcy,aTo<;.,
J. ieyeudorff, op .clt.. p.173, lino 146.
touched upon in theso letters. However, on 23 June I'¥><->, just
a week before these papal letters to John were dated, Urban
wrote in a very different tone to Louis. The pope reminded
Louis of the Ion? history of Greek perfidy which had caused
western unionists much disappointment in the past, and he cast
doubt on the sincerity of the Byzantines in the current negotia
tions in iiuoa . Accordingly he absolved Louis from any promises
he might so far have made to provide the empire with military
assistance, and suggested that, although limited aid might be
given, Louis should consider himself free for any other works
of piety"*".
This letter is most uncharactex-istic of Urban who had
spent much tine encouraging Louis and other western loaders to
give military support to dyzantiu a and who, in 13^5, had even
shown himself willing to consider the provision of aid without
the pjreVidiiy achievement of Church union. However, on the
evidence of this letter it appears that Louis' insistence on
rehaptism was a response to the pope's warning and was designed
to test the depth of the Byzantines' sincerity in seeking union
This interpretation, which takes as its basis the belief
that the Hungarian king*s primary objective was the achieve¬
ment of an outstanding victory for his religion, is unaccept¬
able since it conflicts with much of what 13 known of Louis*
character and political ambitions. The posture of champion
of the Roman Church which he assumed, was a cloak beneath
which his policy of territorial aggrandisement in the Balkans
1. 'Sane cum, sicut in antiquis chronicis et scripturis
aliis reperitur, iidem Greci cum dicta ecelesia in tracta
tibus per ea i cum eisde.a habitls dolose ac f'raudolenter
incessoriut, illudendo fallaciter ecclesic nemorata,
ot ex huiusmodi preteritis de sirailibus futuris sit vere-
sirailiter presameudum; presertirn quia iidem Greci non
videntur ex devotioriis zelo et pura voluntate, sed coacti
pro habendo tuo succursu venire velle ad huiusmodi unita-
tem, cum eis est cu.^ multa uaturitate et cautele studio
procedenhum.' V.M.d.. 2, ed. A. Xheiner, no.139, p./3j
Haynaldus, ann.1366, no.3, pp.122-123. O.Halecki. ou.cit.
pp.l29ff.
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could bo made to so© i mora creditable* This is clear from
his negotiations -with Venice in 1366 and 1367 for a snail naval
force -which was to support his expedition to Byzantium. Ho
claimed initially that he intended to load his army to defend
the empire from the Turks and required a few galleys for this
purpose. In .larch 13b6 Venice welcomed this proposal aid
agreed to provide up to five galleys at its own expense. But
during the ensuing months* when there was regular correspon¬
ds ice between Venice and Hungary^", Louis triodi to reduce his
dependence on the Venetians cutting his requirement to only
two galleys and offering to pay for the 1 himself. Finally,
soon after march 1347 ♦ Louis revealed to the Venetians the
true nature of his plans, he admitted that the galleys were
not required for an attack on the Turks, but were intended
for use against Serbia, Bulgaria and perhaps the liniperor of
Constantinople, whom he accused aF had faith and various
intrigues, Jhen this became clear, Venice immediately with-
2
drew its offer of assistance .
This plan may not have been fully developed at the
beginning of the negotiations between Louis and John in >uda,
but it suggests that political ambitions wore never far from
the surface in Louis' crusading plans. Xn the light of Louis*
later actions it see is likely that his demand that Byzantine
convorts should be rebaptised was deliberately intended to
cause the negotiations with John V to breaic down, while putting
the blame for the rupture on the Byzantine emperor. lie was
aware that robaptisu was a condition which the Greeks could
1. Tor this correspondence see M.S.H.b.:-.. 2, ed. u.Ljubic,
itos .14b, 151, I.53, 154, 135, 157.
2. *Dlpoi qualche giorno il ro d'Ungaria scrisso all* inclito
dues, non voler pih la galee offerto in suasidio dei Greco
imperatore contra urehi, havendo sua laest^. intentions
mover guarra al re di corvia e all' i operator di Bulgaria
o Corse contra l'imperator di Constantinopoli, quaudo il
non voglia osservar li patti che havovavseoo; il quale non
cessava tachinar. contra sua regia ajaesta, mavendo, fattejolte innovation!•r Chronicle or Caroldo , cited by
S. bteinherz, • Die Beziehungen Ludwlgs X von Ungam zu
(contd.)
not accept and that, in the rejection, of his demand for it,
he would have an excuse for repudiating his responsibilities
to the enipire which he meant anyhow to evade. Furthermore,
the Byzantines, by refusing baptism according to the Roman rite,
would appear to be displaying the lack of sincerity of which
they were often suspected, and would lay themselves open to the
righteous indignation and aggressive reaction of the forces
of western Christendom under the leadership of King Louis.
Although this initiative to procure Hungarian aid failed,
John V came out of his Hungarian embassy fairly well, at least
in the eyes of the pope. The emperor had again demonstrated
his eagerness for the project of union, and the negotiations
in Buda had collapsed over a point which, had little signifi¬
cance in the relationship between emperor and pope. Urban V
never authorised Louis' demand for rebaptism, and the question
was not raised again in the future. Urban had been made aware
of John's determination to bring the matter to a conclusion,
and had been most impressed with George lanikaites, the ambassa¬
dor sent by John to the Curia at Avignon"''.
John's determination was also clear to the citizens of
Constantinople who, it seems, fully expected the visit to Buda
to result in the arrival in the empire of a powerful army
under the command of a king of the Roman faith. indeed one
party in the city was so alarmed at the prospect of the appear¬
ance of such a force, under a leader whose talents for the
conversion of schismatics had already been demonstrated in
VIdin, that it proposed that on his return the emperor should
2
be excluded from the capital . Little did they know that they
Karl XV, zweiter tails 1353-1373', riitteilungeri dea instituts
fttr ttsterroichische Geschichtsforschung, 9^ (1>38), p.f>o3, n.3.
1. 0, lialeoki, op.cit. p.j. no.?, pp.36o-3J7
2. D« kydones, Hybouleutikos riomaioia. M.R,G., 15K> col.loOOo.
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had been anticipated by the king of Bulgaria, John Alexander,
who, from precisely si illar fears, had prevented the Byzantine
emperor froa crossing his territory, although there was no
sign of ail accompanying Hungarian axiay1 • This was John V' a
final humiliation; to be forced to wait in the hungarian-held
town of Vidin until the Bulgars could be obliged to let him
past was a most hurtful blot* to the imperial pride, it was
not even uo though he had earned such treatment by succeeding
in his mission; he was returning without union, without an
army or any prospect of one, and indeed without his son Manuel,
whom ho had been obliged to leave for the time being in Duda
2
as the hostage of the Hungarian king . For a second time
John V had endured much in olie cause of Church union and
had got nowhere.
ii) Hie Crusade of Amadou of ^avo y '.
in 1355 a"d 1366 John V had sought to encourage the
provision of military aid to the empire by offering to stake
concession* in the religious sphere. However, as he waited
1. •(John V) reverti non poterat propter impedimentua quod
sibi faciebat X operator iur >;arie' , F. di St .P. Bollati,
illustrazio ii della spedizione in. Oriente di Amadeo VI.
(Turin 1900) nos.XIX and 2o3. This Account Book of Amadeo's
crusade thus makes it clear that Join V was not arrested
but impeded, on the orders not of Sis-nan but his father
John Alexander. This first point is now generally accepted,
but many modem writers still name SLeman as the man res¬
ponsible. On these questions see F.Pali, * lincore une fois
sur lo voyage diplomatique de Jean V Paloologue en 136.5-
13t>6' , Revue des 4>tud.es aud-est europeerines. 9,(l9/l),
535-540.
2. K.C. Zaohariae von Lingentiial, •Frooemion zu Clirysobullen
von Demetrius llydones* , Sitzungsberichte der RSniglich
preussischen Akademiti der* issenuclial'ten zu nerliri, -^f
(lbSd ), 1419.
3. On the crusade of Amadeo see Li.L. Cox, The green count of
■lavoyt Amadeus V£ and trcnsalpine Savoy in the fourteenth
century, (Princeton 1907), chapter 7; J. Deloville le
Aoulx, La France en Orient au xiVe sifecle. 1, (Paris iJub)
po.l4l-i3b; A.S. Atiya, fhe crusade in the later middle
V- r-.Ti b ' ' •' '-H- V
in Vidin for his deliverance, he can have been little encouraged
by the results of his initiatives, for there was nothing, apart
from the transient successes of 1359» to show for years of
effort, hut the expedition of Amadeo of Savoy presents a very
different picture* Amadeo was the only western rnler of the
century who took seriously the call to bring about a reunion
of the Churches by providing military aid for the Creeks. No
doubt he was more influenced in this aim by his family connection
with the Palaiologoi than by abstract zeal for religious unity,
but in practice these two interests came together to make up
the most effective link between East and West in the whole of
the fourteenth century.
"fflaueo1 e military plans, however, were rather confused,
his intention of taking part in a crusading expedition had
been announced on Holy Thursday 13^3t but his preparations had
been interrupted by domestic difficulties, his plains and
objectives were unsettled and finally Urban V lost confidence
in Aiaadeo' s determination to such an extent that he revoked
the papal bulls which had granted the count ecclesiastical
tithos for six years for the expenses of the expedition. The
first crusading plan was that a Savoyard contingent should
accompany Peter of Cyprus to Alexandria, but Araadeo was so
occupied by the need to suppress the marauding mercenary
companies which were active in Savoy that he had to let the
crusade leave without hitn. Auadeo' s attention then turned to
the project of a joint expedition with Louis of Hungary against
1
the lurks, and ambassadors of the king were received in oavoy •
By 27 Hay 1366 it had been definitely decided that the expedi¬
tion' s destination was to be Byzantium} on that day a contract
was drawn up between Arnadeo and • Florimonz sire de Lesparra'
who agreed to join the crusade with thirty men for one year
and promised that any fortress he might take would be delivered
1. J. bervion, destez et croaipues de la mayson de bavoye.
eel. P. Jollati. Dlbliotheque de la maison de bavoia, 1-2,
(rurin 1B79)» p.124} J . Uelaville le koulx, op »cit.
pp.l4l-l43. E, Cox, op.cit.. pp.20^-207.
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up only to Amadeo or to 11* erapereur de Costant ignoble' ^.
it seems certain that at this time Araadeo still believed
that he would be met on his arrival by a Hungarian army with
which he would act in concert. The negotiations between King
Louis and John V were still continuing in Buda. It is also
clear from the date of this contract that Ainadeo's decision
to make Byzantium his objective was taken long before he
could have hoard of John's enforced stay in Vidin - his plan
was to save the emperor from the Turks not the Buigars. In
any case the empire had a special claim upon Ainadeo' s sympa¬
thies for John V was his cousin through Anne of savoy who was
John' s ^aether and a half-sister to Ainadeo's father Aiaon^,
As wo shall see in due course, the strength and importance
of the family connection was appreciated by both iiuadeo and
J ohn.
Amadeo want to Byzantium to fight the Turks, and his
first military action on arriving in the empire showed that
he had considerable talent for it. The city of Gallipoli had
fallen to the Turks in 1354, after a severe earthquake had
destroyed its fortifications, and its acquisition not only
provided the Turks with their first crucial foothold in Europe
but represented also a defeat of very great strategic and
psychological importance to the Byzantines. It was, therefore,
an objective of great significance to Amadeo' s expedition for
its recapture would demonstrate the efficiency of western arms
1, Bollati, -111ustrazioni, Document 3, p.33b; see also no.73*
2. J . Servion, Gestez et croniques, p.151 and see below p.173
n.2.l,A\\a utiv o re ttiq orpareCocq £heCvtiq fiyouuevoQ
&v£(1>i6q tori tcp 7tap'T|yAv PaatXet.'
D. Kydones, bybouleutukos muaiois, K.T,G.,
154, 993a.
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and would givo a ouch needed boost to the empire' s morale''".
For tlixs important venture the crusading force was
strengthened by the prosenoe of Francesco Gattiiusio, the
Genoese lord of Lesbos and brother-in-law to Jolm Vf and by
the participation of some Greeks, perhaps under the command of
2
John*s eldest son Andronikos . The fighting was fierce and
went on for two days; the .'.alls were climbed and breached, but
the city still held out. Finally, however, at night while
Aiaadeo' s men were resting in their ships, the Turks withdrew,
and on the morning of 23 August 136b the inhabitants shouted
the new3 of the Turns' departure and the crusaders took possess-
3
ion of the city, garrisoning it with a substantial force .
A i&deo* s expedition thus started with a striking success against
the infidels, the power of western arms had been demonstrated
and hopes for the future raised.
1. The significance of Gallipoli's capture by the Turks is
illustrated by the mention of the event in very .many short
chronicles. The strategic importance of the town is indi¬
cated by h. Kydones, De non reddenda Callipoll, M.P.G,,154«
IOO9-IC36, where the r5lfeoTtheLatlnisinreturriing the
city to the empire is emphasised.
2. J. Servion, Gestez et cronicues. p.l35» indicates the
presence at Gallipoli of the 'signieur de Mettelin (Mytilene)
aveques les grezoys* 5 this is confirmed by ollati, illus-
trazioni. nos. 154, 155. bervion op.cit. p.139 also men¬
tions the ' noveu du signieur de Hettelin' who is not
named. This could be a reference to Andronikos IV. Gatti¬
lusio only had nephews on his wife*s side, since his
brother Niccolb had no known sons. See W.Miller, 'The
Gattxlusij of Lesbos (1355-1462)* » b.2.22. p.447; G.Deimii,
'The short chronicle of Lesbos 1355-1^28• , Lesbiaka. 5,
(1965), 19-21. Thus Gattilusio* s nephews were Andronikos,
Manuel and Michael Palaiologos. The last two had gone to
Ouda with their father, leaving Andronikos as regent in
Constantinople. Furthermore, bhort Chronicle 4/, p.31
states that Arnadoo returned to Constantinople from dulgaria
Vl£T0C Twv (3occaX.6u)vAt this time Andronikos was the only
holder of the imperial title apart from John V, having
probably hern proclaimed emperor at birth (Gre roras xviii,
2: ' 879- 80) and certainly by the time of his marriage
in 1355 (M.M..1. pp.432-433). These references suggest
that Andronikos was lot as indifforont to John V*s plight
in 13bo as has been suggested, e.g. G. Ostro:;orsky, 1 history
of the •yga.xtxne Crate. (Oxford. 19b ), p. 53 •
3. J. Corvion, op.cit.. pp.133-140,
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A lad do in Bulgaria •
Despite the success of the assault on Gallipoli it was
to be Anadeo' s only .iajor encounter with the Turks. the news
of John V's plight in Vidin caused the expedition to recon¬
sider its objectives, and in any case the failuro of any
Hungarian troops to make their appearance would severely have
1
United the crusade* e capabilities against the Turks . So the
main effort of the western, army was deflected from the struggle
against the infidel Turks and was turned to a campaign against
the Christian Bui gars.
Ai.iacleo led his men to Constantinople to .make prepara¬
tions for his next undertaking. They arrived on 2 September
13i>6 and stayed for a little over a month, laying in provisions.
Meanwhile Amadeo took his first step towards procuring the
release of John V, -sending two of his chief men as ambassadors
to the emperor in Vxdin. The main body of the army then
followed and Amadeo 'was approaching Bulgarian territory* ori
p
4 October^.
The invasion of Bulgaria was a fairly straightforward
business, although John Alexander seems to have been in alliance
with Turkish forces. Amadeo's army had the continued support
of Francesco Gattilnsio, and was further strengthened by the
addition of two galleys provided by the Genoese colony in Pera
and another two from the Empress Helen, who also contributed
12,000 hyperpyra for the expenses involved in obtaining her
a
husband's release .
1. Louis had been expected tc provide a land force of 60,000
men, ibid, p.124. ervion suggests that Amadeo heard of
John V* s enforced stay in Vidin just before his at tack on
Gallipoli, and decided to change his plans and obtain John's
free passage soon after he left Gallipoli. ibid.pp.132. l4l.
2. Short Chronicle 47, p. >1, lines 27-28 ; the da te of Auiadeo's
departure Tip u Constantinople is here given as 11 October.
An item in tne Accounts suggests an earlier date of depar¬
ture, 'iibis?it GuilTelno 8o Virga, rai«ulo Domini, pro expen¬
ses per. in sum faciendis apurt Constantinopolin certis vallo-
txs Domini, quos touunus axraxsit xbidoa axe quarts octobris
quando ad pprtes Our. arte accedebat. ♦ .' 1 ollati. xllustraa—
ioni. no.2?4. ^ee also no.268. '
3. Turkish ships were found and sunk in the Bulgarian port of
ataffida. J. bervion, op,cit. p.l4l. xn 13o4 John Alexander
(contd,)
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With these forces Araadeo was able to achieve consider¬
able military successes. The towns of Sozopolis and Mesembria
were taken, the latter not without some effort, although part
of its fortifications had been destroyed by John V in 136k,
Lemona, StaffIda and Manthopolis also fell to the western
array. Varna, however, the most important ulgarian city on
the black boa was too strong to be taken, being 'trefforte,
bien rauree, et grandenmnt garnie' . Nevertheless it was
subjected to siege, and while the military advance was thus
halted, Amadeo turned to diplomacy to achieve Ills ends. An
embassy consisting of five members of Amadeo's party, includ¬
ing Paul the Latin Patriarch of Constantinople, left Varna
on 29 October for Tmovo the Bulgarian capital. it re> sained
there, negotiating with John Alexander, until 21 December
when it returned to Aiaadeo' s winter quarters in iesombria^,
During tills time the Bulgarian king also received embassies
from the citizens of Varna and from some Bulgarian prisoners
taken at Anchialos, who went to Tmovo to impress upon the
king the fact that all A iadeo wanted was the release of John V
and that the siege of Varna would be lifted when tiiis was
3
achieved . At the same time Auiadeo wrote in Greek to Dobro—
tica, the independent ruler of the former Bulgarian province
considered an alliance with the Turks against John V,
hantak.iv, 50» IXX, 362 . BoLlati, Jllus trnaioni . rios.XXX,
29b,297.
1. esembria was taken on 21-22 October, Chronicle of ipse .1-
bria. ed. P.bchreiner, Studien zn den Urachea Chronika.
( tunich 1967) pp.143, 204. Staffida 1s the Bulgarian
rivor and port of Skafida in the Bay of Burgas, between
Sozopolls and Anchialos. Manthopolls might bo Makropolis
near Varna. On the topography of the Bulgarian coast see
C. Jirocek, Das llrstenthvim■. (Prague-Vienna-
Leipzig Id'JiJ osp. pp• >19, 532. Anchialos is called
Lassilo in the Accounts. Lemona is called Linona in the
Accounts and Lyiaeur by bervion; it is thirty miles south
of Varna, on the coast. J. Servian, op.ext. pa.141-1.4.
2. Jollati, illustrazioni, nos. 321. '388*.—VTZT shore Chronicle
47, p .81, HuTe 3«'.' • » - »
3. J. Servion, op»cit.. pp. 145, !• .
of the hobrudja, perhaps encouraging him also to make tuese
points clear to John Alexander* this diplomatic activity had
the desired results, and aoout Christmas John V was free to
re suae .uis homeward journey across Bulgaria1 •
Ariiadeo thus succeeded in his limited objective, but his
military conquests cannot have appealed an entirely satisfying
reward for che expense and effort employed and for the noble
intentions with which he had started out from .>avoy• his
disappointment must chiefly be attributed to the failure of
Louis of Hungary to arrive with the expected horde, but the
Creeks must also share the blame, for they contributed very
little to the military endeavour. There is no evidence of the
participation of any Byzantine land forces and it also appears
doubtful whether they took over any of the responsibility for
the garrisoning of the captured towns* bervion says that
eseubria, Anchialos, Steffida, Sosaopolis and Hauthopolis
wore handed over to the crews of the dree.-, galleys to be
guarded in the emperor's na «e, xvhile Amadeo and his main force
prooeeued against Varna* lie also states that Kalokastro was
later garrisoned by the Greeks but that not enough men could
be found to guard Lemona as well* however, several entries
in Amadeo'a Accounts reveal that the picture drawn by Servion
is not entirely accurate. Hie garrisons of Lemona, Anchialos
and Mesembria re mined under the contraand of the Count* s ten
long after the expedition moved on to Varna, and Amadeo still
retained tie responsibility for feeding and paying the >.
Hose foria was not handed over to the emperor's aen until
9 March I3672.
1. oiiati, Illustration!* nos. 32(i, 332* P. bchreiner,
op* cit*pp.148-161.
2. J. ...ervion, op*cit • pp.l44,i4'/ • Aollati, j-ilu-straaloai.
nos.XL, 353, 'i^3, 307.
Possession of these towns was not without its advantages
for Amadeoj ho made a considerable amount of soney by levying
taxes on Anohlalos and Meseubria and also froit the sale of
goods found there. Furthermore, since the return of Meseubria
to the empire was made conditional upon John V paying a lar ,e
sum of oney into the expedition's treasury, the towns had an
important role to play in the relations between Amadeo end
his cousin •
Nevertheless it is certain that the military effective¬
ness of the crusading' force was appreciably reduced by the
need to garrison the towns it took. ot much is known about
the garrisons of the Black -Sea, except that they existed,
because being placed in the centre of Amadeo*s main theatre
of action, their expenses are largely lost among those of the
expedition generally. About the size and cost of the garrison
required in Gallipoli, however, much more is known, since its
expenses were entirely separate from those of the lack -ea
forces. The entries in the Accounts concerning Xallipoli
demonstrate that the need to garrison captured towns was a
major drain on manpower and economic resources. One hundred
and sixty men were permanently tied down in (rallipoll and
cut off from any further involvement in the expedition'a
activities from 26 August 1366, when the garrison was appointed,
to 14 June 1367 when the town was returned to the empire as
Amadeo began his homeward journey. The total cost of the
Gallipoli garrison to Amadeo* a treasury is even more stagger¬
ing, amounting to a little over 33,000 hyperpyra in wages,
provisions and transport, and Araadeo was still paying debts
2
incurred at Jallipoli long after he had returned to Italy .
1. Amadous raised nearly 23*t>O0 hyperpyra from teu.es and nearly
1400 hyperpyra from the sale of ,.-roods. Bollati, Xllustra-
giQiii, nos.VXU, XX, XXj., Uli, XXXXX, and for receipts
generally pp.3-2*t.
-bid. no.,.lyj. h3k~h3<>* 613, 1.202,120;, Ly the calculations
of J. Delaville le Uoulx, La France en Orient, X. p.l4U.
t.' to Oal1 ipo11 garri son o cc' ~ aodVJ.t a rodx/, o f Amadeo • s
uotal force.
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iii) ■». ;a..io j' :j Gxpodivlo.:i md ao:vi;iai.loaa f^r uss k ox
the Churches *
Although Aiadeo was denied the satisfaction of making
lar e-scale military conquests av the expense of the infidel,
lie wet with success in & sphere which was not directly
connected with the initial objectives of his expedition.
The presence of a western, crusading party in Constantinople,
which included such a dedicated unionist as Paul the Latin
Patriarch of Constantinople who acco ipaniert the expedition,
was a crucial factor in maintaining the momentum of religious
negotiations between the Churches of '.one and Constantinople
at a time when the disappointment and disillusionment of
John* s visit to tuda might hare tended towards a widening of
the gulf between the two sides.
The discussions about religious questions very likely
began early In 13&7 when John V and Aaadeo met and stayed
together in rozopolis before their return to Constantinople
in holy keek, 11-17 April 1367^. However, it is not cox'tain
what they talked about until they reached the capital, when
they embarked upon two parallel sets of religious negotiations,
involving on the one liand Paul and John Kantakouzenos, and
on the other A-aadeo and John V. These two concurrent yet
independent dialogues illustrate the radically different
approaches to the matter, and more especially to the manner
of achieving union, pursued by the Churches of Jlo se and
1. u0 paatXcuQ o notAouo\6yoQ ano xffQ OuyypiacQ £px6y,evo<;,
uxyoctixapQ wal o k6vtoq sapecaq duo rou xouou ocutou ouv
KupCcp riauXtp,.... ^vooBticxv dX\fj\oiQ kv xijf Eoj^oaoXei .
ev0ac 6t| kcxi ££Tixii0Ti Aap'auxajv, rjyouv xou k6vtou koci
tou naoxou. t| x,ajv svcpalc.' , ,
0. ,-eyendorfi, 'Trojets do concxXep, p.170, lanes 6-11.
JoIaiV refused to enter into detailed union negotiations
until no returned ,0 Constantinople and could consult
kantahouzenos, the patriarch and the synod. Loc. cit.
lines 11-15* or the date of the return see nhort
Chronicle b), p.cil, line 29.
Constantinople. We have three main sources of information
for our knowledge of the religious discussions held at this
time - accounts of both sets of negotiationsf and a letter of
Urban V written in 13b9» which summarised the agreements
reached before Amadeo left Byzantium for home*
a) The debate between Kantakouzenos and the legato raul.
The attitude of the Byzantine Church to the question of
reunion with Rome was given one of its fullest and most
effective expjsitions in a debate between John Kantaicouzenos
and the papal legate Paul, which took place in Constantinople
in June 13b/"''. The responsibility of putting forward the
case of the Byzantine Church fell to the ex-emperor since
the Patriarch Philotheos refused to have any contact with a
western official whose title of Patriarch of Constantinople
negated his own, but Kantaicouzenos, now the monk Joasaph,
showed himself to be quite equal to the task. it was not
the first time that he had found it necessary to explain the
Byzantine viewpoint to legates of a pope, since in 1330 he
had talked to Clement VX' s envoys in much the same tone as
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he now addressed Paul .
Rantakouzenos insisted on his own personal desire for
Church union, but stressed that the good intentions of both
sides would come to nothing if proper attention was not paid
to the form by which it was to be achieved. it was essential
that union be re-established on equal terms, that Rome should
not demand the return of the Eastern Church, but should meet
it half way in the convocation of an oecumenical council,
in which all the churches of Christendom could discuss the
1. Tor this debate see J. neyendorff, op. cit. pp.l;49-177;
text, pp.lb9-177» Also D.rf.Nieol, 'Byzantine requests',
Aiuiuarlu-1 historiae Ooncilionm, 1 (1969), B9-92.
2. Philotheos excused himself from participation on the
grounds that Paul had no official lettei-s of introduction.
J. i ieyendorff, op.cit. p.l73» lines 16-21. on omiakouzenos
in 1330 see KanTaJctTv, 9: III, y3-62; also B.Il.iiicol, op .cit.
pp •
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problems together, ' inspired by a love of the noly spirit
and a feeling of brotherhood' . Only in this -way could the
yzantine people be persuaded to consider re-union; their
opposition to the methods of Michael VXIX Lao in no way
diminished, and Miey would resist attempts to secure union
by tyranny and persecution just as much as they had a
hundred years before,
haul undoubtedly had a greater understanding than lost
members of the western Church of the importance attached by
the Uyzantines to the principle behind oecumenical councils.
Yet in the course of his debate with Kantakouzenos, he put
forward many of the customary Roman arguments based on a
misunderstanding of the emperor's powers in ecclesiastical
affairs and aimed at finding a route to union which did not
involve the calling of a council, he made the common assump¬
tion that an oecumenical council was not a prerequisite for
religious change in a church which was so manifestly under
the personal influence and direction of the emperor, He
imagined that an imperial decree would be quite sufficient
to bring Constantinople back to the fold,
hut, as far as can be judged from the Byzantine account
of the debate, haul was left unconvinced by his own arguments;
he followed none of them through with any determination and
finally ended the debate with a totally unexpected agreement
that a council should be held in Constantinople some time
before the end of May 1369"*" • The form of the debate had
closely followed that of the various earlier dialogues
between representatives of the Churches of Cast and Vest,
but it ended in the one true breakthrough, in the one realistic
1, J. tieyenaorff, op.cit. p,177» lines 326-330.
70
hope of achieving union through the involve ent and agreement
of both Unurches, that o terged in the course of the religious
negotiations of John V* s reign.
xiie significance of this debate is to be seen in the
fact that it, alone of ail tuo union initiatives of the
second half of the fourteenth century, produced any excite*
sent or positive reaction from the sierarchy of the Byzantine
Church. The Patriarch Philotheos was prepared, despite his
earlier refusal to meet Paul, to take advantage of the
concessions which Kantakouzenos had -won for the iyzantine
Church. A ynod of the bishops under his jurisdiction, which
was attended also by the Patriarchs of Alexandria and Jerusalem,
who were at this time resident in Constantinople, was held
and expressed itself in favour of an oecu leiiical council
being called in the city. Invitations to this council were
then sent out to the Patriarch of Antioch find the Archbishop
of Ochrid*• Place hantakouzenos in his debate with Paul had
laid special emphasis on the fact that the council should
include the Metropolitans of hussia, Trebizond, Alania and
/iacchia, the Catholicos of Georgia and the Patriarch of
Tmovo, it seems likely that they also would have received
invitations. 'further lore tl?.e patriarchs and monies living In
Constantinople appointed ambassadors to travel to u.taly with
A.iadeo and to visit Urban V. Suddenly the ) yzantine Church
awoke to the fact that there was now a real chance of pursu¬
ing union through the nacliinery and in the manner which it
had always felt was appropriate and necessary for the re-ecta -
lish lent of union with, the homan Church. There was at last
1. A ailotheotd letter to the Archbishop of Oclirid is published
in . hi. pp.'w^l—493* it suggests that Paul's agivjeraent
had" "a-1 vam.forication'0 h6vto<; ZocpoeCotQ.... excov ]ied'
^cxutou Koct 5vaiwov (ipxiep^a, tov Kup IlauXov, 6i£H6vuae
\6youQ toO ndtna Tipog tbv Kpdrtarov kocl ocytov uou
ocuTOKpdxopa 7tep\ rrfq evtiaeooq na\ 6y.ovoCag ttov
tt)q re fiuet^pocQ StiXovotc noti ttiq toov Acx-rCvoiv.'
;
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an atmosphere of hope, produced by Kantakouasonos' debate
wi'ta Paul, xu which it see isd thai the project of union could
flourish aud, with the goodwill and de-©ruination of botu
sides, he brought to a satisfactory conclusion.
b ) The negotiations between Amadeq and John V•
;.hile Kantakouizenos and Paul were making their momentous
and most encouraging decision to seek a union founded on
the solid basis of a full council, Amadeo aud John V were
engaged in discussions which see ieu to undermine the progress
made by the other two negotiators and returned the question
of Church union to the secular authorities. The story of
the negotiations of the emperor with his cousin is told by
Servion in his Chronicsues de oavoye. and although it contains
some manifest inaccuracies, the basic features of the acooiint
1
are borne out by the evidence of other sources .
The story begins aa Amadeo was n©aring the end of his
stay in Constantinople and was evidently feeling that he had
not yet been sufficiently rewarded for his efforts. He asked
John to consider how difficult and unpleasant it was for the
House of Savoy to have such an eminent relative who did not
profess the Roman faith or recognize the pope. Fearing the
scorn of his western colleagues, Amadeo asked his cousin as
a personal favour to visit Home and to submit to Urban.
John pondered on this request for some time and then agreed,
since ho was so indebted to Amadeo, to do a? he desired.
However, he said, it was not possible for bin to leave his
country at once, but he would send the patriarch and some
counsellors to Italy with A .adeo and would follow himself
within six months.
1. J. orvion, vestok ot croniquaa. pp.131-153.
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Ataadeo expressad his pleasure at this answer and was pre¬
paring to leave for home when the patriarch cauo to Iiim to
ask whether he would mind if John did not after all carry
out his pro.ise, because his people had jot wind of his inten¬
tions and threatened to depose Lin if he went ahead. Aiadeo
replied that ho did indeed mind, and wondered at such ingrati¬
tude in the face of the expedition* s successes and hards,.rips
in the eaperor1s service, and concluded that if John would
not do as he had promised, the crusaders would undo the work
they had none and would * rotum the empire to the g^^e in
which it had been when they had passed the raa de saint
. 1Jeorje' indeed, according to ervion, Amadec and his men
prepared for military action against the empire in order to
force John V to honour his promise. 'when the emperor and
his people saw how determined Anadeo was, they submitted to
his do sand and, as a pledge of good faith, handed over the
* riche chappel imperial* and four noble hostages to the
count, to be kept by hi.i until John visited home.
p
c ) urban V* letter to i-ora, 16 'iovealer Juk2'~
A letter written by Urban V to the uenoese authorities
in Pera after' John V* s eventual arrival in home, is a document
of great importance in resolving the apparent contradictions
between the yzantine turd western sources relating to the union
negotiations of 13^7 • 'ike letter adds nothing to our know-
lodge of J low the religious discussions were conducted, but
it summarises the terms which resulted from the- , and does
so in such a way that the final agreement, made before the
!• ibid. p.l33»
2. 0. haleeki, 'in cmporeur, p.j. no. 15, pp.3bO-38l.
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crusaders left the empire, seems to owe much more to the
conversations of Amadeo than to the debate of Paul.
From this letter it appears that the main feature of
the agreement made in 1367 was that John should visit Rotne in
March 1368, and that certain sureties were deposited by hira
as a guarantee of his sincerity. This was substantially what
John V had promised Amadeo, according to the account of
Servion. Urban's letter, however, went into greater detail
than Servion about what precisely the sureties were and what
penalties the emperor would be subject to if he failed to
visit Rome. There is no mention of any hostages being sent
to Italy, and it appears that it was not so much the Byzantine
crown, • chappel imperial', which John surrendered as a pledge,
but rather a large jewel, 'balasslus grossus' , which the
emperor wore in his hat. The sureties also included a ring
of precious stone, two saphires, and some pearls ' of little
value' . An entry in Aaiadeo' s Accounts confirms the handing
over of the stones of a ring and a bracelet by John V, and
2
their deposit in Pera . The letter furthermore specified
that if John broke his promise, he would forfeit not only
these jewels, but also the entire commercial revenues which
the empire received from Greek and foreign ships over a
period of five years. Although it is not .mentioned in this
letter, we know from Amadeo's Accounts and from a letter
1. * lit ut huiusmodi suam promissioneia adimpleret, idem
iraperator in nostris maaibus certa iocalia, videlicet
unuin balassium grossum, quern idem imperator super
capello suo deferre solebat, ac unum anulum de petra
pretiosa barracii duosque saphiros et aliquas margari-
tas munitas pauci valoris, necnon sua comercia tali
conditione adiecta deposuit' . Ibid. p.3f30.
2. 'Libravit, de raandato Domini, Baldassano Nycholay notario
pro redempcione duoruia ixistrumentorum receptorum per
ipsurn, quorum unum est de deposito lapidum annulli et
converiquiorum tradictorum Domino per Imperatorem
Gostantinopolis (et fuit factum dictum depositum de
consensu dictorum Dominorum in manibus Comunis Pore)...'
Bollati, Illustration!. no.555*
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from Urban to Amadeo in November 13^9» that the emperor's
pledges also included the sum of 34,862 hyperpyra, which was
loaned to Amadeo on 29 aiay I367 until John V, or his eldest
son Andronikos, should arrive in Rome* John was thus given
a financial incentive to fulfil his promise since Araadeo
was bound to repay 20,000 florins, or 40,000 hyperpyra, to
the emperor if he ca;ne^,
The whole tone of Urban's letter to Pera and of the
information given by the Accounts, is in accord with the
story of the Chroniques de Savoye in suggesting that John
was forced into promising to make a visit to the pope, and
that the westerners were so unsure of his good faith that
they obliged him to deposit very heavy guarantees with Amadeo
and the podesta of Pera. However, it should not be ignored
that the very nature of Urban* s letters, demanding as they
did the return of the sureties given by the emperor, caused
them to dwell chiefly on the punitive clauses of the religious
agreement of 13^7» and so were bound to have more in common
with Uervion1 s story than with the account of Paul's debate
with Kantakouzeno3.
On this evidence alone it appears that John V was a
party to irresponsible negotiations, and was influenced more
by Amadeo' s appeal to family honour and by the crusaders'
threatening attitude than by a sincere desire to assist in
plans for union, which would bring strength to the Church
1. ' Recepit a domino Xmperatore Costantinopolis, mutuo per
ipsum facto Domino pro viginti millibus florenis boni
ponderis, solvendis infra unura mensem posquam ipse dora-
inus imperator vel dominus Andronicus eius filius
pervenerint ad presentiaai domini Pape.. .; et de quibus
viginti millibus florenis recepit instrumenturn Baldasal
Nycholay notarius die xxix maij, xxxiiii1? viii9 lxii
pp. (hyperpyra) dicti ponderis (Pere).' Dollati,
illustrazioni. no.LXlil. Urban's letter to Amadeo 4
November 13<j9» published by O.Halecki, Un e ipereur.
p.j. no.14, pp.373-379.
and the Byzantine empire. But it would be wrong to see the
two sets of negotiations as entirely independent of one
another, to see Amadeo1 s plan as a strict alternative to
Paul's, and to assume that the project of holding an oecu¬
menical council was altogether undermined by John V's willing
ness to accede to Amadeo's proposal that he should visit
Italy. It is clear from the dates of the two parts of the
religious negotiations that John* s intention of going to
Rome was confirmed before the debate between Paul and
Kantakouzenos took place, and that it was not merely a method
of concealing Paul's rash concession to the Byzantine
position by obliging the emperor personally to pursue the
course known to be favoured by the papacy. John V s first
dei>osit of sureties, the return of which was dependent upon
his arrival before Urban, was made on 29 ?-Iay 13^7» when
34,862 hyperpyra were handed over to Araadeo. The discussions
preceding this settlement, and the raising of such a large
sum of money from two colonial Genoese bankers, had doubtless
been going on for some time^". On the other hand the debate
between Paxil and kantakouzenos, which produced the agreement
to seek union through holding an oecumenical council, is
dated June 1367 ; it must in fact have taken place early
in the month since the legate sailed back to Italy with
3
Amadeo* s expedition which left Pera on 9 June • From these
dates it appears that the decision to hold a council was
reached after John had committed himself to visiting Rome and
if anything, John* s promise produced the favourable atmos¬
phere in which it was possible for Paul to make concessions
to the Byzantine Church.
1. See above p. 74-- n.l .
2. J. Meyendorff, op.cit. p,l69, line 4.
3. ' . . .usque ad diem nonaun mensis iunii, qua die Dominus
ultima vice recessit de Pera, veniendo apud Veneclas* .
Dollati, Xllustrazioni. no.612.
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it is also clear from Urban* s letter to Pera that
John V*s agreement to visit Rome was not an abject surrender
to the terras traditionally demanded by the papacy for a
political settlement. It emerges from the letter that the
emperor was not ljomediately obliged to visit the pope by the
terms agreed in 1367. His obligation only began when two
imperial ambassadors, sent with Araadeo to the papal curia,
returned to Constantinople with apostolic letters relating
to •several promises' which Araadeo and Paul had made to the
emperor1. Once these letters had arrived in Byzantium,
John was boirnd to visit Urban in March 1368, but if they
arrived too late for John to be able to keep to this time¬
table, he was allowed to postpone his journey beyond this
date. However, John did not have to wait for the letters
later than September 1368; if they had not arrived by then,
the emperor* s obligations were at an end, and his sureties
2
would be returned to him . The nature of these promises
and the role of the Byzantine embassy in Italy are therefore
of great importance to an understanding of the religious
negotiations of 13^7 and of John's visit to Rome in 1369,
1. ' lohannes Paleologus.•• promisit quod quampriraum duo
ipsius imperatoris ambaxiatores de Rornana Curia cura
litteris apostolicis nonnulla, que per venerabilera
fratrera nostrum Paulum, patriarchal Constantinopoli-
tanum, et dictum comitem eidem iuperatori promissa
fuerant, continentibus reverterentur, idem imperator
ad iter arripiendum ad nos veniendi personaliter vel
eius filius prii.iogenitus, qui in imperio succedere
debet, se pararet, ita quod per totum mensem raarcii
tunc proximo futuri se ante conspectura nostrum presen-
taret* , O.llalecki, op.cit. p.380.
2. ' Si huiusraodi littere apostolice tardarent et in tempore
non venirent, ita quod idem imperator predictam promis-
sionem per prefatum mensem marcii adiniplere non posset,
non intelligeretur in penam incidisse predictam, sed
intelligeretur tempus esse sibi prolongatus, ita quod
convenientur et commode ad nostram presentiara evenire
valeret, quodque si ipse littere apostolice per dictum
mensem marcii non venirent, prefatus imperator per
totum mensem septerabris tunc j>roxirne subsequentem
exxiectare deberat et essent obligata eius pignora supra-
(contd.)
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<3 ) The promises made by Paul and Amadeo.
There is no positive indication in any source about the
nature of the promises made by Amadeo and the papal legate,
it seems likely that the question of future military aid
should have been a matter discussed between John V and the
western negotiators*". Concessions in the religious sphere
were usually only contemplated in Byzantium if there was a
reasonable expectation of deriving military advantages from
them and it would have been natural for John to seek some
assurances on this matter before committing himself to the
journey to Italy. According to Servion this was how Amadeo
represented the situation to Urban when they met in Viterbo.
Later, when John actually arrived in Home, Servion makes out
that the emperor announced his willingness to submit 'sur
condicion* that he received several armed galleys from the
West until the Turks were chased out of Greece. Urban
apparently was satisfied with this, but could not obtain
his cardinals' consent to such a plan, and so John left Rome
without any progress being made in either military or
2
religious matters •
The obvious inaccuracy of the last statement of this
account must cast doubt on all those parts of it which cannot
be directly corroborated by other sources} but it is a Savoy¬
ard chronicle and its serious mistakes seem only to occur
when it refers to events which did not directly concern
1 ips'arn
dicta. Si vero per totura^raensem septembris huiusmodi
apostolice littere non venirent, tunc eo casu tenere-
mur pignora et comercia dicto iraperatori vel eius pro¬
curator! legitirao cum sue obligationis litteris resti-
tuere.1 Ibid. p.3dl.
1. Ibid., p.151.
2. Amadeo told Urban that John V wished to submit 'en esper-
anco que 1'oglise luy deust aydier contre les infidels,
qui trop fort 1' oppressoyent; et pour cestes choses
aco.'uplir, 1' empereur son cousin luy avoit promis de
venir en propre personne a Romtae.' J. Servion, G-estez et
croniques, p.157. See also p.159.
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Amadeo. Amadeo at least knew about the negotiations of 13&7
at first hand - as bervion made Urban remark to Am&deo, 'vous
faites avez 1*appointoment et savez les choses comme elles
se passent1^. it may be through Bervion that one can come
closest to an account of what Amadeo himself knew to have
taken place.
There is also one other topic which is known to have
been the subject of discussion in the 13^7 negotiations,
which very likely was included in the promises made by
Amadeo and haul to John V. The holding of an oecumenical
council had always appeared as an essential prerequisite
for the reunion of the Churches, in Byzantine eyes, and the
negotiations of 13^7 are of prime importance to the history
of Bast-West religious discussions in John V's reign since
they produced, for the only time in that period, an agree¬
ment for such a council to be held. Indeed the only thing
which Paul is known to have promised in the course of his
stay in Byzantium, is that an oecumenical council should
form the basis of Church reunion and should be held before
the end of Hay 1369*
However, the opposition of the Papacy towards such a
plan had been so consistent and so vehement on all the previous
occasions that it had been proposed that, although Paul had
full authority to negotiate on Church union as the representa¬
tive of the pope, the agreement he made with Kantakouzerios
clearly required Urban' s ratification before any further
progress could be made. It was up to Paul to persuade the
papacy that its previous objections to the holding of an
oecumenical council were no longer valid, and that the
1. ibid. p.15d .
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established truths of* the Faith would not be endangered,
before the Byzantines would accept the next stage - the
visit of John V to Urban in Rome*
e) The Byzantine embassy to Urban V in 13U7.
The papal ratification or rejection of the 'promises'
made by Araadeo and Paul was to be transmitted to John V by
the ambassadors which he had sent to the papal curia with
the returning crusading force. This embassy was one of the
most remarkable and encouraging results of the 1367 nego¬
tiations, and its significance can at once be seen from its
composition. Among the eight ambassadors were representatives
not only of the emperor, but also of the Patriarchs of Con¬
stantinople, Alexandria and Jerusalem, of the Byzantine
regular clergy, of thk citizens of Constantinople and the
Byzantine aristocracy"''. This was the only time in the entire
course of the religious negotiations between the Churches of
Constantinople and Rome that all these parties on the Byzan¬
tine side came into direct contact with the pope, and it
is a measure of the impact which Paul had made upon them by
the sincerity and goodwill of his approach. The composition
of this embassy lends weight to the supposition that the hold¬
ing of an oecumenical council was among the promises made by
Paul. Nothing else could have persuaded all these interests
in the empire to come together in a common approach to Urban
V, and a council was undoubtedly the one topic which the
representatives of the eastern patriarchs and the Greek
monks would have been prepared to discuss with the pope.
1. The composition of the Byzantine embassy is known from
the papal letters with which it returned to Constanti¬
nople; Raynaldus, ann.1367, nos.9-lU; Tautu 11, pp.202-
206. O.nalecki, op.cit. p.j. no.10, p.369.
Unfortunately we do not know wliat in fact was said in
the meetings between Urban V and the Byzantine ambassadors.
We know only that the two sides first met in Viterbo on 7 October
1367 arid tiiat the Greeks went to Rome with the pope on 16
October and remained there until 6 November, on which day
were dated the many letters which they took back with them to
Constantinople"1". But these letters, of which there are twenty
im
three all dated the same day, are most /informative about what
was discussed. Military aid, in so far as it is mentioned
at all, is given no more prominent a place than was normal
in papal letters to the empire. Union was to come first,
and the territorial revival of Byzantium might then follow
2
its spiritual salvation . The idea of an oecumenical council
was passed over without mention. The letters to those parties
which had sent representatives to the pope, and those to
other individuals, both Latin and Greek, who had influence
in the Bast, merely thanked them for their past encouragement
of John V, stressed the promises which he had made to visit
Italy, and exhorted everyone to continue to work for union and
to help John on his way.
Urban's apparent lack of Interest in the project of an
oecumenical council was a very considerable setback, for
nothing could be done without him, and it was an open rebuff
to the leaders of the Eastern Church who had already busied
themselves in sending out invitations. However, it is doubt-
1. Vitae Pa.Jaram Ayionensiuia, ed. S. Ualuzius, new ed.
G. i-lollat, (Paris 1914) I, p. 388 5 see also p. j6k, Sixteen
of Urban* s letters dated 6 November 1387 are published by
Tautu 11, pp.202-214.
2. • Quare cuai ox dicta obedientia et reconciliations, si earn
fieri contingat, Domino iuvante, compleri, salus niultaruia
alias pereuntium animarura, Ohristianitatis auginentuiu et
tutela fortissiiiia, infidelium repressio, aliaque raulta
spiritualia et temporalis bona sint jarobabilitor proven-
tura' . 6 November 1357, Urban V to Joanna of Sicily,
Raynaldus, ann.1367, no.7 f&utu 11, p.213.
ful whether tho series of* letters which Urban sent to Byzan¬
tium with the returning ambassadors, represented the apostolic
letters which John V was waiting Tor before setting out for
Italy. None of the letters dated 6 November 1367 «as even
addx'essod to John V, and although llaleclci makes it plain that
such a letter could easily have been written and subsequently
lost"*", there is some evidence that Urban himself did not
regard these letters as replies in the matter of Paul* s
promises, and did not yet consider John V to be obliged to
make tho journey to Italy in accordance with the terms agreed
in Constantinople.
The letters of 6 November 13&7 cannot have been Urban's
final word on Paul's 'promises' for if they were sent on the
day they wore dated, they would have arrived in Constantinople
in ample time for John to make his journey to Rome by March or,
as Urban's extended timetable allowed, by May 1363. Yet
John was not in Italy by this date, nor did he forfeit the
jewels and commercial revenues as he would have done by the
terms of 13b7» had he received the apostolic letter's relating
to the promises of Amadeo and Paul. So presumably the letters
which arrived in Byzantium were not those for which John was
waiting and on receipt of which he was bound to visit Urban,
If any letters were written to John by Urban, between
1 July 136b, when the emperor was in Buda, and 2 September
1369* by which date he had arrived in Italy, they have not
survived. There is no letter which was obviously a papal
reaction to the promises of Auiadeo and Paul. However, there
is a brief entry in a short chronicle which is of some
1. 0. Haleeki, op.cit. pp.166-167.
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significance to the contacts between the papacy and Byzan¬
tium. It reads, 'on Sunday 20 September 1363 letters from
the pope were read out in the hippodrome'. It is the only
entry between those relating to Araadeo' s departure from
Constantinople and John V* s return to the City din 1371^".
The most significant feature of this bald statement is
the date which it contains. 20 September I36S fell just
inside the deadline beyond which John V was no longer under
any obligation to wait for Urban's apostolic letter relating
to the 'several promises' made by Paul. it cannot be stated
definitely that these letters were the pope's long-delayed
reply, but the date fits and within a year John was in Italy,
was held to have fulfilled his part of the bargain and vras
able to reclaim his sureties from Amadeo and the Genoese in
Pera. It is also reasonable to assume that any jaapal letters
which were considered worthy of a public reading in the hippo¬
drome, must have contained some elements favourable to the
Byzantines. There was really only one thing which they wished
to hear from the pope} that he was prepared to ratify the
promises which had been made by Paul in 1367 about the calling
of an oecumenical council. The normal papal letter, containing
the standard mixture of exhortation, vague threats and vaguer
hopes for the salvation of the empire from the Turks, can
have given little encouragement to any Byzantine addressee
and certainly would not have been broadcast in public.
A litlle over a month after the pope's letters wore read
out in the hippodrome, Urban wrote to Paul, his legate in the
1. '^tei ZexTEuPpCcp K'riu^pqt KupiocKij eiq to iioi66povi,ov
yicxi av£yvu)aTT|aoc( v) ^tuotoXocC tov ndata ahort CI ironi c 1 e kj,
p.81, lines 30-31* This chronicle is one of the very rare
Byzantine sources even to mention the exploits of Amadeo
of Savoy, or John V's visit to Hungary, and it is alone in
recording John's return from Italy. On the manuscripts
of this chronicle see P. Schreiner. Studien. dp.11-12.
18-20, 92.
East, in terms which show that he had not given up hope of
making progress on the basis of the terms agreed in June 13^7
it was a letter not of despair but of encouragement, for whil
Urban recognised that nothing might come of his plans, he
exhorted Paul to continue his efforts to bring the natter of
union to a satisfactory conclusion 'while there is still
some hope remaining* ^» This hope can only have remained
because Urban had managed to get his letters to Byzantium
by the end of September 1368, Had he failed to do this,
John V could have reclaimed his sureties and would have been
under no obligation to visit the pope in Home.
This hope which still remained was to lead John V to
Rome in 13^9 in the culmination to a chapter of East-Vest
religious negotiations which had begun in 1360 with the
arrival in the empire of a small western crusading force.
Amadeo*s exploits in the military sphere may not have
aiiounted to much 1.10re than a psychological boost for the
Greeks, but once he and Paul turned their attention to
religious affairs they not only generated sufficient confi¬
dence to excite the enthusiasm of the Eastern Church, but in
the negotiations of June 13^7 they laid the foundations
necessary to get John V to Rome in 1369*
1. ' uonec aliquid spei poterit remanere* , 0. iialecki,
op.ext., p.j. no.11, p.370.
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C. Joh.ri V in Italy,
i) Tho religious aspect.
That John V personally became a convert to the Roman
Church cannot be doubted. Although no Byzantine sources accept
or mention this Tact, it is clear that in the West, at any
rate, his renunciation of the schism was known and he was
regarded as a 'prlnceps catholicus' . There is, however,
some doubt about when this conversion took place and exactly
what steps had to be taken by the emperor to guarantee its
acceptance. John's willingness to submit to the pope and
the Western Church had been expressed as early as 1355» but
the conventional accolade of a western ruler, ' carlssiiaus in
Christo filius noster' , was not finally and permanently
granted to him by tho pope until 1369.
It was this fact above all which caused Haleckl to entitle
his chapter on John V's visit to Urban 'la conversion do Jean
V Paloologue* , and he regarded the ceremonies whiclr took place
in Rome a3 marking John's ftxll acceptance of the Roman faith*".
But, in the overall picture of his relations with the T/estern
Church, John's Italian journey ha3 a different significance.
He had, after all, briefly been called 'carlsoiuus filius*
some ten years earlier by Innocent VI. In 135^ papal envoys
had been sent to Byzantium to receive the oral profession and
submission which John had announced he was willing to make.
John V*s visit to Rome added little, in either matter or
manner, to the promises which he had made in 1357 to the papal
legate, Peter Thomas.
1. 0. halecki, Un emporeur. chapter 8, pp.188-212, esp.p.189.
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One of the ,.»ost surprising features of the emperor's
stay in Rome was how little it brought him into contact with
the pope. When John. V arrived in the City in late August or
early September 1369 f he found tnat Urban was not there,
and the pope did not return until October 13. Urban, however,
had already appointed a Cardinal to receive John and to stay
with him, and we are told John was welcomed honourably and
' treated only a little less well than if he had been Emperor
2
of the Romans' •
The pope had also already delegated the responsibility
of receiving John's profession of faith to four Cardinals,
but although Urban was not to be present, the ceremony did
not take place until after his return to Rome. On 18 October
1369 John V was received by the four Cardinals in the Hospital
of the . oly Spirit. John was accompanied by four members of
his retinue, Francesco Gattilusio, Demetrios Kydories, Michael
jtrongj'los and Philip Tzykandyles. These men were notable
in two respects in that they were all members of the Roman
Church and also all knew both Greek and Latin. The Cardinals
likewise brought their interpreters, Paul the Latin Patriarch
of Constantinople, Nicholas bishop of dryinopolis and a
Franciscan, Anthony, from Athens. Several other Roman Church-
3
men were present as witnesses.
1. 0. Halecki, oiucit. p.l9*t says that John arrived in
Rome in mid-oeptember, but he landed at Naples on 7 August
and sailed for Rome on 18 August; Chronicon blculum incertl
author!s ab a. 3^*0 ad a, I396 in forma diary ex inedito
codice Ottobonimo Vaticano. ed. J. de Blasiis, (Naples
1887) ooc'ieta Napoletana di otoria ratria. Monument!
■korici: serie 0rx iajcrotxache, p.22.
2. ' Puitque receptus honorifice ac tractatus per dictum papam
et cardinales paulo uinus quemadmoduia si fuisset imperator
Roraanorum' , Vitae Paparuin Avion en slum, ed. 0. baluzius,
new ed. G.Mollat, {Paris 1914) 1. Prima "Fita. p . 372. For
the date of Urban's return see ibid, aecanda Vita, p.391.
3. Notarial act 18 October 13^9» ad. 3. Lampros, • AuTOKpoctdpcov
tpu By£aytCou xpua6^ou?Xoc wad ypucrot YP^hWXTa avaupepoueva
ftf.wam-gr.no.12, m.*9-z53> «»♦» u,
PP.287-290.
Ih© jj-rofession of faith presented to John was the same as
had been administered to Michael VTII and as had been sent by
Urban to John in Buda in 1366. It -was drawn up in two columns
with Greek on the left and Latin on the right, and the inter¬
preters all swore that the one was an accurate translation of
the other. By signing this profession and sealing it with a
gold bull, John explicitly accepted the jurisdictional primacy
of the pope, as the s -ossor of Peter, over the whole catholic
Church, acknowledging the righteousness of the Roman claim
that questions of faith and cases before ecclesiastical courts
were ultimately subject to the decision of the pope alone,
Joion further promised to 'hold to and persevere in all that
the holy Roman Church held, taught and preached', and the
profession itemised all the contentious articles of faith
which divided the Churches of Constantinople and Rome, indicat¬
ing and approving throughout the positions held by the Roman
Church, Thus the emperor specifically accepted the western
teachings on the procession of the Holy Spirit, the existence
of seven ecclesiastical sacraments, the eucharistic rite,
the legality of fourth and subsequent marriages and the doctrine
of purgatory'*".
Three days later the emperor met Urban V, apparently for
the first time, on the steps of St. Peter's, The pope was
seated on a throne, and John, advancing towards him, knelt
three times and kissed the pope's feet, hands and cheek.
Thereupon Urban took John by the hand and,; singing the Te iJouia,
1. The best edition of the profession of faith is in S.Lampros,
op.clt.pp.2hl-2541 no,10 has the Greek text; no.11 has the
Latin translation. Raynaldus, ann.1369, nos.2-3, p,l64;
T&utu 11, pp.283-286.
led him into St. Peter's where the pope sang nass In the
presence of the emperor together with ' a large congregation
of Greeks'*'. With this ceremony, so reminiscent of Byzantine
court ceremonial but with western 'political' overtones, the
final seal was set on John's acceptance of and by the Roman
Church - according to Halecki the efforts of the lasi fourteen
years had finally resulted in the conversion of John V.
However, the ceremonies performed in home seem in rio way
to add to or* improve upon those celebrated in Constantinople
twelve years earlier. On both occasions John made his pro¬
fession of faith not to the pope himself, but to papal agents
specifically appointed and charged to hear that profession.
Peter Thomas had been sent by Innocent VI to carry through
the project John had advertised in 1355 and to complete them
with a profession • ore proprio* . There is evidence that
when this had been done, not only did John V consider himself
to be a member of the Roman Church, but that Innocent agreed
and encouraged western princes to view him in this light also.
In Rome John's profession was heard by the four Cardinals
appointed for that purpose, before the emperor and pope had
even met} in this sense certainly the Roman ceremony added
2
nothing to what had gone before .
We do not know about the form of the submission lade by
John in 1357 in the same detail as is provided by the docu¬
ments of 13^9» but there does not seem to be any substantial
difference in the nature or soleimxity of the promises made,
rl; .lippe do il^zidres in his Life of baint Poter Tho as
1. ialuzius-; ollat, Vitae. 4, xter l'talic.ia Urban! V. pp.135
136. Cf. Pseudo-Kodinos, Traitlt des "offices, ed. J.
Verpeaux, (Paris 1966) pp.235-23^•
2. For John V's conversion in 1357 see above pp.4l~45\
stated that the emperor* made his oatii -with his hands in those
of the Papal legate 'promising to observe and cause to be
observed as far as possible what pertained to the holy domau
Church' , acknowledging the articles of faith one by one^,
it is entirely likely that the form of oath administered by
Peter Thomas was exactly the same as that used in 13<>9»
Already it had been used in the conversion of Michael ViXi and
had been sent to Buda in I366 as clarification in the dispute
over rebaptism which had arisen between the Byzantines and
2
Louis of Hungary *
Finally, the ceremonies of 1357 culminated, like those
of 1369, in the Mass, and on the first occasion we are told
that the emperor received communion from the hands of Peter
Thomas ' tamquam fidelia Catholicus et devotus' . Both sub¬
missions also had a quasi political character; in 1357 dohn
made his promises with his nanus in those of the legate, a
gesture of putting himself under the Church's protection, in
1369 by his kissing of urban's feet, hands and cheek he
3
emphasised his position as the pope's subject •
There is indeed one important way in which John's con¬
version at the hands of Peter Thomas was more emphatic than the
later 'conversion'. innocent VI had laid great stress on the
fact that the profession should be made ' ore proprio' which
haiecki, without much apparent justification, toon to mean
a public profession, Khether or not this was what Innocent
meant, clearly a public profession would have been more accept-
x. Philippe de Itfzibres, The life of oalnt Peter ihomas, ed.
J, Smet, pp.74-75*
2. The same form of oath was also demanded of the Alan chiefs
by Benedict XIX and of Ossinius, the Armenian King, by
John XXIX. Cf. naynaldus, ann,133>, p.1^3 and ann.1369,
p.162. The 1369 profession adds more detail on the
articles of faith, but tn... substance of the oath is
unchanged.
3. P. de Mlziferes, op,ext. p.75« Ualuzius- .ollat, Vltae.k,
P.135.
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able than a private ono, to a pope intent on the conversion
of the entire Byzantine people. According to John V1 s letter
to Innocent the ceremony of 1337 was by no means private, the
oath being made 'in the presence of many bishops' and ' with
the advice and consultation of the barons'^". Even if one were
inclined to doubt these statements as being unduly designed to
please the pope, it cannot be said that the smallest concession
to a public profession was made in 13^9* Although John
brought a number of prominent men with him to Italy, not all
of whom were members of the Roman Church, it was only those
four who were already converted who accompanied him to the
Hospital of the Holy Spirit to witness his profession of
faith, and their participation seems largely to have been
due to their ability to act as interpreters.
The similarities between the two ceremonies are manifest*
the content of the profession of faith, the way in which it
was received by agents of the pope, the celebratory Mass were
common to both. Nevertheless it is true that nearly all the
* 2
western sources with the exception of Philippe de hozitlres ,
imply that John V was converted in 1369. The catalogue of
•miracles' connected with Urban V and his pontificate, which
1. >ee above, p. 4-2.,
2. Philippe de MOzi^res wrote The life of Saint Peter Thomas
in 1366. In a later work, Le son ;e dn vioil pelerin.
written in 13&9t ile described John's profession in Home
as another •conversion1 , stressing its si llarity to that
of 1357 and dismissing both as ineffective. • Cellui
ompereur appelle Jehan Palirlogos, sotiverain chief de la
division de la cote de mon tresame fere, et contre son
sacrament et sa profession. Car deux foys depuis XX
ans il a este reconsilie a 1'eglise de Homme, et renoncie
en publlque au scisme tres raaudit, l'une foiz en la main
de frere Pierre Thomas, soiennel ..aistro cat tkeologie, de
1* ordre des Carraes, et le legat apostolique a 1' e apereur
susdit; 1'autre foiz en la personne du devest pape Urb&in
quint, en la cite de Homme* Et tantost qu'il fu retourae
en Constantinople, il ne donnast pas ung noble de sacre-
ment qu'il oust fait'. Le son ;e, ed. G.V. Coopland,
(Cambridge 1969), i, pp.23d-259.
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was prepared as evidence Tor liis canonization, cites John* s
visit to .Home as one such raiiucle and represents the event
as marking his conversion1. Xt was naturally no part of the
compilers' tasii to detract from Urban* s successes to give any
credit to his predecessor, but most of the Lives of Urban V,
some of which, were written by authors who had already dealt
with the life of innocent VX, likewise state that John* s
conversion dated from 13&9 • There can be no doubt that the
events which took place in Homo eclipsed those which had
occurred in Constantinople in the western, imagination. indeed
it would appear that the West had a short memory even for
John's visit to Home, for in 13&1 the terms of the Treaty of
Turin included a clause enjoining the Venetians and the
Genoese o work together for the return of John V and his
subjects to the Houan faith. The Treaty had, moreover, been
drawn up under the sponsorship of Anadeo of Savoy who, more
than most westei-ners, should have remembered John's conversion
3
and the visit to the pope .
There is, however, a significant, if somewhat confused,
entry in the Fourth Life of Urban V which suggests that the
author was not entirely ignorant of the steps which John had
taken during innocent's pontificate. It states that in 136^
• Urban sent two bishops to the Emperor of Constantinople to
1 • Liber Ue Vita et .iraculls beati .. rbani ,japa .biiatj, in
Actes anciens et documents concernant le bienheureux
Urbain V Pape. sa famille, sa psrsonno, son pontificat.
ses miracles et son culte. ed. J.H. Alban&s, X, {Paris
1397), P.392.
0, ?aluzius-Wollat, Vitae, X, p.372. Some Lives of Urban V
do not mention John's visit at all.
3. 'Dioto imperator© Kaloiano se et suos ad fideni catolicaja
redducere recusante se^aper dicti ianuenses et veneti
teneantur'. Liber iurium Keipubllcae Uenuensis. 2,ed.
II. Hicottius, iistoriae Patriae Monuvienta, 9, ("Turin
18.57), col. Also in in. b.H.o..'r7~^T~P.133.
find out whether he was firm in the faith which he had sworn
to in .:oae in the hands of his predecessor* . We do not know
anything of these two bishops from any other source, but it
was in 136^, in the second year of his pontificate, that
Urban first came into direct contact with John V through a
Genoese intermediary, Michael Malaspina, and it is entirely
likely that in this first approach Urban should ask for
Confirm&tion of Jo- !s past promises • John's reply, according
to the fourth Life, was the somewhat ambiguous statement that
all his family had lived and died in the catholic faith and
that he would always do likewise, deviating not at all from
the faith of the Roman Church. Although the autnor of the
Fourth Life was evidently confused in his statement that
John V had made his promises to Innocent VX in Rome, he
clearly was aware that the relations between the Byzantine
emperor and the papacy had reached an advanced stage before
the pontificate of-Urban V,
One significant novelty, however, did come out of John
V's visit to Rome. The pope now possessed a profession of
faith written in two languages, signed and sealed by the
emperor, witnessed by a number of prominent figures from both
hast and. 1/est. This was a considerable improvement on Joim's
letter to Innocent VX in 1337» which, despite its insistent
sincerity and the confirmation of a papal legate, lacked
the force of the foxTnal document produced in 1369* it
1. 'Idem domiuus Urbanus V raisit ad imperatorem Constantino*
politanum duos epi'scopos, ad sciendum an essot firmus in
fide jurata per eum tome in manibus sui predecessor!®
(cum) OTtiibus magnatibus et populis suis. Qui rospondit
ei grata.a responsionem, dicens omnes progenitores in
fide catholica vixisse et obiisse, et se similiter agere
et semper facturuia, nihil discrepando a fide ro^iane
ecolesie' • Daluzius-iioJlat, Vitae. X, Quarta Vita,
p.401. On Malaspina* s embassy see 0. llalecki, op .cit.
pp.cJ6-87. icaynaldus, arm.1364, no.27* p.103.
marked a further stage In the progression from John V' s letter
stating his desire for union, written in 1355» through liis
oral profession of 1357» to a final Ttfritten subrdssion with
all the weight and authority of the imperial seal^".
This is the true significance of John V* s visit to Home,
It did not mark Ms conversion, for that had been secured
twelve years earlier, but it was the final personal submission
of the emperor to the person of the pope authenticated by a
written and sealed document. It was a legal and symbolic act,
the importance of which came not from the profession of faith
alone but chiefly fro i the fact of the emperor* s presence
in the Vest and his homage to the pope. This can joso clearly
be seen in the fact that John once again earned the title
'carissimus in Christo fllius noster* not after the sealing
of his profession of faith on 13 October 13b9» hut on 2 Septem¬
ber 1369» on which day Urban wrote to the e nperor fro ri Viterbo
2
rejoicing in his arrival in Italy . This final consummation
of John's official conversion in Rome was the crowning glory
of the closing years of Urban* s pontificate. It must be seen
in the context of the return of the Curia from Avignon to
Rome and the reception there of several of the crowned heads
of Europe including the Emperor of the Romans . Finally the
emperor of East Rome came too, the first Byzantine emeror
for seven hundred years to visit the former seat of the imperial
1. The importance of this document is brought out in two
Lives of Urban v. Lostea (imperator) suscripsit inanu
propria cum sanguine conchilii et bulla aurea igillavit
cartara scriptam grece et latine, repositam in arcMviis
celeste* . Baluzius-Lollat, Vitae. I, ->ecuridaVita, p• 39I,
of. i/rima Vita, p.372.
2. 0. I'alecki, op.cit. p.j. no. 12, pp.370-371.
3. 'Ad dictum dotainura Urbanum venit imperator iomanorum,
imperator Grecorum, Johannes rex Francie, Johanna regina
Sicilie, et fere cuncti principes seculi huius e 1 idem
timebant' . iJaluzius-dollat, Vitae. I, next a Vita, p. 413.
This Sixth Life mentions the visit but not the profession.
power to which he was j^eir; he cane not only with the authority
of his ancient dignity, but as a convert to make submission
to his acknowledged spiritual father. Urban could rejoice
in the emperor's membership of the Roman Church, and also in
the important testimony which the whole ceremony in iome
gave to the re-establishment of the pope* s position in dome,
and also to the restoration, in some measure at any rate, of
his position among tne Christians of the East.
The emperor's reaffirmation of his new faith had also an
important role to play in allaying some fears and suspicions
as to his sincerity and depth of purpose. -it could not oe
ignored that since his conversion he had done nothing to help
the spread of the Roman faith among his people, and although
this did not invalidate his personal conversion, it doubtless
diminished its impact. It is not surprising therefore that
Urban should have sought from John V this sort of personal
confirmatlon of his adherence to the western Church. However,
it is surprising - and it is a fact which shows the real
depth of the suspicion with which westerners regarded the
Greeks - that only three mouths after John made his personal
and detailed profession of faith, he was obliged to make
another, designed finally to allay any fears still remaining
that his conversion was an elaborate fraud based on semantic
sleight of hand.
John' s second profession of faith1 made in January 3.370,
(the bull curiously does not specify the day), was much
shorter than the first, its only object being 'to remove all
ambiguity'. it referred to the profession made on 13 October
and especially to the phrase 'holy Roman Church* which
li S. Lampros, op.cit. Neo« Hel 1 enomnenon, 11, (1914), no .13,
pp.253-25^; naynalcius, ann.13/0, no. 1, p.1/0; Tautu 11,
pp.30b-309.
occurred in it on a number of occasions. The bull declared
that John meant by this expression the Church 'over which
the aforesaid Pope now rules as his predecessors, the Roman
pontiffs, have ruled, and as we believe the catholic Chris¬
tians of the west understand it* . Clearly there were so ie
at the papal curia who were not satisfied with the first
rofession, despite its explicitness, despite its recitation
of disputed pointr and its clear enunciation of the western
line on each, and %tfho feared that John was inwardly merely
reaffirming his membership of the catholic Church of East
Rome.
Xt should not be assumed, however, because Jonn was for
the most part, from his own personal point of view, merely
retracing the path he had trodden in 1357» and because the
pope was anxious to obtain an unambiguous demonstration of
his position and to close every possibility of evasion,
that the ceremonies in Rome in 1369 were simpl}' a secular
formality with no religious significance. There is testimony
(admittedly not altogether disinterested) to John's sincerity
and devotion during his visit to Rome. The Book of Urban
V's miracles tells of John* s frequent visits and gifts to
the pope, and his habit of arriving uninvited for meals at
which he would ignore the elaborately prepared food and would
insist on sharing the simple dishes which were brought for
Urban alone, announcing that his body and soul were better
refreshed by such a meal than by the feast prepared for liim"*".
1. •Summo pontiflci adhesit et devote obedivit, ipsu.i Jevo-
tissxme veneraado, et in tanturn quod propter devotioneci
quam dictus iiaperator Constantinopolitanus ad ipsu 1 et
mores suos haoebat, ipsum aepxssirae visitabat et jocalia
sibx devota tribuebat, et sepius ipso domino Urbano
ignorante, dictus imperator non invitatus ad eiu& pran-
diuia veniebat, et aabo simul. . . . . sua capiebant cibaria
pro solo domino Urbano prepax'ata' • Liber do Vita et
iiraculis, ed. J.U. Albanes, p.392.
Urban, impressed no doubt by such, exhibitions of" humility
and spiritual and personal devotion, and with the additional
reassurance of the second profession of faith, granted a re¬
quest made by John for the use of a portable altar. Such a
grant was by no means unusual, but on this occasion it signifi.
cantly specified that it was for use by a Latin priest,
according to the rite of the Roman Church.
The problem of a converted emperor remaining steadfast
in his faith when once again among his Orthodox people was a
difficult one. The provision of a portable altar, serviced
by a Latin priest, was an obvious way of overcoming John V' s
personal religious problem. We hear no more of the Latin
priest, and it must remain doubtful whether or how far John
made use of the papal privilege. In practical terms, however,
he would have had no difficulty in recruiting a priest from
among the western clergy in Pera1.
ii) The political results of John. V 3 visit to Rome.
Urban's satisfaction with John expressed itself also in
less personal ways which had more significance for the
Byzantine empire as a whole, and perhaps more relevance to
the motive underlying John's Italian journey. On the strength
of the first profession alone, Urban issued an encyclical to
all catholics informing them of John's visit, telling them
henceforth to regard him as 1 a true son of the same Church'
2
and requesting that aid and favour should be snown to him .
On 29 January 1370 Urban directed his appeals more precisely
and energetically towards those powers whose help was most
needed and whose interest in the fate of >yzantiu.i was most
1, Kaynaldus, arm,1370, no.4, p.171.
2. ' Varum eiusdem ecclesie f ilium' , Raynaldus, ann,1369»
no.4. 0. Halecki, op.cii. p.20l.
manifest* xdentical letters were sent to the Doges of Venice
ana Genoa which informed them, with many references to the
parable of the prodigal son, of John's visit to the pope
and his submission to the Homan Church. ihey were reminded
ox the desperate situation of the empire, which'had been
brought to the brinn of extersnxnation' as a result of the
savage destruction and occupation of the infidel Turks.
ihey were told that the emperor was now a ' princeps catholicus'
and so was worthy of the support of all the faithful of Christ,
and finally they were encouraged to help the emperor with all
possible aid against the Turks1. Urban also wrote a letter
commending J otm. V to Louis of Hungary, who apparently had
heard rumours that John had beexi making derogatory remarks
aoout hii.. at the papal curia. The pope assured Louis tnat
there was no truth in this suggestion and asked him to give
help to Johu who was hoping for Hungarian aid against tne
2
xurks .
A possibility of great mutual benefit to botl: Last and
nest was raised when Uruan gave John permission to negotiate
with the raercexiary bands of Lnglishmen, Germans, and other
.nationalities, which were active in parts of Italy. bafe
conducts were given to eight envoys of the mercenaries to enter
the Papal territories to negotiate with the emperor, but the
lure of honourable and beneficial employment against the
xxifidols seems not to have been sufficiently great, for,
although Urban wrote to bicily asking for them to be given
help in their passage, nothing is heard of the a in imperial
' Mm i 1 in... imi' 8w ■■ ...,i. ■
1. 'Ad extremura exterininium deductma' , Kaynaldus, ann.1369,
no.5; Tautu 11, pp.309-310.
2. 0. Haleckx, op.cit. p.j. no.18, pp.383-384. Tautu 11,
328 .
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service"*". The full fervour of Urban* s enthusiasm aroused
by John's visit to Home is revealed in his letter to all the
churchmen of byssantiun which not only reminded the 1 of the
great victories which could be expected 'with the help of
their western brothers' , but also expressed the ambitious
2
hope that the Turks would themselves be converted •
o far John had achieved all he coul d liave hoped for from
Ms journey to Italy# The West was reminded of Ms adoption
of its faith and its leaders had been summoned to his aid
by the one authority in western Europe wMch commanded some
measure of international respect. Furthermore the pope had
expressed himself in such a way that involvement in the
enterprise against the furks was seen not as charity but as
a religious duty. There can be little doubt that John V had
great hopes of the emotional impact of the ceremonies wMch
he had performed in Home, He had made Rone his first object¬
ive on his Italian journey, not because Ms personal spiritual
health outweighed the fate of Ms empire on his scale of
priorities, but because it seemed probable that the solution
of the latter problem could be eased by the ceremonies and
formal appearance of the sincerity of his submission. The
customary and easiest route from Constantinople to Italy
ended in Venice, but John made a long detour around Italy to
visit Rome and to preface his political business in Italy
1. 0, lialecki, op ,cit. p.j. nos,16,17, pp.3^2-3^3; Tautu 11,
pp,3O2-303,313* A similar plan inspired by Paul Archbishop
of Thebes (later Latin Patriarch of Constantinople) had earlier
had some success, •uominus Guillelmus role, miles de
Anglia rediens de Romania, ubi cum Thebano archiepiscopo
et socj,1s suis haouerunt, .... accedit ad presenciam Sancfc-
itatis Vestre, suffragia petiturus pro Isto bono principio
continuando. Nam nulti de Societate Anglicorua illuc
creduntur ituri fijtque duplex bonuia, quia purgatur Christi-
anitas a scandalis et bellurn dorainicum exercetur sine
laagao sumptu et quodauuodo miraculose. ., • irum est enim
quod ducenti vel illc homines ausi fuerint realiter aggredi
cantutn opus' . 23t25 Januar 13^5, Pierre Ameilh to cardinal
ui de ouloicne (copy of lewcr to Urban V), Ea corres¬
pondence de Pierre A ioilh, ed, H.Bresc, pp. 3b7-JW . 0TT"the
career of lyilliam <ie la Role end Ms colleagues until their
departure Irom Italy, see N.lorga. Philippe do Moaiferes,
pp. 209-270, ° u
2. ' Luvantibus. ,,fratribus occidentalibus* , Raynaldus, ann,
1370, no.2. ilutu 11, 311-312.
with the religions ceremonies which he hoped would bring
increased favour to his cause.
Xci: adiately upon arriving in Xtaly John V had indicated
that much of his business was to be with the Venetians, lie
wrote from Naples to Venice to announce his willingness to
negotiate a renewal of the five yearly treaty which had lapsed
in March 1363 and which had remained in abeyance despite the
mission of Jacopo Dragadin to Constantinople early in 1369.
The Venetian Senate replied to John's initiative by sending
two ambassadors, larco Giustinian and fomraaso Sanudo, to
negotiate the treaty. They met the emperor in Rome in
October 13^9^•
p
The treaty which was finally signed in 1 February 1370*
reveals a uiuch more conciliatory attitude then that displayed
by Bragadin in Constantinople. The ambassadors' instructions
allowed them to accept the JJyzantine demands on all the con —
tentious subjects which had caused the failure of Bragadin* s
mission. The Venetians accepted limitations on their rights
to acquire property in Constantinople and the empire, and they
allowed the number of their taverns to be limited to fifteen.
Furthermore the instructions prepared the envoys to accept a
demand which John V did not in fact ask for. The earlier
negotiations having foundered on the Venetians' demand to
preserve their right to trade in corn anywhere in the empire,
the new ambassadors were told not to insist upon this privi¬
lege. Xn the event, however, John showed himself ready to
conclude the treaty without having his way on this point.
1. 0. ilalecki, op.cit. , p.j. no.13, P«373» also pp.222-225#
2. Text of treaty published h.V.L.il. pp.lpl-156. O.iialecki
op.cit. p.j. no.13, PP.371-373. Thiriet, Regestes. nos.
459, 470, 432.
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These clauses were in fact standard and show no altera¬
tion from the 13^3 treaty1; but the fact that the Venetians
were prepared to accept the status quo represented a decidedly
accommodating approach to the treaty which was quite absent
froai the earlier negotiations. However, there is nothing in
the treaty to indicate that the Venetians were in any way
influenced by John's recent submission in Rome. The reason
for the Venetians' willingness to make concessions on the
points in dispute was simply that they were anxious not to
leave their trade unprotected by treaty. A lapse in the
treaty in 135" had been followed by the imposition of very
heavy taxes on Venetian merchants in Constantinople, and
after John V left for Italy in 13u9 these economic pressures
2
were applied again . it was therefore in the Venetians' commer¬
cial interests to negotiate the renewal of the treaty as
quickly as possible without insisting upon the most rigorous
terms.
In the context of relations with Venice the new treaty
must have seemed to John V a satisfactory conclusion to the
long negotiations. It is a totally unexceptional document,
entirely functional, concerned with the customary topics of
corn sales, taverns, property and nationality. Nothing, it
appeared, had changed. But fundamentally John V's plans had
misfired, since he had not gone to Rome in order to maintain
'.V-L.li. pp.d7-92.
2. i,lor 135J see Thiriet, kfegestes, nos.285, 291. For I309
see O.iialecki, op.cit. p.376. 'Post recessum ipsius
do^uini imperatoris facte sunt nostris certe novitates
et extorsioues contra fortnam treuguaruia' . Also see
below pp. 2-48 -Z.41. Halecki, op .cit. p.223 attributes the
Venetians' change of attitude to John's visit to Rome,
but X can see no reason for accepting this view.
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the status quo. He had seen the religious ceremonies in
home as a stepping stone to further progress in the political
field. But after the signing of his treaty with Venice his
main purpose of extracting some advantage from his submission
in Koine still remained to be achieved,
John V's dealings with the Venetians did not end with
the conclusion of the treaty in Home, He hoped also to arrange
a financial settlement with Venice which would dispose of his
long-standing and ever-increasing debts to the Republic and
also provide an inflow of capital into the empire. This pro¬
ject required his presence in Venice where he hoped to receive
a warm welcome and especial favour as a result of his activi¬
ties in Rome. As Demetrios Kydones wrote after his arrival
in Venice 'we have come to Venice, whither we have been
hastening for a long time, In the hope that the treasures of
Croesus will be proffered to us and our great hopes will be
given substance'*"•
John V had left Rome with his galleys in early Harch
2
1370 and, stopping at Naples and Ancona on the way, arrived
in Venice, the first reigning liyzantine emperor ever to
visit this former imperial possession. The official reception
in Venice was encouraging. The Venetians greeted the emperor
enthusiastically and showed interest in his business proposals.
The negotiations began and the basis of a financial settlement
was agreed. John V offered the Venetians the island of Tenedos,
1. ,MH\0ouev rev eiq tt)v BeverCav, e<p' i\v icoppooSev TiitEiyoiaeQa,
T|*v touq KpoCaov StiaaupouQ rivuv ^xxc^oviev 6ei£eiv hoc!
t£\oq s^oe 1 v tociq ueydcxaiq £hecvouq ixtccoiv.1
D. Kydones, Gurrespondaaco.
ed. R-J. Loenertz, letter 71» lines 11-13#
2. * Kodern anno (137&)» do taense martii recessit dictus impera-
tor Grecorum curn quatuor galeis, cuin quibus venerat' ,
Baluzius-Mollat, Vitae. 1, Secunda Vita, p.392.
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which they had long coveted for its strategic position at the
mouth of the Hellesxiont, and in return he v/as promised twenty-five
thousand ducats in cash, together with six ships* hulls and
the jewels which his mother had pawned to Venice in 13^+3 for
thirty thousand ducats* The arrangements were almost con¬
cluded and John had been given an advance of four thousand
ducats on the sum he was promised. But at this stage the
negotiations faltered and eventually broke down*",
Xt seems that the collapse of the negotiations was caused
by differences in the interpretation of the terms. The basic
terms were accepted by both sides, but the Venetians insisted
that the Byzantines should repay the principal of the loan
given to Anne of Savoy in 13^3, together with interest at
five per cent for the first three years. The total amounted
to thirty-four thousand five hundred ducats. Thus, instead
of receiving twenty-five thousand ducats, Joiin was required
by the Venetians to pay nine thousand five hundred ducats
and to cede Tenedos in return for the pawned jewels and
2
six hulls . This interpretation of the terms gave John V
nothing of value and was totally unacceptable, not least
because John did not have nine thousand five hundred ducats
to give the Venetians. John V remained in Venice but the
Venetians refused to soften their attitude. They paid no
1. The Chronicle of Caroldo. partially edited by J.Chrysos-
tomides, * Studies on the Chronicle of Caroldo, with
special reference to the history of Byzantium from 1370-
1377', O.C.P.. 35, (1969), PP. 160-161.
2. 'This explanation of the collapse of the negotiations is
given by J. Clirysostomides, 'John V Palaeologus in Venice
(1370-1371) and the Chronicle of Caroldo: a re-interpre-
tatlon* , 0 «C«P.. 31 (1965) 76-84. She examines and
rejects the alternative theory, that the cession of
Tenedos was prevented by Andronikos IV, which had pre¬
viously been proposed by K-J.Loenortz, 'Jean V Pal^ologue
a Venise (1370-1371)', rt.E.B.. 16,(1958), 217-232.
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attention to tho pope's demands for aid to be given to the
empire. They regarded their business with the emperor only
as a long overdue settlement of an old financial obligation.
John's total failure to procure economic assistance for
the eiopire was not all that he had to endure. His personal
financial position in Venice was extremely sorious. His
lengthy stay in Rome had proved very expensive, and during his
journey to mice it was realised that additional funds fx-orn
Byzantium were necessary to pay for the homeward voyage.
Constantino Asan, a member of the imperial party, was dispatched
from Ancona to attempt lo raise money in the i-eloponnese, but
Demetrios Kydones, writing to Asan after his departure, thought
little of his chances^. The delays in Venice put John further
into debt and, looking any securities, he was obliged to borrow
2
money at extortionate rates .
These circumstances have encouraged the view that John V
3
was made a prisoner for his debts by the Venetians . Although
1. *0vh ol5' e£ xf|v T|uET£pav TtevCocv ol TfjQ^FIeXoTcovv^aou x
OTOtTTipeQ TcocpaviuSriaovTou . kocl ah twv tou PaatX^oog y,vria0eiQ
evtoXgov apyupoXoyficrELQ todc; ApoaattTouvrag, £(po5iat youv
7CPOQ TT1V KCXTpCSa TtOp CPOCQ, COQ t6v y* d^tOUVTa
£XkC£eiv kftpwOev icAvteq £XXe(36pou SelpOcxC cpapt,.'
Demetrios Kydones,
Correspondance. ed. R-J.Loenertz, letter 71, lines 25-28.
2. 1n&Xiv yap ^v^yupa, kou 5av£i0TT)£ y,6XiQ £tu aoXX$
6av£C^£uv K£t96uevpQ^ xal viiv ylv uTuaxvouuEvog auptov
5e dvaf3aXX6uevoQ, kocI toclq avaf3oXat(; rautaig au£oov
ttjv anopCav.'
Ibid, lines 16-18.
Caroldo states that John required his loan of 4000 ducats
from the Venetians 'per il vluer suo' . J. Chrysostoinides,
'Studies on the Chronicle of Caroldo', p.161.
3. This view stems from the use of the word cpuXanfi by
Challcokondyles in his account of John's Italian journey,
ed. DarlccJ, I, 46-47; ed. Bonn, 50-51* Dee also ii.Gibbon,
The history of the decline and fall of the Roman empire,
ed, J,B,Bury, (London 1902) VII, p.90. For a more sober
assessment of the situation see P. Gliaranis, 'The strife
among the Talaeologi and the Ottoman Turks, 1370-1402',
B., 16 , (1942-43 ), 287-291; R-J .Loenertz, 'Jean V \ Venise' ,
217-218 .
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this was certainly not the case, it is tine that John could
not return to Constantinople until he could raise money to pay
off his aobts lie was unable even to pay the wages of the
crews of the galleys which were to carry him home1. Without
outside assistance John was powerless to raise the money he
requix'ed, and Asan's mission to the Pelox>onnese was apparently
fruitless. The emperor therefore ordered his eldest son.
Andronikos, who had been left as regent in Constantinople, to
raise money in the empire and to send it to Venice, however,
Andronikos refused on the grounds that this would necessitate
the confiscation of ecclesiastical wealth which was ocnonically
2
forbidden . John V's second son Manuel was more co-operative.
He raised the necessary money himself, and in the middle of
3
winter 1370-1371 brought it to Venice in person .
John V's immediate problem was solved by Manuel*s action,
lie managed to pay off uis pressing debts to the Venetian
merchants, and was free to leave for Byzantium. His departure,
like his arrival, was conducted in an atmosphere of official
friendliness. The Venetians provisioned his ships, the debt
incurred by his advance loan of four thousand ducats was can-
ceiled, iianuel was given a present of three hundi^ed ducats,
1. '0t be incr0o<p6poi tntnei vtoci , TJnaQoSorei v koci &7i07i\£tv
(£vocyk{^£°vT£Q . D. Kydones, Co rre sportdan c e, loc.cit. lines
23-2*+ •
2. John's appeal to Andronikos and the latter's reaction are
only mentioned by Chalkokondyles loc.cit. It is logical
that John should first approach his regent for funds.
Andronikos' excuse for refusing the request also rings
true in the light of a contemporary synodal act forbidding
the alienation of ecclesiastical property even to the
emperor. M,M.. 1, no.201.
3. Manuel's journey is mentioned In the chrysobull granting
him an appanage in Thessalonica in 1371-1372. K.Zachariae
von Lingenthal, 'Prooemion zu Chrysobullen', p.1420, lines
5-33« hydones also praised his action in a letter written
to him in Venice, Corresoondance,letter 21. Certain
(contd.)
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and a Venetian squadron escorted John's galleys on their way"*" •
But such gestures of goodwill could not conceal that the
2
emperor's stay in Venice had been a failure . His negotia¬
tions for the sale of Terxedos had resulted only in a humiliat¬
ing demand for the payment of past debts, and his prolonged
stay had caused him to incur heavy new ones. The Venetian
merchants had taken advantage of his plight, and the authori¬
ties had totally ignored the proofs of good faith which he
had recently given in home. Finally he was obliged to leave
3
manuel in Venice as a hostage for further unpaid debts*',
just as he had been left in Buda in 13b6. John V*s two visits
to western powers had brought hira nothing in practical terms
and had resulted in serious personal humiliation. Demetrios
Kydones, the most prominent and vociferous advocate of the
western alliance among the Byzantines, who had hoped that
the treasures of Croesus would be unlocked to them, reported
writers have suggested that Manuel brought with him some
jewels which were pawned to the Venetians for 30,000
ducats, with which John returned to Byzantium; see most
recently D.M. Nicol, The last centuries of Byzantium,
(London 1972) p.234. This arises from a misinterpreta¬
tion of Caroldo, published by J. Chrysostoraides, 'Studies',
p.161. Caroldo is actually referring to the loan given
to Anne of Savoy in 1343* see T. Bertelfe, *1 gioielli
della corona bizantina dati in pegno alia Repubblica
Veneta nel sec, XIV e Mastino II della Scale' , Studi
in onore di Amintore Panfani. ed. A.Ciuffrfc, II (Milan
19b2) pp.123-126;J. Chrysostomides, 'John V in Venice',
p.77{ J« Barker, Manuel II. Appendix 1, pp.444-445. John
received no substantial sum from Venice in 1371.
1. The Chronicle of Caroldo. J. Chrysostomides, 'Studies',
p.161,
2. ,lH 6e tiey&Xii PouXt) kou ot ecpopoi - oturo touto (3oiAf| -
xat axfTtTovTaci CUVEXWQ, ovh OTCOJQ TI Tipdt^ouat v
1). Kydones, Correspondance.
letter 71» lines 20-21.
3. John V left Manuel' dcKorce 1 pacouevov p-Cv t5v OtioXoCtccov
£\TtC5cov, £<£rw|T?iv 5e xal tt)q £v p-axpcp XP0V(P SocTcdvtiQ^aohEvov, ffv riiitv tiu^tictev r\ tcov £urc6pu)V ULxpoXoyCoi.'
K. Zachariae von Lingenthal, op.clt. p.142
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that everything had turned to ashes'1". Similarly, after his
return, to Constantinople, he referred to the voyage to Italy
2
as a 'vain trouble of no use whatsoever to our country' .
1. D. iiydones, Correspondance. letter 71, lines 15-16 .
2. 'To u^vov 61ht) K67trea0ou u"n&' otlouv ttj mxtpCSt XuaireAouvTa.1
xbid. letter 37* liue p* Cited by G. Ostrogorsky,
History of the Cyzantine ->tate. p.54o. Also,"H b' &\) BevcrCqc.
KOt0£6pa ot» TtavroQ yeCpcov 3apdt0pou;' D.Kydones, Ad Ioannem
Palaeologum oratio, In Correspondance, ed. R-J.Loenertz, 1,
p.15 line 2.
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D. Byzantium and the Roman Church 1371-1391.
John V returned to Constantinople from his visit to Italy
on 2d October 1371"*" to find the condition and circumstances
of the empire greatly changed since he had set out two years
previously. The most significant development had taken place
just over a month before his return on 26 September 1371 when
the Serbian army under John Ugljesa and his brother VukaSin
had fought a decisive battle with a Turkish force at Omomen
2
on the Baritza river, not far from Adrianople . The Serbs
were totally defeated, their two leaders were killed and their
surviving nobles became vassals of the Turks. This battle
had far-reaching consequences not only for the progress of
the Turkish advance into the Balkans which were defenceless
against the steady expansion of the victors, but also for
the countries of eastern Europe which were now laid open to
the Turks and for the empire which found itself at the centre
of a closing circle of enemies, it demonstrated the superior¬
ity of rkish arms over those of the iialkan countries and the
lesson was particularly striking for Byzantium which had long
been incapable of raising an army as large as the one the
Serbs had lost. furthermore the battle had destroyed any
chance there may have been of constructing a defensive alliance
of eastern Christians against the Turks. This possibility had
been raised by Serbian embassies to Byzantium before the battle
while John V was still abroad and his son Andronikos was regent,
but their suggestions of marriage alliances and financial
1, ohort chronicle 47» p.61 line 32.
2. Short chronicle 20, p.37 line 3l 33t P«6l line 1.
uhronicon breve Thessalonicense.ed. B-J .Loenertz,
D^n^trius Gydon&s CorrespondauceT-. p.175*
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subsidies v<ore met with indifference in Constantinople"*". The
Patriarch Philotheos had for some ti le been attempting to
counter the emperor's western orientated policy by building
up his authority among the eastern Christians of Serbia,
Bulgaria and Russia. These efforts had resulted in the sub-
2
mission of the Serbian Church to Constantinople in 1371 • The
union thus cemented between the churches was, however, insuffic¬
ient to produce a Byzantine force beside the Serbs at the
battle of the Maritza. After the battle the Serbs, who would
necessarily have formed the backbone of such an alliance,
were in no condition to oppose the Turks any further. The
significance of the battle was that, as an anonymous fifteenth
century Greek chronicler expressed it, • henceforth the Ishmael-
3
ites began to rule over the kingdonsof the Christians' .
The other development which confronted John V on his
return to the capital was that during his absence the Emir
riurad had demanded that the Byzantines should surrender the
city of Gallipoli to him as the price of temporary respite
from attack. He thus clearly indicated the importance of
this town as a link between his forces in Asia and Europe, and
he also showed that the empire could not much longer expect
to escape his attention. Oemetrios Kydones, who had gone
ahead of John V, returned to Constantinople in time to oppose
Murad's demand with a forceful speech which succeeded in
1. Uemetrios Kydoxies, Oratio altera delibex'atlve de non
reddenda Oallipoli petente Amu rate. ri.P.G.15^.1033a.
2. . * -. i, pp.553-555. O.llalecki, Un emiereur. pp. 237-241.
3. A. Karpozilos and G.M. Parassoglou, * AfnyTjOLC Bocch\6u)V TU>v
'IaiPXTiXlTWV , a short chronicle', B .,,42, (1972), 75 • ' ElCt
etouq jQwoQ^' (6879- 1370-0 UTi&yoi <XUTOQ o CTUOXTOXV)
mcopdtttiq woti ettoxoccitiaev vle tov OuywEaiv, tov seotcottiv
£eppcocq}, pq x(t|v) awpuv tou kototp,ou Mapo^t^a, h£ou) x
t(5v)^ CVivaaEv. kocl aito tote acpxiiaacv ot ^ouacxiiteq va
hipote3ouv t(icq; f3aai\CotQ t&v XpiaToi&v(u>v).' (sic).
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stiffening the Byzantines' taorale enough for the proposal to
be rejected. But the most alarming aspect of the incident was
that before Kydones' intervention, the majority of the capital's
citizens was in favour of ceding the town, which Amadeo' s
crusade had restored to the empire in 1366, in return for the
uncertain prospect of a peaceful interlude in which the harvest
could be gathered"*".
This demonstration of Turkish military superiority,
together with the appearance of a significant group within the
capital which advocated the appeasement of the enemy, must
have raised doubts in the mind of John V - fresh from his
failure to get aid from the west - about the possibility of
continuing the struggle against the Turks. However, the
emperor's disappointments did not reduce him to despair, and
his initial reaction to the disaster on the Maritza was an
aggressive one. lie authorised his son Manuel to mop up the
exposed and defenceless possessions of the Serbs and to hold
them for as long as possible against the Turks. As a result
of this action Serres was again integrated into the Byzantine
2
Empire . John also showed his determination to reinforce
the domestic military resources of the empire at the expense
of the church which had consistently resisted attests to
oblige it to contribute money or property for the defence of
1. 'Kou To-.TcXeLCTTov TTIQ ico\£a)Q, Kou T5v auuPouXetieIV £LOOQotcov,
cpaci 6eiv ff&TiSi&ovati, kox viTj y^XXeiv.* Deraetrios Kydones,
Be uon reddenda Calllpoli. M.P ,G.. 15^t 1009b. The
references in this work to recent Serbian embassies, see
above jp .IOk-7 * help to date ^ydones' oration to 1371»
rather than 1376 or 1377• The case for the latter date
is argued by P. Charania, 'Strife among the Palaeologi' ,
B., 16,(1942-43), 296-297; J• Barker, Manuel XI. pp.16
n.3» 460. But now see R-J• Loenertz, ' Demetrius Cydon^s, I',
0. C . ? ., 36, (1970 ), 68 } O.K. Nicol, The last centuries,
p. 28 4-.
2. The chrysobull granting Manuel an appanage in Thessalonica
is published by K. Zachariae von Ling-en thai, ' Prooeraion
von Chrysobullen', pp.1421-1422. J. Barker, Manuel II,
p.17.
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the state. in Autumn 1371 half the ..ionas tic estates of the
•
•.. • .j were eecular&M4 f*I - , ... .. 1 . ui. o. prouo&aii •*
..iilitar> sma*.ih©ldingsf and the oilier hair were subjected to
new forms of taxation • in this matter John showed much
greater resolution than he had In his earlier dealings with
ft
the privileges and immunities of the vUurch , and greater
realism in undera tanding that byzantium' & security cepeuuwd
immediately on the employment of local resources, and only
subsequently on foreign assistance,
i) wmx V and. 'U^;.t}3.-y ;CX«
bhile John V was adjusting to the developments in the
empire, new proposals for concerting military action for the
salvation of Christians in the east wore being .aad© by the
a
papacy. Urban V had died in Avignon on 19 beeember 137U-^ mid
1* ripo TtoWoSv xp^vo)v eu0uq petgt tov QAvoctovv Tou 6eoa6tou^
ttJq seppcaq^ tou OuYY^eorTI £v*eCvou, 6ioc irriv eaCQeoiv t"hvn
t6te ^syovuiav xapcx tgov ToOpkcov, ipoptt-htiv ouaav ayotv wai
auvexti» avtf<|>£u)Q yevopfivtic; xpoc; to wotvij \uoite\ouv,
e&o£ev, iva xpovoiacrdukn ra thiCoti tujv petoxCcdv tcov te
'AyiopuTajv wai tu5v QsaoaXoviK^cov, k<xi octcAooq x&vtot, 6ia
to p,fi7cote cacavTcx cyuwfj36t]v xiqwaiv.'
these are the opening words of
a proatagaa of Annuel 11, issued in 140b, by which the
taxes on lonascic property were ronoved, od. V, 0*1 in,
* AJctl kz avetogorskih arhiva', ^rpska vralJevs^u Akade-
mpoaenlk. 91, (Belgrade 1939), lb3-167. it is gonor-
ally assumed that the original iieasure was Manuel* a
respoilalb11Ity alone, and that the confiscations were
confined to the property of the .lonks of Athos and Thesaa-
ionica, wiiora ianuel was addressing; in 1406. bee b. 1 ,bti£:.--is,
Manuel 11. ff*dO«jll« however, the expression 'nat ocxAaQ
xivTa ' suggests that the measure was mere generally
effective in the empire. bee d.Ostrogorsky, 'The Palaoo-
logt* » C.H.it. IV, (2nd. eti,) i, pp.371-372; id. i our
l'histoire de la leodallt^ hyatantine. French t ransint oa
by vrre.-to ire, OorpuwrnxetlcuBo istories yap-a t.ui^e.
rubaldla. i# (1954), pp*lbl*lo2«
2. In 13b7 John V had unsuccessfully attempted to persuade the
Patriarch fixilothcoa to allow the settlement of soldiers
on Church land between ielyi?A>r±a and Constantinople. :;,A,,
i, pp • >u/»>u.. .-oe generally, P. Charanis 'The monastic
oropertles and the state in the iyasantina £mn ire*, .0,1..
4,(19^), 31-119.
3. o. halecki, Un e-nereur, p.232.
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was succeeded by Gregory XI who, throughout his pontificate,
showed exceptional concern for the welfare of Christians
facing the Turkish advance. His first plan, which was inspired
by the news of the battle of the Maritza, was designed to bring
together all those pollers, both major and minor, which were
directly threatened. In order to arrange a common programme
of action Gregory invited all the leaders of the east Mediterran¬
ean to a conference to be held in Thebes beginning on 1 October
1373^♦ The letters of invitation were sent out on 13 November
1372, not only to those who were habitually exhorted to show
concern for the fate of the east but also to the minor leaders
of the islands, principalities and dukedoms scattered in the
path of the Turks. A general encyclical was addressed to all
the faithful informing them of the dangers faced by * Romania
and the other regions overseas' and granting a plenary indul¬
gence to all who died on a new crusade.
The most striking feature of the letter sent to John V
was that Gregory described the enterprise in purely political
terms, lamenting the successes of the Turks in Serbia and their
attacks on the empire and ' othex* Christian parts' and acknow¬
ledging that unless rapid action be taken the empire and the
other lands of the faithful overseas would be totally lost.
Thus Gregory represented the Turks as a threat to Christendom
as a whole and recommended concerted Christian action. No
mention was made of the union of the Churches which all previous
popes had made a precondition of western aid for Byzantium.
The emperor was invited to take part in the Thebes conference
on equal terms with his neighbours for the salvation of them
all.
1. Ibid, pp.25^-260.
2. TSutu 12, pp.9^-96.
Ill
Thus the situation for Byzantium appeared to be relatively
hopeful • dotii at home and aoroad the seriousness of the
position was fully realised, and both pope and emperor were
working actively to halt the Turkish advance, however,
Gregory* s plans began to go wrong before the end of 1372,
and they were soon in complete disarray* The chief merit of
the Thebes initiative, its international involvement, proved
ilso to be its fatal weakness. The local rulers of the east
Mediterranean were divided by strong rivalries and conflicting
ambitions which made any plan based on tneir mutual co-operation
a vain, illusion. The major powers also sought individual
profit at the expense of the common enterprise, Louis of
Hungary, although welcoming the principle behind the pope's
Initiative, imposed conditions for his participation which
Gregory was unable to accept, Genoa and Cyprus, whose parti¬
cipation was essential to the success of the league, were
divided by a hostility which broke into open conflict in 1373,
Meanwhile, on 7 February 1373 Louis of Hungary declared war
on Venice and turned his army against the Hepublic in support
of Francis of Carrara, in addition the whole of Italy was
shaken by internal disputes which also involved the Lmperor
Charles i. . put the papacy Into direct conflict with the
Visconti"*", Although there was no official abandonment of the
plan for an international conference and league, it was clearly
failing from late 1372, and in March 1373 Gregory revealed that
he no longer considered the plan worth pursuing. In its place he
substituted a much less ambitious proposal for a fleet of only
2
twelve galleys ,
1, 0, halecki, op,clt. pp,26l-270,
2. lbid.p.274.
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On top of tills disappointment the empire suffered another
blow. On 6 i.ay 1373 John V s eldest son Andronikos fled from
Constantinople and joined uurad' s son oaudji in an allied
revolt against their fathers1, this action was to have
profound consequences for the empire, Jin the face of this
joint insubordination, Murad and John V combined to defeat the
rebels and inaugurated a programme of military co-operation
between Byzantines and Turks which characterises the last
2
years of John V' s reign . John V helped Murad and his army
to cross into iDurope and to pass through Constantinople in
pursuit of the rebels, On 25 May Andronikos fought a battle
at Derkos arid, being defeated, surrendered to hi© father on
3G May. Saudji held out until beptemfoer before being captured,
whereupon he was blinded by Murad who demanded that John V
should punish AncLroniicos and his infant son, John, simi-
3
larly .
This incident appears to have been the final factor in
convincing Jolui V that the most profitable course for the
empire was to work with the 'Turks in the hope of" obtaining
favourable terms, instead of attempting to defeat them mili¬
tarily. The combination of fresh disillusionment from the
1, Short chronicle 4?» p.81 lines 35-39* R-J.Loenertz,
'La premiere insurrection d'Andronic XV Pal4ologue* .1,0 .
38,(1939), 334-345. P• Charanis, 'The strife among the
Palaeologi and the Ottoman Turks 1370-1 402', B, 16, (1942-
1943) 286 -314, F. JJolger, ' Ziua Aufstand des Andr*onikos
XV, gegen seinen Vater Johannes V. im Mai 1373', R»B*B» 19,
(1961),32b-332.
2, According to Chalkokondyles, ed, Dark6 X, 36-46, ed. bo11x1
40-46, John V was already serving in Murad's army at
the time of the revolt. Many authors acce£>t this testimony,
e.g. G.Ostrogorsky, 'Uyzauce, otat tributaire do 1'iSmpiro
turc* , Zbornik Radova, 5,(1958 ), 50. But the first corro¬
borated, contemporary evidence of military co-operation
between Greeks and Turks relates to the campaign against
Andronikos and ^audji.
3* Chron, Vat, gr,l62, ed, R-J .Loenertz, E.b.B.b,. 28, (1958),
p.207, Doulcaa,xii, 2, ed, Grecu, p. 73,
n3
west arid tire necessity to co-operate with rtur&d to defeat
Andronikos and baudji forced John into a policy of rapproche¬
ment with Turks, froia which he could not later escape,
henceforth it was impossible to conceal that the emperor was
acting as vassal to the Turkish emir. That the alliance was
not a temporary expedient but a definite change of policy
is clear from the rift which developed between Demetrios
lvydones and tne court. Kydones wrote to a friend saying 'far
frora the palace X have what I was wanting; ... to be a private
man and to have no responsibility for what is taking place at
this time.... for to be involved in that affair, evoai. only in
appearance, and to be a passive witness of another's insolence
seems to weigh on me and to be unworthy of a man who knows how
to distinguish between what is shameful and what is not'1,
kydones was undoubtedly referring to the policy of appeasement
towards the Turks against which he had arguea strongly in
1371 when Gallipoll was the price of peace.
The news of the alliance between Byzantines and Turks
was slow to reach the west. The Venetians knew of it by
14 July 137^t but Gregory showed no sign of having heard
before 21 September 137^^• During the period from Spring 1373*
when the plans to hold a conference at Thebes broke down, until
the news of the alliance reached the west, the papacy had been
engaged on a more energetic programme of organising western
military aid for the east than ever before. Xt was a period
of disappointment for Gregory XX. He was continually obliged
to limit his objectives and to cut down the size of the forces
1. Demetrios Kydones.Correspondence, ed. R-J .Loenertz, letter
115 lines U-9. Translated R-J .Loenertz, * D&ndftrius Cydonds
2. cw.3 !• Xtf&UV.25'
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to bo employed in liis schemes, but lie showed constant concern.
for the empire* s condition and great persistence in his plans
to improve j.c,
once it became clear that Gregory's initial plan for
international action to be organised by the Thebes conference
was too complicated to implement, he settled for a much
reduced naval force which was Intended only to act defensively
1
by cutting the Turks' co miunications between Asia and Europe .
The problem of driving the Turks across the Bosphorus was
deferred until a land force could be assembled to supplement
the defensive fleet. The co-ordination of this plan was
placed in the hands of John Laskaris Italopheros who was
authorised to act as Gregory's ambassador to seek assistance
from the countries which the pope wished to involve - France,
Hungary, Genoa, Cyprus and the Hospitallers of Hhodes. Little
is known of these embassies except that they met with no
success. Charles V of France was too committed to the struggle
with Lngland to consider weakening his forces for the benefit
of the east and not even the presence at his court of Philippe
de rfezieres, a tireless campaigner fox* cxoisading, could
persuade him otherwise. Louis of Hungary failed even to
acknowledge the letter sent to him by Gregory to enquire whether
kalopheros' embassy would be properly received and, when he
finally did write, he indicated that he would play no part in
a permanent Christian fleet of a defensive nature, it was
only in Genoa that kalopheros met with any success. He
managed to obtain a proaiise that two galleys would be con¬
tributed to the enterprise, but without the backing of other
1. Ibid. pp.274-2dO, 29^.
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western powers this contribution was insignificant"*". The
attitude of the west generally is well illustrated by the
react-,... of Venice, in February 137^ the pope sent a Venetian*
John Corsini, to sound out the Republic's feelings about a
plan for providing the empire with naval aid* While applaud¬
ing the plan in principle, the Venetians declined to make a
firm promise to join the fleet on the grounds that the dispatch
of ships was premature and that their arrival without warning
might alarm the Byzantines who* in any case, could not be
2
relied upon to accept the Latins' aid ,
On the evidence of these failures Gregory Xx might be
accused of obstinacy in adhering to an unrealistic attempt to
organise military aid for the east through an international
league. To a certain extent the charge is justified. But
it must be borne in mind that Gregory's uncle Clement VI
had succeessfuily organised a similar alliance for the capture
and defence of Smyrna in 13^. Given the condition of the
major European powers and their preoccupation with local
problems, it was vain to consider any plan which called for
larger forces from a single nation. Louis of Hungary was
the only leader of Roman Christendom willing and able to
raalce a substantial personal contribution, and his aiotives
for this were very properly questioned by the papacy . Xt
must also bo emphasised that in relation to Byzantium Gregory
showed a more accommodating and understanding attitude to
local conditions and anxieties than any of his predecessor .
lie also took methodical steps to acquaint himself with the
1. On the-mission of kalopheros see ibid, pp.261-288; also
A.ri. Gazer, Das abenteuerliehe Leben des Johannes I askaris
kalooheros. (1/ie sbaden 1909 ) PP.55-59, 128-132.
2. 0. Halecki, op .cit. p.j. no.27, PP»39°-391» also 2J9-291.
3• ibid, p.268.
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past history of the problems he faced and the solutions which
had previously been attempted.
Xixi•- is illustrated by a letter which Gregory wrote on
19 March 1373 to Gasbert, Bishop of Ceneda, who had been
sent to the east in 1350 by Clement VI*". Gregory aslced him
to provide copies of all the documents in his possession
relating to the affairs of the Greeks, and to give informa¬
tion about the r6ie he had played and particularly about the
reactions of the Greeks towards him and those engaged in
previous union negotiations. Gregory wished to know why
earlier contacts with the Byzantines had achieved so little
and what the bishop, with all his experience of eastern con¬
ditions, felt would be appropriate action in the future.
Unfortunately it transpired that Bishop Gasbert had recently
died, but Gregory arranged for his envoy to inspect hi©
papers and send them to Avignon* -In his searcn for accurate
information Gregory sent a group of four ambassadors to
Constantinople in the summer of 137^ • in letter's relating
to this embassy the pope stressed its importance to the
cause of church union, but the presence of two knights
Hospitaller among Gregory1s representatives suggests that
the purpose of the visit was also military reconnaissance.
The other two envoys were friars who were intended not only
to take active steps towards union by negotiation, but also
were to report on the internal state of the empire.
Gregory's many letters addressed to Byzantines illus¬
trate both his energy and understanding. He equipped his
four ambassadors with letters of recommendation to everyone
whose assistance he valued or required, including Demetrios
1. .ibid, p.j. no.26, p.3^9} also p.237.
Ibid, pp.292-293, 31^-315.
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Kydones, Maximos Laskaris kalophei^os, Philip Tzykandyles, and
the people, nobles and clergy of Constantinople and the rest
of the empire, and also to many western leaders"'". He went
so far as to refer to John V as ' imperator Constantinopolitanus' .
This was the title previously reserved for the titular Latin
emperors. If not quite equal to the Byzantine style of
* iiniperor of the Romans* , it was a distinct improvement on
2' Emperor of the Greeks' used in previous papal letters*,
furthermore Gregory recognised the important influence exer¬
cised by the ex-emperor John Kantakouzenos especially in the
spiritual affairs of the empire, by writing him two personal
letters, and he responded to Manuel's coronation by \xriting
him a letter addressed with his imperial title. This letter
was particularly apt since at the time it was written, in
1375, John V was suffering from a serious illness.3
Gregory' a awareness of the gravity of the empire' s
situation and the past history of the negotiations between
east and west is clearly illustrated by his attitude to the
question of church union. During Gregory's pontificate union
remained the ultimate goal towards which all jjarties should
work, but it was no longer regarded as the essential precon¬
dition for the supply of military aid. It was acknowledged
that assistance should be given to all the Christians of the
east, whether members of the Roman Church or Greeks. Gregory
told the Byzantines that sincere participation in union
negotiations would help and speed the plans to send western
ai but at no point did he esroound the customary papal formula
1. Ibid-, pp.294-297.
p.296, n.2.
3. Ibid, pp.295. 310.
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1
of full conversion first and military aid second . This
concession broke down a major barrier between east and west,
which had always distrusted the other* s order of priorities,
and it siiows Gregory's recognition of the urgency of the
problem.
The most striking indication of Gregory's exceptional
sympathy and concern for Byzantium is found in his reaction to
the news that the Greeks had entered into an alliance with the
Turks. Although his initial and understandable attitude to
the news of this ' iaipia colligatio* was to condemn it as
inexcusable and beyond human judgement", he did not allow it
to cause a complete br*each between Byzantium and the west,
indeed his concern for the empire was increased, he warned
John of the dangers of admitting too many Turks into Constanti¬
nople and giving them the opportunity to seize it. Further¬
more in letters to Hungary and bicily he described the alliance
as evidence of the dangerous weakness of the empire which was
now more oppressed than ever by the Turks and totally deprived
of assistance. Gregory pointed out that the Turks were not
to be trusted and that if Gonstantinojjle were to fall it would
be followed by other Christian countries of Latin Greece and
3
also Siciij and Hungary" . Finally, in a letter to the Hospital¬
lers in Bohemia, he stated that the west was partly resjjonsible
for this state of affairs which had coaie about ' as a result of
4
Christian negligence' '.
1. bee especially the letter of Gregory XI to John V 21 June
1373, Tnittt 12, pp.149-150. Raynaldus, ann. 1373, no.2,
p.219* 0, nalecki, In e..; oreur. pp.281, 312.
2. Letter of Gregory XI to itohn V, 13 December 13/4, 1'S.utu 12,
p.244} Kaynaldus, ann.1374, no.4, p.234.
3. 0. lialecki, op.clt. p.312.
4. 'Civitas... gloriosa Cons taut inopolitana et aius i.iperator
illustris adeo sunt arctati a Turcis eisdem, quod noxx solum
eia tributarii fact! sunt, sed fere in eortua manibus con¬
sistent.... Quae evenerunt propter Christianorum negligen-
tiaxa' . Raynaldus, ann.1375, no.9, p.250.
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Gregory did not consider that the cause of church union
and the salvation of Byzantium was lost, lie was convinced
that if western aid could be organised the empire might yet
return to the unity of the Church*. Two embassies received
from John V in late 1374 and early 1375 reinfoi*ced this
impression. Philip Tzykandyles had been sent by the emperor
to explain the circumstances of his alliance with the Turks,
and the Bishop of Tabriz, who was returning to the west via
Constantinople, brought a letter from John V asking the pope
to encourage Louis of Hungary to fulfil the promise he had
made in 1366 to supply military aid in return for John1 s
personal conversion . The emperor said that desx3^® bis
treaty with the Turks, he still hoped that the west would
assist in the defence against them. The bishop was also able
to inform Gregory that a party of Dominicans on their way to
Armenia had conducted a debate in Constantinople in which
John Kantakouzenos had enthusiastically participated turd which
had resulted in the conversion of many 'prelates, doctors
and monies' to the iioman Church, Thus the pope was assured
that neither John nor his people had entirely abandoned the
west as a source of spiritual and material help.
With this encouragement Gregory set about organising
another scheme for providing the empire with military aid.
On 28 January 1375 be wrote, in accordance with John V' s
wishes, to Louis of Hungary to remind him of the emperor' s
conversion and his visit to Rome, and to exhort him to
alleviate the Byzantines' present distress^. Xt is clear from
1. Letter of Gregory XI to Louis of Hungary 23 January 1375»
Tautu 12, pp.259-260, .Raynaldus, arm. 1375. no.6, up.248-
249.
2. O.Halecki, op.clt. 306-398. Gregory's reply to John's
letter is published by L. Wadding, Annales Minorum. 8,
303-304.
3. iSutu 12, pp.259-260. Raynaldusjarm.1375* no.6,
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this latter, with its reference to John as ' carissinus in
Christo filius nosier' , that Gregory did not consider that
the emperor had forfeited his membership of the Roman Church
as a result of his allianca with Murad. The pope made
preparations for an array based on a contingent of one thousand
loiights and squires of the hospital to be drawn from all over
Curope and to set out in the spring of 1377* However, even
with this solid foundation the army required forces fro a
other countries. Sicily, Genoa and Venice, in addition to
Hungary, were approached by Gregory to secure some pro dse
of help fro a them*".
This plan foundered on the obstacle which had wrecked
all Gregory1 s previous initiatives. Louis was absorbed in
the problem of his succession, and his interests showed a
noticeable northward shift from his Balkan to his Polish
possessions, Joanna of Sicily had recently married for the
fourth time, and she was faced with dynastic complications
and competition in her claim to b© the rightful heir to
Philip of Taranto in Achaia. In 1375 and 1376 Venice was in
dispute with Byzantium over the renewal of the five-year
treaty. Although the contentious issues concerned only the
local conditions of Venetians in Constantinople and the vast
debts incurred by the empire, and should not be interpreted
as evidence of a general desire on John V's part to reject
western contacts, the dispute was sufficiently serious to
require a show of Venetian force in Constantinople in 1376
to produce a settlement. As for the Genoese, although they
showed a willingness to join in Gregory* s plan and were
1. 0. Halecki, In eapereur. p.316.
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rev/arcled with a present of twenty-five thousand florins from
the pope, they had a quarrel with both the Venetians and the
empire as a result of the treaty of 1376*. This treaty had
opened the way for the island of Tenedos to be ceded by
Byzantium to Venice, end it aroused all the old fears of the
Genoese that their rivals had stolen a march on them. ooon
the empire was caught at the centre of a major war between
2
Venice and Genoa, and the Turks were solicited by all sides •
Gregory XX's plans for the salvation of Byzantium by inter¬
national co-operation broke down completely.
The affairs of the empire were forced even further into
the background on the death of Gregory XX on 27 March 1378, when
the election of his successor, Urban VX, was disputed by a
group of cardinals who chose Clement VIX as a rival and split
western Christendom into two separate, opposing camps. In
the early years of the schism in the western church the two
factions were forced to concentrate on the struggle for
supremacy in the west and inevitably the fate of Byzantium
3
was relegated to a position of relative unimportance .
The events of 1376 to 1381 must have shattered any illus¬
ions that John V and his subjects still cherished about the
readiness of the western powers to help yzautiv .. They saw
that Venice and Genoa could liaise large enough forces to fight
each other or to protect their own interests, and also that
they would enter into alliances with the Ottomans and conspire
1. Xbid. pp.317-322..3,g
?. See belowpp.2.i?Z-5^G,T.Dennis, Manuel XX. pp.37-4o.
3. for the meagre western aterial on the contacts of Byzan¬
tium and papacy from 1378 until John's death see C.Halecki,
♦ home et Byzance au temps du grand schisme d' Occident' ,
Collectanea Theologica, (lw<$w), 13 v (1937 ) 4773•
rceprinted with Un empercur, (1972; .
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against the legal e.nperor of Constantinople. It cannot have
escaped the Greeks' attention that the fleet of ten galleys,
with which Venice forced a renewal of the five year treaty in
1376, was almost equal in size to the fleet which the pope
was incapable of raising from the whole of Christendom for
the defence of the faith against the Turks* In addition, the
empire was further humiliated by the Peace of Turin which put
an end to the hostilities between Venice and Genoa in 1331*
Phis treaty, which was negotiated under the supervision of
Amadeo of Savoy, regulated the succession to the imperial
throne, and reinstate uadronikos as John V* s legal heir at the
expense of Manuel without any reference to Byzantine opinion*
It also contained a clause enjoining both Venice and Genoa
to work for the conversion of John V and his subjects to the
Roman Church'4', In 13^9 Amadeo had received a letter fro a
Urban V announcing the completion of Jo, ' conversion and
submission, but by 1381 he had either forgotten it or no
longer regarded his cousin as a member of the Roman Church.
It seemed as though the contacts and negotiations of the pa3t
twenty-five years had achieved nothing and that John's per¬
sonal submission had been in vain.
ii) aanuei Talaiologos and Urban VJL.
Luring the period from John V' e restoration to fche
throne in 1379 until his death in 1391 the dominant influence
in ayzantine politics was the power of the Turks over the
empire. The extent of Murad' s control over Byzantium had pen
amply demonstrated by 1379* Twice within four years he had
caused the imperial throne to change hands, receiving Gallipoli
1. Liber iurium reipubllcae Genuensis* 2, p.S'Jk a.
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as a result of his first effort, arid increased financial end
military services in return for the second. As Kydones wrote:
• they command and we must obey in everything. That is the
measure of their power and our servitude'^. Each new emperor
accented that one of his first duties was to visit Murad,
and Chalkokondyles suggested that the emir' s power over Con¬
stantinople was so great that he could conduct a test of
public opinion to discover whom the citizens wished to liavo
2
as emperor .
i olicy in Constantinople became centred on the need to
maintain good relations with the Turks. The treaty between
iiyzantiura and Genoa signed on 2 November 1332, while providing
for mutual assistance against each other* s enemies, specifi¬
cally excluded ' the Turks of Murad* from the agreement since
the loyalty which John V now owed to the emir came before
all other political considerations . Thus it was with alarm
and displeasure that John V viewed the secret departure from
Constantinople of his son Manuel, whose rights of succession
had been overridden by the Peace of Turin. Manuel removed
himself to fhessalonica where he set himself up as the inde¬
pendent ruler of a 'new empire' and, attracting to the city
many siipporters, pursued a policy of open aggression towards
the Turks. Demetrios Kydones wrote to his friend John Asan
to warn him that his political standing in Constantinople was
being ruined by his adherence to Manuel* s cause, and John V
openly dissociated himself from his son' 3 actions and held
4
a council to discuss his fate .
1. Demetrios Kydones. Correspondence, ed. R-J .Loenertz, letter
167, especially line 13.
2. Chalkokondyles,ed. Bonn p.63 lines 10-15.
3. L. nelgrant), 'Prima serie' , Atti della societal Li<parer13.
pp.133-140. -
4. G.T. Dennis, Manuel xi« pp.60-76, lfj£. Demetrios ydones
Correspondence.ed. R-J .Loenertz letter 264, especially
line 30, ' ttiv vfocv dcpxTtv.'
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Although, Manuel* s campaign began with some successes
over the Turks on land and at sea, the tide soon turned
against him as the Turks organisod their forces to meet this
unexpected attack* Serros fell to the Turks on 19 September
13d3i and Manuel1 s territories dwindled until he was besieged
in Thessalonica* As the situation worsened Manuel recog¬
nised that outside help was required to maintain the policy
of opposition to the Turks* he turned i'irst to Venice,
asking for financial aid and military supplies* but cue
Venetian benate refused to prejudice its position with John V
and the Turks by providing direct assistance, and it confined
itself to offering its services as mediator between the
2
opposing parties'* Manuel's reaction was to embark on a
course followed by many of his predecessors, sending an
embassy to Urban Vi in the hope that his authority in the
west could assemble the material aid which Thessalonica
required*
The history of Manuel's relations with the papacy
is known from only one source, the letters of Demetrios
kydones, himself in Constantinople, written to Manuel and
3
others in ihessalonica . The registers of Urban VI, in
which details of the contacts might be expecta to appear,
have been lost, and since no other source, Byzantine or
western, mentions the events, {Cyclones' account must be
regarded with some reserve, particularly since it describes
a development which had long been close to his heart. however,
he picture which emerges front his letters is entirely credible*
1. u»T.Dennis, nanuel U, p.75 and n.60.
2. ee below pr> .308-40.T. Oennis, op ,clt. pp. 123-12' .
3. These letters are examined in detail with lengthy trans¬
lations by G.T.Dannir, op.cit. pp.132-150.
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oome of the facts which are mentioned by Kydones are
oeyond doubt, first he reported that •under pressure of
necessity t.i.e fhessalonians nave submitted to send envoys
to Rome* Aydones identified the envoys as a certain
iuthymios who appears to liave been a known anti-Latin, and
2
an unnamed Latin theologian described simply as ' the piaster* .
manuel wrote a brief letter to Rydones in which he confirmed
that the embassy had bee lent to the pope . Secondly Deme-
trios provides the information from first-hand knowledge that
ianuel* s embassy resulted in the visit of a papal legate to
the east in the spring or summer of 13^6. Xn a le^er to a
friend, Rhadenos, in Thessalonica, Deraetrios revealed that
the legate, who had been supposed to visit tianuel first, had
mistakenly gone straight to Constantinople where he met a cold
and hostile reception, Aydones does not mention whether the
legate nad any contact with John V, but of tlie others in the
City ' sorno did not suffer to see him and those who did showed
unpleasantness and would not speak to him, ... mocking the
pope... and calling his striving for union sheer folly...
They began to demand of the pope that, unless he first removed
this and that from the creed, they would have no further dis-
if
cussion with him at all' .
After these humiliations the legate proceeded to Thessa-
lonica, assured by Rydones that there he would be much better
received. However, at this point, it is not known what
happened, the only information comes from a letter in which
Rydones told manual of the rumours which were prevalent in
1. Demetrios Rydones.Corrospondance. ed R-J.Loanertz, letter
314 lines 7-&. Cr. T.Dennis, op ,cit. p.137.
2. D.f.Dennis, op.cit. pp.l37»l4l.
3» ibid. p.l40.
4. Je .ie trios kydones.Correspondance.ed. li-J .Loenertz letter
334, especially lines 7-14. G.T.Dennis, op.cit.pp.144-145.
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Constantinople about the events in Thessalonica, and asked
for fuller details. The rumours which circulated were that
the lCyu.s had bean warmly welcomed by iianuel and the church,
and that 'now our city (Thessalonica) is persuaded to render
the same honours to the Son as to the Father and to hold this
teaching both in the common holy places and in the assemblies
everywhere* . In the capital this news was regarded as 'not
only the adulteration of the faith but also great dishonour to
the imperial majesty* . Accordingly many voices were raised
against Kydones •for having persuaded the legate when he was
here to demand this new faith in return for the alliance*^.
Towards the end of Demetrios' letter he begged Manuel
• for God's sake be kind enough to reveal to me what is going
on', He was aware that the rumours he had heard might not
represent the whole truth, but despite his anxiety for news
there is no source which confirms or corrects the rumours
which reached Constantinople. However, we know what the
citizens of the capital thought had taken place. Clearly
they assumed that an agreement had been made with the legate
by which the church in Thessalonica accepted the authority
and teachings of Rome in return for a premise of military
assistance. However, there is no evidence of papal action
to help Thessalonica and it is likely the fall of the city
2
in spring 1387 would have left Urban with insufflcient time
to make the necessary arrangements. At any rate a year after
the fall of Thessalonica Urban ordered the bishop of Castello
to supervise the arming of two galleys for service against
1. Demetrios Kydones. Correapondance.ea. K-J ,Loenertzr letter
327 translated G.T.Dennis, op.cit. pp.11+6-147,
2. G.T.Dennis, op.cit. p.155*
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the Turks, the expenses of which were to be aet by contribu¬
tions from Venice and iTerrara'^, but no reference was made to
any agreement which obliged the pope to take tiiis action.
xf an alliance was made with the papacy in exchange for
the conversion of Thessalonica, it is impossible to believo
that Manuel*s interest in the homan Church was founded on
anything other than the desperate need to attract western
attention to the plight o" Byzantium*s second city. Manuel
had earlier received two letters from Gregory XI encouraging
hiui to work for Church union and reminding him of the advan¬
tages which would flow from it, but at no time before 13t>3»
when Manuel* s embassy set out for Italy, did he show any
signs of interest in the Roman Church. indeed in l400, when
as emperor he visited faris, again in search of western
military aid against the Turks, he wrote a long pole ileal
trace against the Latin teaching on the procession of the
uoly bpirit . J. erhaps his experiences in Theosalonica had
convinced him that the west could not be persuaded to provide
the empire with military aid merely by seeing the Greeks
submit their Church to that of Rome.
Manuel II* s appeal to Pope Urban VI for military assistance
against the Tuiks fits in to the genoral pattern established
by John V in the arid-fourteenth century. The only soureo of
substantial military aid, which the Byzantines felt they could
turn to with any degree of confidence, was western Christendom
irnder the leadership of the pope. Repeatedly, b.owever, this
confidence proved to bo misplaced. The pope* s influence in
the west did not extent to assembling an intematioriai military
*>» Ibid, p.150. O.Halecki, * Rome et Byzance'^ pp.^91-^93»
2. J. Barker, Manuel II. p.193•
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force for service overseas in the name of Christian unity.
Equally the promises which the Byzantine enperors were re¬
quired to make to win the papacy* s favour we re incapable
of being fulfilled. Even had the division between Greeks
and Latins been merely on points of theological importance,
the emperors could never carry their people with thorn into
unity with Rome by imperial decree. But the differences
between East and Vest went much deeper than the theological
dispute, and therefore if any chance existed of the two sides
co xrig together it lay in contacts on a more fundamental and
general level than those pursued formally by the emperor,
the pope and their ambassadors. The next two chapters are
concerned with some of the daily and Informal contacts between
East and Vest which existed in the empire during the reign
of John V.
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BYZANTIUM AND THE WEST -
THE INDIVIDUAL AND INTELLECTUAL CONTACTS
At various moments in John V1 s reign, for example in
1357» 1367 and during the Italian visit of I309-I370, the
prospect that the Churches of Constantinople and Home might
be reunited appeared to those involved in the official negot*
iations to be quite hopeful. However, despite the conversion
of John V personally and his submission to the Pope, the
Byzantine people as a whole and their ecclesiastical leaders
seemed to be as sharply divided from the Roman Church as
they had ever been. The root of the problem was the diffi¬
culty of persuading the Byzantine people that the course of
action to which they were constantly exhorted by the pope
and occasionally by the emperor, meant anything but submis¬
sion to a generally hated foreign power and to unintelligible
foreign ceremonies and customs.
The formal contacts between East and West had encouraged
the two sides to fortify their traditional positions and
had provided the opportunity for the reading of prepared
speeches. Thus the Greeks and Latins met usually only to
slander and revile each other and there was little chance
for any Byzantine to gain a rational view or the slightest
understanding of the westerners. Moreover, those Latins
with whom the Greeks came into direct daily contact came
from the foreign colonies in Constantinople and Pera and
formed an unattractive group. They confined themselves to
' soldiering, sordid trade and tavern keeping* and seemed
entirely to justify the division of * humanity into Greeks
and barbarians, looking on the latter as donkeys and cattle
and counting the Latins among then' 1. ueietrios Kydones,
1. DemetrioS Kydones, Apologia, ed. G. lercati, Notizie J[
p . 3'J 3 lines / < — >k .
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who lamented this situation, saw that the basic problem
was that ' there was nobody to persuade our people that there
is any intelligence in the Latins and that they are able
to discuss anything besides these paltry and mechanical
arts, because the long separation of the two peoples has
resulted in much ignorance of each other*1". In addition to
the division caused by ignorance there was also the factor
of the hatred which repelled the East from the West as
Barlaarn plainly stated to benedict XXI.
• For let me assure you that it is not so much
a difference of dogma that separates the hearts
of the Greeks from you as the hatred which has
entered into their minds against the Latins
as a result of the many and great evils which
the Greeks have suffered from the Latins in
the past and are still suffering day by day}
and until this hatred is cast out from thera
there can be no question of union being
achieved.' 2
The dangers of this situation were realised in the
thirteenth century by Humbert de Romania, the fifth
General of the Dominican Order, who observed that the
longer a schism lasts the more difficult it is to bring
to an end"*. A Dominican of the mid-fourteenth century,
Philip Xncontri, who had a lifetime' s experience of Byzan¬
tine conditions, gloomily agreed that the positions of
the parties were so entrenched that little progress could
be hoped for.
• This division or cause of division has lasted
until now and will remain until the end, so it
seems to me, because I see that the Greeks
have become so obstinate on this question that
they would accept all heresies before they will
confess that the iioly Spirit proceeds from the
Son. They are more obstinate now than they
ever wore*
1. Kydones, Apologia, Notlzie.pp.3b5-366 lines 84-87.
2. O. Raynaldus, Annales ecclesiatici, ann,1339» pp.159-164.
Cited by D.M. Hicoi, *dyzantlne requests' , p.78.
3. E. Martene and U. Duraria, Veterum scriptorum et monu-
'tentorum .... amplissi ia collectio. 7. (Paris 1733)p»193.
4. T. Kaeppeli, 'Deux nouveaux ouvrages de fr. Philippe
Incontri de Pera O.P.' Arch. Praed., 23i (1953), 1/6.
131
liven the most tireless and optimistic of missionaries
would have felt some despair at the determination of the
Byzantines and especially at the stream of formalised
polemic which showed no sign of changing course or dry¬
ing up. Demetrios Kydones, who in his researches into the
background of the schism claimed to have read everything
which had been written on the subject in the five hundred
years the schism had lasted, commented that * it seemed as
though all our forefathers who had anything to do with
learning, had firmly made up their minds and taken an oath
to publish something anti-Latin, sometimes refutations,
sometimes just abuse; anything to have a memorial to their
zeal when they died.* ^ in the west exactly the same pheno¬
menon is found.
Thus on the surface there appeared no reason for be¬
lieving that the Churches of Constantinople and Home %i?ould
ever be united unless the papacy could be persuaded to sub¬
mit its case to the jurisdiction of an oecumenical council
or the Greek people could be forced Into abandoning its
insistence that such a council was necessary. Meanwhile,
however, despite the ignorance and hatred which often dis¬
played themselves there were some people who held out at
least some hope for the future. The situation was not unmiti-
gatedly bad, Last and West were not entirely cut off fro i
one another, there wore still so ie links which connected
the two halves of the Christian world and which allowed a
degree of communication to pass between them. Among the
Byzantines who most consistently sought to emphasise the
common factors and interests which formed a basic bond between
1. Kydones, Apolo la. otizie. p.3 ■ » lines 53-56.
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Latins and Greeks was Demetrios Kydon.es. He reminded the
iiyzantines that
'we have not been lor long; or completely separated
Irorn the Latins and have not inherited the struggle
against them as a sort of feud, as the Greeks did
against the barbarians and as we do still against
those hardened blasphemers of Christ, so that we
therefore have to keep up the old enmity at all
costs. On the contrary, from the beginning we
have both been citizens of one state, that is
the Church, have the same customs and usages,
obey the same authority. Only later did the
moment of division come and the differences re¬
mained only in points of minor importance, if
one can call them of minor importance if they
involve a contradiction of the faith. The
difference bears less resemblance to war between
hereditary enemies than to a civil quarrel or a
revolutionary movement.'1
Hometrios was an exceptional ,»an» quite unusual in his
enthusiasm for western thought, but representative of the small
but important groups among his Byzantine contemporaries who
wished to know more of the Latins and to forge substantial
links with them* During John V* s reign there were three main
sources of communication and understanding between the Greeks
and the Latins* First of all there wore the friars in Con¬
stantinople who formed an articulate and energetic body of
interpreters of western religion and thought at the centre of
tli© Dyaiantiae empire* Secondly, there wore the western theo¬
logical works which were translated into Greek for the first
o
tine in the fourteenth century""* Thirdly, there were the
individuals whose lives and careers formed a series of personal
links between East and West at this time* These will be con¬
sidered in turn and their effectiveness in bringing the Latins
and Greeks to a greater knowledge of each other will be
assessed*
1* Ibid * * p*40! lines 39-^S«
2* Xt is an indication of the Greeks* marked sense of super¬
iority that translation had never been an admired for of
activity* in the wost from classical times throughout
the middle ages the translation of Greek thoughts and
forms into Latin had been one of the chief agents of
literary and philosophic culture.
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A. -t-lie friars
By the mid-fourteenth century both the Franciscans and
the Dominicans had been established for a long time either in
Constantinople itself or on its doorstei> in Pera, first under
the Latin Empire and than, after a period of exile, under the
protection of the Byzantines. About 1.3^7 both orders were
expelled from Constantinople by Andronikos IX, whereupon
Per , where they wore already established, became the centre
of their activities. The association of the friars and
Genoese colonial power was an important factor in their steady
expansion and lasting presence. This is particularly true
of the Dominican order whose four eastern houses in the mid-
fourteenth century were found in the Genoese mercantile
centres of Pera, Gaffa, frebizond and Chios. Their mission¬
aries followed the merchants along the trade roiites to the
interior and the Genoese position in the towns gave the friars
enough security to become the most influential and permanent
outpost of the Roman Church in the East*.
Although both orders maintained similar establishments
in Pera, the contribution made by the Dominicans is better
documented and had greater influence on the Byzantines.
The Dominicans were alone in producing individuals of suffic¬
ient stature not only to catch the historian* s eye but to
1. On the foundation and general history of the Dominicans
iti Pera see R-J . Loenertz, La societe des Freres Pe're-
grinants. Etude sur 1'Orient dominicain X, instituturn
historicum PF. Praedicatorum Romao. Dissertationes
historicae. fasc. 7, (1937)• R--J . Loenertz, ' Les
Vtablissement s dominicains de Pdra-Constantinople ', E.O., 34,
(1935), 332-349; rex:>rinted in liyzantina et Franco-Graeca.
articles parus de 1935 a 1966. Etoria e letteratura
no. 113 (Rome 1970) pp.209-226. R-J. Loenertz, 'Les
missions douiinicaines en orient au XXVe siecle' , Arch.
Praed., 2. (1932). 2-d3» Relations between the Dominicans
and the colonists were not always good; in 1372 the
Commune of Pera expelled so le Dominicans who tried to
enforce the papal prohibition on trade with Egypt.
0. llalecki, Un Empereur, p.253, n.4.
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arouse strong emotions, both of respect and distrust, in
Byzantine hearts. The zeal of the Franciscans cannot be
doubted; the part they played in the conversion of Prince
Stracirair of Bulgaria and the inhabitants of Viclin is proof
of their militancy"*", but the Dominicans possessed two very
considerable allies which the Franciscans lacked. They
could claim brotherhood with St. Thomas Aquinas, on whose
person and teaching were centred many of the contacts and
disputes between East and ¥est, and as a result of this
they had a fina and influential friend in Demetrios Kydones.
But most especially the characteristics of the Dominicans,
above all the emphasis they put upon preaching and writing,
conformed well with the Byzantine mentality and way of looking
at religious problems. They talked, debated and wrote in a
fashion which the Greeks ftilly understood and appreciated.
They were on the whole graver, more moderate and more schol¬
arly than the Franciscans, and did not display either the
hysteria or the extreme views which were common among the
Franciscans. Significantly it was the Dominican order which
received all the Greek converts to the Roman Church who felt
o
a vocation for a religious life in a western mould"'.
Tho Dominican house in Pera had in its founder, Guillaume
Bernard, a man who exemplified the order's characteristics.
When he had moved his twelve brothers from Constantinople
to Pera he used his knowledge of Greek to ' preach the word
of the Lord and to dispute against the errors of the Greeks' >.
it is clear that from the start the order was instituted
in Pera not only to serve the Latin population in the
1. Wadding, Annales i-■linorum. 8, 230-231. bee abovepp.
2. E.g. Manual Kaladcas, Andrew, Theodore and haximos
Chry sobarges and .Maximo s of Constantinople on whom
see G. bercati, x.otizie. pp. lul-103. The ability of the
Dominicans to taci'g.e trie Byzantines in debate is emphasi¬
sed by kydones s, • oov5oeq ovm aire i pot 5 laAeEecov
Apologia, Notlzie, p. 364 , 1 ine J8 .
3. 14—J* • Loenertz, 1 Los missions do linicaines' . Arch. Praed.,
2, (1932), Doc.1, p.66.
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colony but also to play an active polemical role against the
schismatics of the empire. Guillaume Bernard was followed
by others who also threw themselves into the task of exposing
and correcting the errors of the Greeks. Siaion of Constanti¬
nople was a prominent member of a long line of Greek Domini¬
cans who brought the order the benefits of a deep knowledge
of Byzantine theology; he made use of it himself to write
five polemical treatises addressed to eminent Byzantines,
including Andronikos XX"''.
Xn the reign of John V few personal details are known
about the Dominicans of Para, apart from two major tvriters
who both belonged to the earlier part of his reign. The
2
most illustrious was Philip Xncontri who had joined the
house in Pera by 1312 and had known Simon of Constantinople
in the last years of his long life. His career shows vividly
the intensity and consistency of a Dominican's life in Pera,
beginning with twenty five years of discussions and disputes
with the Greeks 'fmtting the whole weight of his study and
effort against them' " . Xn 135b he was inquisitor in the
Orient, a job which was far from a sinecure having responsi¬
bility for the firjvaiess of the Roman faith among the western¬
ers and converts of the whole Latin iiast.
1. R-J. Loenertz, La societe des Freres Per^grinants,
pp.76-79. Philip Xncontri wrote *Fr. Simon Constanti-
nopolitanus ordinis Praedicatorum, qui satis erat imbutus
scieiitia Graeca raagis etiam quam Latina, quern vidi nona-
genariuin existentem, qui inulta scripta dimisit contra
Graecos, ex cuius scriptis et libris initium habui contra
Graecos dlsputandi qui raortuus est me existente novitio'.
Scriptores ordinis Praedlcatoruni^ = S.S.O.P.. ed.J.Quetif
and J . Echard,X,(paris 1719), 55*3.
2. On Philip see R-J. Loenertz, ' Pr. Philippe de Bindo
Xncontri O.P. du couvent de P6ra, Xnquisiteur en Orient',
Arch. Praed., 16^ (194i), 265-260. T. Kaeppeli, 'Deux
•rtouveatlx ouvrages de fr. Philippe Xncontri de Perq O.P.,'
Arch. Praed.. 23?(1953hlb 3-163. S.S.O.P. X, 646a-647b.
3. 'Ego..iam per XXV annos cum praefatis Graecis disputans
et tractans, et totura contra eos meum impendens studium
et conatum'. S.S.O.P. X, 646,
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Only after Philip had been through this long apprentice¬
ship of direct confrontation with the Byzantines and had
been rewarded with an importemt position in the hierarchy
of the Roman Church in the east, did he turn liis attention
to writing. ds first known work was the translation of the
abridged acts of the anti-Photian council of o69» known in
the west as the eighth oecumenical council. This work was
done in collaboration with Bemetrios Kydones who had dis¬
covered the acts in Greek and brought them to Philip about
1355-135b1. immediately after this Philip began his pro¬
gramme of polemical writing, starting with his Libellus
pualiter Gi-aeci recesseruat ah obocdfentia -cclesiae Romanae,
a historial work which grew out of his belief that the Latins
had not sufficiently studied the causes of the schism. It
was directly inspired by the discovery of the acts of the
council of Sb9 on which the Libellus is largely a commentary
with a brief summary of the later sciiisms up to the time of
the fall of Andronikos II. It was written between 133b and
1357 and was dedicated to • the most reverand father and lord* ,
who in all likelihood was the papal legate, Peter Thomas.
Following this, between 1358 and 1359 Philip composed the
be oboedientia kcclesiae Koiaanae debit a which clearly draws
heavily on the years of confrontation and disputation which
began his career. Finally in 1359 he finished his De proces¬
sione Lpiritus Sancti. which ho had worked on together with
2
the de oboeclientla . All these works were written in Latin,
and so were not for a Greek audience directly; they were




intended for other Dominican missionaries to provide material
for sermons, to give them the benefit of the questions Greeks
had asked Philip and the answers which he had given. Hut
above all, in common with most of the Dominican polemical
works, tlieir interest and influence lay in the fact that they
drew on the authority of the Greek Fathers to support the
positions taken up by the Roman Church, and also x-eported
the arguments and authorities of the Byzantines.
The only other Dominican writer working during John V* s
reign of whom we know anything is John de Fontibus and our
knowledge of him is extremely scanty. His only surviving
work is a long letter in Greek to an unspecified Byzantine
X
monastery in Constantinople . This is a polemical work com¬
posed on traditional lines, dealing with such contentious
points as the primacy of Peter and Rome, the infallibility
of the Roman Church and the orthodoxy of fi.lioqne. John
admitted that the Latins had added the word but claimed that
it had been done only for the sake of greater clarity and was
not an innovation in the creed. In discussing filloque
John reveals that this letter was not his first work on the
subject and that his beliefs were 'sot out more clearly and
fully in another book written by me, containing many demon¬
strations about this article offeith, founded on holy scripture
and approved yy Greek doctors' . He added ' you can get this
2
book from brother anuel who lives in Galata' . The letter
of John de Fontibus cannot be accurately dated, but it must
1. R-J. Loenartz, 'iohannis de Fontibus G.P. Gpistula ad
abbaten et conventual monaster!! nescio cuius Constanti-
nopolitani' , Arch. Praed.. 30, (l960)? 163-195.
2. R-J. Loenertz, ' Xohannis de Fontibus*, p.192, lines
323-329.
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have been written after 135b since it mentions the acts of
1
the anti-Rhotian council which were lost • for three hundred
years' before Demetrius Kydones found them and translated
<>
them with Philip Xncontri's help in 1356''.
The Dominicans and the Greeks.
One of the characteristics which distinguished the
Do iiinican order in the east was the emphasis which it put
upon learning the language of the court tries in which it
operated. Humbert de Roaanis, in his study on the schism
prepared for the Council of Lyon in 1274, had given as his
fourth reason for the continuance of the schism ' the differ¬
ence of tongues, because of which we cannot preach to them* .
For a Dominican this was a very serious disability and it
is not surprising that among his proposals for promoting
reunion Humbert stressed the importance of acquiring 'know¬
ledge and skill in the Greek language' and lamented that
it was • scarcely possible to find anyone in the Roman Curia
who could read the letters sent by the Greeks, and the legates
sent out to them had to have interpreters of whom it was
unknown whether they understood or were deceived' . Humbert
also pointed out the necessity to the Latins of acquiring and
studying Greek theological works and also the desirability
of ' translating Latin books into Greek so that they can see
1. k-J . Loeriertz, ibid, pp.164-165 tentatively dates the
letter to c. 1353» but since it mentions that 'the
complete acts of the aforementioned (eighth) council
may be read both in Latin and Greek' , p.135 lines 193-
199» ft must be post 1356.
2. 'Quod concilium per tricentos annos fuit ita occultatum',
T. Kaeppeli, 'Deux nouveaux ouvrages', p.165.
139
what learned Latins have written and taught*.1
this might almost be semi a© the official programme of
the Dominicans in the east# They set about learning Greek
in order to !>o able to debate lore effectively# studying
(4rook theological works in order to turn back their oppon¬
ents' autiioritie© against themselves tuid they encouraged
translations to be jade first ay themselves, later by
•yxantine©* juu 1333 tiio Chapter of bijou ordered tlie founda-
2
tlon of a 1 Tlj—ffliltt school in the dominieau bouse in fera »
and although thei-e is no firm ovidenco tuat is ever existed#
the long lino of itouliiicana in Pera who clearly did know
Greek sliows that the spirit of the proposal was enthusiasti¬
cally received.
it does not seem that the Franciscans shared this talont
for Greek, for w© know of no member of the order who made use
of the language in the sane way a© the hominleans did*
indeed the brief entry of Aregos (.' enry), the superior of
the Franciscan© of fera into the .1story of John ontakou-
zenos strikingly illustrates this ignorance of Greek*'* The
inhabitants of rera sent Aregoa and another Franciscan to
visit John hantakouzenoa because thoy wished to know the
rights and wrongs involved in the civil war between hi i and
John falaiolo -;os* The two Franciscans were both *well versed
in ,.ouiaic wisdom and in the philosophy of Aristotle* * Uioy
1* See Humbertus de Romanis, Opus Tripartitum, ii, 17,19 (E. Brown,
Fasc. rerum expetendarum, 2, 220-223), on the methods necessary
to promote union with the Greeks. The main aids are knowledge of
Greek, translating, embassies, observers, marriages - a preview of
the methods used in the time of John V. On the knowledge of Greek
among the Dominicans see, B. Altaner, 'Die Kenntnis des Griech-
isohen in don iasionordneu w&hrond ties 13 und lh
Jaiiriiuiiderts. iiin Beitrag sur Vorgsschichto des
liumanisrua' , ^sitgehrift fnr kirchen^eschlchte. 33,
(133*0, W-*W3.
2*
_ u tti :onia ordlnis frat ru- s >raotUcatomm 1tlatorxca, (ho so
1 99) *♦"*> Acta ca»ituloivu * remoral iua l'K>^-13 7
p*220 line© 31-33#
3* hantoh* iix,J2—->4: XX, 502-521* On the identification
(coutd*)
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interviewed Kantakouzenos for two days and were finally
convinced of the righteousness of his cause, promising to
let both the Greeks and the Italians lcnox# of their decision,
They then acted as intermediaries between Kaatakouzenos and
his chief opponents, the Patriarch Kalekas and the Grand
Duke Apolcaukos, to idiom they took a copy of Kantakouzenos*
proposals for peace. They handed it over and later carried
the reply back to Kantakouzenos' camp under the impression
that they had convinced Apokaukos and Kalekas of the injus¬
tice of their actions and that the reply contained their
submission to Kantalcouzenos. Unfortunately Aregos, • being
completely ignorant of the Hellenic dialect and letters ....
and deceived by the Patriarch*s seal which he thought was
like that of the pope and therefore trustworthy*, had mis¬
understood the contents altogether and was shocked when
Kantakouzenos revealed that nothing had been conceded at all.
Evidently therefore Aregos* knowledge of classical Greek
learning was derived from Latin, translations since his
actions show very clearly his ignorance of the Greek language.
The result of the Dominicans' enthusiasm for learning
Greek was that they were able to become involved in Byzan¬
tine life much more deeply than any other group of western¬
ers. They \iore first of all extremely well qualified to
act as ambassadors, being able not only to talk to each
side in its oxm language but also, when questions of church
reunion were raised, to understand the positions taken up by
both sides. However, while it is natural that successive
of Aregos with henry see G, vj-olubovich, Biblioteca^k'Q-
bibliografica,3» p.297•
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popes should make use of these talents, it is surprising to
find on a number of occasions Byzantine emperors entrusting
their affairs to western Dominicans. Andronilcos XI used
a Dominican called Andrew as his ambassador to the pope in
1326 and Andronilcod XII sent letters to John XXII by the
hand of two Dominicans Francesco da Camarino and Richard of
England who were returning to the Curia from the Crimea in
1333. Kantakouzenos, having received Clement VI*s envoy
Gasbert d# Qrgueil O.P. in 1350» sent fr* John of Pera as
his representative to Innocent VI, In 137^, while Gregory
XI! s ambassadors Thomas de Bossolasco O.P. and Jartheleray
Cheraseo O.F, u were on their way to Constantinople, Jolin
V's envoy, the Doioinlcdn John iiishop of Tabriz, was going
the other way"'". The Dominicans thus demonstrated their
usefulness as linguists and men of affairs in bringing east
and west closer together on an official level.
It was, however, on the personal, individual level
that the Dominicans had their greatest impact ->n Byzantium.
Living nore closely with the Byzantines than any other
section of the Latin community they were able to have much
closer relationships with then. John Kantakouzenos, des¬
cribing his ambassador John of Pera, called hini 'one of his
2
friends living in Galata, of the order of preachers' . The
1. ii—J . Loonertz, 'Los missions doninicainos' , Arch, Praed.,
2-?(l932), 9-11 • Gasbert d'Orgueil was accompanied by
a Franciscan Guillelmus Emergani; ivantak. iv,9» III,
55 describes them both as well versed in 'profane
literature' .
2. u'o PaciXeuQ riiv ev TaXaxa 5locxp 1 3ovx'ov cpCXmy Itoxvvriv (
ovoy.a, xf|Q X(X?_E'jjq ovxa xmv mtipuwojv, npoQ ttxtxxv tc£]j,(J)0cq.
Aantaic, iv,9s hi,62 linos 12-13# Fr, Jolm of Pera is
often identified with John de Fontibus, see R-J. Loenertz,
' Xohannis de Fontibus1 , Arch. Praed.. 3u. (lieu). I03-I65.
In addition to the evidence he cites it should be noted
(contd.)
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most interesting source on this side of the omtnleans'
activities is the autobiographical information supplied
by Philip JLncontri especially in his De oboedientia Jccle-
s 1ao -o ■ ~uiae 3' Ata. ue describes how tie relations between
Greeks and Latins had shown marksd improvement during his
career in Pera.
• ofore, when i ixsod to talk to then, their
bishops, monks, priests and even people fled
from us as though we were excommunicates or
heretics, and there was a great fuss even to
get permission for us to enter their monas¬
teries or churches just to look. if it
happened that one of our men was thirsty it
was Bd&rcely possible to find anyone to give
him some water; and, when he had drunk they
would break or throw away the cup. Rarely
could we find anyone who would talk to us
about anything!, however, when X began to
deal with, them more familiarly, visiting
their monasteries, standing with them
informally, debating with them and replying
to their points, X have so tamed them within
ten years that they do not by any means
avoid us, indeed they eat and drink together
with us and we with them*' ^
Although Philip attributes this thaw in the relation¬
ship entirely to his own efforts and his more friendly
behaviour, there was perhaps another basic factor under¬
lying this. fhe be oeoeaientxa was written in 135*3 to 1339
and if we are to take the ten years mentioned by Philip
fairly literally the most striking change to have occurred
that Fontlbus is the Latin equivalent for IiriyaiQ. rryyaC
was the old name for the western quarter of Pera and
persisted in the fourteenth century as ' Gpiga', see
. .or tola t to, ' Nuova serie* , A11i Joe. Lig.. 28. (1393-
I89;i) p.55^1 ' Xspiganskol* , Anthony of Novgorod cited
by J. itarr, The Jews :Ln the Byzantine Umpire. (Athens
1939) p. 2*4-0. Both those versions are derived from
eiq n^ydQ. Thus John de Foutibus = John niyyuuQ =
John of Pera.
1. Similar events are reported by Ps,-Jrocardus, Lirectorium
ad passa,,iu.ii faciendum, in Recueil des historians de<
c'r-TT*;^".yV rP and fetrarch in
a letter to Urban V, Raynaldus, ami. 1366, p.135. Both
refer to the Gyzantine practice of reconsecrating ehurclie sin which Latin priests nave celebrated.
2. i. Kaeppeli, 'Deux aouveaux ouvrages' , Arch. Praed., 23,
\19b3), 179*
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i;a Constantinople was the entry o±' Kantakouzenos into the
capital on 2-3 February 13^7* There is no reason why in
itseir this development should have produced such a result,
but in his wake Kantakouzenos brought Derr.etrios hydones
to a position of power and influence as the first minister
of the empire. The relations between Philip Xncontri and
Kydones therefore deserve some investigation.
The first occasion when the two men can definitely be
linked was iix 1355-1356 when they were both interested in
studying the causes of the schism, i hilip himself had
worked on the subject for thirty years and then
* finally last year, working together with a
certain faithful Greek called Demetrius Ohidonij,
. a noble citizen of 'fliessalonica, who had been
converted to the faith arid was carefully enquir¬
ing into the same tiling, he at last unexpectedly
found the acts of the eighth council .... which
had been lost for three hundred years .... When
Demetrius himself found the acts of the afore¬
said council in a certain monastery called
St, John of Petra he, as a true member of the
faithful, showed them to me, made a transcrip¬
tion and even handed them over to me so that 1
could make a transcription which X did care¬
fully. After this we immediately made a
translation into batin together so that it , ^
could be transmitted to the ears of our people.
This account suggests that the collaboration had begun
some time before the discovery and translation of the acts
and that their relationship was based on a common interest
in the background to the schism. The description given of
Kydones in this passage is interestingly similar to that
given by Philip in his de processione bpiritus dancti of
a conversation he held with ' quodam not ill Graeco fideli*
1. ibid. pp# 164-165
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in 135o about a chapter in the Acts of the Apostles* in
the past it has been suspected that this could be a refer¬
ence to hemetrios Kydones, and its similarity to the explicit
X
mention of him would tend to confir-'i it" ,
The regard which Kydones felt for Philip personally is
shown in two letters he wrote in which he defends Philip
p
against attacks made on him by George the Philosopher .
George had provoked bemetrios' letters by publicall> adher¬
ing to the Roman Church, making his confession to Philip
during a service, and then later rejecting the western,
church and casting aspersions on Philip*s morals. Kydones
regretted that George was now libelling a man whom he had
previously admired and whom, if he knew him better, he
would heap with praises for his wisdom.
besides his friendship for Kydones, Philip Xncontri
also had close relations x?ith the Metochites family. He
had been greatly 3truck by the firmness of faith shown by
those Greeks who had supported the union of byon, especially
George netochites who died in 132b after forty two years in
prison. Despite many offers of freedom in return for his
recantation he remained firm and wrote two books against the
Greeks while in prison which were given to Philip by George's
grandson . Philip also mentions a meeting he had with the
bishop of Durazzo, who revealed himself as a secret admirer
|£ the Roman faith and exchanged texts with Philip on the
1. far. iioeuertz, ' Fr. Philippe de '*indo Incontri 0 .P.* ,
Arch. Praed. lu (19^) 207. G, Mercati, Notizle,
P.51U. T. Kaeppeli, op. cit. p.181.
2. R-J. Loenertz, op.cit. pp.27^-277. Demetrios Kydones,
Corret pondanco, ed. i<—o . Loenertz, Letters 31 and 110 .
See also F. Tinnefeld, 'Georgios PhilosophOB. Ein Korrespondent
und Freund des Demetrios Kydones, ' O.C.P., 38, (1972), 141-171.
3. T. Kaeppeli, op. cit. pp.174-175.
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procession of the aoly Spirit"*".
The Dominican order played an important role in Byzan¬
tium because it operated on. this individual level. In their
writings and conversations the Dominicans demonscrated the
human side of the Toman Church which rarely emerged in
the head-on conflicts which characterised the union nego¬
tiations held on the official level. Their presence in
the empire provided' a focus, a meeting place and instruc¬
tion for those Byzantines who wei'e attracted to the Roman
faith, nut above ail the friars were practical men of
action whose greatest contribution to mutual understanding
between east and west was made merely by living and working
among the Greeks«
The trailsiat ion of western theological works into Greek.
The dangers which arose fro >. the linguistic division
between Latins and Greeks were realised not only by the
Dominicans but by the Byzantines as well. Deretries
Kydones in jrarticular was aware that the difference in
language had resulted in the Byzantines making an absurd
distinction between the Greek and Latin Church Fathers.
Although the latter were represented on the Byzantine
church calendar and were invoked as intercessors during
church services, their writings were ignored by the Greeks.
• Why should we listen to Athanasios, Basil,
Gregory, John and Cyril, and then unceremoniously
cast out of the Church Hilary, Jerome, Ambrose,
Augustine, Leo and Gregory as though they are no
help to us in discussions about God, although we
1. Ibid., pp.176-177.
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liavo anointed then with oil and invested them
with tiie wool? The only charge against the. i
is tiie difference of language, for X can see
no other reason for condemning them.1 1
The first objective, according to Kydones, should be
to make the 5yzantir.es concentrate not on • how* but ' about
2
what' the Latin fathers spoke . Alexios ivalothetos, in his
correspondence with harlaam of Calabria, also laid great
stress on the advantages which would, be gained if those
authorities which Cariaara cited in his defence of Roman
doctx'ines were as easily available to the byzantines as
they were to the Latins he called for the translation not
merely of the Latin Fathers Ambrose, Gregory and Jerome but
also of past papal letters to the eastern Church and the
acts of the ' quasi-general councils' which the pope had
called to enquire into the problem of the procession of the
Holy bpirit; 'for once we have seen these things about
itfhich you talk, we will be aware that oux' quarrels with
a
the Latins have been for the most part solved* .
It was with this conviction that, during the reign of
John V, a programme of translating Latin works into Greek
was pursued. it was remarkable not only for the sheer
number of works involved but also for the quality of the
translations and the range they covered. This can partly
be illustrated by a simple list of the translations made
1. liydones Apologia, Notizig, p.y> 2, lines 35-^1 • Investi¬
ture with the wool, eptov, is perhaps a reference to the
woollen pallium received by archbishops from the pope
in the period before the schism. it is thus intended
as a reminder of the pristine and proper state of the
undivided Church in which differences of language were
irrelevant.
2. kydones Apologia, uotizie. p.3^2, line 16.
3. ' tfa:a si his visis, de quibus dieis, informabimur,
bene scito, quod controversiae nostras cum Latinis ex
maxima parte solutae erunt' • .1'. - . 151, 12b 2d-12d 3a.
John V had proposed the foundation of schools of Latin
in dyssantium in his first approach to Innocent VI in
1353, ^3e above p. 34 and j» iialecki, ■jii L iperear, pp. 35-36.
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1. This list is based on those found in S.G. Papadopoulos,
'EWnvtwai ueToupo&ae i c 9'out at i k(ov epyqjv. TiAoQmm a rat
wax (xvtl 6(ini.i. CTcxL ev ByCay tii),
= Greek t ransiat ion s^ (Athens 196 7 ) j>p .25-64, where there
are details of tho manuscripts of the translations of
Aquinas.
iercati, otizic, pp.23-40, for the translations by
Prochoros Kydones. M. Jugie, 'Demetrius Cydones et la
theologxe latino a byzance aux XxVe et XVe siecles* ,
E,0.t 27, (192b ), 401-402.
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To this list might also be added two other works of Thomas
Aquinas, the hymn Pange lingua and the Devotissima expositip
super symboioru; i apostolorui. However the translator of
neither of these works is known, and since the translations
appear only in single manuscripts of late date, they may
belong to a later period.
The earliest translator mentioned on this list is Maximos
Planudes''", a Byzantine monk who died in the early years of
the fourteenth century. He is chiefly known to historians,
as he was in his own day, as a classical scholar who was
distinguished among his contemporaries not merely by his
1. On Planudes see u-o. ocit, Kirche und tneologische Litera-
tur_..iAi_Jyzaatinischen ueiolq {Munich lb nr>.cdo7 *
and nor.es for further bibliography.
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sophisticated scholarly techniques but also by a thorough
knowledge of Latin. This aide of his work, is represented by
his translations of Caesar* s Gallic VJar. Ovid* s etauorphoses
and heroides arid Cicero* s .iomiu!i acipionis. Jut in addition,
Iiis translations of Augustine* s he Trinitate and boetlxius* s
Consolation of vk-lo sophy were the first cx^anslatioris of
suustaiitial and fundamental works of eaxiy western Christian
writers which were still unknown in the Byzantine world, his
interest in : oetiiius and bt • Augustine was primarily iuteilec-
tual and had no effect on his own orthodox Byzantine religious
convictions, indeed he also composed several polemical works
against the Latins, ilanudes was a contemporary of Guiilaurae
er.aard, the founder of the Dominican house in i- era, who also
knew both Latin and Greek and to whom are attributed the first
translations of Thomas Aquinas into Greek. The eaxiy four¬
teenth century Dominican historian Bernard Gui wlu> describes
the institution of the order in Pera, adds the note that
Guillauuie Bernard ' libros f. Thomas de Aquino e Latino
Graecos fftcit*^. Unfortunately no ti'ace of xuese tx-anslations
remains and they appear to have had little impact in uyssantiura
since there is no evidence that any Byzantine had any know¬
ledge of the works of Aquinas before the next generation of
2
translators led by Jeietrios iiydoues began its work .
Uemetri03 Lydones' interest in the theological writings
of the western Church was sparked off by a purely practical
need. As chief minister at the court of John Lantakouzenos he
frequently came into contact with western ambassadors and
i . 13ertiard 3ui, Co. ipllatio histor.ica ordinis praedicatorum ,
c i ted ' -J . Loenertz, ' Les ussions don xmc axn e sT', A roll.'
Praed.. 2. (1932). Doc.l. p.oo. (
2. Matthew Angelos Panaretos states oj, nva (roc ptjBXCa toO
8u)1ioc) ayvwrxoc xff ICHwXriaiqc ttiq veocq lPa)kTlQ erijyx(x^ov nai
tocch to i q oo^oboF.oiQ E'oq 8ao tXe C<xq 'Ico^v vou xou
Kavxocwou^T] vou . A.Demetrakopoulos, 'QpBo&oXoc 'JAXocc. p. A3.
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travellers with whom communication was usually made through
interpreters; however, the lack of adequately trained inter¬
preters and Deme trios* desire to be able to converse directly
with the more eminent Latins who passed through Constanti¬
nople caused him to learn their language himself, he found
an able master in a Dominican who was already his friend and
a skilful philosopher, who temporarily left his House in
order to teach him. lie worked at night after completing his
official work for the emperor and made rapid progress"*" #
Kydones owed his knowledge of western theology to his
Dominican master, who gave him the bumrna contra Gentiles
of Aquinas as a text. Kydones was so carried away by the
contents that he translated several chapters of it into
Greek to show the emperor and was encouraged to finish a
2
translation of the whole book . Xt was an enormous task for
a beginner, and Kydones marked his relief at its cosnpletion
by noting the exact time at which he finished! it was three
o'clock in the afternoon of 2h December 135^» Although
in a letter written later in life Kydones said that he had
been occupied with translating Thomas' s writings • since Iris
k
first youth' , it is clear that this was his first trans-
n;
lation. After this, 'having tasted the lotus' , he produced
1. Kydones Apologia. Notizie. pp. 360-362*
Ibid. pp *362-3^3»
3. ' Xstura librum transtulit de latino in grecura de ietrius
de thesalonicha servus iFiu Xi. laboravit autem trans-
ferendo per unum annum, et fuit completus M° c8c l°v
indictione octava, xxiiii mensis decebris ora post
meridiem tertia. hoc autem dictum est non solum pro
istis duobus libris tertio s(cilicet). et k? sed pro
tota Suma contra gentiles, tota fuit translata.'
G. Mercati, Notizie. p.160.
'
IT&vu y^P veoq Trfq epjrn ve Ccxq xcov tou 60140, Xoy'jov ri^apriv.
Demetrios Kydones Correspondance. ed. R-J. Loenertz,
letter333 lines 37-33.
5* 'Aojtou 5ti YEbP&UEvoqKydones, Apologia, Notizie, p.363 line 30.
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a stream of translations. The second work he translated
was also by Aquinas} it was the monumental burcuna Theologlae
the first part of which was produced in a fair copy on 13
November 135^^« None of the later translations can be
2
dated accurately"". One of the most striking aspects of
Desuetrios' translations is the speed at which they were
made. The Summa contra Gentiles was completed within a year
and much of the Gumma Theologiae was translated in the follow¬
ing two. During most of this time Kydones was also respon¬
sible for major affairs of state, being only briefly relieved
of liis duties as first minister aft©*- the abdication of John
Kantakouzenos. However, the translations remain lucid and
accurate. Kydones certainly had helpers, he even briefly
acknowledges them, but apart from his younger brother Pro-
clioros none of his contemporaries showed skill and enthus-
3
iasm approaching his .
An examination of the material translated gives a clear
indication of the change in the principle of selection in
the course of the fourteenth century. Maximos Planudes had
chosen for translation two of the front rank western works
which were distinguished not by their contentiousness but
!• 1 'ETrcXri po)6"n ttj iy' NoeuppCou tpq 13' I v5 iktiSvoq , ttepi
COOXV T£T XpTTl V Ttf Q THJEpTCg, KXTX TO Ej/XH I OX tXlOCTOV s
6wT xvooLOffrov E^tiwoctov E|36OUOV ETOQ (6367=1353) 5l X
yeipoQ Mocvodt|\ T£uwouv6u\ri\
S.G. Papadopoulos, Greek translations, p.^9 n.102.
Xt was copied again four years later, M, Rackl, 'Die
griechische tfbersetzung der Sumraa theologiae des hi.
Thomas von Aquin', D. A . 2k, (1923-192^), 60 .
2• Aquinas* s De ratione fidei ... ad cantorem Antiocherium
was translated before 1363, the year of the death of
Neilos Kabasilas who cites the translation. Ricoldo
da Monte Croce's Contra lege-1 Alcorani was translated
before I36O tvhen Kantakouzenos U3ed it as the basis of
his work against the Moslems. See below p. iS"4 and n.2..
3. M. Raokl, 00. cit. p.$k» On Kydones' affairs generally
see R-J . Loenertz, ' D^mfljtrlus Cydones Xj de la naissance
a 1373' , O.C.P.. 36. (1970), 56-57.
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by their solid theological worth. Neither Augustine* s De
Trinitate nor Boetliius* De consolatione phllosophiae con¬
tained touch that the Byzantines found objectionable. Their
authors were in no way symbols of the schism but v;ero cut
off from a Greek audience merely by the language in which
they \*ere written. Planudes \«as attacked by the Dominicans,
and later by ;!essarlon, for glossing over passages in St.
Augustine which dealt with the procession of the Holy Spirit
from the Son without expressing the full force of the Latin
in his translation, but the authentic text of the Greek of
Planudes shows these charges to be without foundation. He
inserted the filioque passages without alteration and with
no comment because he translated the work not for its pole¬
mical possibilities but as a major example of western litera¬
ture which deserved study in the east'". The De Trinitate in
particular achieved considerable popularity on Mount Athos,
which indicates both its non-polemical character and the
. 2
willingness of Byzantines to read it .
The works translated by Kydones show a rather differ¬
ent pattern. Most of them were associated tijith the differ¬
ences between east and west, the works with which he began
most of all. The Summa contra Gentiles arid the Suinaa Theologiae
were the most complete and uncompromising statement of western
theology that could have been chosen, but they were not by
1. For the attacks on Planudes see A. Dondaine, • "Contra
Graecos", premiers Merits poldmiques des dominieains
d* orient* , Aroh.Praed.. 21. (1951^T 421-422. who shows the
injustice of the charges p.422 n.76. See also Gulllelmus
Bernard! de Gaillac O.P., Tractatus de objectionibus
Graecorum contra processionem Spiritus Sanctl a Filio in
Analecta Upsaliensia tiieolo.la ; tedl-i kevi illustrantia
lT Opera svstet.iatica^ ed. F. itet'ymttller".(Uppsala 19")lVr
p.360. For Bessarion see t.P.G. l6l, 309-317 esp. 312b-c.
2. S.G. Papadopoulos, Greek translations, p.45* n.92.
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any means allied against the Grreks. Their importance was
that they were fundamental works of current Latin theology
without which an understanding of the developments which the
Roman Church had undergone while in isolation from the east
was impossible to achieve* Another work whose subject
matter has a clear relation to the schism is bt. Anselm's
be sacrificio azimi et fermentati which although dealing
with a disputatious topic is notable for the moderation of
its tone^*
Two other characteristics stand out in the bulk of the
Latin treatises translated during John V's reign. On one
hand they are for the most part short works, many of them,
especially the works of St. Augustine, often appearing to¬
gether on one manuscript in the west where they were fairly
2
common in the fourteenth century". On the other hand a
large number of them have a clear connection with the Domini¬
cans; this is particularly obvious in the large number of
works of Aquinas, which not only illustrate the enthusiasm
of Kydones for his writings but also indicate that the
Dominicans were the translators' source of Latin manu¬
scripts. The Dominican link is also evident in the choice
of other works notably the Commentary on the Sentences of
Peter Lombard by Herveus Natalis and the Contra legem
Alcorani of Ricoldo da Monte Croce. Hgrveus Natalis had
1. ' De sacrificio vero in quo idem G-raeci nobiscum non
sentiunt rrrultis rationabilibus catholicis videtur quia
quod agunt non est contra fidem Christianam* .
S» Anselmi Opera Omnia, ed. F.S, Schmitt, 2 (Edinburgh
1^46), p.223.
2. A catalogue of manuscripts preserved in the library of
the University of Cambridge. 2.(lo57) no.l2jl« pp.43b-
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been the General of the Dominican order from 1318 until his
death in 1323» and had been a staunch defender of the teach¬
ings of Thomas Aquinas against his opponents within the order.
On 18 July 1323 Aquinas was canonised by John XXII, aun event
for which llerveus Natalia had long worked'1', similarly Ricoldo
da Monte Croce, whose refutation of the Koran was a very
popular anti-ioslem source in the west, had been a Dominican
himself and had written a defence of Aquinas'* doctrines in
2
collaboration with John of Pistoia about 128 5 • The works
of both men therefore would have held a special place in a
Dominican library where the short worics of St. Augustine
would doubtless have been found also.
The translations of wester?! theological works in John
V's reign opened up to the Jyzantines the whole range of the
developments which had taken place in the Roman Church during
the schism. Even if the Uyzantines did not like what they
saw in Aquinas they had no excuse for misrepresenting or
misunderstanding Latin theology after the labours of
Demetrios Kydones. The translations formed an important
channel of communication between east and west of which
iiyzantine writers both pacific and polemic were quick to
take advantage.
C. The individuals
The process of making the east and the west more intelli¬
gible to each other, and breaking down in at least a few
1. 'Pro qua diu laboravit* . A. de Quimaraes, • Uerve No&l
$1323) ^tude biographique*, Arch. Praed. 8,(l9>3)?
5-81* esp. p.75»
2. The text of Kydones' translation of Ricoldo da Monte
Croce* s Contra Ler,em a Icqrani is published in M.p.G.
15^» 1037-1152. It clearly shows the influence of
Aquinas' s .:.:umraa contra entiles. It formed the basis
of the anti-Moslem polemic written by John Kantakouzenos
in 13t>0. fee E. Trapp, Manuel II Palaiologos. Dialoge
lii-t—eine;.a 'Terser" , (Vienna 1966 ), pp. 35*-48*
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minds the barriers of enmity and ignorance, was aided by a
force less easily isolated than the friars or the translat¬
ions. There was a number of individuals in the mid-fourteenth
century who by their office, background or career, were able
to form a personal link between Greeks and Latins. This
group includes both Latins in the east and Byzantines in the
west, and prominent among them wore three Greek speaking
bishops of the Roman Church, iiarlaam of beminaria, bimon
Atuaiano and Paul the Latin Patriarch of Constantinople.
i) Uarlaau
Barlaara is particularly interesting because in him east
and west were more inextricably mixed than in any other
figure of the period'*'. He was a product of Calabrian nonas-
ticism, which had kept the Greek language and the culture
and Church of Byzantium alive within the territory of the
2
western world . To a man of the great intellectual capacity
of Uarlaain a cloistered Calabrian life was too constricting
and he sought the wider horizons of Byzantium, but it is
important to appreciate that he came to Constantinople be-
cause he was seeking 'true piety* in the capital of his faith .
In Byzantium his advancement was rapid since he combined both
4
Latin and Greek virtues and education . This fact won him
the honour of disputing with papal envoys in Constantinople in
1. On Darlaaa see J. Moyendorff, Introduction a 1' etude de
Gregoire Palamas, pp.65ff« H—G. Beck, Kirehe i-and theolo-
gische Literatur. pp.717-719•
2. F. iiusso, ' il tiionachisruo calabro-greco e la cultura
bizantina in occidente' Bollettino della badia greca di
Gro11aferrata . 5, (l951), 5-29. Also K.M. bet ton, 'The
Byzantine background to the Italian renaissance',
Proceedings of the American Philosophical bociety, 100,
l,(195b), 1-40. " 7 77
3. J. iieyendorff, Introduction a 1'etixde. p.06. x
4. 'MovotyoQ yctp tiq oou'oiievoq eh KaXajSpCac toic AaxCvwv ti'Bech uai
vouoiq cvrpacpeYq, ovopa EapXaay,.' Kant ale • ii, 39«1» 543.
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133'* and rive years later he was sent to Avignon to discuss
the reunion of the Churches with Benedict XXI» His address
to the pope on this occasion is one of the best statements of
the Byzantine position on the question of union and the methods
of achieving it, insisting at length on the necessity of calling
an oecumenical council. These events demonstrate both the
confidence which Patriarch and emperor had in iiarlaaia and
also his personal orthodoxy.
it was in the name of the orthodoxy of the Byzantine
Church that Barlaam began a series of attacks on the practices
of certain monks which they associated with mystical exper¬
iences. The arguments which Barlaam turned against the hesy-
chasts were the same as those which he had produced against
the papal ambassadors in 133^* We attacked them both for
daring to claim to 'know' God, the former through individual
mystical experience assisted by mechanical exercises, the
latter through soulless syllogisms. However, his arguments
were less popular against the hesyehasts than they were against
2
the Latins, and were condemned by the Byzantine Church .
This rebuff was fatal to liarlaara* s loyalty to the Greek
Church, lie responded by leaving Byzantium for the west
and the Church of Constantinople for that of Home. He found
a ready welcome in Avignon and very soon was appointed to the
bishopric of Horace in Calabria. darlaam's personal conver¬
sion cannot be said to have brought the Latins and Greeks to
1. D.M. Nicol, 'Byzantine requests', Annuarium historiae
concilioruu, 1 ,(1969),77*81# C. Giauuelli; ♦ 'Jnprogetto
di Barlaam per 1' unione delle chiese' Miscellanea G.
Mercati.3. Btudi e lestx. 123 , (19^6),pp .157-208 .
2. J. "ayendorff, Introduction a 1* etude, pp.65-9'* •
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a closer understanding of each other, he merely made a whole¬
hearted exchange of one faith for another. One of his Greek
friends who had been surprised at the speed with which 13arlaam
had oeen able to accept the Latin doctrines vma told 'neither
used i to know whether the Holy Spirit proceeds from the
Father alone, nor do X consider that i know now. For X think
that problems of this sort both are and were above all human
knowledge, understanding, method and demonstration. Out
previously I believed that lie proceeds from the Father alone,
and now X believe he proceeds from the Son as well'^. Such
a conversion, which shows Barlaam*s strong desire to cut
the knots which could never be untied by reason, was not the
sort which many Byzantines found themselves able to follow;
oven Barlaam required the spur of his condemnation in
Constantinople.
Although most of Barlaam'a writings wore not designed
to make either Church understand the other better, but merely
asserted the orthodoxy of the one to which he belonged, there
is one aspect of his career in which Barlaam can be seen as
an important influence in the cause of union. Me clearly
enjoyed considerable authority in a circle of Greek friends,
mostly from Thessalonica, with whom he remained in contact
after his journey to the west and his conversion. To these
man Barlaara offered a much more practical form of spiritual
guidance than he had given to the Churches of Constantinople
and Rome at large. Surviving from his correspondence with
this group are two doctrinal lotters sent by Bar1aam to all
1. Letter to Demetrios of Thessalonica, 1.1'.G. lpl# 1301c.
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his friends in Greece, in which he extolled the virtues of
the Roman Church and of -western society, two letters to Barlaam
from Alexios Ralothetos, a letter from a certain Deuietrios of
ThessaJLonica who sought spiritual advice particularly on the
procession of the holy Spirit, and si so Barlaam's reply to
this letter*". in these letters the difficulties which a
Byzantine faced in coming to an understanding and acceptance
of the Roman Church are revealed, not only the spiritual
problems which Barlaam did his best to answer in his own way,
but also the practical difficulties of not having Latin books
and not understanding those that they had.
The extent of Barlaam's influence over these Greeks is
further illustrated by a passage in the letter from Demetrios
of Thessalonica . Admiration for Barlaam and his teaching and
disapxjointwent at his sudden departure from Constantinople
ax^e expressed in the warmest language * Xt is also revealed
that Barlaam visited Constantinople early in 13^7, and that
when his friends heard of his presence they prepared with all
JL
possible speed to meet him. But before tliey were ready to
3et out they were disappointed to hear that Barlaam had
1. They are published in >1.P.G.I51. 1255d-131^b.
2. Demetrios of Thessalonica used to be identified with
Demetrios Kydones but R«J . Loenertz, 'Note sur la corres¬
pondence de Barlaam, eveque de Gerace, avec ses amis de
Grice' , Q.C.P.. 23.(l9 57)T 201-202. has rejected this
identification on the grounds that Kydones was with
Kantakouzenos in Thrace and Macedonia while Barlaam was
visiting Constantinople in 13^7• His case is not com¬
pelling, however, since the writer does not say that he
and his Thessalonian friends were in Thessalonica at the
time, nor that they hoped to meet Barlaam in the capital.
Further, Kydones often calls himself Demetrios of Thessa¬
lonica e.g. CorrespondanceT ed. it-J. Loenertz, Letter 117
line 73} also the signed manuscripts G. Mercat i, Notizie.
p.loO. Loenartz suggested an alternative identification
with Demetrios Angelos of Ihessalonica, for whom see
Tautu 11, 122*.
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already left for Negropont*". The writer's enthusiasm for
Barlaam is clear enough, even allowing for so ae natural
exaggeration in Barlaara's translation. It was on this per¬
sonal level that Barlaam was most effective at cosnuiunieating
his own religious convictions and encouraging and assisting
others to share them.
ii) minion Atumaao
When liarlaam returned to Avignon in 134? after his brief
visit to Constantinople he was, in all probability, accom¬
panied by Simon Atum-no, whose career shows great similarities
with Carlaaia's • Simon had been a monk in the monastery of
Stoudios where he had acquired an impressive education and a
dislike for the hesychast monks which must have made monastic
q
life in Constantinople very disagreeable for him . Little is
known of his early career until he arrived in Avignon in 1348*
Almost immediately Barlaam died and Simon was hurriedly
appointed to the bishopric of Gerace on 23 June 1348, almost
six months before he was ordained and very probably before
liis official conversion to the Roman Church .
Although Atumano* s chief recoimendation to Clement VI
as bishop of Gerace was his friendship with Barlaam, he
represents a different kind of link between east and west.
When Simon first arrived in Avignon, he brought with him copies
1. On hearing of your arrival 'nos qui radiis tuae saplen-
tiae illustrati multis ignorantiae tenebris liberatos
nos esse putabamus' M.P ,G. 151, 1283b. On hearing of
your departure *perculsi nos, et ad profundum tristitiae
deaersi' • Ibid.. 128 3d.
2. On Simon Atu lano see G. .iercati, Se la versione dall1
eoraico del codice Veneto jcreco VII sia dx si>.-tone ata -iano
arcivescovo di Tabe. Kicerce storica. studi o Testi,30,
(Uome 191o)« Also G. ledaito. simone Atumano aonaco di
otudlo. arcivescovo latino dl Tebe secolo XIV. itoria del
cristiauesimo. 2 (Brescia 1968).
3» Atuuiaiio wrote an anti-hesycliast tract, K.M. Setton 'The
yzantine background', Proc . An. Phil. do c . 100,(1956),
4. Tautu 9, 219-220; ' priraam damtaxat clericalen tonsura i
habentem' .
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of classical Greek works which were of fundamental importance
for tk© revival of Greek studies in the west and for the
survival of the texts, i-o Drought worses of Lux-ipiaes,
Aeschylus, and Sophocles, and the Guripides was of supreme
importance since it was the working copy of the groat trans¬
criber and editor of classical texts, Deroetrios Trlkliaios,
1
and bore his corrections, glosses and cor-.-rvantary .
hut Simon Aturaano was no mere porter, he made his own
contribution to the study of classical texts, adding commen¬
tary and scholia to the Sophocles -ianuscript in his own hand
and also translating Plutarch's he eoij.ibeu.ria Ira into Latin.
Although Coluccio Salutati criticised this translation for
its lack of literary style, he excused Simon on the grounds
that he was a Greek and praised him for .making an important
p
contribution by introducing the wo lie to a western audience".
Simon Aturaano* s career illustrates.the fact that the
bulk of tiie work which saved the Greek classics for western
readers was done by Dysontine scholars by the early fourteenth
century. Although the influx of Greeks into Italy caused
by the fall of Constantinople played a significant part in
the transmission of the classics, the copying, critical edit¬
ions and commentaries of the schools of Constantinople and
Thossalonica under Thomas iaglstros, Demetrlos Triklinios
Maximos Planudes and Manuel :!oschopoulos were the essential
prerequisite. The transmission of these texts was also well
under way by the fourteenth century through the work of Simon
Aturaano and the enthusiasm of such men as John 1 of Aragon
and his hard-working associate Juan Fernandez do ieredia, the
i » J- * Zun fcz, An inquiry into the trans- lis & ion of 1110 elay s
of Curinldea. (Ca ^brid.-ro '106 5 } prj«2Gl-2 '3 . ' A. 'Turva.
Studies'in the manuscript tradition of the tragedies of
coohocT'esTTi11iaois studies in language and Literature!)
5©p75T. A Giiryn, .t'ho n .^auscript tradition of
the .tragedies of iGq.-?cliylust| "fTho Polish institute oT"
arts a-i.d sciences in. America,19^3)'» "-p™/1**
2. K.M. Jetton op. cit. p.50, F. Jovati, Fpistolario di
ooluccio ..oJLuTat£*(Fonta per la storia cP^xlTalla.'
si;ituto storico ..ito^liac^^'lot' p. 23 •
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Grand master of the hospital at Rhodes'*".
Although it is thi3 side of Simon Aturaano's activities
for which he is chiefly remembered, he was also responsible
for maintaining the influence of the west in Oyzantium* he
visited the empire several times and was in close contact
with the western group led by Demetrios Kydones. During one
of his visits he conducted an unoriginal debate with 3atthew
Angelos fanaretos on the Byzantine practice of putting warm
2
water in the consecrated chalice before communion . Through
hydones Siuon also remained in contact with John V, encourag¬
ing him along the path to union and conversion and giving
him practical advice about the need for talcing plenty of
3
money to the papal curia if anything was to be achieved there .
In 1373# when Atumano had been transferred to the archbishop¬
ric of Thebes, the city was chosen by Gregory XX to >e the
site of an international conference, at which the Byzantines
were to oe represented, to discuss the possibilities of taking
common action against the 'furies. The conference never took
place but the selection of Thebes as the site illustrates
the position of ooth the city and its archbishop as a natural
4
bridge between east and west •
1. 11. i. >etton, op ,cit. t pp.65-68. For I eredia's literary
interests see A. Luttrell, 'Greek histories translated
and compiled for Juan Fernandez de aeredia, Taster of
Rhodes, 1377-2396'* uneculum. 35, (I960), 401-40? .
2. P. Risso, ' i-iatteo Angelo Panareto e cinque suoi opuscoli',
ho ia e 1' Oriente? lO, 1(1913), 146-143 .
3. ue ;etrios Yyclones. Correspondence. cd. R-J . Loenertz,
Letters 93» 103» 220 t3xe first two of these letters were
writtexi on John V's behalf. Si ion also expressed his
admiration for John Kantakouzenos in a laudatory poem,
see, D • . • Nicol, The Byzantine family of Kantakouzenos.
P»97» n,158{ the T^Ti 'toxf is .oablisKed "i'n TTJ".rT^ 737 •
4. 0. halocki, Un dinpereur. pp. 257. 263, 286, suggests that




Paul was another Latin bishop xirho, over a long period,
played an important part in maintaining contacts between
the Latins and the Greeks. Like dar.laam, he was a Calabrian,
born in Naples and in all probability spoke Greek1. However,
he had been brought up a member of the Roman Church, and
showed a more accommodating and understanding attitude to
the Byzantines than those who had joined the Roman Church
later in life. He was an influential figure during John V's
reign both on the official and the unofficial levels, as a
papal envoy and as an individual concerned with the promotion
of Church union and the increase of mutual understanding.
Paul, when bishop of Smyrna, visited Constantinople
in 1355. lie was probably there on his ox-m initiative and he
used the opportunity to encourage the new emperor John V to
make his first approach to the papacy about union and also
helped to compose the letter in which John set out his propos¬
als for the pope. Paul*s Influence is particularly to be seen
in the positiveness and attention to detail which character¬
ise this letter and distinguish it from most Byzantine
initiatives on the matter of union. Paul travelled to Avignon
with the letter and was able to explain the background to
the Byzantine situation to innocent VX. however, when
innocent* s reply was ready it was not entrusted to Paul but
to Peter Thomas, who had previous experience in dealing with
aspiring converts and their possible duplicity, having been
i. * Hoc uatus, nutritus et a primovis conversatus*,
Letter of Pietro Aueil, Archbishop of Naples to Urban
V, cited G. Fedalto, Simone Atumano p.79*Ka\a(3poQ yap rfvj
J. leyendorff, 'Projets do concile oecumeniqae,
P.O.P.. 14t (1960 )t 171 lines 59-60.
sent to Serbia in response to Stephen Dusan's professed wish
to join the Ronan Church, it is possible that innocent felt
that Paul's enthusiasm for the project made him an unreliable
representative of official papal policy, and Paul was trans¬
ferred to the archbishopric of Thebes which, while being a
hierarchical promotion, removed him from the scene of active
1
union negotiations .
it was not until 1367 that Paul played an official part
in union negotiations. On 17 April 1366 Urban V appointed
himi to the Latin Patriarchate of Constantinople, which he
visited the same year as a member of Amadeo of Savoy's
expedition to the empire. After the military events of the
crusade Paul and Amadeo turned their attention to the ques¬
tion of the reunion of the Churches. The negotiations which
Paul conducted in the form of a debate with the ex-e iperor
2
John Kantakouzanos have already been described'. Paul's
eventual agreement that an oecumenical council should be
hold to discuss the problems between the Churches repre¬
sents such a complete acceptance of the traditional lyzan-
tine position that Innocent VX* s suspicion of Paul* s enthus¬
iasm in 1356 would appear to have been justified. That Paul'
agreement una far from representing official Roman policy
is clear from Urban's complete silence on the question of a
council when Uyzantine ambassadors arrived at the curia to
arrange for the implementation of Paul's promise.
1. -see above pp.40-l,QHalecki, Un enpereur 55-57*
2. bee above pp.fc?-7l,J* Aeyendorff, 'Projets de concile
oecui Unique', D.O .P. 14, (i960), 147-177 .
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Paul had been induced to offer ti e concession of a council
by his realisation that for progress to be made some ground
had to be given, nis stay in the east had been long enough
for him to understand how deeply the byzantines felt on the
flatter of councils* Many westerners had this understanding,
but what marked out Paul from his colleagues was his enquir¬
ing and sympathetic nature which led him to attempt to under¬
stand the dyzantine viewpoint at a much deeper level than
any other papal representative*
This is illustrated by the unofficial contacts which
Paul made on both his visits to Constantinople in an effort
to understand hesychasm, the dominant influence on contem¬
porary byzantine religious thought, in 1333 a meeting was
arranged by John V between Paul and Gregory Palamas, and
this was followed by a debate between Palamas and Nikephoros
Gregoras auout hesycl-asm, at which Paul asked to be present
as an observer1. In 13^7 Paul again made inquiries into
hesychas -i to find out exactly what it was abou t and how wide¬
spread it was. When John . antakouaenos heard of his interest
he sent Paul an invitation to the palace where they had
frequent conversations. A record of these discussions, in
the form of letters between Kantakouaenos and Paul, was made
probably by the ex-emperor himself who certainly put together
a series of extracts explaining the Palamite viewpoint, m
addition kantakouzenos arranged for an eminent hesychast,
Theophanes metropolitan of Nicaea, to compose a reply to
2
Paul's questions .
1. Gregoras xxix, 57s 1X1,264. J. Meyendorff, introduction
a i!etude, pp.164~16o.
2. J. Meyendorff, ' Projets tie conoilo oecumenique.' , > ,0.
14, (i960), 139-lob. 1Ouxoq 5r| o rJau\oQ ttoAAoc ktl pXoocpriua
Ttocpcc t(j5v xcc xou BapXaap, vu '\kiv5uvod cppovotivxwv ocwtikoooq,
auwocpavTiK'UQ ene uyovtojv xrf xtiq Kocvaxavxi vouitoA-eooq xyif
tHH\r\oCa ETte^fixEi ueta artouSriQ irapa xlvoq x5v xou y,EpouQ
(contd.)
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What conclusion Paul cane to about hesychasra is not
known"*", but the fact that lie was prepared to pursue his
enquiries over many meetings on both the occasions he was
in Uyzantium, shoi«?s that he, alone of all his colleagues in
the cowan hierarchy, set great importance on gaining an
accurate insight at first hand into current developments and
viewpoints in dyzantium.
p
iv) Joim Laskaris ! alouhoros *
John Laskaris halopheros was cast in a very different
mould from those individuals who have already been considered
as links between east and west, but in his own way he played
aii important part in keeping J>zantium and the west in con¬
tact with each other, and he helped to maintain the momen¬
tum of negotiations between the Jhurches at times when
they seemed to have broken down.
The nature of the link formed by Joim Laskaris *alo-
pheros can be expressed in several different ways. Jfirst
of all he belonged to a family which provided many converts
to dome and he himself was converted some tine before 1365.
is brother laxl u»s Laskaris Xalopheros, who Jiad encouraged
John V's union initiative in 1355 was also converted by
1365, although he was a monk and chancellor of the patriar¬
chate. Of the rest of the family Alexias Lasicaris, a high
rrf q evvAr.oC xq iicxQeiv, el aoa aVnPTi eit] xa tiepi xuxuSv
Xeyoueva r? ]if\. Touxo 5r| uxbdv (3occi\edq o Kavxanou^rivoQ,
UETavXriTov ettou"nPaxo xov HauXov ev xcj) TcaXaTtc^, wal 5lq
nal TptQ wal TioXXaHtQ auxcp KEpl tcov ^rixouiaevoov x
5uaXex5eLQ, ocxe^el^e xouq jev tk "\hlv5 0vou h x 1 BxpVxxp.
cppovouvraQ hcx.h<oq cppovouvxocc • A* Papadopoulos-Kerameus,
IeoopoXijuix 1 hti Bt GXi oQfyn « Petersburg 1899} p.llo.
1. A latter nuhlxsliod in ^.P . u .1 >4. 833-d 3d, purports to be
froni Paul to Urban V on the subject of hosychas 1. It is
known from only one sixteenth century Greek manuscript
with the unusual title, EtupxoXti TTxuXou.... etcI xov
UXHxpLcbxaxov ndTrav nal xo^q auxou wccp5 1 va\C ouq
J. teyendorff ' Projets de coucile ooci leaique1 ,
p.loO n.30. concludes tliat it must be a forgery. bee also
G. 'orcati, o fcizie, p.03 f.
2. boo especialTy TTBsaer, Das abenteuerlicb.e Le >en des
.T ohnaae a Laakari.« alophero s . (Wi e rbadon 1969) .
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X iperial official, accompanied John V to Ro ne in 1369# and
snuel Laskaris joined the Roman Church together with his
whole family and became a priest*".
The influence of John Laskaris Kalopheros was greatly
strengthened by the nobility of his birth, Whether or not
his claims to bo descended frou the fa illy of .Laskaris
which provided Nic&ea with some of its emperors were su.md,
lie was everywhere accepted as a man of noble blood. This
was reinforced by a succession of marriages lie made which
connected him with influential families in east and west,
his first wife was aria Kantakouzene, John V*s niece through
his wife Rolen. The prospect of disaffection as a result
of this match between a lantakouzene and a Las! oris caused
John V to forbid the marriage, and John Laskaris Kalo-
phoros went into exile among westerners. It was thus that
ho cam© into contact with Cypriot society and, after Jaria
iiantakouzene' s death, marriad iarie de Mimars, the widow
of a noble bypriot Jean de Soissons* Finally as his third
wife he took Lucia, the daughter of Lrard III lavros, baron
of Arcadia, bach wife contributed to his circle of strate¬
gically placed and influential relations, and to 3 .is growing
1. For the conversion of J.L. liaiopheros, see letter of
drban V to Peter Thomas 18 April 13^5* ' iam diu invet-
erataa schisma tofcaliter dereliqu.it* . "iautu, 11 124-125•
vlor M.L. Kalopheroa, see Tautu 11, 128 { and u. Halecki,
in oirperenr. p.95*
!*'or A. Laskaris, see 0. Ilaleclci, L'n onporeur, p»94;
For li• Laskax'is, soe the letter of Gregory XI to Ilugolin,
Latin Patriarch of Constantinople Id January 1373* Tautu
12, 103-104, and nalccki, m emperear, pp.23 4-235•
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X 2
wealth" . lost significant were his contacts in Cyprus .
here he quickly won the esteem of Peter of Lusignan with
whom he went on several military expeditions* including the
crusade to Alexandria* and whoa he helped with financial
contributions.
JoSm's riches were derived not only from the large
©states he had gained by marriage but also from his extensive
trading interests* he obtained a special licence fro.a
Gregory XX to send trading galleys to Alexandria and he was
q
a -iajor exporter of silk to Aragon and Oastille . A letter
fro,a the Council of Barcelona to the .ing of Aragon in 13 j 3
illustrates his importance in ;= editerranean politics, it
refers to a claim made on behalf of John and others for
compensation to be paid for some of their goods which had
been seized from Catalan ships by the captains. The Council
advised the king to uaice a payment for the goods since John
La&karis Aalopheros was an 'eminent and powerful man in Modon
and was Count of the islands of hakynthos and Cephalonia
where there woro uiaay Catalan .aerchaiits who might suffer
1. R-J. Loanertz, 'Pour la biographic de Jean Lascaris
Caloph<£ros', R.C.b. 28 , (1970), 129-139. Kydonos
■orre spandance, od. R-J. Loenertz, letter 73, lines kO-
4b, 'what the emperor reproaches you for is no trifle,
... yo'ar crime is to have become the friend of those
who do not like the emperor, to have coveted an
alliance which would suit an emperor and to have be¬
come related to those who covet his crown'.
2. D, Jacoby, 'Jean Lascaris Calopheros. Ohypre et la
..ore'©', K.a. 28, (l^uo )t 1 1^-220. Gregory \x recog¬
nised -valopioros' qualities! ' nobilitate, prudentia mo-ritas
ccaepic-uos ac nobis ot quam^plurious regibus et principibus
iTundi diloctus et cams' , 0. haleclci, Un empereur,
p.2/3# n.4.
3» Tautu 12, 229. Kalopheroa also received permission
to lead a hundred people on pilgrimage to the holy
places, ibid.. pp.23i>-24o.
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riling interests Joim vas among the most cosmopolite^ men
of liia day, for although lie was always known in the west
as 'Lilies Constantinopolitonus' , he was also granted
with tliis international background John La&karis
i-alopheroo formed a porrianont contact between the Greek
and hatxa worlds* .but his contribution went cooper than
his powerful connections since, as a confirmed unionist, he
was able to ploy a unique role as a direct personal link
between Byzantium and the Roman Curia . On 18 April 1365
Urban V wrote a very conciliatory letter to John V, in which
he expressed great hopes for the reunion of the Churches
and for the salvation of the empire from the Turks. With
this in raind Urban made the unusual offer of forming a
naval league to aid Byzantium without insisting that union
be achieved beforehand. He said that positive action was
only waiting for an end to the hostilities between lenoa and
If.
Cyprus and he added an invitation for John V to visit him •
This sudden thaw in the pope's attitude towards Byzantium
1. .* " ' * -- - * " ' - l* Orient Jataifr 1301-
Johannes ha.a'carig V.alcnharos ;>p . 18 "-1 ' 6 . ' .1 oban baseari
es ho a assat's no talilo e "asaenyalat en lo dit loch de
hodo, e es corate de les illos de Jazant et de bephalonia
en les quals illes molts morcadsrs cathaian s e nitres
do vostra sanyoria convoncvn ah lure robes e .tercaderies
e han aqua, pendre port de uecessitat, a si sa'uisfaccio
no a fahia do la clita seda, es dubte que 13 dits
mercaders 110 fossen dampnifioats' •
2. '•), Jacoby, 'Jean Lasoarls Calopheros' » C. U .« 2b. (1968 ) „
204, 214.
3. Gregory XI mentions Kalophoros' intei"est 'pro raagnis et
arduis negociis iicclesiam do lanam ac incro iontum fidei
orthodoxae ac j^artes oriontales concemantibus' •
Tautu 12, 149.
4. Tautu 11, 122-123.
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was entirely I to worst of John Lnsuaris falopheros -who had
visited Avi, .-ion in the Lope tha t l!rban V won Id intercede
with the o i:jaror on his behalf to and his exile* -a the
letter which Urban wrote to Joint '/ to asouro hi of John* *
loyalty ho amle it clear that Kslopheros had Informed hi *
about the state of the e xpire and had given hir* news which
nsade his regard Uyzantium more favourauly • The news which
rhan would have been wsi. interested to hear was of the con¬
version of .axi'noa Laalaffis f©lophero®, he .retries ydorsea
and aimel figelos, to whom he wrote letters of cotigratu-
1ation2.
John*© second contribution to the cause of union was
mds in 13/3, when regory \x was convinced of ti e need
for positive notion against the Turks, out was unable to
decide which of the possible piaxis would •>& : io«t effective#
- \ this situation the arrival of a »an who knew the local
situation well was a great help# The decision to sot up a
oea«> ased international 1©ague which would draw email eon-
tin.,-outs fro i the powers moat closely concerned with the
irkiyu problem, required an International ion of affairs
as a co-ordinater. .regory employed John taskaris alo«
pharos as nn embassador to those whoso help ho required,
sending ni.-. to f ranco, Naples, <«»gary aim diodes#
this plan failed, bregory laeie a final gesture of
coufiden.ee In < alopheroe, suggesting that formal union "ogo~
t lot iona sliould onco again bo undertaken and that the ho &n
daurch should ae represented by the most eminent of it»
converts fit i tie east, hemetrios ydonee end John hnekaxi*
3
■ .alopheros«
1# i-•id. pp. U3-12'm 1 lobRWM • • •» nobis nsiHn quae to in
etf "'"'imperil tui lumorwa et state n proswerub diao-^euntur
coritij 'Oi'O, t idoliter ; e - .asi t' • s2# ibid# op# i<§8t u. daieeki, .,n etaoereur# pieces Justifi-oatIves no#3# f-v-.j-i-*3» U* Haiecki| eo, oit» pp,3M»l-2bd • '.fautu 12, 130# Chregory\f. aesortoerf iC aXop!T©ros, aa * anl •.x> a» i» i>I arl ■ nr. ■ i contr«
■nrr-iOR eos- -'or ©I.d© IV, Uu;.->oai vprsuciis et coat ictloni-
• ws r..e no vcirs iilnr-j-1 oar© .turn tnfor jatus et alias ytr
intelligent ac circumsp©c tua • • HtlMki, eo.olt. p#2/<», n.i
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v) Anne of Savoy
The personal liiucs e twoon east and vest were not re¬
stricted to Creoles resident in the west; dyantium also had
its share of Latin immigrants who settled in the empire
a id were a constant re sindor that the two sides of 01iris ten-
doa were not totally irreconcilable• The aost prominent of
these figures during John V s reign was his mother Anne of
oavoy, who was Andronikos JljLi* a second western wife1 •
Anne's departure fro i the west had raised somo hopes
that, by her influence, Androniscos Xii light be persuaded
more roadily to join the ho ran Jhurch himself. benedict
.XX, however, had doubts about the wisdom of mixed marriages,
and feared that it was much aore likely that the husband
2
would convert his wife to his rite". In an attempt to
reduce trie impact of her Greek surroundings, Anno was accom¬
panied at her wedding by a large retinue of Savoyards, botii
men ancl women. Although most of them returned home after
the festivities, some remained, notably a woman called
Zampea (Isabella) who stayed with her sons and distinguished
herself by her wisdom and education. Also several Savoyard
nobles elected to stay and serve the eiporor and introduced
the court to Jousting and tournaments. Then these men had
to leave for hone replacements cane fro i ^avoy and 'there
3
were nearly always some Savoyards with the young emperor' .
The effectiveness of this retinue in keeping Anne enclosed
in a Latin, world could not be very great or lasting. A
1. i). uratore, na priuci >assa abauda sul trono di .-izaii-
aio. viiovarma di Javuia imporatrice Anna Pai'eolo .ina
( §hambdry i9d 5) ,,
2. xr.-ttu i, 31-32. Letter to iidward Joi nt of bavoy,
31 December 1323. N
3. Xantak. 1,32: J., 203j 'eueivcxv 5e y,EXJ exuxffe, o\C/ov xiveq
Mil ZtlTXEX pi oc TCOV YUVAlK'tV '"tit T01Q Vital , (ppOvfjoEl T £
^
uttepexondx tciq ctwaq mil pacixikoiq oikoiq 51a. xe ttxi6eixv
kcci xiiv a\\t|v euitt]6eioxtixx, TtpeTtouoa tixxpC(3siv!
The Savoyards introduced 'ttiv x^oudxpC&\> w.ai to. xep veps vxa
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Do.;i±nican writer who visited the ©■ lpire suortly after Anne* s
arrival, reported that she had been Made to send away all her
servants, nurses, counsellors aud spiritual advisers includ¬
ing four Franciscans, and had become a 'faithless Greek'^,
thus ."-enedict vii' e fears were realised,
Ariae's convorsion to the eastern Church cannot be doubted
despite the persistent story that she entered a Franciscan
nunnery and left instructions in her will that she was to
be buried in Assist. Anne certainly became a nun, but in the
yzantine rite, the oynodlcon of Orthodoxy records that she
took the veil and the name of Anastasia, a fact which would
2
not have been mentioned had Anne becoae a Franciscan nun ,
ihrther.iore Amie played a full part in the affairs of the
dyzantine Church, although in the early years of her regency
she alloxced the Patriarch kalekas to manipulate the relig¬
ious situation as part of his political campaign against
John kantakouzenos, To this end he secured the imprison¬
ment of the heaychast leader, Gregory ala taa, on a warrant
signed by Anne, Jut Palaias was convinced that Anne was
basically on his side and insisted that his politically
motivated arrest did not reflect Anne'a true convictions,
There is so le evidence to support Palamas' contention.
Anne refused to recognise the ordination of Akindynos on
the grounds that he waa a formally condemned heretic, des¬
pite the fact that halekas had performed the ceremony;
furthermore she authorised Ikindynos's ejection fro
sanctuary, in. 13k6, with the political tide running against
1, Pa-Urocax-dus,Plrectorium ad oaseafrluLi faciendum. Recueil
des historians de3 cifolsados. docrrTar^r^TrTrrXenr,TT,
p . i2F , vl so Guilielurus Ada>: , i)e mode arraceuos
extirpandi, ibid, p#5*»?• 'Graeca perfida est effocta'•
2, f. iolubovich, sioiiotoca bio-oxbliografica dolla Terra
•T'i Ft o Toll' oriii.ttc fi'n'icQscana, 3, 30G-303, J.huratore,
'norinciuessa sa?)auda.nr>, 2k2-2hk • G, ercati, otizio,
•'Awns, x'ns ev tuaegei tri pvnyij yevopevns a01*5^00
<5ecnroivns nywv, xys 61a too 0eiov kou ciyyeAikou crxnyaxos fiXTovo^icccrljaarjf
'Avyc-rycrtyr
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her* Anne looked beyond the politioal intrigues of Xalekas
and made an attempt to understand hesychasm. She received
the Dogmatical Treatises from Philotheos Kolckinos on Mount
Athos in defence of Gregory Palamas* teachings. She asked
Kalekas to write a book setting out his side of the contro¬
versy and then arranged for Palaraas to compose a reply.
Finally, at Anne's request, David Dlshypatos composed a
history of the dispute between D&rlaam and Palamas to explain
the role played by Akindynos*'.
Although Anne was fully converted to the Byzantine
Church, she did not wholly lose sight of her western back¬
ground or of her potential influence in unifying east and
west. Despite the reduction in her western retinue, Savoy¬
ards continued to appear in the empire as men of importance
and influence. The superior of the Franciscan house in
Pera, Aregos, known as Henry in the west, caste from Savoy,
and Philippe de Saint Germain, who had formed part of the
entourage in Constantinople, was sent as an ambassador to
Clement VX in I3U32.
As a unionist Anne did less than might perhaps have been
expected of her. Benedict XXI wrote to her on 17 January
1337 to ask her to encourage her husband along the road of
union, but although Andronikos XIX briefly showed signs of
interest in the western Church there is no evidence that it
was as a result of wifely pressure**. Anne's embassy to
2. On the identification of Aregos with Henry see Golubo-
vloh, niblioteca blo-blbllografica 3, p.297• On
Philippe see T&utu 9, *»6. J • Gay, he Pape Clement VX
et les affaires d' Orient T(Paris 1904), pp.46-5**•
3. Tautu 3, 30-31. On the question of Andronikoa .til' a
'conversion' see U. Bosch, Kaiser Andronikos ill
Palalolortos. Vorauch elner Darstellung der byzanti-
niaohen Geachlohte in den Jahren 1321-1341.
(Amsterdam 19°3)» PP« 120-121.
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-toman Church which cannot have set inch store by her inse¬
cure position as regent*', Her influence directly on John V
cannot properly be gauged, but it is significant that he
looked so immediately and consistently to the west after
his accession. Finally the link established by Anne of
Javoy'a marriage lade Amadeo a cousin of John V. This
fivaily relationship was very important in drawing Amadeo' s
crusade to the help of Byzantium and in encouraging John V
to visit Rome ,
O
vi) Francesco Gattilasio-
Franeesco Gattilusio was a Genoese who like Anne of
oavoy, though from nore humble beginnings, married into
the imperial family and together with his son remained a
permanent western influence at the centre of Byzantine
political life througiiiout John V's reign, ills marriage to
John V's sister Raria was a reward for the help which he
gave John. in entering Constantinople in 133'+# and as a dowry
he received the island of Lesbos. This action was not seen
as the granting of political independence to Lesbos under
uenoese lordship, but as the creation of a separate appanage
within the empire for a member of the imperial family*
1. J. Gay, Le Pape Clement VI, p.2dff.
2. Amadeo was also related to John V through his mother
Violent® of Montferrat who was a member of the cadet
line of the Falaiologoi through Andr-onikos IX's second
marriage* See D. Huratore, dna principosoa Babauda.
genealogical table. In the union negotiations of 1367#
Amadeo appealed directly to John V's sonse of family
responsibility, 'lay esto melencolieux considerer que
ma mere partit de vous et vostre mere est partie de
nous, les contes de ©avoye'* J• Servion, Gestez et
cronicrues do la may son de mvoye. ed* F.L. Bollati,
■ Ibl iotiifec.ie de In .-.taiaon de oavoie_ 1 -2 , ('s .rin Id 7))
p.151.
3* On the Gattllusii see w .killer 'The rattilusij of Lesbos
(1333-1^02) ' ii»Z. 22 ,(1913)» kOb-kk'J • Reprinted in bssaya
on the Latin Orient. (Cambridge 1921),313-333* G.T.
>ennis, 'The short chronicle of Lesbos 1355-i^25,»
AepgiaKct, 5", (19L3), 2-2*t.
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Vo a certain extent this position was maintained in
reality as well as in theory. Although tlie practical admini¬
stration of the island was henceforth no longer in the Hands
of the central iyzantine govemtaent, Gattilusio played the
part of brother-in-law to the emperor very dutifully. xn
1333 he was one of the advisers who encouraged John V to make
his approach to tne papacy about church reunion, for which
he received a letter of thanks from Innocent Vf^". John* 3
proposals had a more distinctly 'western* character on this
occasion than on any other, incorporating such concepts as
the use of force, the rapid acquiescence of the whole empire
in the face of the emperor's example and western ar; is, and
indeed the acceptance of the basic human tenet that union
should oe seen as a matter of the return of the eastern church
p
to the parity of the faith through conversion". fho part
played by Francesco Gattilusio and Paul bishop of Smyrna
certainly contributed to the character' of John's initiative.
Gattilusio next appeared on the Byzantine scene in 1306
when he assisted Auiadeo of Javoy' s crusade in its attacx on
the Xurklsh held town of Gallipoii. he played a large part
in both the planning and the attack and, after the town had
been taken, ho accompanied Amadeo to Bulgaria in order to
obtain loave for John V to return home from Uungary aoi-oss
3
juigarian territory . Francesco Gattilusio seems to have
been the only member of the imperial family to have partici¬
pated actively in the effort to rescue the emperor fro.a his
embarrassing position and bring him safely to Constantinople.
1. Tautu 10, 173.
2. A. Theiner and F. iklosicF, onu lenta spectantia ad union-
em Beclesiarani iraec;m at omanae pp.29-33 (Greek), 33-
37 (Latin). uoo above, fp . 31-34-.
3. J. Servian, Fosioy. ot croniciues. PP»133» 13G-133* 1^3*
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After the emperor's return to Byzantium the important relig¬
ious negotiations, -which were to result in his visit to
Home in I309, were undertaken. Although Francesco's name
does not appear in the records as a oentral participant in
the discussions which took place, he received a letter from
Urban V, dated 6 November 13&7, praising hin for his •faith¬
ful advice and efficacious aid' in the business of recon¬
ciling the Greeks with the Roman Church3", in addition, when
John visited Rome to make his submission to Urban V, Francesco
Gattilusio formed a part of his retinue and was one of the
four Greek-speaking members of the Roman. Church who witnessed
2
the profession of faith on behalf of the Byzantine contingent .
The relations between Gattilusio and John V were not
always good. After their return from Italy in 1371 John V,
disillusioned by the lack of solid support which the west
via.6 prepared or capable of offering, and convinced of the
invincibility of the Turks after their crushing victory
over the cerbs on the Maritza river, gradually abandoned his
westward-looking policy in favour of throwing in his lot
with the Turks* Those who had consistently supported his
policy of western alliance were alienated from the emperor
and among them were Demetrios Kydones and Gattilusio. John V
was sufficiently alarmed by their opposition to prevent them
meeting on Lesbos ,
however, this antagonism did not last. It is signifi¬
cant that in the Chioggia War, in which Gattilusio's Genoese
sympathies would have caused him to support the revolt of
Anchonikos XV, he is instead found supporting the Venetians
lT Tautu 11, 211*
2* ibid.. 289* bee above, p. 95".
3. ." Loenertz, 'Demetrius Oydcm&s XI, ae 1373 h 1375',
O.C.P., 37. (1971) i)einetrios Kydones Correspondance. ed.
U—J. Loonertz, letter 11/ to Joim emphasises the relat¬
ionship with Francesco ' xu5 aw Kn<Seax^', r,fte t 3, arid the
fact that he was a Christian' and a friend, lines 20—27•
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who t?ere allied to John V. An agent of Gattilu3io,
:;affaolo de Quarto, .stirred up uiie Venetian Inixabitanta
of the 1 aland of fonedos against ceding the island on the
terms of the treaty of Turin, -saying that if the Genoese
could gain power in Venedoa tlxey would force the Venetian
colonists to emigrate or turn into Jews"'".
Perhaps the most important contribution made oy
..'raneesco Gattilusio to the development of tutual. under¬
standing between oast and west, was to give a practical
demonstration of the possibility of coexistence on the
island of Lesbos. He learned ireelc and showed great toler¬
ance of the customs and religious habits of his Byzantine
subjects. Throughout his rule the Roman archbishop fttne-
P
tioned side by side with the Byzantine metropolitan". Xt
was through such attitudes and in such an atmosphere that
the barriers between Latins and Greeks could be broken
down, and the sharp divisions, which for the most part the
official contacts only tended to emphasise, could be blunted




D. The effects a the contacts oetween east and west.
In the preceding pages a number of factors have been
examined whose influence tended in one way or another to
strengthen the links between east and west by increasing
their consciousness and knowledge of each other and* in the
process, gaining a greater understanding of themselves, their
prejudices and their misapprehensions. However, it remains
to be seen, to what extent these factors succeeded in influen¬
cing the thoughts and actions of Byzantines and Latins and
whether there was a perceptible growing together as a
result of these contacts. In order to narrow the horizons
of this investigation, this study will concentrate on four
of the most eminent figures of Byzantine intellectual and
religious society in the reigri of John V, representing two
farailies and two distinct attitudes towards the west and
the part it could play in Byzantine life. They are the
brothers Bemetrios and i-rochoros Kydones on the one hand,
and Meilos Kabasilas and his nephew Nicholas on the other.
These two pairs had much in common} most significantly
they all came from Tliessalonica, a fact which contributed to
the similarities in their educational and political back¬
grounds and brought them into close friendly contact with
each other. Both the Kydones and the Kabasilas families
had noble antecedents and good connections, but suffered
in common during the period of Zealot mile in Thessalonica
between 13^1 and 13^6^"* 5oth families gave political
support to John Kantakouzenos, who became a personal friend
of both Ueuetrios and Nicholas in whose company he once
1. R-J • Loenertz, 'Demetrius Cydones i, de la naissance a
1373*. o.c.p. 36 9 (1970), ka-cyo.
1?8
contemplated entering- monastic life*'.
Educationally and intellectually they shared a common
background* indeed Neilos Kabasilas acted as master to both
2
Demetrlos and Nicholas in Thessalonica , and they all show
a profound knowledge of the 'profane wisdom' of the Greek
classics which they employed freely in their writings.
Xn the religious sphere they had all been exposed to the
same influences when young. Neilos and Nicholas Kabasilas
were firm adhex*ents of Gregory Palamas and the two Kydones
wore also well acquainted with hesychasm which had strong
associations with Thessalonica. Demetrios had as his early
spiritual director the future patriarch Isidore Boucheiras,
a disciple of Palaraas, and Prochoros spent his adult life
as a monk on Mount Athos, a stronghold of hesychasirr. The
two families were equally divided between monastic and
secular life: demetrios was a layman, as was Nicholas for
4
most of his life ; Prochoros and Neilos were monks. despite
these many similarities, however, there were deep differen¬
ces between the two families, particularly in their recep-
tiveness to the western influences which were at work in
Byzantium during their lives.
1. For the friendship of Demotrios, Nicholas and John, see
Kantak.iv, 16 till,107* For the friendship of Demetrius
and ?!eilos, Kydones .Apologia. Notizie. p.391, lines 11-
12, 'lie was so attached to me that it surpassed the
classic friendships' . Kydones. Correspondance. letter 87
invites Nicholas to share the xruxts of Kantakouzenos'
victory, for which he had suffered.
2. On Thessalonica as a centre of philosophers, writers and
orators see Kydones, Occisorum Thessalonicae Monodia.
.i.p«G. 109, 644b.
3. R-J . Loeuerta, ' Deme'trius Cydones i', 0 .0»P.. 3^,(1970) 48.
4. On the question of whether Nicholas remained a lay aan all ,
his life see A. Aii;jelopoulos> NikoAoios KotgaaiAas XayaeTos, ri gain
ka\ to epyov av-roC,Analekta blatadon, 5^ (Thessalonica 197©),
pp.69-74. Angelopoulos concludes that Nicholas became
a nonk and later a 'priest of the altar' . Also X. Sevcenko,
'Nicholas Kabasilas' anti-zealot discourse, a re-inter¬
pretation' , Q.O,P .. 11^ (1957)? d6—b7 n.24.
Demetrios had an adelphaton in the .aonastery of St .George
in Ilangana, R-J. Loenertz, ' i)e letrius Oydones II', 0 . C. P.
37, (1971), 7.to He was also a canon of the Roman Church
in 1'atras, Tautu 11, 316-31J,
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i) Deaetrios iydones
Doaetrios Kydones was undoubtedly most unrepresentative
of Byzantine society in the later fourteenth century in his
enthusiasm for promoting the growth and dissemination of
Kostem influences in the empire. However, he illustrates
how far it was possible for a prominent Byzantine to ffu in
accepting western concepts and beliefs.
On a personal level the most important and evident
sign of Demetrios' acceptance of western, influence was his
conversion to the Roman Church. To understand the nature
and the cause of this development it is necessary to estab¬
lish, as nearly as is possible, the date which it happened.
The only certain fact is that Demetrios xcas a member of the
Roman Church by April 1365 when Urbau V, having been Informed
of the fact by John Laskaris Kalopheros, wrote to congratulate
and encourage him"'". However, the evidence of two other
western sources suggests that Demetrios' conversion should
be dated rather earlier. Philip Incontri, describing the
discovery and translation of the acts of the anti-Photian
council in 1355 or 1356, stressed the part played 'by a
certain faithful Greek called Demetrios Kydones, who had
p
been converted to the faith' . Confirmation that Demetrios
was converted before embarking on his translations, is provided
by another Dominican, Bishop John of Tiltanyoh who, writing
in 1404 about the difficulties faced by Greek converts to
Rome, mentioned ' several nobles and monks who wore converted
by ono of our Spanish brothers. Among them was a learned man
1. 0. lialecki, ua empereur. p.j. no.5 P«3(j3»
2. 'Coadiuvante quodam fideli Greco vocato Demetrio Chidonij
nobili genere, cive Thesalonicensi qui conversus ad
fidem', T. Kaeppeli, 'Deux nouveaux ouvrages' , Arch.
Fx'aed,. 23, (1953)* 164-165.
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who was like another Chrysostom, and who after being con¬
verted with nany others to the catholic faith, learned the
Latin tongue and grammar and translated the books of bt.
3.
Thomas against the Gentiles '« This passage suggests that
Demetrios was convei'ted before 1354 when his translation
of the Gumma contra Gentiles was completed.
Demetrios* own account of his conversion suggests
that it happened after the translation of the Sununa contra
Gentiles and was preceded by a long religious crisis during
which he attempted to resolve his spiritual difficulties
by questioning all the people and reading all the books
o
which might be of any help to him". These factors have
led most writers to date Demetrios' conversion in the
early 13^0*s. Two points, however, ,iust be considered.
Demetrios' long description of his conscientious yet fruit¬
less exposure to the repetitive arguments of his opponents
living and dead nay have been exaggerated to make his
decision to join the Roman Church seem more lengthily
considered than in fact it was. Similarly his letter to
Neilos Kabasilas, attributed to the period of his ' spirit¬
ual crisis', and dated by its editor between 1355 and
13ul» in which he begs Neilos to share with him any informa¬
tion which would help him resist the charms of the Latin
dogmas, has a distinctly ironical air in the extravagance
3
of its language and of its sentiments towards Neilos •
1. A. Kern, 'Oer "Libellus de notitia orbis". lohannes XII
(de Galonifontibus?) Q.P, Erzbischofs von Sultariyeh' ,
Arch. iTaed, d,(193^)>101 lines 10-14.
2. Kydones.Apologia. Notizie, p.386 lines 49-52, 'Thus
armed X tackled "Che Task of reading everything that had
been written during the five hundred years or so that
the schism had lasted' . p.39o lines ^2-3J, ' When X
had no more hope of finding out anything from books...
X went to sit at the gates' of the wise nen, like a
lovesick man at liis girl's door* .
3. D. Kydones.Correspondance, ed. R-J. Loenertz, letter 378
lines 4-11, '1£ someone ... staggers tnose who read him
by his knowledge and subdues those who approach him by
(contd.)
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Demetrlos' conversion could \fell have been accomplished
by the time the letter was written*
The fact which emerges clearly from all the accounts
of Demetrios's conversion, both his own and the western
versions, is that it was an intellectual conversion, closely
connected with his relations with the Dominicans and his
translations of Thomas Aquinas. From the moment that
Deaietrios began to read Aquinas and experienced ' the flights
1
of his thought and the forcefulness of his arguments'
he was as good as converted. The translations began,
Kydones' house became a meeting place for westerners, espec-
2
ially the Dominicans , and it is hard to believe that this
period about 135^ does not mark, the turning point in Derne-
trios' conversion.
The impact made upon Demetrios Kydones by Aquinas and
the Do'iinicans not only resulted in his conversion to the
Roman faith, but also is visible in much of his later writ¬
ing. ills concentration on Aquinas is expressed everywhere,
in the identification of the Dominicans with the person of
3
Thomas , and in the feeling that his writings formed the
essence of Latin theology. Furthermore Kydones regarded
himself as Aquinas's personal champion and, having introduced
him into the Byzantine world, he felt responsible for his
fate. Thus in his defence of Thomas Aquinas against iMeilos
Kabasllas, Demetrios wrote that he was prepared to stay
silent while Noilos attacked the Latins generally, but once
his virtue, 1 call him .... a divine man .... X am con-
, f&sgs1 • •'
X • 4 '
%id6neKa\rpv1^v'l^Trfpobv, tcai
yaAtaQ' oaoi imp' aO-rc/is tns eToupeias ricrav Guiya'.
ifciidx 'XkltttoLS paav Qajya' ,
3. ibid..
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he turned against Thomas lie felt bound to reply1. In the
course of this reply Demetrios closely identifies himself
with Aquinas, referring to hira as 'our Thomas' and to his
2
enemies as 'our opponents' . Ite compares Thomas and Neilos
to the disadvantage of the latter, nut claiming tooth as his
friends; however, 'Thomas without doubt surpassed the other,..,
and what is mo re he had sanctity, a tiling so great that even
in the absence of knoxirledge it should cause us to associate
with liim who possesses it' . Throughout this wo tic Kydones
pays tribute to the excellence of Aquinas who 'by his wisdom,
virtue and study of holy scripture eclipses not only our men
but also many of those who formerly wore eminent in theology'^.
He protests that Aquinas is not in need of a defender since it
was 'a fruitless enterprise even to try to support the strength,
majesty and holiness of his words with such weak and petty
arguments'and he concludes that 'Thomas's works will remain
for ever and ever and will be an example of his wisdom and
~
\ T -> \ / > / ~ s > v.
1. '^yw 5e, yexPi yev ouxos koivi^ jcaxa iravxcuv e<j>epeTO, oiyr) icai ^auxos
xa>v 3Aaacj>yyiwv yicpowyyv.... eire\ 6e Kai xw yaKaplw 0wya xy^Sia xys
puyys (j>epoyevos EirEiryiSyaE TPS ekeivou irepi xa 0E^a aoijuas^Kai
a<pi3eias kui ayioxyxos ku . ' n^vyoEV...• aSiKov yyyaayyv aitoxrri xyv
eis ekeIvov irap£X0Eiv irapoiviav'.
M. liackl, 'Thomas von Aquin im tferturteil eines byzantini-
schen Theologsn' , Aua dem Geist des Mittelalters, iartin
Grabmaim sum bO. Gotourtsfcag. Sujiplementbaiid 3 {Munich
1935), p.l3<>6.
2. M. Rackl, ' Der hi, Thomas von Aquin und das Trinitarischo
Grundgesetz in byzantinischer Beleuchtung' , Xenia
Thomiatica 3 11925), 3'56-^d8v, - . ' \ ,* ■ V ' c ,
3. '$iAos y£v yap o6xos, ijnXos 6e Kai^Ocoyas Kai ao^w yev ayipag y o
UTTEpgoXf) Trap' eke'ivuj <a\ xoaouxo xo^jtAeov, woxe yy6e irapagaXXEiv
clival" Kai TtpoaEaxuM ayiuiaovy' irpayya xoaouxov, 6ji ' yv Kai xys
ao<j>ias x^P^s eke'ivov expyv irpoaip£"ia0ai Kai auyyaxeiv'.
.'■X. cackl, 'Thomas von Aquin im Werturtoil eines byzantini-
schen Theolo, ;en' , p.l3,ub. \ > >. < v
4. Xbid. dvSpa xoaouxov ao<fia xe Kai apety Kai xy TTEpt xov 0eiov Aoyov
PeXextj ou xous je<J> ' yywv yovov aAAa Kai xuiv £in 0EoXoyia iraAai gEBoyyevuv
ttoXXous aiTOKpu^avxa'.
\ > /
5. M. Uaclcl, 'Per hi* Thomas von Aquin', 3 jg n.l/. cTnv,EKeivou
(xou 0wya) xwv Aoywv lax^v Kai yEyaXoirpEireiav Kai upoa£0 ayioxyxa
ouxojs aa0EV£ai Ka\ yiKpaTs etuvoiois oiy0yvai KaxaBaAEiv'.
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virtue to future generations, sine© they have been fortified
on all sides by theology and philosophy'1.
iCydones' most fulsome praise of Thomas Aquinas appears
in a letter to Maximo* Ohrysoberges, which is of particular
interest because it help? to explain the attraction of Aquinas
to Demotrios and many other Byzantines.
For it is undeniable that an abundant treasure
xtfill be found in this man* Of all the difficul¬
ties which our holy dogmas might present, you
will not find one which has not been directly
resolved in his writings or which might not be
cleared up by the questions and answers which
he proposes elsewhore. it is that, one could
say without fear of mistake, which gives his
works their special character, having placed
on the lips of imaginary adversaries the objec¬
tions which might be made to his thesis, he
resolves them, not in a sloppy manner but in a
way which discourages all insistence, ae solidly
establishes the truth which he is examining by
all sorts of arguments, going first to the holy
scriptures, which hold first place in his writ¬
ings, then appealing to the rigorous deductions
of {jhilosophical reasoning, with the result
that our faith is fortified by all possible
proofs. He is the first to have used this
teaching method, to my knowledge. According
to the professional dialecticians, this is in
fact the perfection of the science ; add to the
proofs which establish the thesis, the objections
which tend to oppose it and show that they are
without force, in such a way that no difficulty
remains to sueale up on the unwary like a robber,
able to snatch the truth which wo thought we
held away from us, and to deririve us of our
treasure^.
For Demetrios and other Greeks of his generation the
particular aerit of scholastic theology was its certainty,
its refusal to adrait more than one answer and the seemingly
xTcr tftrpr'vrsivou (too Owya) icai pevexv <a\ pevelv ye^pexpi
1. rravtos, 6eiypa xns ekeivou ao<f>ias kou apetns eaoyEva kcu tois
pETEiTEiTct, us av 0EoXoy{a Kai <|>iAoao<J>ia rravTO0£v Katuxcpuyeva1 .
Ibid. p.389.
U. Kydones. Corres;<ondaftce. ed. R-J. Loenert?., letter
333 lines 1O-20. Cited by I. Jugie, b-^ietrius Cydouos
et la the'ologie latino a Jyzance', MjOj., 27, (1923 ) 384.
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Inevitable progression from problem to solution carrying the
reader rigorously through every step. In a society which
lacked any form of certainty and in which constant political
retreat had undermined traditional explanations and beliefs, such
a. clear cut .and lucid system had an immediate appeal. In Byzan¬
tium therefore there was fertile soil and it was possible for
such sentiments as expressed by Jeraetrios to flourish in a
way not found in the west until the supremacy of Thomas Aquinas
was established among the theologians of the Roman Church in
the late nineteenth century.
An associated theme which runs through much of Dometrios
Kydones' writing is a profound admiration for Rome, the pope
and the curia. Rome is praised not only as the proper resid¬
ence of the papal curia but also as the source of empire,
hemetrios continually reminds his readers of the principle of
translatio imperii, but unlike most of his contemporaries who
saw in the theory tho ultimate proof of Constantinople's
superiority to Rome, Kydones insisted that because the seat
of empire had been transferred to the Byzantines from Rome,
they should honour the old Rone for providing thevn with their
name, institutions, titles and empire"*".
however, it was as the home of the curia that Rome held
a special place in Demotrios' esteem. Despite his disappoint¬
ment at the failure of iiis mission there with John V in 13^9»
1. The theme appears in kydones, Apologia. Notizie. p.t3^2
lines BO-chjr 'aXXa <ai to xris gaaiXeias uijjos eWeiSev fjicev riyiv....
Trap' ns Kai gaaiXeiav kcu BooXriv kcu xrtv yeyaXnv eutovupiav eSe^axo*.
The relationship is like 'ai cnroiKicti xais ynxpoifoXeoiv'.
Kvdones, Byboul.eutikos. Uonaiols, -i.P .U-,1.54. 977d-9bOa.
* *H y«P feicefvuv irBTi's x'ns '^yexfpos pnxpolroXiS1 y£yovEr.
D. ivydones. Co rrespondan.ee. e.d. H-J, Loenertz. letter" 36;
see i-J • Loenertz, 'Lettre de Demetrius Cydones a Andronic
Oendote, grand-juge des Ronains (13^9-1371) 1 , R«D. ■1. 29, (1971),
303-308.
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he clearly enjoyed being a centre of attraction at the curia,
sought out by wise men from all parts who congregated there
and who 'enjoyed listening to him even more than they enjoyed
speaking to him'. Although he told his brother in a letter
that the pressure of business had prevented him from making
friends with any of these aen, he addeds
nobody who is ariyuody here is completely unaware
of me; the greatest of them and those who cosnmand
the others know mo, like me and invite me to
their homes .... Everyone enjoys meeting sue, they
consider it profitable to hear* me spea*c and they
are annoyed when they hear me speak of returning
home; they attempt to keep me oven by force and
promise me Rome and their company in exchange
for ray friends and my country. And he who is
their chief and leader in everything believes
that .ay presence will be very useful in his
affairs and he honours me and gives me audien¬
ces today and promises me others if i remain a
little longer*-.
Among the honours given to Demetrios by Urban V was his
2
appointment as a canon of Patras on 9 March 1370 » and among
the eminent philosophers and theologians with whom he
became acquainted at the curia were Agapetus Colonna, bishop
of Hrescia and later a cardinal, and Pierre Roger of Beau¬
fort, a cardinal, nephew of Clement VI and the future Pope
Gregory XI-*, In his Address to John V, written shortly
after their return to Constantinople in 1371, Kydones sug¬
gested that he should be a permanent representative of the
emperor at the curia of Gregory XI who might be better dis-
L
posed towards John if his letters were delivered by his hand'.
1. D. Kydones, Correspondence, ed. R-J.Loenertz, letter 39
lines 22-32.
2. TSutu 11, 316-318.
3. Tov yEvvouov jAyoctuit6v. . .. tote et5ov £v'Paoiom.'
D.Kydones, Correspondance, ed. R-J.Loenertz, letter 190
line 61. '2>C\oc i*[v hoc! TCpoTEpov o oc\^^GreSory XI)
Ibid, letter 154 line 48. Also see Kydones, Ad Iohannem
Palaeologura Oratio, ibid. I, p.22 lines 34-35.
(contd,)
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Gregory shoved that Hydonos was not Misrepresenting the close¬
ness of thoir relationship by suggesting that Deraetrios should
represent the Roman Church together with John Laskaris Kalo-
pheros in fresh religious negotiations between Constantinople
1
and Home .
Demetrios Kydones was one of the very few converts xvho
managed to remain sufficiently disiJas3.ionat© to be of direct
use to the cause of Church reunion, he was proud to remain
a nyzantine despite his admiration for the west saying *as I
see it, after God, the fatherland is the tiling most worthy
of honour and the most holy and X set it before everything
else as the origin and homeland of myself and all X have..*.
kven in misfortune I would rather live in tay own country
2
than enjoy great honours abroad * * lie remained at his offic¬
ial post until the policy of rapprochement with the Turks
and the ejuperor' a lack of confidence in him forced hi i to
a
resign , and both in and out of office he continually advocated
a policy of alliance with the west and worked personally for
Church reunion on both official and individual levels* His
letters to George the Philosopher, Maximos Laskaris Kalo-
pheros and Maximos Chrysoberges demonstrate his lasting con-
L
cem in the religious affairs of his friends .
suggested to Demetrios that he should act as resident
ambassador for the empire at the curia, where his presence
*poterit esse catholico fidei multiplicitcr fructuosa*•
Letter published by G, lercati, brLmone Atuniano. >tndi e
Testij 30j (191b), 57 n.l. '..ydones mentions Gregory* s invita¬
tions in letter 154 lines 44-53 and letter 226 lines
174 ff.
1. T&utu 12, 150.
2. iCydones, Aeolo ;ia. Notizxe. p .400 lines 1302-1307.
3* Kydones. A-J iohaimem Palaeolo-yum Oratio. p*l8 and p.23
lino 12-13. "
4. O* Kydonea, Corxes^ondance, ed. il-J . Loouortz, letters 3X»
72, 101, 353.
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Although in the political sphere the -west was a dis¬
appoint :ent to Jeaetrios Kydones, his admiration for its
church retaained unaffected"''. Oemetrios tried hard to co nriuni-
cate this admiration to his fellow Byzantines and through his
work provided the i with tho riaterials necessary for a better
understanding of the Latins. Largely as a result of his
offort- the Jo sin leans had been brought into the centre of
Byzantine life and he himself had crowned their work with his
translations of Thomas Aquinas. The extent to which the
Byzantines took advantage of the groundwork done by Dene-
trio 3 will presently be considered.
2
ii) irociioros Kycio.,.ea
JProchoros Kydones, De e trios' s younger brother, was born
about 133b and entered monastic life while he was still very
young* Apart froa a short break when he visited his brother,
he remained at the Great Lavra on Mount Athos until his death
about 136'i or 1369• it is an unexpected place to find a man
who devoted most of hie energies to the translation into
Greek of Latin works of scholastic theology and who in his
secondary writing showed how entirely he had absorbed the
material which he had translated. Prochoros may even have
become a lember of the Roman Church, for although there is no
explicit evidence of the fact, the example of his brother and
his consistent- acceptance of western theological preeepts and
techniques suggest that he cannot have been far from an open
conversion.^
inevitably this situation led to conflict between tro-
choros and his colleagues 011 Mount Athos, but he waa relatively
1. According to Gennadios Scuolarios, Denetrios abandoned
the Roman faith just before ho died. This possibility is
exa Aned and dismissed by G. ilercati, Notizie, jjp .441-4 50.
ee also 3.G. Papadopoulos, Greok Transiat"1ons, p.iA.
2. For his career, see especially G. Mercati, Hotizie, pp.l-6l.
3. M. Candal, 'El libro VI de Procoro Cidonio (cobra la luza taborica)',
O.C.P., 20, (1954), 257» claims to find 'prueba explicita' of
Prochoros' conversion in a passage from his De essentia et operatione:
(Contd.)
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safe from official action against hira while Patriarch .Kallistos
was alive and Demetrios held high imperial office. After
Pliilotiieos Kokkinos succeeded Kallistos in 1364, Prochoros1 s
survival depended on the influence of his brother, who had
played a major part in. persuading John V to accept philotheos
as patriarch, and of John V himself, who in appointing Philo-
theoa had specifically forbidden him to take measures against
his auti—hesychast opponents. This protection worked well
enough until 136 5 when the ciperor and hornetrios left the
empire to visit King Louis of Hungary in Juda* Philotheos
took the opportunity presented by their absence to allow pro¬
ceedings to begin against Prochoros who was expelled from
ilount Athos by the higorineno 3 of the Lavra, James Trxkanas.
Despite pained protests from De.etrios, official investigations
followed which culminated in April 1363 in the condemnation
and excommunication of Prochoros by a synod which also
canonised Gregory Palamas. Very soon afterwards Prochoros
died, having made no recantation and leaving his brother to
continue writing in his defence*.
hiring his life on Moimt Athos, Prochoros was a pro¬
lific translator. How he managed to learn the Latin in order
to do this i:- not known, for while it was not difficult to
find a teacher in Constantinople or Pe,ra. , it is unlikely
that iount Athos contained anybody suitably proficient in the
language or books from which to learn. However, the success
of his linguistic studies is undeniable, he translated from
a wide range of authors, concentrating on St. Augustine and
Thomas Aquinas, but adding single works of erveus Natalia,
1. Q* Mercati, Motizie. pp.44-52. R-J . Loenertz, 'oemetrius
Cydon&s X* , 0.0.p.. 36f 62-65.
(Contd. from p.187 n.3)1 toOtcdv be ovtuq exovrwv, tt)v tt[q k<x0o\iwtiq
TcCarewQ 66£avs itepl toutov £k06a0ou neipocaovieOa, kcx0'oaov
av ol6v re kcxi o Qeoq p.276, lines 25-28. But this
single reference to the Roman Church as 'catholic' is not compelling
proof. See Mercati, Notizie, p.2 n.4.
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Joethius arid St. Jerome. The choice of works betrays the
same Dominican source as used by Dometrios,
The significance of Prochoros, however, does not lie in
bis translations alone, but also in the use he made of western
works, especially Aquinas, in his secondary writing. his
major work, called rieoY oucCocc HQU £veoYeCac or he essen¬
tia et operatione del; which was formerly attributed to Gregory
Akindynos^, consists largely of extracts from the gumma contra
Gentiles and ..aumma Theologiae of Thouias Aquinas. These pass¬
ages were not taken from the translations of Deuetrios but
2
were new versions prepared by Prochoros himself , without
any mention of the original author.
In this way the ideas of Thomas Aquinas were introduced
to a Byzantine audience which was unaware of their western
origin. Although the members of the synod which condemned
Prochoros in 1368 had read the De essentia et operatione Del
it is not clear whether they knew of its dependence on Aquinas.
The title of the work is not specifically mentioned in the
Tomos of condemnation, but certain of its chapters were cited
for rejection on the grounds that they were the product not
of holy scripture, nor of the saints but were derived from
Aristotelian syllogisms, lire so chapters were all taken from
4
the Gumma contra Gentiles . The synod did not recognize the
source, but it knew that Prochoros posed a rather different
and lore developed threat to the eastern Church than that of
earlier western orientated writers. Although the fomos con-
1. G« Gereati, Jotlzie, pp.l-lJ, It is partly published under
the name of Akindynos in 1.P.G.I51. 1191-1242. book Six
is published by I. Caudal, • El libro VI de i'rocoro Cidonio',
O.C.P. 20,(1954),, 247-297.
2. G» liercati, Notizio. pp.15-1'. Also S.G. i'apadojjoulos,
Greek Translationstpp.92-96•
3» "i.P.G. 151, /05d.
4. G. Gercati, iptizie. P«9«
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deiffied Prochoros for his adherence to the beliefs of .iarlaa i
and Akindynos, which was the customary formula used in the refuta¬
tion of Latin tendencies, it repeatedly emphasised that irochores
had amplified, their thoughts so that they wore 'far worse, no re
absurd and more impossible to respect' Thus the condemnation
of Prochoros nust also be seen as an i mplicit condemnation of
the thoughts and writings of Aquinas* i'hit> is emphasised by
the fact that John Kantakouzenos, who was certainly acquainted
with the Greek translations of Aquinas, was sufficiently dis¬
turbed by Prochoros' s work to write a refutation of it and so
2
endanger J lis friendship with iene triosDespite these attacks
the career of i'rochoros iiydones not only resulted in a large
amount of basic western source material becoming available to
Greek readers, but also marked a new stage in the assimilation
of that material into Byzantine theological writing*
ill) ^eilos iaaasilaa
Derne trios Kydones concluded his description of the taking
and dissemination of his translations of the works of Thomas
Aquinas with the claim that 'now Thomas's book against the
Gentiles is in many hands, praise is heaped upon the author
and much profit is derived from it by the readers' it is
1. 'noAAtj) xeipw Kai otTOTrajTE^a koii fiuaaege'axepct' > i,P .G.151.
71^o, >9^a* b.G, i'apadopoulos, Greek t ranslat ions, p.136 .
<- The ,ti11 o pt t\ie conylemnnt ion i'iFopoS auvo6iKo*s tcaxa lIpoYopou
lepoyovaxou xou Kugcovp, tou <f>povnaavxos xa BapAaap kcu
Akivsuvou' xt is pllblish0d H.p,(b 151,693-710 .
2• >.-.* Nicol, -tiie ^yz^aitine family of 1 an tanouzquos, p.99•
D. -ydones, .U o rre soondance> ^d. 1W . Loeuertz, letter 400
line 35P1 K atixos aovu$picqinv ' hydonee accuses Kantakou-
zo-ios of publishing his refutation very widely, in ionia,
Cyprus, Crete, Palestine, i£gypt, Trebizond and Cherson,
lines 21-22.
s
J. > '..ydqnes Apologia,. Nfotizio, p. 3^3 liues 2/-29'«Kou vuv
eaxiv^ev iroiAwv"xEpcFTxcTxouJGuipa kcxQ' 'EAApvtov gigAiov, £ttcuvov
pev <J)£ppv xoj auYYpa^eu» iroAAriv <5e kcu xoTs xpwuevois axjiEAeiav exov*.
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very hard to estimate the truth of this statement and to
decide whether a significant number of people actually did
read Aquinas once he was available in Greek, and if so whether
what they read had touch impact upon them. Furthermore it is
questionable whether this readership spread far beyond a close
circle of converts or sympathisers with the Koman Church
to those whose loyalty to the liyzaritine Church was never in
doubt•
One of the individuals in the light of whom these questions
may be most satisfactorily considered is Neilos Kabasilas,
simply because our information about him and his attitudes
is particularly full. Unfortunately however, much of the
evidence about Nellos's attitude towards Thoraas Aquinas and
western theology is found in the works of hemetrios Kydones,
who cannot be considered a disinterested commentator. There¬
fore we must compare what he has to say about heilos with
what can be gleaned frorn Neilos's own career and writings.
According to Demetrios' s testimony, Neilos had used his
translations of Aquinas and had * gained much wisdom and theo¬
logy from them'^; he became a 'confirmed admirer of Thoraas's
oooks* and was certain that no other thinker approached him in
2
depth of thought . When he was with Kydonos in privato, Neilos
praised the theology of Thomas, calling him 'a holy man and
3
the most useful of any of the doctors of tho Church' . Further¬
more, when Demetrios asked Neilos for his help in x'esolving his
1. "zy* te y«Pv TPOTEfJos xaSv^Gurya Aoycov airijAauaa, kou^ouxos (Neilos)tfaxepov iyoi ^pncrayevos spunve'i ook oAiya xris eiceivou ao<j>ias icai
SeoAoyias TrapEauaae'.
M. Uackl, ' Thomas von Aquin
im Ivorturtoil einas byzantinischen Theologen* , Aus dera
vei i t des .littolai ters, p,13o6. , ^ v
2. .-'/jlIouoA;nyLo ,ia, yoLiaio, lines.28«*2jt* T?v Y«P
xou Qoiya^ pi BaTOV n^"f(facxris xai xaiv eiceivou Aoywv e«Jin<j>iCexo
iroAAio xous xuiv aXXajv 5i5aaKaA<cv nTxaa8ai'.
3. D.Kydones, Adversus Cabasilam, cited G.Mercati, Notizie,
p.392 n.' tStqc y,ot ouyytv6uevoq dvrip tov Qocuocv tytov te^
hvi&Xe i koci tcov nomoTE y£voy,£vu)v £v ttj toO Qeou >E«K\T)Oiqt
6t6aakd\o)v (icpeXLhtiTaTov.1
spiritual difficulties, he found that Neilos -was 'in sua saie
state of doubt himself and was unable to be sure of the truth.
lie quoted a number of syllogisms which referred to the views
of both sides, and the contradictious arising from them which
similarly were valid for both sides ... e was in just the
same position as I v;as'^".
Apart from the intrinsic likelihood that two men whose
educational careers had been so interwoven should have shared
similar views on the most striking intellectual novelty of
their time, there is 110 obvious indication in any otner source
to suggest that Meilos found himself in the same condition as
hydoues regarding Aquinas and western theology. The impression
gained from bexlos himself is very much the opposite. The
icre titles of some of his writings illustrate the point.
The last part of his very substantial work Against the batins.
about the procession of the holy onir.it. bears the title the
Latins cannot hemonstrute by the use of syllogisms that the
2
noly Spirit px'oceeds from tne oon". Then there is a homily
against the Latins and a major work, directed against the papacy
in two parts, the first called About the papal primacy, the
other with a long descriptive title which may be summarised as
That the schist.i is the pope's fault for not calling an oecu-
3menical council . There are also a number of Leoychast works
which attack all those who do not share the views of Iregory
Palamas.
In the course of his work on the procession of the holy
spirit hollos Kabasilas repeatedly condemns and refutes the
1 • 30.
2. The last part is published by ;. Candal, Tilus Cabasilaa
et thoologia 3, Thomas de proceasione Spirltus Sanctl.
btudi' o" Teo*ti„ lib a (Rome 194 j). PP .13,s-~3 n'.'
3. The anti-papal works are published -T.P.G.149. 700-730
and 634-700.
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thoughts of Thomas Aquinas# ili.es© criticisms are sufficient
to show the extent of Hollos' s acquaintance with the works of
Aquinas* References to the usruta contra Gentiles appear sost
often; iu the last section of the work it is cited thirty-five
tines, often with precise references to the correct chapter
and book and occasionally quoted at length* The Su.?rna theolo-
■: JLae 1 s mentioned four times* all the references being taken
from Part One* There is also a single citation of the
Pe rationibus fidei« « « ad caatore i Antiochenu) i, In addition
.abasilas attributes to Aquinas a quotation which is not to
be found among his works; this was a point which Kydones
quickly seized upon in his refutation of Helios's book, but
it is his only error of this kind and seems to spring fro i a
genuine misunderstanding^" ♦ hollos 1 abasilas thus demonstrates
a thorough knowledge of the works of Thomas Aquinas which
were available to hi s, and also was cloarly well acquainted
with Latin theology generally, for in the forty nine chapters
of the last section of his work on the procession of the Holy
Jpirifc he deals with the whole range of Latin Trinitarian
doctrine with on accuracy and comprehensiveness which no
2
iyssantine writer before hia Iiad been able to achieve .
One of the most striking indications of the degree to
which "eilos had absorbed Aquinas's work is found in the
organisation and structure which lie gave to that part of his
work in which he attempted to refute the Thomist doctrines*
e adopted a rigorously systematic approach which is almost a
parody of Aquinas's own style, his thesis is that divine
1* M, Candal, -lias Uabasilas. pp.lOd-111 and 276* Candal
points out the similarity of the misattributed quotation




matter cannot be demonstx-ated, which he proceeds to illus¬
trate in separate sections showing how this fact is made clear
first of all by holy scripture, then by patristic tradition,
citing Dionysios the Areopagite, Jt• Basil, Gregory of . azian-
S5U3 and John Chrysostom, he then attempts to show that ' oven
Thomas himself at times said things incompatible with the
demonstrative method in admitting, as in hum.na contra Gentiles
1,3, that some divine things are beyond human reason. in this
May Neilos made Aquinas's words work against himself. In his
fourth section Kabasllas produces his evidence to show that
even roason itself cannot allow the demonstration of divine
mysteries. Then he introduces and refutes seven objections
to his case which the Latins make and finally, in the longest
section of the work, he cites fifteen passages from Aquinas
giving lengthy, accurate quotations and then refutes them one
by one. Xn this section he makes Aquinas speak for the Latins
generally in the same way as Kydones makes him do. Kabasilas
is hero following the technique which Kydones, in his letter
to .axirnos Chrysoberges, praised as 'the special character'
of Aquinas's works: 'having placed on the lips of imaginary
adversaries the objections which might be made to his thesis,
he resolves them .... by all sorts of arguments, going first
to the holy scriptures •••• then appealing to the rigorous
j»
deductions of philosophical reasoning' • However, Demetrios
found such methods less commendable in 'oilos than in Thomas,
and derided the work for attempting to coxiceal the inadequacies
of its contents with • altered presentation and unexpected style' ?
1 • ibid. , p.Ijk lines U-19 •
2. D. Kydones Correspondarxce. ed. R—J • Loemertz, letter 333®
Sec above p. 1837 b. cl-iro, * il parados so di rilo Gabasila* ,
atudi bizautiai & neoelleuici. 9 (195?) 3b2-3<i8, has shown
the Neilos borrowed extensively from darlaan*s writings
against the hesychasts in employing demonstrative tech¬
niques in the defence of apophatic theolog^,
3. Kydones, Apologia, Notizie, p.393 line 6k.' a\r\]L&xoi\f
i^cxWoLyi} KOCI xapoc6o£oiQ amxyYe^CctQ.'
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This closo acquaintance which Helios shows of the form
and content of Thomist theology suggests that iydones' claim
that Kabasilas was once an 1 ardent admirer* of Aquinas's works
lay have been true. If so, however, it is not clear why Veilos
should so utterly and so quickly have changed from admiration
to refutation. iJhat clUes there are coae from Dera«strios' own
works. ,q says that "eilos, while supporting him, urged him
to keep quiet about his feelings for Thomas because of the
unpleasantness which goes with disputes, saying 'you see for
yourself that it is not much use arguing against the emperor,
the patriarch and the nation'. however, 'when he saw that 1
could not ae persuaded, and that for the sake of the truth X
cared nothing for public opinion, he suddenly began to express
iiis real views, to argue with ae openly and to oppose iy argu¬
ments with hi3 own. This ho did out of fear that as a result
of his friendship with ne ho might be exposed to alio same
suspicions as I was, .... ho was friendly with the most impor¬
tant people among i.iy opponents, respecting them not for the
reasons with which they supported their faith, but because
of their holy clothing. • • * Tills is why he opposed me and later
abused what ho had formerly praised* .
fiiis account is no doubt influenced by hemetrios' s feeling
of desertion and betrayal, and it is in fact self-contradictory.
On the one hand it suggests that it was ftolios*s position and
aspirations within the hierarchy of the Byzantine Churoh that
prevented bin fro.-i making his admiration for Aquinas openly
kaown and from going further towards an admiration of Latin
theology generally.
1. Ibid., p.391, lines 35-43.
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On the other hand Desnetrios's account suggests that Neilos
was never wholeheartedly behind hydones and at no point was
prepared to allow his admiration for Aquinas to lead him
towards the same conclusion as it was leading his friend.
Despite their apparent contradiction both these suggestions
may have some truth in them. Helios's appointment as Metro¬
politan of ihesealonica in 1361 may well have been the event
which brought him to set about the compilation of his work
against Aquinas and the Latins1* iut equally there is no
evidence that N eilos ever contemplated abandoning his ortho¬
dox faith, indeed his praise for Thomas was evidently tempered
by his fear of the effect his skill might have upon the faith¬
ful since God had given him such powers that he could pull
o
apart arguments as easily as a spider's web"*, in his book on
the procession of the holy Spirit Neilos showed that Aquinas
had had an effect on him by adopting some of his stylistic
and philosophical techniques; his apprehension about Aquinas's
pov/ers appears not only in the general attacks upon him but
in his precise complaint that his writings do not proceed
from scripture 'but from worldly wisdom ... and stir up the
divine tradition as though it were imperfect or insufficient,
ike use of syllogisms had to be kept within bounds as the
servant of theology not its master. They could be admitted so
long as they were concerned with elucidating material derived
from revealed theology, but their use was quite unacceptable
in the absence or in defiance of scriptural writings, as though
1. M. Candal, Nilua Gabasilas. pp.27-2d.
2. Kydones, Adversus Cabasil am. Notizie. p.392*1*
3. h. Candal, -ilus Cabasilas. p'«27f> lines 26-2d.
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man could by ills owu efforts i taprove upon or replace divine
revelation* fhe Latins iiad to oe opposed and Aquinas liad to be
refuted, but tixelr techniques had their uses so long as they
were employed judiciously, as the Fathers themselves had used
them, 'not always but in time of battle' , From Aquinas Neiloe
abasilas had learned the power of syllogisms allied with
scripture* oo ho employed this method as ho battled against
the hatin s and showed, that some western characteristics could
be absorbed and appreciated even by those who guarded their
orthodoxy closely.
iv ) hicholas Kabasilas.
The main themes of Nicholas Kabasilas's writings concern
the opportunity available to everybody for experiencing the
mystical life, the 'Life in Christ', and the importance of
the sacraments in attaining this experience . These themes
tie him closely to the .main iyzantine heeychast theologians
such as Gregory of Final and Isidore •oucheiras, who had been
•icholas* s teacher* Such a background might be taken to
b • J..ld, , p * 23 1 lino *> '°u6' aei, aXX'£v rai too troXeyou Kcupu!'.
Kydones emphasised the importance of his translations to
anti-Latin writers who could use them to become 'better
acquainted with the affairs of the enemy and therefore
counteract their strategy1 * Kydones, Apologia, botizie,
j • JJ J liiXeSH-O— ip* . . / , ir r\ ! \ V /•
2. On Nicholassee A*A• Angelopoulos> dtKoXaos KagaoiXas Xapaexfc
n gun <ai to EPYQVLJLUjrou. Analeutq lr.tadon, 3 4>hes«a- .
lo^lca 1970)/* Nicholas's two -xjor works are 1} plJnv-£- TnsXexxoupfias, published M.P.G. 130, 367-^92} trans¬
lated by J. '.ussey and P. icNulty, Nicholas Cabasflas;
a coiiimaiitax'y on tap divine bitur, ;y. (London 19bb), and
S, Salavilley Explication de la Liviiie Lituirpu, (Paris
1967). li) Tlepi TPC £v XptaTS Ccotjc M*P,G. 150, 493-726.
Translated by S. Hroussaleux La vie or, Jesus Christ,
. re .... -'.a .1 ovo.;o; ,.ii; 1 .:•*
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indicate that Nicholas also shared the antipathy towards
the west which characterises many of the hesychast writers,
however, the Latins appear only very rarely in Nicholas's
works and he did not write at all ort the central polemical
topics which occupied many of his contemporaries^. When he
did refer to the Latins in a more general sense, he displayed
some of the same characteristics which have been observed
in his uncle Meilos.
Chapters twenty-nine and thirty of Nicholas*s Commentary
on the divine liturgy are often, described as anti-Latin polemic,
but such a bald statement misses a very important fact about
the author. Although the chapters represent an attack on
Latin church practices, Nicholas displays a thorough knowledge
of Roman ecclesiastical forms and the thinking behind them and
also a desire to find common ground between the eastern and
western usages, 'those facts are illustrated by the chapter
headings themselves} on the one hand 'the criticisms certain
Latins made of us and a refutation of these*, and on the other
1 that in the Latin Church the consecration is performed in
o
the same way as by us' .
The main point of conflict was the epiklesis, a prayer
of invocation to the holy Lpirit said in the eastern church
asking for divine blessing upon the bread and wine of the
communion whereby their consecration is completed. The Roman
Church contended that this prayer was superfluous since the
consecration was fully achieved by the Words of institution
1. bennactios Scholarios says that Nicholas did not write
against the Latins at all. .-t.h .G. luO, 6b2bd.
2* T.t' .G. 150, kz >c and 433c.
199
' Tiiis is my Body «««', 'This is my Blood' which are spoken
eariiex* in the service, Nicholas explains the orthodoxy of
the Byzantine Church's position in an interesting fashion,
he first demonstrates that prayer is used to supplement the
•formal actions decx-eod in other ecclesiastical sacraments,
citing the particular example of ordination in the Latin Church
where 1 the bishop ordaining priests anoints the head of the
candidate with oil and prays that he may be richly endowed
with tho grace of the holy Spirit' «"*" Than Nicholas proceeds
to show that the Latins themselves use a prayer some time
after the Words of institution which although not explicitly
asking for the t ransub s tantiation of the elements is neverthe¬
less equivalent to the iyaantine epilclcsis, ho quotes tho
nor.ian prayer containing the vjords ' Command that these offer¬
ings be carried in the hands of thy holy angel to thine altar
2
on high' and explains that the Latins are asking by these
wards that the bread and the wine should be transformed into
the ' higher and holier' consecrated elements, 'Thus, though
q
in different words, they are asking just what we ask' ,
Nicholas emphasises the closeness between oast and west
in the matter of the epiklesis by explaining that the Byzan¬
tines do not believe that the prayer alone consecrates tae
elements for 'once the words (of institution) are pronounced,
the entire sacrifice is complete'4, 'oo we pray that the
elements might be consecrated? Certainly aot; for they are
so already; but that they may sanctify us, so that God who
1• ibid., 432c, in fact it is the hands of the oriest which
are anointed.
2 . Ibid,y 433d.
3, Ibid., 437a. SicxcpopoiQ nal \6yoiQ, £v hoci to ocuto
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sanctified them nay also sanctify us through them' . Thus
Nicholas Kabasilas attempts to explain to both sides the
customs and beliefs of the other and it is reasonable to
assume that he made these same observations directly to the
Latins with whom he ciiust have come into contact in order to
O
gain such a complete and lucid knowledge of the Roman rite «
Nicholas concluded chapter thirty of his Commentary on
the divine liturgy with the statement that 'it is evident
that It is not the whole Latin Church which. concieuuis the
prayer for the offerings alter the words of consecration,
but only a few innovators, who are causing her harm in other
3
ways' * . Perhaps Nicholas was deluding himself, but it is
possible tliat in his contacts with Latins he had met some
with whom ho could establish some common ground. That
Nicholas was deeply concerned with the search for such agree¬
ment is clear from the tone of his writing and the vocabulary
he uses. For example he makes frequent use of such terms
and expressions as ' community', 'unity of the faith' and 'the
plenitude of the Church' * Most significant perhaps is his
/ It
use of the wordXpianaviayos, # or Christianity, which Mas
1. Ibid.. 43?ab.
2. Some writers have commented on the similarity between
Nicholas .Kabasilas' thoughts on redemption and those of
St. Anselm in cur aeus homo. See in particular ¥• Cass,
Die Mystik des Nl.kola.us Kabasilas von Lebert in Christo
(Leipzig 1 ' »9T, but note the modifications of j.^dvi^re,
Le do 'jrie de la .redemption. Etudes critiques et docu-
.iet~fca, (Lou-vain 1931) pp. "zTl-303. S. Salaville, * Vues
sot«£r±ologiqu©s choz Nicholas dabasilas' , 1 ,
(19^3), i-37• The superficial similarities ax-e not
enough to provo a direct acquaintance with Anselm, but
they suggest a knowledge of western redemption theology,
based on Anselm, and the me dacx-amentis of Hugh of
St. Victor.
?* M.P.G. 150, 437b.
A.A. Angelopoulos, Op. Cit. p.95* KoivoovCa, £v6tt|c TcCaxeooc,
itaripooiia ttiq EkkXtjcCocq. See m.p.G., 150, 433a.
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the closest a Byzantine could get to expressing the concept
of an all-embracing Christendom without any political over¬
tones. Finally it should be noted that the value of Nicholas* s
attempts to explain the faith and look for points of contact
between east and west was appreciated at the councils of
Florence and Trent where Nicholas1 s works were recognised
as fundamental to an understanding of the relationships be¬
tween the Churches.^"
v) Qihor anti-Tho. :1st .>olouic
An attitude of guarded admiration for Thomas Aquinas
is found quite often among oyzantine writers who, although
composing works of polemic and refutation against western
theology or Aquinas personally, show that Thomas had in some
way caught their imagination. Sometimes this is visible in
the sheer vigour of their attack, sometimes it is openly
admitted, but most often it is displayed in the degree to
which their own works reveal the absorption of 1homist
techniques and a thorough knowledge of his wi'lting. Joim
kantakouzenos, in his refutation of the work of Proclioros
Aydones, illustrates this dual attitude well, paying- tribute
to Aquinas himself and admiring his philosophical abilities
but showing alarm at the potency of ills weapons and the unde¬
sirable results they might have among the Byzantines.
join you in appreciation of Thomas the master
of the Latins, who breathes syllogisms x-ather
than air; you will not be able to reject his
writings completely and you will enjoy them as
if they were the indestructible tablets of the law .
.
,-Op. Cit. p.95 n.4.
^ __ ^
'htv SiSaaidiXou Gwyct auXXoyiayov yoiXXov n aepa
uveovTos Tr)\> yapxiTo iav croi irape^oyeGa irpos yv ouk av eins <5nca\os
avxifkuveiv xo?s auxou auyvpayyaatv Eiuxoupuv <a\ xauxot ica0airep
ttXoikois extov aKctxaXuxous' . G. Mercati, Hotizie, p. 13 n.l.
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An interesting example of a fierce anti- hornist who was
unable to escape the influence of the man o attached, is
latthew Angeles Panarotos, a lay writer o the mid-fourteenth
century who pro lisod to refute all that Aquinas had written*".
Among his surviving works are two whicli are explicitly
directed against Aquinas, attacking his views on the pro-
o
cession of the Holy Spirit and the fire of purgatory . The
grounds on which ho rejected Aquinas and the methods by which
he proposed to refute htm were standard; he attacked Aquinas
for his failure to understand that 'the supreme and incompre¬
hensible richness of theology surpasses not only human under¬
standing but is also inaccessible and unintelligible to the
angels themselves. therefore our faith ... is not proved by
propositions and conclusions'. Accordingly Pannretos,
'courageously donning evangelic armour and putting on the
arms of the apostles and girding with the knife of theolog¬
ians' set out to do battle with the many 'slight books and
frivolous writings in which the Latins take pride'. he
proposed to 'contradict Aquinas's natural science and theology
about the holy Spirit, as far as possible following divinely
3
inspired sayings* . Despite these good intentions Panarotos
fell into precisely those habits which he was attacking,
attempting to demonstrate the orthodox position and refute
the Latin innovations by means of syllogisms and 'natural
,4science* .
— — V / - - - ~
„ I t - ,/ /
, '....a Tivct (tct fhPXia too Qajya) too Geoo 6i6ovtos nyxv axoXr\v iravxaX •
Ttepi^avus avaipriaoyEv'. A j)enotrakoponlos,i0p9°6oS°S '^^bP'49'
2. M. Jugie, * De'ae'trius Oydou^s et la thoologie latine a
ysarice* , J.0 .. 27 5 (192b )k00 .
3. Cited j.C . I-apadopoulos, 'reok .translations, pp.131-132,
■ •. ;utla» ' XI ilio tis.' o a ilTauSTb nel seco'le* XXV. Una pole¬
mica bisantinn del secolo ,CCV' , Arc.ivio Ab'{TT6^a
-mu-^veuyctto6 1dv\*e OeoXoyiav irpoodevres,
avxiXe^wyev <axa to Suvaxov, to^s GeoirveoaToxs eir<£yevo\ pnaeai.'
4. S. G P.ap ad opoulos, ura a.- transi a t ion s . p.134.
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vi) The Thonfst circle in Jvzantlurj and converts to the
Rg-i^n Church.
The 8UOCOS3 of the Thomist translations in extending their
influenco beyond the restricted circle of committed western
sympathisers was largely due to tne encouragement and active
help whic Demetrios received from John Kantakouzenoa» The
emperor and the court were involved in Kydones' translating
activities from the beginning* llion Deuetrios had made his
first translation of a few chapters of the . ainma contra
Gentiles he gave it to Kantalcouzenos to read* The emperor
was impressed with the work and urged him to complete a trans¬
lation of the whole book, saying that ' all the Greeks would
benefit groatly from it' * T/hen the translation was finished
' the emperor immediately had a copy made and many of the
i
more respocted people did the same* *
The emperor's involve teat may indeed have been nore
personal. The word used by Tydones to describe Xantakouzenos'
interest in having the won'c copied, e±£YPaVaro f could be trans¬
lated as 'he made a copy for his own use* , and it has been
intorpx-etod in this way . That John Kantalcoazenos was a
prolific copyist of manuscripts used to bo a widely held
belief until it was shown to be based on mistaken evidence-*,
liowever, the notion is also supported by a furt.ier source*
Matthew Angelos Panaretos, in a short note on tho life and
work of Thomas Aquinas, states that 'towards the end of his
(John Xantakouzenos' ) xreign a certain man from Thessalonica,
7 *Ouxw ie oiroufins^ a^xov evoyxa8n, wot' eu9us^yev o BaaxXeus XaBcbv
eSeypa^axo, xauto 6'EiTcmouv kou tojv aEyvoxEjstov ttoXXox <ai oxs
nv yaSe'iv tx tuv xPncuuwv a-rrooSn'*
Kydones, Apologia* Notizie, p.363 lines 118-127.
2. M.Jugie, 'De'me'trius Cydones et la the'ologie latine a
Byzance aux XlVe et XVe siecles,' E«0., 27, (1928), p.391.
3. L. Politis, 'Jean-Joasaph Cantacuzene, fut-il copiste?',
R.E.B. 14,(1956), 195-199..D.M. Nicol, The Byzantine family
of Kantakouzenoe, pp.100-101.
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called Kydones, translated all the works of Tho stas Aquinas
from Latin into Greek, some of which were copied by the
.(imperor Kamtakouzerios and were put in his library" J'. This
account shows certain confusions; >e letrios Kydoaes never
translated all the work® of Aquinas, although to the iiyaan-
tines it nay well have seemed that he did, and although he
started the work in the last years oV Kantakouzenos's reign,
he did not finish his first t; ransir cion until after John V's
entry into Constantinople. However, since the completion
of the Greek version of the Sunrrta contra Gentiles coincided
with Kantakouzenos* retirement from office and entry into
monastic life, it may be supposed that the ex-emperor would
at least lrnve had the leisure to undertake a copy if he had
Z
so wi shed •
It must remain doubtful whether kantakouzenos iado
copies of Kydones' translations with his own hand. However,
it is certain that he took a direct Interest in the production
of copies. That ranch is clear from a note, found in two
manuscripts of the mi i 'a contra Gentiles, which states that
' this boolc was translated fro a Latin into Greek by heme trios
of Thessalonica and was copied by Iamiel Tzylcandyles of
3
Ayzantiuiu at the command of the lord autocrator antakousenos' •".
3_. 'Kqxa 6e to teXos xiTs aoxoo ('Iwa'vvoo too RavxaKOOCnvoo) gaaxXEx'as
QetroccXovxKEOS xis Ku5covr)S to Eiruivoyov, yEyvyysvos xns )iCitivikFis
SxaXeicxoo, xravra xa ekexvoo (too 0wya) xp eXXdvxSx SxaXsicxu)
e£e6wkev, a>v icax xxva icax y£TEYpa<j>ricroiv xrapa too gaaxXews too
Kavxaicoosnvoo icax airETE0riaav Iv xri aoxoo gx3Xxo0riK^'.
A • • 'Oi iet.rakopoulo ®, Op0o<Sogos t^XXas, p.49 .
2» D. . Nicol, 'The abdication of John Vi. Uantacuzene' ,
: yza'itinl ;e!ie i'orschutigen, 2 Aiolychordia, "'estschrift
■ ran>: (1 j67*J~ 2a 1-2J 3.
. •. -iicol, The lasx centuries of ".-yaiantiua 1261-1453*
(Lwadon 1031'£Tpp.23©*257# x » - - > \ , /.
fooxo xo^BxyXxov y£0Epynv£Oa£ ijev ek too Xaxxvxicoo exs xnv EXXaoa
<()a)vriv Anypxpxos xxs 0EcraaXovxic£OS, yETEypa^axo 6e MavoorjX T£Oicav6oXTis
0 Bo^avxxos, icaxa irpoaxa£xv too icopxoo aixoKpaxopos too
KavxaKOOCnvoo' .




was the oiTiciaJL court copyist whom Kantakouzenos employed
frequently for copying many works -including some of his ownt
among which was his refutation of the he essentia ot operatione
of Prochoros Aydories. fzykandylos also sade a copy of the
first part of tl»o -in. t an Vheologiao^". John ' antakouzenos*
involvement in the copying of the translations and his encour¬
age' .cat of Denetrlos personally Is strongly brought out by
ydones in his Apologia. ,.e mentions that the emperor financed
the production of books and * put. the . La his treasury, regard-
xng them as aore valuable than any of the treasures there* *
Furthermore Kydone claimed that as a result of his work the
emperor, the court and the greater part of the people of
Constantinople showed bin increased honour every day, and
those who attempted to bring hi into disrepute with the
emperor were rebuffed end served only to increase his tmpor-
3
tance further *
Kydoner,* claims are certainly not without foundation for,
although later passages in the Apologia make much of the
ignorant opposition which he had to face, it is significant
that he was not condemned for his activities during his life-
ti e and his work was enthusiastically copied. The fourteenth
1. See above p.l5~l a• 1 Vicol, xhe family of hantakou-
zeiios, p»99» n.164. 3.G . Papadopoulos. Creek translations.
p«33» n.33 suggests that there Jay have been two copyists
called ..anuel Tzykaridylea. he also attributes several
manuscripts to a Michael fzykandyles who is otherwise
unknown apart from an apparent misprint in it. nevrsesc,
Codices Vaticani Craeci, 3 (hone 1930) pp.l , 2h. in his
index Devreese mentions only one *4. Tzykandyles} this is
correct and his name is tanuel. For an authoritative
commentary on Cod. Vat. gr. old containing books 3 and h
of the -u tua contra Centiles see A. Turyn, Codices vrraeci
Vaticani saecuiis at XiV .scripti armoruiiquo notis
instruo ti . (Vatican City l<)ob) pp.150, 133 •
2. ..ydones, .apologia, dotizie, p*Joh, lines A;>- '2.
3. xbid., p.369 lines >9~97•
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century niajiuscripts of the translations arc numerous, Light
copies oi the uunua contra Gentiles and ten or various parts
of tiie ,u una iheo1 o ,ic■.o nave survived from the fourteenth
century* in addition two works of Aquinas, the he rationibus
flnei ad can toro > Antioohanun and the .ntaostio de potentia
which Deietrios and frochoros .ydones had trailslated, appeared
in other versions by unknown translators^.
ike intellectual circle in Constantinople, centred
largely on the court, was chiefly interested in the works of
western theology from an academic and theoretical point of
view* Jomi -.antakouzenos, * olios habasilus and Matthew
augeios taiiarutos acquired choir knowledge of Tiiomism as
iiieubors of this circle but they all turned and wrote against
UiOi.tisrsi when they appreciated the dangers which it posed to
the orthodoxy of the Uyzantine Church* however, a number
of their colleagues connected with the court and the intellec¬
tual life of the capital were prepared to go further in their
appreciation of western theology and became members of the
Roman. Church. Among them were a hi lip Tzykandyles, -icnael
dtrougylos, Manual LJouropoulo£>, George ianikaites and haximos
Lasfcaris halopheros, all of whom held iuportaat official
posts in either State or Church in Dyzantium^* it is signifi¬
cant that nost of the : also know Latin and were involved in
frequent contacts with the west on the empire* s behalf* Je
1. m.G. rap&dopo'ulos, -?roek t ra»si a fcion s. pp.33-37# **9-56,
53-5**# 5b-60. . iatthev; Angelos Panaratoa used the second
vers.ion of Aquinas' s a r^tioni ms fiae.i.
2. Tzykandyles and otrongiios were witnesses to John V* s
profession of faith in Rome in 13-3; Xautu 11. p•239•
bguropoulos translated a letter oi John V to the pope
into Latin and was thanked by Gregory X.T for his help to
Dominicans and Catholics in the empire; i'&utu 12, p.253*
.anis^ai tos visited Lungary with John V and went on to
ivvigion, see 0. halecki, Uit enperenr. pp.113, 116 arid
P.J .6, /, .• ..3 -4-3'. - For . ,L. waloylieroH, the patriarchal
chancellor, see T&utu 11, p.12 >,
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know of those men largely because of theix" official duties and
so it may bo supposed that other converts of their background
remain unknown because of their lack of public pro licence .
however, it is undoubtedly true that ost of the 'iyzantine
intellectuals who showed an interest in the translations of
western works wore not prepared to become members of the Roman
Church.
The converts fro the lower social orders in jJyzantium
are mostly unknown to us but what information there is suggests
that the conditions of their life were vary different from
those enjoyed by the privileged, intellectuals who were pro-
woe ted by their office from persecution and among whose circle
interest in fiae west was common and accepted. the somiriican
Philip Incontri described the situation of these Greek converts
and the pressures upon them.
aiuce early -times there have been many reasonably
knowledgeable men among the Greeks, some of whom
... have seen who fully confess the doctrine of the
Roman Church about the procession of the >oly
Spirit and even jive me the authorities of the
saints and councils to demonstrate this conclus¬
ion, but they cio not dare to do anything unless
the emperor proposes it himself, because they
fear the people .... opaaking with them singly,
x am often consoled, thinking that the desired
goal will bo arrived at finally. but although
many of them talc to me secretly, none of them
dares to say these things in the presence of
others .... however, they are aware of each other' s
opinions and it often happens that one will point
out to me anotiier whom x do not know saying "go
to so and so, because he -knows the truth well . *
Philip incontri's description of the Uyzantine converts who
individually promised much but collectively were unable to
take positive steps towards the reunion of the Church, suggests
1. T. Xaeppeli, 'Deux nouveaux ouvrages', Arch. t raod.
23,(1953), 17b.
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t tat the supporters of dome formed a kind of secret society
a long t.he Greeks. They yare afraid to spoax openly of their
opinions, they knew each other's views and .rave an appearance
of oldarity so Ion g as they were not put to the test • <ut
t.ho pressures pu t upon them were formidable. The only converts
from the non-official classes whose names we know appear in
the records only because they were forced subsequently to
roeant ux- else they sou-j.it refs ,e in the west. ttregoxy kl
wrote a letter of recommendation to i' eter 11 of Cyprus in
favour of a certain Oassiaa of Constantinople who had been
force! to abandon Ms fa ily» his country, friends and station
in order to become a. member of the Roman. Church . it is inter—
estin .j also to note the lar e nu ibex- of teaks and priests
2
among the converts . it was among such people that the friars
had particular influence. A group of Dominicans on their way
to Armenia s topped in Constantinople in October iy]k and in
ts e course of thoir disputatious many 'prelates, doctors and
3
monks' ere converted to t^e ho.»an Jhnrc v .
'iiie number of firm conversions -rde a ;ong the Greeks as
a result of tlx© activities of the friars, the example of notable
individuals and the influence of r.he translations of western
theological works, re .aired small tJxroujhox.it the fourteenth
century, however, the particular i uportance of these contacts
1. ' Coiiaaiguiuois, patrxu, aaxcis, facultatibus et ;ente..».
ponit-ir, derelictis converses fait* . 3 :ove.;'iuer 13'/* , nut.:
12, 22>.
2. for the recantations of the monks see .•!.£, pp.501, 303-5,
53h, 5/L> • A uQaoese and a ioslu i wore among the con¬
verts to the Byzantine Church, ibid. 506-7* 550-1. On
2<> danuaxy 1373 'regory >1X wrote to Joiux 7, John Kn itakou-
zenos and fanuel i'l to protest against the harassment of
Greek converts and Latins in Constantinople, T&utu 12,
pp.25'i—259l Rayualdus, ana . 1375, nos 1-5.
3 • 0 • ■. Lecki, n e ipere-.;r, p.30;.
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mad© between east and west in the reign of John V emerged
more clearly in the long terra. The barrier of ignorance
which, more than anything else, had separated the Greeks and
the Latins during the schism was substantially broken down,
The progress which had been made is illustrated by Joseph
Oryennios who was active in the lata fourteenth arid early
fifteenth century« He was a consistent opponent of Latin
theology and the character of his attacks is uniformly anti-
Thomlot. But the most striking feature of his dealings with
western theology is the depth of his knowledge of Aquinas' s
writings. This emerges very clearly from a debate which he
conducted on Crete in the late fourteenth century with Maximos
Ohrysobergcs, a Dominican and a disciple of Deuietrlos kydones.
iryannios shows how his generation of Byzantine theologians
had profited from reading Aquinas in Denotrios* s translations
to gain an understanding of the theoretical presuppositions
of their adversaries with a view to refuting them. During
the dehate on Crete, when Chrysoberges introduced Aquinas
into tho discussion, he found himself confronted by a man who
was better acquainted with fhomist theology than he was himself,
and who proceeded to quote sections of the works of Aquinas
attributing than correctly to their chapter and book"*".
Tills was the impressive legacy of the pioneering work
which had been done during tho early years of John V* 3 reign.
The translations, the friars, and the personal contacts with
the west did not male© great inroads into the membership of
tho Byzantine Church, nor did they produce official agree lents
1. ..G. i apadopoulos, •' "rook t ranslat ion s, pp,l40-l4l.
210
with the Roman Church. But they laid the solid foundations
. on which the later generations could build relationships with
the west on the basis of knowledge and understanding which
had never 1 'are been possible. it was only as the result of
such begirmu.-jo that the last Patriarch of Constantinople,
>ennadios uchoiarrlos, could openly declare himself one of the
roost forwent of all Aquinas* s disciples* while refusing"'to take
the final step of accepting the western formula for the pro-
2
cession of the Holy Spirit • To understand and revere the great¬
est of western mediaeval theologians, and yet to remain firm in
the essential beliefs of the Greek Church, was the most refined
result of the efforts of the forirteentn century translators and
interpreters and, from a Greek point of view the best justifi¬
cation of the intellectual activities of the la3t century of
nyasantium. « -
■j 'Gwyav yotp xov e£ 'akivou ouk oi<5a ei xts cyou irXeov xexiyritce
TUV aurw wpoaexovToav'. Gennadios hcJiolarios, AirctVTOt
xa euptOKoyeva. ed. L. Petit, X.A. idorides, U Ju ;ie,
P., lEiQ'e 'Qma yn*^a9a*yeyovws sv xri 6uaet,vctXX' ev xp avaxoXn Yva
fiaQa op9o5ogos Kai iva 'e^poveis Kai irepi tn® etctriopeooews xou
ayxou Ilveuyaxos &p9cos, us Kai iTepi x5v aXXwiV KaXws Xeyeis'.
-.G. Papadopo ilos, Greek translations. p. kht n.90. ee
also p.15^ for a similar note in Scholarios* s iiaud•
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THIS COM] IEKCXAL CONTACTS HETWEM BYZANTIUM AND THE
WEbT AND THEXH POLITICAL COKSEqblffiCES *
On the eve of the Council of* Lyon in 127**, Humbert de
Komanis wrote a detailed account of the causes of the schism
between the Churches of Home and Constantinople for the bone-
1
fit of Pope Gregory x • Although he made it clear that funda¬
mentally the schism vras the fault of the Greeks, he found
cause for complaint also in the attitude of the Latins to
the East# He accused them of not caring enough about it.
This assessment of the attitude of most of the major powers
in the west to the fate of the rebom Byzantine empire was
no doubt largely accurate, not only in 127**, but during the
whole of the rest of Constantinople* s faltering career.
However, while such countries as France, England and
Germany were prevented both by distance and the pressure of
affairs at home from talcing a more active interest in Byzan¬
tium, it would be saost unexpected to find the trading powers
of the west holding bade in an area which was of such vital
importance to them. The geographical position of Constanti¬
nople and the Byzantine islands made the empire a political
unit which was impossible to Ignore. Xt commanded the sea
route by which goods were taken to and from the Black Sea
and Asia ilinor, and the City itself not only was the estab¬
lished centre of a highly developed and far-flung colonial and
trade network, but also supported a large and most privileged
trade of its own. Finally the empire acted as a buffer
state between Moslem East and Christian West, and Constanti-
1. Humbertus de Roraanis, Opus Tripartitum, ed. E. Brown, Fasciculus
rerum expetendarum ac fugiendarum, 2, (London, 1690), p.219.
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nople was a secure stronghold in a constantly fluctuating
and uiostly unfriendly ijolitical environment*
The Byzantines themselves believed that the importance
of their empire din the commercial calculations of the western
world could be turned to political advantage. They knew that
the busy markets of the Venetian and Genoese colonies in
Byzantium provided a focus for western interest in the eastern
Mediterranean and they realised that the tangible benefits
Tsrhich they offered western merchants would act as a powerful
incentive for the west to guarantee the empire1 s survival by
lending it practical support* in 1350 the Venetian Senate
indicated to the emperor that its concern for Byzantium was in
direct proportion to the economic advantages which were con¬
ceded to its citizens*-* hemetrios Kyclones was confident that
the western mercantile cities would give assistance to the
empire if only to safeguard their own interests. lie told
the Greeks that the merchants were aware that once Byzantium
had fallen, the ports of the empire would be closed to them,
the carrying trade in foodstuffs would pass into other hands,
the immunities from taxation which they enjoyed in Constanti¬
nople would be lost, and that tho fall of the City would be
followed shortly by the enslavement of their colonies and
2
direct danger to their mother cities*. Unlike the pope and
most other western leaders, who had to take their inspiration
for the salvation of the empire from the spiritual and far
from certain victory of tho True Faith over a schismatic
church, the cities with commercial interests in Byzantium
1* On 2 March 1350 the Venetian Senate ans\*ered a complaint
from John V about the growth of Venetian property In the
empire with the claim that • domlnus imperator plurimura
debet esse contentus quia nostri habentes possessionea
predictas erunt riagis dispositi ad bonum ot augmenturn
imperii' . J. Chrysostomides, 'Venetian privileges under
the Palaeologi' , ;tudi Veaezianl* 12, (1970), Document 4,
P. 333.
2. D. Kydones, byml >ou1 eu t iko a Uona lo 1 a * M.P.G.. 15^» 9S9bc.
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were spurred on by the knowledge that their profits could be
measured in the same terms as their investment.
in the following pages various aspects of the western
colonies in Jyzantium will be considered! their structure
and organ!sation, their formal relationship with the empire
and the nature and importance of their trade. Finally the
involvement of the trading cities in the domestic political
affairs of Byzantium* and their attitude towards the empire* s
enemies will be examined*
A« The Genoese colony in Pera*
i) The territorial expansion of the Genoese colony*
In 1267 hichael VIXI authorised the Genoese to establish
the centre of their commercial activities in the empire at
Pera* At the time this concession seemed not to be particu¬
larly generous. The Genoese merchants were cut off fro 1 the
port and the commercial life of Constantinople by the Golden
horn. The fortifications of the area were destroyed and the
colonists were not protected by the walls of the Byzantine
capital^"* The houses were little 10re than 'wooden shacks
2
and grass huts which were at first poor and not numerous' •
however, by 13&3* ?or which year we havo our first and most
detailed description of the settlement's shape and size,
the Genoese had firmly established themselves in Pera. The
1, D.Geariakoplos, ti.iporor lichaeJ Palaeologus and the West.
1253-1232. A study in Byzantine-Latin relations. (Cam¬
bridge, hess. 1959;, pp.206-200. The early treaties
between the restored empire and Genoa, and the spirit
behind them, tire described by Pseudo-Kodinos, Traite des
offices, ed. J. Verpeaux, (Paris 1966),pp.235-237} also
Kantak.iv,25*iXX,133-189. Pera was the western name for
the Genoese colony. The Greeks called it Galata.
2. Makrembolites, Logos Listorikos. p.lhh, The full title of
this work is ' historical discourse treating of the weak¬
ness of the Genoese when they arrived In the country of tlio
Greeks and of the benefactions of the emperors towards
then and of their consequent prosperity and expansion and
their subsequent wickedness and intrigue against their
benefactors.* Of. Gregoras, xvii,ltXI,o4l.
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ditch, which marked their boundary, enclosed a colony larger
than any previously granted to foreign settlers, with a front¬
age onto the Golden horn of about 600 metres. Although this
area formed only about a third of the colony* a ultimate terri¬
tory* it was always its heart*"•
The growth of the colony in both size and confidence is
illustrated by the war it fought with the empire in 1346-1349 .
One of the major causes of the war, which wore all colonial
in ciiaracter, was the Genoese demand for an enlarged terri¬
torial concession. Their objective was to Incorporate some
land for houses to the North of their boundary, on the hill
which dominated their side of the Golden Horn. John Kantakou-
zenos refused the request for more land, fearing that it was
fortifications and not houses which the Genoese intended to
build on the hill. This was not the first time that such a
request had been turned down and, together with other griev¬
ances, it seemed to the Genoese to bo a sufficient cause for
2
war . The colonists were encouraged also by the illness of
the emperor which caused him to be away from Constantinople
for a long time, leaving the capital apparently leaderless
3
and defenceless .
1. The delimitation agreement of 13^3 is published by
L.Uelgrano, •Prima serie di document! riguardantl la colo-
nia di Pera' , Attl dolla society biguro di storia patria.
13, (1&87-1664), 103-104; also L.Sauli, Delia colonia del
nmoves! in Galata. 2, (Turin 1831) pp•209-210. For a
detailed description of the colony* s boundaries and their
measurements see C.Desi ioni, *1 Genovesi ed i loro quar-
tieri in Costantinopoli nel secolo XXII' , Giornale Llgu-
stlco di arcneolo ,ia. storia e delle artl. 3, (1676),
217-274. For the Genoese under Andronikos XX, see A.JLaiou,
Constantinople and tho Latins. The foreign policy of
Andronicua XX~{1262-1326 ) , (narvard 19/2) .
2. Kantak.lv,11»XXI,6b. Makrembolites. Logos Tistoriko3»p.l39.
3. Kantak.iv,10iXXX,67 • Lakreiibolitos, Lo>;as iiistorikos.
pp.146,156•
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ilio fighting broke out on 15 August 1348 and continued
until March of" th© following year* • During this period the
Genoese ' extended the limits of their settlement, expanding
it to the shape of a square by stx*etching its boundaries
2
<auch further up the slope of the hill* • They also * forti-
fied their hill and built a tower towards the top*~, The
iallitary confrontation was unspectacular and long drawn out.
The liyaantines withstood the hardships of blockado by sea
and long range bombardment much better than the Genoese had
expected. But finally, when the time for direct action came,
the Byzantine fleet was abandoned by its inexperienced crews
and was totally defeated. By the terms agreed in the peace
negotiations the Genoese were allowed to keep the land which
thoy had seized, and received a chrysobull confirming their
* inalienable possession'4 of the hill on which their tower
stood. The wall, which had been built during the war, stretch¬
ing southwards from the tower, bore an inscription which con¬
firmed the formal cession of the area to the colony in 1349,
Underneath the date, written in Roman numerals, was the figure
of St.Nicholas with the arms of Genoa on his right and the
arms of the imperial house on his left ,
1. The dates are given by 1iakrerabo1ites, Logos historikos.
p.15^1 P.Schreiner, * La chronique brfeve do 1352*, part 4,
P.O.P.. 3ht (1968), 40; short Chronicle 52, p.89 lines 19-




4. 'avowpaCpETOv kcxtoccxechv., iMakremboiites, Logos nistorikos.
p.l53» kantakouzenos described his cession of territory
to the Genoese as voluntary* 'kocI to x^P^ov auTOQ bvid)V
Etvact kxapL^eio / kantak,iv,lliXXX,79. The covirse of
these peace negotiations is rather confused; for a further
discussion soo below pp. 303-3io»
5» A.Bchneider and M.Nomidis, Galata tonographlscii-archaolo-
gischer i'Leai, (Xstaabul 1944^ P.71 M.A .i>o1in.Ii'gtoire de
la latiiiit^ de Gonstantinoole. (i'aris 1894)p.l42.
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On 6 May 1352 another peace treaty was signed between
Byzantium and Genoa. The war which it concluded was not
directly concerned iirith Genoese efforts to expand or increase
the security of their colony, but the question was not ignored
in the treaty. The voluntary cession of Fera to the Genoese
was confirmed and a segment of land to the Last of the colony* a
previous boundary was added*".
Further extensions to the colony in Pera were probably
•ado in 1387» 1397 arid 1^00, However, there are no treaties
or documents which relate to these additions and the only
evidence comes from inscriptions found on the internal walls
of the colony, which divided it into cells, each of which was
presumably acquired at one time. These inscriptions often
include a date which gives some indication of when the colony
was granted or usurped the land. One of these inscriptions,
bearing the date I387, was found on the first tower to the
north-west of the Tower of Christ on the hill, it includes
also the arms of Genoa and tliose of the podest&, RapJiael
Doria, but the imperial arms were not added as they had been
in 13^9. in the most north-westerly comer of the colony
there is an inscription with the date 1397. The walls surround
hag the most easterly and latest section of the colony have
O
many inscriptions dated between l'+04 and 1452 . Although these
1. * item per pactum iraperium nostrum de gracia donationem
facit coniuni Xanue de Gallata...* Liber iuriu.i Heipublicao
Genuensia. 2, ed.R.Ricottius, Patriae historiae monumenta.
9, "(''furin IB57) 602b. C .Manfroni, • Le relazioni fra Genova
1' iiapero bizantino e i Turchi,* \ttl oocieta Limire. 2o,
(I896-IB98)?710,713» considers that the 1332 treaty marks
a new phase in the possession of Pera by the Genoese,
however, the language of the treaty shows little differonc
fro i.i that of the Byzantine commentators in 1399. Lee
above p 2.t5\
2. The most complete list of the inscriptions in Pera is in
A.Schneider and M.Noaldls, op,cit. pp.7-1^. Lee also
L.helgrano, 'Prima serie', pp.321—33^, and appendix with
plates.
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dates do not give a precise indication of when the land
enclosed by the wall was absorbed into the colony, it is
likely that the Genoese expansion followed the pattern revealed
by the inscriptions.
ii) The for ial relationship between the empire and the Genoese
colony.
Although foreign visitors cannot be expected, except in
particular circumstances, to give an accurate account of the
government and social relationships of the countries they
describe, yet their accounts deserve some x*espect. As eye¬
witnesses they may correct some of the misconceptions which
can arise from an undue r-eliance on the written word of offic¬
ial documents or partisan descriptions. They will certainly
be wrong In many pai'ticulars, but their general impression
of the situation is likely to provide a valuable correction
to the foraal records on which we must for the most part
x-oly.
One striking fact about the accounts of visitors to Con¬
stantinople is the extent to which they make the Genoese of
Pera seem subject to the empire. A perceptive and much-
travelled iiosi em observer, known as ibn liattuta, who arrived
in Constantinople in 1332, visited the colony and reuiarked
that * it is reserved for the Christian Franks dwelling there.
They are of different kinds, including Genoese, Venetians,
man of Home and people of Franco, and they are under the govern¬
ment of the King of Constantinople, who appoints over thei one
of their number whom they approve and call the Qum§ (comes).
They are required to pay a tax ever*y year to the King of
Constantinople, but they often rebel against his authority
and then he makes war on them until the pope restores peace
■ ..L*
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between them' Dattuta's view of the situation is cer¬
tainly nielending in various ways, not least in liis faith in
the mediating influence of the papacy# The bpaaish visitors
to the enquire show the same mixture of fact and fantasy in
varying proportions. Pero Tafur xjassod through Constanti¬
nople in 1437 and has left a vivid account of his impressions
of the decayed splendour of the city. His description of
Pera .shows that he was impressed by the good walls, the tall
houses, the fine church.es, monasteries and business pre rises,
he also added that 'when the ships come to Pera to traffic
with the Genoese, they first salute Constantinople and pay
tribute. Criminal justice is administered from Constanti¬
nople for Pera and for the whole country.... The common
people are Greeks, but they are governed by the Genoese who
2
hold all the offices' • Finally a Castilian., Ruy Gonzalez
do Clavijo, who visited Byzantium in l403« was convinced tliat
the colony was entirely subject to the empire, and stated that
' Pera has always belonged to the emperor, only his ioney is
current over there and hie jurisdiction extends over the
3
whole town' .
The rolationship between the e lpire and the colony in
the four areas commented on by these visitors to Constanti¬
nople was of groat importance to tho definition of the poxvers
and freedoms exercised by each side. An examination of the
i . The sravel s of Xbn ,..ia11uta. A . h«132 -13 j4. translated
ii.A .R.Gibb, 2, hakluyt Goclety. Ser.2, 117, (Cambridge
1962) pp.pod-509.
2. Pero Cafur. Travels and adventures. 143 3-1439. od. and
translated G.le ctrange, (hoixcion 19261 pp.146,149. See
also A.Vaeiliev, 'Pero Tafur, a Spanish traveller of the
fifteenth century and his visit to Constantinople,
Trobizond and Italy', B.f 7, (1932)?75-122.
3. iiuy Gonzalez do Clavijo, embassy to Tamerlane. (l403-
l4o6 ). translated G.le strange," '(Loncloii" ) p .91.
219
appointment of Genoese officials, of the duties owed by them
and their people to the Byzantine emperor, of the adminis¬
tration of justice in cases concerning Greeks and Genoese,
and of the coinages current in Constantinople and Pera in
the second half of the fourteenth century, sheds some light
on the status of both parties and the basis of their relations
with one another#
a) The appointment of officials.
The appointment of the podostd of the Genoese colony
was as much outside the control of the people of fera as of
the Byzantine emperor. The holder of the post changed
"annually, being selected in and sent out from Genoa. Only
if a podestd failed to arrive did the colony have any power
in the matter, and then only briefly. The Council of twenty-
four was then empowered to elect an interim podesth who could
servo until the permanent podestd arrived, but his term could
in no case exceed throe months1. The emperor likex;ise was
without any real influence in the selection of a podesth,
although it was a post of great individual responsibility
and a clash of personalities could only have the most serious
effects. The case of iiemabo Spinola, to whose appointment
as podests? in 130b Andronikos XI objected on apparently
personal grounds, demonstrated the ultimate power of the
Genoese metropolitan government to appoint the man of its
choice even in the face of Byzantine disapproval. In Spinola's
case, his claim to the post was not that he had been appointed
2
to it, but rather that he had bought it .
1. Statuti dl Pera, ©d.V.Promis. Miscellanea di storia itali-
Ma* 11, '(lS'/l)>nos.236-257, pu7TG9-77V~. —
P. Spinola had previously been • vxcariue ianuensis in fcoto
imperio RoHianie' , in 1300. For documents on this and his
later career, see L.Delgrano, 'Prima aerie' , pp.102,113,
113.
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Far from submitting to a podesta appointed by the Byzantine
enperor, the Genoese sometimes attempted to exert influence over
some Byzantine appointment®. One of the causes of the war of
I'jkd cited by lakreTbolites, was the choice of Phakeolatos
as commander of the Byzantine fleet, The Genoese considered
hitn to be unduly hostile to them, and protested 'as if,
Makrembelites commented, * there had boon some sort of agree¬
ment that the emperor should appoint no commander without
receiving their consent beforehand' . in this instance the
Genoese failed to make the emperor change his mind, but by
13o2 they had grown more ambitious, and saw themselves as
arbiters not only of Byzantine naval appointments, but of the
imperial succession itself"*".
13 ) ihe duties owed to the e iuoror.
The former authority of the empire, if not its present
power, was reflected in the honours and duties owed by the
Genoese community to the person of the emperor in particular
and to his empire in general• The salutes given by ships
visiting rera, which were mentioned by Tafur, are also des¬
cribed elsewhere. Vsaudo-Kodinos briefly stated that 'when
their ships come, whether they are numerous, few or single,
2
they acclaim the eiaperor' . John V himself mentioned these
honours due to hiia as emperor, in a letter of complaint sent
to the Genoese about 13o5» his indignation had been caused
not only by the fact that his troublesome grandson John VII,
had been paid imperial honours which were not due to him, but
also because the inhabitants of Tera had failed to pay similar
1. Makrembolites, ho, ;os iListorikos« p.l47 • The Peace of Turin
between Veil ice and Genoa in iyS2 recognised Andronikos IV
as heir to the Byzantine throne in place of Manuel IT.
See below p. 3*6 •
2. Pseudo-dodines, Traits dos Offices, ed.J.Verpeaux, p.236,
bee also i'achymeres, he micnaele 1'alaeolo ,0. v, 30:1,421.
lines 3-7•
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respects * and to do those things xtfhich they -wore accustomed
to do* when he himself sailed by*".
Another highly important and regular illustration of the
relationship between the imperial and colonial authorities,
was the involvement of the podestd and the other Genoese
dignitai'ies in the court ceremonial of Constantinople. They
were given a specific place in the hierarchy of Byzantine
officials, among the archa.ri.tcs of the empire, immediately
after the Grand Grungarius of the Fleet. Pseudo-Kodinos
described tho scene ia some detail* 'The podostA of the
Genoese in Pera enters with the men of his entourage and
kisses the emperor in the manner of the archontes.... that is
on his foot, his hand and his cheek. While the orthros is
sung again they are given candles, as are the archontes; after
the kissing ceremony they go .... «'hen tho podestd arrives
from Genoa for the first time, and only then, when entering
for the proskynesis, ho bends his knee twice, when he is at
the door of the triklinos and when, he is in the middle of it.
After that he comes forward and kisses the emperor*s foot and
hand as he is sitting on the throne. Likewise the other
Genoese arciioatea. coming from abroad, make their bows and
kiss the emperor's foot and hand. Every day when they come
to the proskynesis, raising their hats, they bend thoir Icnee
-> i
twice". Xt is clear from Kantakouzenos' history that the
Gonoese officials also cam© to the emperor every bunday In
accordance with a long-established custom, as a mark of honour
3
and agreement.
1. ii-J .Loeaertz, 'Fragment d'un© lottre do Joan V Pal^ologue
d la commune do Genes, 1337-1391,' D.Z.. 31, (195$), 37-90.
The letter is also published by L• >>elgrano, 'Prima serie' ,
pp.l39-l40j and L.Sauii, holla colonla.2. 267-266,
2. Pseudo-Kodirios, op.clt. pp.23a-'-3a'.
3. ]:antak.i,12, 11,61.
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in a western context, these ceremonies such as the
bowing and the kissing of the enthroned emperor* s hand and
foot, indeed this whole involvement in the customary functions
of court ceremonial, would amount to a definite acknowledge¬
ment by the Genoese of the suzerainty of the Byzantine e iperor.
Although the origins of the rituals may be partly found in
this theory, the true significarico of the Genoese role in
the Byzantine court ceremonial was, by the second half of
C i ' ' , P
th© fourteenth century, rather different* The whole tone of
Pueudo-kodinoe* account is not that theso acts are a constant
reminder of the subjection of the Genoese, but that they are
a demonstration of the comparative favour in which they wore
held* it was not a humiliation but a privilege to kiss the
emperor's foot; it was a mark of high office which even
Byzantines below the rank of archoc. wore denied. Furthermore,
a very obvious distinction was made between the Genoese and
the Venetians in the v&l es which their officials could play
in the ceremonies of the court. The Venetians wore not allowed
to kiss the emperor's foot, and nap sally did not even kneel?
they were not allowed to stay for the reception which followed
the ceremonial and their boats did not even acclaim the
emperor, indeed their bailo ranked after the officers of the
Pi sans and Anconitans. in this way the Byzantines regularly
commemorated the services of the Genoese in the recovery of
the empire, and also Michael VXXi* s distrust of the Venetians,
which caused him to refuse them a permanent treaty and to
deny them a precise and exalted role in the ceremonial life
of the Byzantine court. Nevertheless, these ceremonies would
undoubtedly give a western observer a definite idea of the
submission of the Genoese to the o iperor.
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c ) Jurisdiction over Pera.
The administration of justice in Pera gives a good
indication of the degree to which the colonists were subject
to the autliority of the empire. However, the emperor* s rights
in this respect were complicated by the frequent disputes over
the nationality of some individuals. Genoese nationality had
very definite attractions for Byzantines, especially those
engaged in commerce, and it would appear that some Latins
found it advantageous to be considered Byzantine* Xn practice
the right to determine an individual*s nationality was a
Genoese one, and the emperor could do little about it. The
system for settling disputes over nationality placed the
responsibility for making the decision on a council of six
Genoese, three reobiles and three popu'lares. which was always
on hand to male© a declaration on a person* s right to be con¬
sidered Genoese, should imperial officials question it"*". The
decision of the Council of Six xvras final, and to be of Genoese
birth was by no means a prerequisite for Genoese nationality.
The determining factors were apparently custom and general
2
opinion . The Ga smiles, those of nixed Latin and Greek
parentage, presented a special proble m, since they really
belonged to neither side, but they appear to have had more
contact with the Greeks than the Latins, and are mentioned
3
serving in the Byzantine floot . However, the descriptions
of them make it sound unlikely that either side courted their
1. Regulations for the government of Pera, Ik February 1317,
L.Sauli, op.cit. p.223.
2. Genoese documents generally use guarded definitions such
as ' laauenses vel qui pro Ianuensibus distinguuntur,
dicuntur, seu appellantur, vel qui dici seu appellari
solent, seu qui privilegio ianuensium gaudent* .
L.belgrano, 'Prima series' , p.287.
3. Pachyneres, Do Hiciiaele Palaeologo. pp.1-58,309. Gregoras,
iv,5»I,98.
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allegiance much* The author of the Directoriun ad paewagimn
faciendum had very little use for them, considering them
* vacillating in faith* and'given to agitation* ready to call
themselves Latin when with Latins or Greek when with Greeks*"•
But the implication of the system for determining nationality
was that if the Genoese should choose to regard them as their
subjects and should extend to them the privileges reserved
Tor the citizens of Genoa, the emperor could do nothing about
it, and so in practice was denied assured sovereignty over
his own subjects, however, since it was so much to the
advantage of the Genoese to guard their franchises with
jealousy, the empire was never threatened with a mass defec¬
tion of its sxibjects.
Even once the question of nationality had been decided,
the emperor still did not have an unfettered jurisdiction
except in civil cases involving a Genoese as plaintiff and
a Greek as defendant* The regulations for the administration
of the colony issued in 1317 stated that such case3 should
be tried by two judges ax->point ed by the emperor. The treaty
of 13^1 mentioned only one judge who was to sit in Gonstanti-
p
nople and presumably was Greek", it is not clear from either
document what provision was made when the plaintiff was a
Greek and the defendant was Genoese, but it seems likely that
a case of this sort would be tried in i'era by a Genoese judge.
This was the pattern followed in criminal cases - the
trial was held in the defendant* s court. A Genoese accused
1. Ps.-Brocardus, Diroctorium ad passa^ium faciendum, in
liecueil des hisfcoriens des croxsades, documents armen lens.
2, pp. 490-491.
2. 'or 1317 see L.Sauli, Delia colonia. pp.227-223. For 13^1
see G. Jertolotto, *kuova serlo di docu ienti sulle relati¬
on! di Gonova coil* impero bizantino', Atti Society Llgure.
23, (1896-1393) 54?. D61 ■";or. hemes ten. 5. no.2d't>(». suggests
that the judge was Genoese, but his evidence for this
assumption is not clear.
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of a criminal act in or against the empire conic? not be tried
in Constantinople but had to be sent to Pora for trial before
the podestk. Byzantine criminals in Pera had reciprocal
rights and were tried by the imperial authorities"'"* The full
weakness of the emperor* s position in criminal cases .is
revealed by the letter of complaint which John V sent to the
government in Pera about 13d3* It was a protest against the
Insolence of successive poriest^t in failing to bring actions
against their subjects for crimes against the empire* John
mentioned the discovery of two plots against his life*
organised by Genoese citizens, who went unpunished* although
in the case of the second plot a full examination was made
by the Genoese officials of Pera and a confession was
2
obtained *
The podeeti.* s judicial powers inside Pera and in cases
involving westerners were not in doubt* .in 13^8 the podestA#
Benedetto d* Areo* judged a case between two citizens of Pera
and two of Ancona, and judgement was pronounced in favour
1
of the Genoese • clearly if the degree of the colony* s
subjection to the empire is examined in terras of the emperor* s
judicial authority over Pera and over Genoese criminals in
Constantinople* it would not be possible to make a case for
the empire exercising any sovereignty or dominion over the
Genoese territory. 'The two governments were equals and
partners in the administration of the law. We have no means
of telling how the system worked in detail* but the fact
that the e.speror considered complaints to the Genoese authori¬
ties to be worth while suggests that the Genoese did not
always ignore his demands* The degree of co-operation between
1. L.Jelgrano* • Prima serie' * p.iuo $ G.bertolotto, ' uova
serie' * p« jhS »
2. il-J .Loeaertz, * fragment d* une lettre* * pp*3?»3G*
3. L * >el > .ratio , * oaconda serie*. Atti bocieta Ligure* 13.
(id84),
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the two 2ovem.ienta probably -varied considerably according
to the personality of the podestA and the amity or hostility
of Genoa ami Byzantium at particular times*
d ) i'iie coinage of fera*
The sources concerning the coinage of Constantinople and
fera in the reign of John V fall into two principal categor¬
ies! the western commercial records and the numismatic remains*
Greek documentai-y evidence is very sparse arid, for this period,
adds little to the picture presented by the other two sources*
The greatest problem posed by these two groups of material is
that they are, on the surface, contradictory. The western
documentary evidence leaves little room to doubt that the
coinage of Pera was the same as that current in Constantinople ,
and that it was based on the traditional Byzantine gold hyper-
pyron until about 1376, when a silver half-hyperpyran super¬
seded the gold coin in both the empire and the Genoese colony.
The situation described by these western sources is
difficult to reconcile with the evidence of the numismatic
regains* The last Byzantine gold coin to hove survived in
sufficient numbers to suggest that it formed the currency of
the international trade passing through the Bosplioros, bore
the effigies of both Andronikos XI and Andronikos XXX, who
ruled together between 1325—1328# There arts very few examples
of hyperpyra of Andronikos XXX alone or of John VI kantakou-
zetos, and not one of traditional design survives from John
V* s reign. Xt is therefore most unlikely that the gold hyper-
Ijyron referred to in the western, sources, although ';yr?antine
in appearance, was the product of a Byzantine mint under the
control of John V, The evidence leading towards this con¬
clusion, and the triplications arising front it are considered
in detail bolou in an appendix* .
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Foreign visitors like Battuta, Tafur and Olavijo, who
stayed in Constantinople and Pera only briefly, were naturally
deceived by appearances. lany of the cere monies which they
witnessed and the coins which they handled seened to indicate
that the Genoese colony occupied a subordinate position to
the empire. in this way the growing practical independence
of the colony was concoaled and its exact relationship with
Constantinople was clouded by ambiguity. The outwardly
hyzantine aspect of the colony was clear enough for the
Venetians to scoff at the theory propounded by the Genoese
podest^t in 1339# that Pera was as much Genoese territory as
the other colonies which Genoa possessed** Similarly, the
Dominicans working in Pera suggested to Urban V that they
deserved special privileges for living in lands subject to
schismatics* They pointed out to the pope that the colony
used Byzantine money, that Greek flags flew there and that
the empire exercised certain jurisdictional rights in Pera*
in his reply Urban V acknowledged these arguments but con¬
tended that the true standing of the colony was not deter¬
mined by such superficial indications of Byzantine authority,
but by the presence there of Genoese judges, colonial offic¬
ials and above all, from his point of view, of ecclesiastical
o
officials of the homan Church".
iii) Tne co amerce of Pera*
a) 'he privileges of Genoese nationality.
The flourishing commercial life of the Genoese colony in
Pera was founded principally on the trading advantages and
1. Xn 1359 the Venetian bailo informed the Senate in Venice
that he had protested to the Genoese podestA about inter¬
ference with the work of Venetian officials stationed in
Pera, iio reported that * idem potestas h&buit respondere* * *
quod Peyra erat sua sicut sunt alie civitates quas Jcuiuea¬
ses habent. et multa alia enormia verba dieens' • >,V-L»,
XX, p. 3d.
2. Urban V summarised the. Dominicans* arguments, in his reply
dated 22 uoptember 13^4, see T&utu 11, pp.114-115.
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franchises, which had been granted to it in return for mili¬
tary aid against the Latin empire, just before the Lyzantine
recapture of Constantinople, These privileges were originally
set out in the treaty of Nyiaphaion in 1261, and were continu¬
ally restated and added to in subsequent agreements between
Genoa and the empire. The fundamental freedom was exvre .ely
simple and far-reaching• it was a total freedom from any
customs tax payable on entry or departure from the empire and
from any levy on selling, buying or bartering inside the
empire, in principle the Genoese colony could enjoy an
entirely unrestricted trade with and through the empire, xdiile
most o th er merchants, in particular the yuan lines themselves,
were subject to substantial taxes and limitations on their
activities^",
Other privileges of less dramatic consequence, were
allowed to the Genoese traders, such as the right of using
their own weights and measures in the colony. The Genoese
pound was divided into 72 saggi or perperi (hyperpyra),
which was also a Byzantine unit of weight, but the Genoese
perporo was fractionally lighter than the imperial hyper-
pyron in the ratio of 100 j 99^, Likewise the Genoese measure
1, The treaty of Nymphaion, •Item dodit et concessit,,. liber-
alitatem, franchiciam, et im>munitateu do cetero in per-
petuun in mari et terra in portibus et insulis nostris
quos et quas nunc habet et de cetero del mieoricordia
acquisiverit, ita tasaen quod omnes ianueases et de
districtu ianue et dicti ianuemses sint franch!, liberi
et inramea in to to predicto imperlo nostro ab o:mi
coniergio, dacita et exaction© int rando ±>nperiu i nostrum
et exsundo, stando et eundo de terra in terrain per mare
et per terrai cum mercious vol sine lercibus iiluc delac-
tis vel illio emptis et alio defferendis personaliter vel
realiter' , bd. C.manfroni, • be relazioni fra Genova',
p.793. Restated in the treaty of 130h, L, ::ol, ;ran.o, 'Prima
serie' , p,107; see also treaty of 1352, Liber luring
.Ueipublicae Geuuensis, 2,ed. H. xicottius, b03a, ,:'or
the taxes levied on other westjruere, see .fegolotti,
La uratica del la mercatura, eu ,A ,Lvan a , iediaeval Acadomy
of .hierica publications, n.2h9 (Cambridge "lass,1936), p,4l.
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of com was used in the colony, although it was 6-7-< smaller
than the on© used in Constantinople"'"# These privileges were
not in themselves of great importance, but they ware a daily
reminder of the differences between the Genoese colony and
the empire, and symbolised the fact that each Genoese trader
was a member of a strong and firmly-established organization,
favoured and protected in the Byzantine empire by a long¬
standing treaty# J.t was similar to membership of the strongest
of guilds, which conferred not only profitable advantages
but also a confidence and security which was of great value
in the uncertain world of international trade.
b ) The relationship between the empire and * era in. co.amer-
ciai affairs#
Despite the autonomy of the colony of i'era and its
commercial dominance of Constantinople, it was not by any
means cut off from the trading life of the empire as a whole.
Its port was visited by ships of all nationalities, and its
market contained, goods for the empire. its popularity among
foreign traders was, however, not due to the fact that it was
independent of the ei.'ipire and a haven from Byzantine taxes.
Considerable precautions were taken both by the empire and
the colony, to protect the rights of the emperor over non-
Gonooao citizens using the port of Para# Despite the privilege
of using Genoese weights, the weighers of Pora were not allowed
unrestricted use of them, for they wore forbidden to weigh in
transactions wltlch did not involve a Genooso, and if only one
of tae parties was Genoese the weighers liad to bo supervised
1. F.ii .Pegolotti, op.cit. pp.32,39# On comparative weights
and measures, see B.SchLlbach, .iyzantinische 'etrologlo.
(Munich 1970).
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by the podestsl. Xn addition they were forbidden to accept any
payment for weighing goods which belonged to a subject of the
emperor, and the Genoese officials were obliged to tell the
imperial customs officers about any foreign goods weighed on
Genoese scales, to avoid defrauding the emperor of his customs
tax1.
There were other provisions designed to safeguard this
important source of the eiaperor' s income. Ships calling at
bora had to give the Byzantine customs officers a list of the
goods and the names of the people on board who were subject to
2
the taxes of the empire . The Genoese colonial authorities
were bound to heljj the Greek officials in forcing payment of
the imperial customs taxes in Para from Byzantines and other
non-Genoese who were liable for them-.
. This evidence of partnership it* commerce and public finance
is a striking illustration of the co-operation between the
empire and the colony. Bach had sovereign rights over its own
subjects and each was allowed to enforce these rights in the
other's torritory. Imperial officials were to be found
stationed permanently in the colony to safeguard tho duos
owed to the emperor, and likewise the local colonial taxes
could be collected from Genoese ships which used the port of
1. L. Dauli, Delia colonia. 2, p.226.
2. Ibid, p.225a
3. 'item volunt et ordinant dicti ambasadores quod officiales
et comsrciarii domini imperatcris capere possint in Pejra
Oiiaaes Grecos et oian.es extraneoa solvere deberites coraer-
gium dicti domini iniperatorio et ipsoe dueere ad
solvendusi comergiuci quod dare debuerint 3ine contradic-
ione alicujus porsoxie et hoc cum conscienoia et nunciis
doraini potestatis Pejre qui ad hoc teneatur prestare
auxilium at favorem' . Treaty of ljhlt G.bertolotto,
• Nuova soris' , pp. 5-5^9 •
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Constantinople instead of passing through Fera^, In theory
there was no way in which a Greek could escape paying his
dues to the empire, or a Genoese could avoid the taxes of the
colony, and the two governments co-operated to see that this
was so# The empire occasionally found it necessary to protest
to the Genoese about alleged breaches of the agreements be¬
tween them. Genoese merchants were sometimes accused of carry¬
ing non-Genoese goods on their ships and passing them off as
their own. to protect them from the Byzantine taxes. However,
the colonial authorities issued injunctions against this
2
abuse of their privileges , and since it was so much in the
Genoese interest to guard their franchises against merchants
of other nationalities, there was never any danger that such
illegal activities would be allotted to continue unchecked by
the government in Pera.
c ) Pera as a centre of local and international trade.
The importance of Pera to the Genoese was emphasised
by the fact that they did not enjoy the right, allowed to the
Venetians, to buy property arid engage in business in any part
3
of the empire as they wished . The treaty of Nysnphaion in
1261, which specified the trading establishments conceded to
the Genoese, mentioned Cassandria near Thessalonica, Smyrna,
Chios, Adramyttion and Lesbos, and proposed that Crete and
the Negropont should be added to the list if they should be
recovered by the Greeks. By John V* s reign ail except the
first of these places had been lost by the empire, and even
in Cassandria there is no evidence of large scale Genoese
1. For the collection of Genoese customs taxes in Constanti¬
nople, see the regulations of 22 January 13^3 L.Bei-
grano, 'Prima serie* , pp.285-293.
ibid, pp.110-115. See also the instructions to the new
podest& of Pera in 1317, L.Sauli, Bella colonia. 2,
p.222ff.
3. £>ee the treaty of 1352, Liber luriu :> Keipubllcae Genuonsis,
2, ed. ll.Ricottius, 6o4b.
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commercial activity*. The Accounts of the expedition of Anadoo
of Savoy mention the presence of a few Genoese individuals in
Mesembrla and Gallipoli, but those merchants seem to have
been established in the towns when they were controlled by
the Dulgars and the Turks respectively, before the western
. 2
army restored Byzantine authority over them .
Pera therefore was the centre of Genoese trading acti¬
vities in the empire. This base was strategically placed
to play a dominant part in local trade with Constantinople
and the international trade between the Black Sea and the
West. The influence of the Genoese on the commercial life
of Constantinople particularly on the provision of food to
the city, was forcefully demonstrated on several occasions,
in 1343 a local quarrel in the Black Sea, involving the
Genoese colony of Caffa, was partly responsible for a corn
"1 4
shortage in the Byzantine capital . Xn this way the daily
life of the Byzantines was subject to outside interference
over which they had no control. In their conflicts with the
os.ipire the Genoese colonists of Pera %<?ere able to impose
heavy pressures on the citizens of Constantinople, by blockad¬
ing the city and shutting the Do sphoro£ to any shipping but
their own. Thus during the war of 1352 when the Genoese
stopped selling food supplies to the Greeks, the price of
corn in Constantinople doubled in a few days^,
1. On the territorial concessions to the Genoese in the treaty
of Nymphaion, see l.oevcenko, 'The zealot revolution and
the supposed Genoese colony in Thessalonica* , Prosolio ra
eis >^t. Ayriakidin. ('Ihessalonilce 1953), 603—617 • Also
P.Leaerie, !»♦ I; Clrat d* Aytlin. pp.45ff«
2. ollati, lllustragioni. nos.XVII,XVIII, LXXXI, 623.
3. Gregoras, xiii,l2i II,663-687♦
4. ibid, xviii,2*11,877} xxvi, 26 jIII,92.
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The list of goods which could be obtained in Pera is
al iost endless. The account provided by Pegolotti for the
first decades of the fourteenth century probably still held
good in John V's reign. Many of the commodities he mentioned
are to be found among the purchases made by Amadeo of Savoy
during his stay in Pera» The Account Book of Amadeo's expedi¬
tion is a valuable source concerning the commerce of Pera,
Although it only provides a random sample of the goods avail¬
able in the colony tho list of commodities he obtained must
be fairly comprehensive since he was supplying a sizeable
army »
Food was the most important item among the goods bought
by the crusaders for supplying both the main expedition and
the garrison left behind in Gallipoli, Com, barley and
biscuit were their staple foodstuffs, together with bacon,
salt meat, and mutton. Occasionally the purchases included
cheese, spices and wine. Dried fruit, such as prunes, dates
and figs were bought for medicinal purposes, and rose water
also was thought beneficial to the health*.
Various forms of manufactured goods were also found in
Peru. Aiaadeo bought varieties of cloth there, including
x?oollen and cotton material, cloth from Vervins and Milan,
silk and samite, for making tunics, stockings, cloaks, flags
and bedsheets. He also obtained some wolf and deer skins
as he prepared for the winter's campaign in Bulgaria.
Articles mad© of wood and iron, notably ladders, posts, beams,
nails and unworked metal, a siege engine, a machine for
burning pallisades and other military equipment were bought
1. Bollatl, Xllustrazio nl. nos.2^7, 263-7, 606-7, 1202.
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by Amadoo for his army. On several occasions he bought
writing materials 3uch as parchment, paper and wax, for keep¬
ing accounts and writing letters^".
Many of the large purchases made by Amadeo in Pera
involved a Genoese merchant called Barnabus de Saacto
btephano de Pera. he dealt in a wide variety of commodities,
but he was the exxiedition* s main source of food supplies such
2
as com, biscuit, bacon and salt meat . He was also engaged
in the cloth trade, and owned a workshop which produced much
3
of the cloth bought by Amadeo • In addition to being an
important manufacturer and retailer in the colony, Barnabus
was also concerned in some of Amadeo's business transactions
with other merchants. He seems sometimes to have acted as
Amadeo's agent in Pera while the count was engaged in Bul¬
garia, He arranged for supplies to be sent to the garrison
in Gallipoli, and sold some of A.aadeo* a stock of corn which
u
was deteriorating in the army* s absence ,
Among the commodities found by Amadeo in Pera were mastic
and salt, both of which had been specifically forbidden to
Genoese merchants and were theoretically subject to an imperial
monopoly. The monopoly in mastic had been broken by the
Genoese in 1346 when they seized the island of Chios fr:>m
Byzantium and thus acquired the principal masicic-producing
5
area • The salt monopoly was still operated by imperial
officials, but Amadeo was not only able to buy salt from a
Genoese in Pera, but oven imported some himself from Bulgaria
and sold it in the colony' • This illustrates how easily the
T. ibid, nos7 192,207.^71,273,^29,^56,557,HB5.
2, ibid, nos»205j2o6,2y7 • 4 30 •
3» £b£3, nos, ^91,493,494,
4. Ibid, nos,606,607,
3* Ibid, no. 247*
6, ibid, nos.XXXX, XXX, 430,432,379• Tor the restrictions on
Genoese trade see L.Belgrano, 'Prima serie', p.lo7s also
L.Sauli, Bella colonia, 2, pp,226-227. it was in the admini¬
stration of the salt monopoly that Aloxios Ajjokauicos first
rose to prominence, Katvfcak.i,4iX,23*
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Genoese had been able to break into the Byzantine monopolies
which had once provided a substantial proportion of the
imperial revenues.
The list of commodities available in Pora clearly indicates
the chief characteristics of the trading life of the colony.
The bulk of the goods carried through i'era, as well as those
sold in tho market there, consisted of food from the Pontic
coastland®, and luxury goods and precious metals fro i the Par
East destined for the populous cities of the west. On their
return journeys the Genoese merchants carried cloth and other
manufactured goods such as tools, utensils and weapons. Pera
acted as a staging post on this important trade route from
East to Vest, It also supported a considerable local trade
arid was used as a depot where goods for transmission to Genoa
could be collected from outlying trading posts. This function
of the colony is brought out in the acts of a Genoese notary,
Antonio di Podenzolo, who operated in the Black Sea port of
Kilia between 13*30 and 13• The only part of his records
which survives concerns the relatively inactive period from
November to May, but it indicates that Genoese merchants and
a few Greeks were involved in a thriving export trade from
Kilia to Pera, and from Pera to both Constantinople and Genoa.
Many of the acts concern the purchase of local goods in Kilia
and further inland, Corn, honey, wax, salt and wine wore
transported to Pora where they were sold to other merchants
who carried them to their final markets, Podenzolo's Register
1, The Register of Podenzolo has not been edited but forms
the basis of a study by U.iliescu, 'Notes sur 1' apport
roumain au ravitailloment de Uyzance d'aprda ime source
in^dite du XiVo sidcle' , jouvelles etudes d'histoire.
(iiucareat !')(> 5), pp.lo j-llb.
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is an isolated survivor from among tlio many notarial records
produced in towns like dilia all around the Black sea describ¬
ing the activities of Genoese traders who wore based in the
colony of Pera.
The commercial importance of vera restilted in the growth
of a secondary industry of banking, money changing arid money
lending. To some people it was a full-time occupation, to
others merely a profitable sideline. Together they turned
Pera into a rajor financial centre. The experiences of Araadeo
in Pera supply a wealth of detail on this aspect of the
commercial activity of the colony. On many occasions he
turned to the inhabitants of Pera to change and borrow money,
and sometimes found it an unexpectedly expensive business.
While he was In Bulgaria, Amadeo sent one of his men to
Pera to buy food for the garrison stationed in Gallipoli.
The agent was provided with 203** hyperpyra 'of the weight of
Messiahria' , which at the customary rate of exchange should
have been equivalent to 337m florins. However, when the
money came to be changed in Pera only 910 florins were re¬
ceived, and Amadeo* s treasurer had to make up the difference
later. Similarly, one of the captains of Amadeo' s fleet
complained that he had lost ho3 Bulgarian hyperpyra in chang¬
ing jhoQ of them in Pera"1" •
Aniadeo used the financial market in Pera chiefly for
raising money, but this process also had its difficulties
and expenses. Vhen John ¥ met Anadeo in eozopolis early in
1367 he agreed to contribute 13,000 florins to the cost of
the western army. Part of tlio money was raised by levying
1. Bollati, 1In 31 raaior1i . nos.^23,437* boo also ^96,60h.
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a tax on the inhabitants of hese.abria, but since the crusaders
had already exploited this source of revenue extensively,
only about a third of the sura promised could be gathered by
taxation. John V then gave Amadeo some gold and silver
pledges to cover the remainder of his debt, but when these
pledges wore converted into cash in the iia.xte.et at Pera they
fell far short of raising their nominal value. One lot of
pledges, supposedly worth 6101 hyperpyra received no raore
than. 4;>00 hyperpyra from the bankers of Pera. Perhaps the
Ueioeso colonists took advantage of Amadeo's pressing needs,
or else they thought little of the e.^eror' a pledges, for
only about two-thirds of the promised 15#000 florins x-jas
actually received by Amadeo1.
By the end of his stay in Constantinople, Amadeo' s finan¬
cial situation was critical. He had a long list of wages to
pay and supprLies for the homeward journey to buy, for which
his income from gifts and the sale of captured goods was quite
Insufficient. A;ladeo therefore began to raise loans. Although
he x'eceived some loans from Venetians and from the men of his
own expedition, he raised by far the greatest number from the
Genoese community, it was not a haphazard process, for lie
engaged the services of two loan brokers who xvere responsible
2
for arranging sevei*al loans each . The total sum raised by
loans from Genoese in pera amounted to 37,672 hyperpyra. in
no case was a firm date set for repayment, but generally it
was agreed that the loan should be repaii , together with a fixed
sum of interest, a month or txio after Amadeo arrived in Venice,
ibid, nos. XL, XLXX.
2# Ibid, nos. 50b, 563.
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or after the letter of debt was presented to him in Italy*" •
In several cases Ariadeo was able to riake repayment early
before ho set out for homo, but the ainotint of interest was
2
not reduced in these cases . 'the rato of interest varied
considerably, on one occasion reaching forty per cent, but
3
generally being about twelve per cent , The podesth of Pern
lent Amadeo 3200 hyperpyra and waived the interest completely,
but such generosity \ias rare*' • Overall Araadeo was obliged
to pay 12,219 hyperpyra as Interest in addition to tlx©
prihcipal of the loans received in Pera.
The -iien from whom Amadeo borrowed money in Pera wore
not all residents of the colony* The Accounts make a distinc-
5
tion between the men * de leun.ua* and those * de Pera* * , suggest¬
ing that the former were in Pera only temporarily, presumably
on business, perhaps in passage betxreen the Black Sea and
the West* All those who lent money must have had close con¬
tacts in xtaly where the money was to bo repaid. Gasario
Saluaio nominated his wife Bella Via to receive payment on his
behalf in Genoa'and the others, if they did not use relatives,
i.aiat have had agents to accept the money. Some of the money¬
lenders wore bankers by profession and may have been repre-
7sentatives of Italian hanks , but most of them seem to have
heea ordinary merchants* It is possible that these men found
no.ley-lending a convenient and profitable aethod of trans¬
ferring wealth from the colony to their home businesses or
baiiic accounts.
1. Ibid, nos. LXVX, LXVII.
2. Ibid, nos. LV, 526; LVi, 528; LVII, 529.
3. ibid, nos. LXVI, LXVIXI, LXXIV-LXXVII,
Ibid. nos.LVIII, 530.
5. ' fib. nos.LI, LXX, LIXI; LVI, LVII, LXXVIX.
6, rnbid. no.LX.
7* ibid, no. LXKIXI. any of the loans made by enoese
were repayable in Venice, nos. LII,LXX, LXVII, LXXVI.
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d ) The volume and value of the trade of Pera.
The volume and value of the trade wliich passed through
Fera has never been accurately assessed, and in all probabil¬
ity never can be. However, there is more evidence than the
single piece provided by Gragoras which is often brought
forward to illustrate the economic power of the Genoese
position in Fera. Gregoras simply stated that the Genoese
had managed to take over nearly all the sea trade and also
a great deal of the revenue from the Byzantine treasury,
until their annual income from taxation was almost 200,000
gold pieces, while the Byzantines themselves were hardly able
i
to collect 30,000 . Any conclusion based on this statement
to the effect that the Genoese controlled eighty-seven per
cent of the sea trade passing through the Bosp"h.ori»s, is read-
2
ing into Gregoras much more than is really there . There is
no knowing how accurate the figures given by Gregoras are,
and it is unclear whether the taxes he mentions were exclus¬
ively customs taxes and whether the rate of taxation was the
same on both sides of the Golden Horn, As evidence of the
stato of Genoese trade in Fera, the figures given by Gregoras
arc totally inadequate.
information of a more accurate nature about the commerce
of Fera is found in the documents relating to the sale of the
tax farm of the karati Feyre. the customs taxes payable by
3
Genoese shipping at Fera . The rate of taxation was expressed
in carats of tax paid per hundred hyperpyra worth of goods
carried. Although the rate of taxation fluctuated frequently,
it is possible to estimate the value of the tax farm, and
hence to have an approximate idea of the value of tlie trade
carried through Fera. The graph shows the value of the tax
far over sixty years, expressed in terms of the number of
1. Gregoras, xvii,l*XI,G^2.
2. G.Kyrris, 'John Cantacuzene and the Genoese, 1321-13^3' .
miscellanea storica ligure, 3,(1963), ^5.
3. The sums paid by the tax farmers from 13^1-1^06 are given
by J.Day, Lcs douaaes de Genes, 1376-1377, (Faris 1963),
(contd.)
THE DECLINE OP GENOESE TRADE PASSING THROUGH THE COLONY OP PERA
The graph is based on the sums paid for
the farm of customs taxes levied by the Genoese
on all the goods carried by their merchants
through the Bosphorus. The figures are given in
tabular form by J. Day, Les douanes ae Genes
1376-1377, pp.xx-xxi. Between 1341 and 1364 the
figures are divided into two parts, i) for
traffic with the Byzantine Empire and the Khanate
of Kiptchak, and ii) on traffic with the empire
alone. After 1369 this distinction disappears
and a single set of figures is given. The
continuous line shows the tax—collectors1 estimate
oi the total Genoese trade passing through Pera;
the dotted line shows the amount of Genoese trade
with the empire alone in the years for which
T*D enitdo nm rs? -rr-m>-i
13*18
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Genoese pounds paid by the tax farmer for each carat of taxs
in other words, the estimated value of the farm :Lf all goods
bought, sold, or carried through Pera in one year, were taxed
at the rate of one carat per hundred hyperpyra of their
worth - which rejjreseiits a tax of 1/24% on all Genoese trade.
The significant feature of the graph is simple enough.
Throughout the second half of the fourteenth century the
volume of Genoese trade in Pera was steadily declining,
indeed by 14-00 the value of the trade had declined to about
one-tenth of what it had boon in 1341. Since Genoese trad©
with the Turks was more lightly taxed by the colonial authori¬
ties than trade with Byzantium, it might appear that the
decline in customs revenue was due in part to the territorial
losses of the empire and the consequent taxation of much of
the trade at the reduced tariff. But this was not the case
since, for the purposes of the karati Peyre. the emperor was
always held to possess the same lands as he had in 1343*.
Nevertheless the Turkish conquests were at the root of
the decline in Genoese trade in Pera. The Genoese were unable
to win from the Turks the same trading privileges that they
received from the Greeks, and. they wore themselves compelled
to allow Turkish traders advantageous commercial privileges
in Pera. Turkish merchants were conceded freedom from the
customs taxos of Pera, and only paid a small sales tax, but
Genoese merchants in Turkish lands were required to pay the
2
local clue3 in full . As Turkish territory expanded, the
Genoese gradually lost their one outstanding advantage in the
pp.XX-XXI. The assessment, sale and collection of the tax
are very fully described for 1343 in L.tiolgrano, 1 Prima
serie* , pp.285-314. Gee also for 139G, ibid. 153-156.
1* Ibid, pp.297-298.
2. For the commercial treaty between Genoa and the Turks in
1JJ7 see ibid, pp.146-14-9•
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eastern trade, but the colonial taxes vere not adjusted to
meet the changed circumstances. Mo doubt part of the drop in
the volume of trade was caused by the effects of the t-laclc
Death in cutting back on the urban population© of western
iiuropo, and consequently on the demand for the cheap food
supplies of the East. Also the growth of the Genoese colony
in Chios faced fera with a new and vigorous rival^. Dut by
far the greater part of the decline must be ascribed to the
changing political conditions caused by the Turkish advance*
however, the importance of the Genoese colony was less
seriously affected by the steady decline in the commerce of
Pera than might have been expected. For as long as the West
maintained trading contacts with the countries of the Black
Sea, Pera, by virtue of ite geographical position if nothing
else, remained a vital link between East and West. The trade
of Pera was probably at its height in the early years of Joltn
V*s reign. Thereafter, it appears to have declined, together
with the empire, as the power of the Turks steadily grew. But
the colony* s greater resilience in the face of the political
changes of the times was demonstrated by its survival as an
important commercial centre long after the Byzantine empire
had been entirely obliterated.
1. On the growth of Chios as a commercial centre see
J .Peers, Canes au XVe steele. (Paris 1961), especially
pp.381-406.
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B . The Venetian colony In Constan e l .opXe.
The materials available for the study of the Venetian
colony in Constantinoj>le are substantially fuller than those
relating to the Genoese colony in I'ora. This fact has encour¬
aged the production of several important works which have
established the details of the Venetians1 colonial organisation
and commercial activity"*". I do not propose to recover this
ground except to illustrate the differences between the
Venetian and Genoese colonies and to examine how these factors
affected Venice' s rolations with the empire.
i) The structure of the colony
The reason for the survival of a vast amount of detailed
documentary source material concerning the Venetian colonies
is not merely the care and good fortune with which the Venetian
archives have been protected. The main reason, which is funda¬
mental to the character of the colonies themselves, is that
Venice exercised a much tighter control over most of its
colonies than Genoa did, subjecting them to persistent metro¬
politan interfei-ence which generated a ceaseless correspondence
between the authorities in Venice and their representatives
in Constantinople• Therefore matters of extreme particularity
and minute detail bocame preserved in the official records
2
of the central government .
1. See in particular F.Thlriet, La uor.ianie v^nitiemt" §.u
i, toyen age (Paris 1959) • «*• chrysostomictes, 'Venetian
commercial privileges under the Palaeologi', studi Vene¬
tian!. 12,(1970) 267-356. C. Diehl, 'la colonic! v&ii-"
tleiine & Constantinople h. la fin du XlVe si&cle* , Melanges
cic i' ocole franoaise de uome. 3, (lbo3)? 90-131. Ch. Malte-
zou, *0 Qecruoc tov? £v KqjvaTocvTi vobTcoXei BevEToi? BafXou
C 1268-1453). Bt0Xio9fjKTi EocpCocc I/xpik6\ou. 6, (Athens 1970).
2. Much of tliis correspondence is summarised by F,Thirlet,
liegestes des deliberations du s^nat de Venice concemaiit
la hoifianlo. X. (Paris 1959). Also liegesti del Coamemoriali.
ed. h.Predelli, 2,(137«).
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Tiie extent of Venetian. governmental supervision is
illustrated by the use of the convoy syste,a which determined
the whole manner of conducting; Venice* s trade with the east.
Nearly every year, in the early summer, a convoy of galleys
was assembled in Venice to undertake the journey to Negropont,
Constantinople, Tana and Treblzond. The organisation of the
fleet was entirely in the state's hands and its security was
guaranteed by an escort of Venetian warships. The government
decided how many ships were to be sent, when they should set
out, which ports they should visit and for how long, and
when they should return, usually in December. bpace on the
galleys was auctioned to members of the patrician class who
could either trade themselves or sub-let their cargo alloca¬
tion to other merchants. The right to send goods on these
official galleys was especially valuable since the most
precious commodities such as spices, silk, jewels, uye,
special cloth and alum could only be carried by ships in
the convoy. nOwever, the greatest advantage of the system from
the point of view of both state and oerchaht, was that inter¬
national trade was conducted under the most advantageous
conditions possible. The goods were given the utmost pro¬
tection, they were assured of a firm market with certain
profits in Venice where trading rivalries could not upset the
commercial stability since government ordinance controlled
the supply and assessed the future demand. In short, the
element of chance was removed as far as was possible from
International trade by the constant supervision of the
Venetian authorities'.
1, F.Thiriet, * Observations sur le trafic des galfees veni-
tiennes d* apres les chiffres dos incanti (XXV-kVe slides)* ,
rftudi in onoro di Amintore Fanfani, 3j,(^±lan 1902),493-522.
(contd.)
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It was but a step from the control of trade to the control
of tlie life of the Venetian colony in Constantinople from the
metropolis. The colonial government was appointed from
Venice and its daily affairs were subject to rigid regulations.
The bailo was in constant correspondence with Venice, report¬
ing on the local situation and asking for advice on particular
matters. He was empowered to intervene in colonial commerce
at all levels, collecting taxes, weighing goods, inspecting
the loading of ships and, in extreme cases, talcing over the
running of maladrainlstored Venetian businesses. Colonial
officials had to keep elaborate records of their expenses
which were checked by the bailo and his council. The bailo
was required to give a full account to his successor and to
the Venetian Senate on his return to the west. The private
activities of the bailo were also restricted by the state,
lie was not allowed to engage in any form of trade during his
term of office and could not accept gifts beyond a small value
even from the emperor for a year after his return to Venice.
It is not surprising that official posts in the colonies were
not always sought after and could only be refused on payment
of a fine"''.
The office of bailo in the colony in Constantinople was
the most senior of all the Venetian posts in the east. The
bailo was set over the consul of Thessalonica, the bailo of
Negropont, the doge of Crete, the castellans of Coron and odon
G.Luzzatto, 'Wavigazione di linea e navigazione libera
nolle grandi citta marinare del medio evo' , Studi di
storia economica veneziana; (JPadua 195*0 , 53-57 • ^.C ..uarie,
• Venetian merchant galleys, 1300-1334* private and
communal operation*, speculum, 3d, (1963), 179-205.
1. C. JJiehl, * La colonic venitienne* , pp.90-131. Thiriet,
lifeeatea •
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axid tiie bailo of Tyro, and furthermore La was an important
figure at the imperial court where he was the permanent
representative of the Venetian government"*". Despite his
theoretical eminence the bailo was entirely subject to the
metropolitan government for instructions concerning inter¬
national affairs, ilia document of appointment set out even
how he was to greet the emperor on arrival in Constantinople,
and during his term of office he received constant orders on
2
how to conduct himself with respect to the empire « The
bailo' s technical subordinates in charge of the other Venetian
communities in the east mediterranean often received their
instructions directly from the Venetian Senate, and in times
of emergency it was usual for a special a bnssador to present
Venice's views to the Byzantine government.
The diffex'ence between the formal rigidity exercised
by Venice over its colonial government and the greater freedom
assumed by the Genoese of Pera is not particularly surprising.
Genoa had risen to greatness with a late challenge to the
already established dominance of Venice. Iience from the
beginning there was an element of intrusion and opportunism
in its relations with the East, The contrast dominated the
development not only of trade, but of the domestic govern¬
ments of the two cities. The social upheavals in Genoa which
resulted in the establishment of a popular government in the
1. C. iJiehl, op.cit. p. 122.
2. In 1374 the bailo was instructed! * quando ibis coram jo
(iiaperatoro) accipere debeas pelle.u de collo et berictum
sive caputeuai de capite, at flectere genua In terrain et
levare in continent! sursuxn et hoc in principio, et
postea plus non debes floctere in terram genua....'
C.Diehl, op,cit. p.130. On the office of bailo soe espec¬
ially Oh.Maltezou ,'Q Qeauoc tou BaiXou.The independent
action of the uuilo whichShe describes p.44, was no more
than the slowness of communications made inevitable.
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early fourteenth century hastened the cx-eation of a new
nobility in which men of wealth could always find a place.
There was no parallel development in Venice where an exclusive
oligarchy was able to keep control of the Great council and
the major offices of state without difficulty. The only
exception to the general rule that new members of the Venetian
Council had to be foreign princes or the nephews of popes,
was made in 13^1 when thirty new men were admltxed. The new
men were those whose money or military skill had kept Venice
going during- the war of Chioggia. They not only had irresist¬
ible claims to the state's gratitude but their contributions
were vital to Venice* s strained finances. The influence of
the great Venetian families was also powerful in the colony,
which had a Great Council and a Council of Twelve with
important acbainistrative functions and severely restricted
membership"'".
The physical nature of the Venetian colony was another
reason why a semi-independent local administration of the
type found in Tera could not emerge among- the Venetians, in
1303 the imperial government had granted the Genoese a plot
of land in Tera on which they could build their colony. By
i.e force of bribery, force and cunning this area was expanded,
fortified and finally won outright'". The Venetian colonists
had no similar opportunities to assert themselves in this way.
After the i'axi of the Latin Empire of Constantinople the
Venetians were naturally regarded by the Byzantines with great
suspicion which was reflected in the terms of the treaties
1. J.C. Lavie, The decline of the Venetian nobility as a
ruling class. (Baltimore 1962) p.18. i". Thiriet. La homanie
veulcienae. pp.204-203.
2. bee above pp. 2_i3 -2.17.
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between the two powers. The first commercial treaty between
Michael Vxxx and the Venetians in 1265, by which the city' s
merchants were granted exemption from all Byzantine customs
and other taxes, specified that Venetian traders should live
outside the walls of Constantinople and Theesalonica. In
1268 they were allowed to rent accommodation inside the cities.
In the treaty of 1277» which remained the basis of all future
treaties with the empire, the Venetians were granted free
use of twenty-five houses for merchants and three for colonial
officials"*". Extra houses were to be made available by the
Byzantines inside the city if the number of Venetian merchants
increased. Similar provisions were made for Venetians visiting
2
Thessalonica. in addition to these lodging places , which
were grouped within the area of the colony which had existed
before 1204 on the shore of the Golden Horn inside the city
walls, the Venetians were given the right first to rent and
later to buy houses, bakeries, fields and gardens and all
kinds of property both in the capital and elsewhere in the
empire. However, these privileges were small compared with
those of the oenoese. Venice never received a grant of land
which tiie colonists could regard as a unit belonging to them
aud over which they could in time establish effective
sovereignty.
Without this permanent base the Venetian colony lacked
the security which the Genoese established in tera, The
feeling of impermanence was heightened by the system of
1. Treaty of 1265, M.M.1IX. 79j Urkundan.III. 70. Treaty
of 1268, Urkunden, III. 96. Treaty of 1277, .».h. ill,
88-895 8rkiunden .111. 139-140. See J.Chrysosto .sides,
' Venetian privileges', pp.290-291.
2. • iiospicia' , Urkunden t 111. 139.
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temporary treaties which regulated the relationship between
the empire and Venice, generally for five years at a time.
On the occasions on which the treaty was allowed temporarily
to lapse it is likely that the Venetians lost the use of their
lodgings*". The lapses also exposed the Venetians to the
demands of the imperial customs and other tax officials. On
11 April 1356 the Senate told its ambassador in Constantinople
to protest strongly to John V because his officers had taken
advantage of the lack of a treaty to impose very heavy taxes
on the Venetian, merchants~. Again, on 26 October 1369 the
Venetian envoys, sent to negotiate with John in Home, were
told to inform him that since he left Byzantium his officials
had invented 'certain innovations and extortions against the
form of the treaties' Similarly, on 13 February 1375*
shortly after the expiry of the treaty, Venetian ambassadors
were sent to John V to protest about the aggressive ttitude
of the Byzantine tax officers who had imposed taxes on
Venetian merchants in the empire . The Venetian colony was
1. The instructions given on 12 harch 1376 to the Venetian
prowedftori to Byzantium included the clause ' Si vero
per douiinum imperatorem vel suos fieret vobis mentio
quod descenderetis in terram secundum usum quia dominus
imperator faciei vobis parari demos et alia ut est
solitura,..A.S.V. Senato, Misti 35, f.98 (Thiriet,
K^-estes 575).
2. Thiriet, K<feestes 291.
3. '...Post recossua ipsius domini imperatoris facte sunt
nostris certe novitates et extorsiones contra formam
treuguarum' . O.halecki, Un empereur. p.j,13, p.376.
k, 'Item quia Venotis et raercatoribus nostris conversaxitibus
in partibus iiaperii sui fiunt multe alio novitates e
extorsiones contra forvaam treuguarum in dannum et sinis-
trum iuua et agendorum suoruj et specialiter infrascripte,
videlicet: Pritao, Veneti nostri de Mesembre molestantur
per officialos ct comerclarios domini imperatoris. item,
dominus imperator ab aliquo tempore citra imposuit unuia
couerclum super macinatura quod comerclum raduridat in
donnum nostrorun. item, Veneti nostri de Salonico uoles-
iantur in Balouico per officiales ipsiu; domini impera-
toris' . J .Chrysos-comides, 'Venetian privileges', doc.13,
P.347.
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continually disturbed by this kind, of activity since in the
course of John. V' s reign of fifty years the treaties between
Byzantium and Venice were in operation for only thirty-three
years.
The Venetians' vulnerability was not entirely removed
even by the operation of a formal treaty with Byzantium.
Between 13^2 and 13^9# while the Venetian merchants were under
the protection of a treaty, they suffered damages amounting
to twenty-two thousand hyperpyra at the hands of the Greeks.
On 21 April 1358, oxxly six months after a treaty had been
signed, ambassadors passing through the empire were told
to protest about the many losses which the Venetians in
Byzantium were still enduring. Three months later the vice-
bailo was ordered to complain again about the injustices his
countrymen were suffering1. The Venetians, however, were
not maltreated only by the Byzantine people, but even the
emperor sometimes ignored the treaties and attempted to levy
taxes or to restrict Venetian activities in an illegal manner.
In January 13&1 » special ambassador was sent from Venice to
John V to demand the punishment of those responsible for
killing several members of the crew of the l/snetian trading
galleys in a church, and also to protest against the intro-
2
duction of a new tax • This tax fell on Byzantines who
1. Thirlet, Kegestes 325# 335*
2. 'Item exponere debeat idem ambaxator praefato domino
imperatori de gravitatibus at novitatibus quae per
ipsum et officiarios suos indebite et contra Formam
treuguarma nostris civibus et meroatoribus ac fideli-
bus continue inferuntur undo infaciendo eos solvere
datia, comercla et alia insolita de bonis et raercati-
onibus suis contra fonuau ipsarum treuguarum' .
30 January I36I# A.b.V. _>enato, riisti 29, f,107v.
V
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bought from a Venetian merchant altho gh the oarlier treaties
between Venice and the empire made it clear that the Vene¬
tians' exemptions protected both seller and purchaser frou
taxation . The importance which Venice attached to this
issue is illustrated by the fact that it offered to levy a
tax on its own retail merchants in the wine trade if John
2
would abandon Ills taxation plans .
The other major weakness of the Venetian colony compared
with Pera was that it was situated within the walls of the
Byzantine capital. Venetian ships did not have an independent
harbour in Constantinople and indeed often preferred to use
the excellent facilities of the port of Pora instead of their
own colony. Some Venetian officials had to be stationed
in Pera to supervise the activities of their citizens, to
weigh their goods on Venetian scales and to prevent them
from escaping Venetian dues and trading regulations. The
presence of these Venetian officials in Pera was inevitably
a source and a focus for friction between the two communities .
Furthermore the Venetian colony had no independent
defences or fortifications, which the Genoese had made a
symbol of their freedom from imperial controls and which,
more than anything else, had allowed them to act as equals
1. see John V1 s response to the Venetian complaints; * .....
imperator potest facere suis Grecis quicquid vult sine
preiudicio Venetorum* * J.V-L.il. p.83. See also
J. Chryaostomides, * Venetian privileges*, pp.300-301.
2. J, Chrysostomides, op.cit. doc.7, p.339.
3. *Pote3tas Peyre .... fecit galeis nostrls, venientibus
de partibus Tane versus Venetias, non modicam novitatern,
nam cum dicte galee essent in actu recodendi de Con-
stantinopoli, et mercatores veneti, qui habebant aliqua
sua aercimonia intra Peyram, valient ea inde extrahere
pro caricando ea super dictis galeis, dictus potestas
impediri fecit dicta merciraonia •..* This incident
occurred in Octo' or 1359• B«V-L.XX. pp.57-59.
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towards the hyzaniine authorities. The Venetians were pro¬
tected froia outside attacks by the walis of the city, but
they had no defence against the Greeks themselves. Thus in
139b, when no treaty was in force and tension between Venice
and the empire was particularly high, the Senate recommended
its ambassador to consider the possibility of evacuating the
colonists from Constantinople to the greater security of
i'era"*". The Venetians' belief that they could not effectively
challenge Genoese co imerce without possessing a secure and
independent territorial unit which they could dominate, was
a main reason for their persistent attempts to win control
of the island of Tenedos".
ii) Colonial trade.
The relative weakness of the Venetian colony did not
mean that its officials and merchants were always on the
defensive in their daily dealings with the Byzantines. The
extent of their power and influence within the empire by the
reign of John V is clearly visible in the series of treaties
between the Republic and the empire. The substance of these
treaties changed little in the clauses relating to Venetian
commerce with the result that the Venetians came in time to
claim their privileges as permanent and irreversible rights,
if the emperor attempted in any way to reduce Venice's advan¬
tages he would be referred back to the earlier treaties which
his predecessors had made and reminded that nothing less
would do. Thus in 1356, although there was no treaty in
1. fhiriet, R^f?;estesr772.
2. For Venetian ambitions regarding Tenodos see F.Thiriot,
* Venise et 1' occupation de Tduedos au XlVe si&cle' ,
M6ianges de 1' bcuie francaise de home. 65,(1953),
219-245.
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operation, a Venetian ambassador was told to protest to
John V against the loss of the ' customary liberties and
freedoms* to which Venetian merchants were entitled"'".
Indeed by John V s reign the privileges of the Vene¬
tians had become so established that many of the treaties
contained small concessions made by the Kopublic to the
empire* Venice thus managed to convey not only its con¬
stant concern for Byzantium's well-being, but also the fact
that its freedoms were hallowed by time and could only be
diminished temporarily by the free will of Venice and with-
2
out prejudice to its undoubted rights .
These concessions reflect the empire* s concern abotvt
the Venetians' influence in certain sectors of Constantinople* s
commercial life. The merchants of the colony were closely
involved in the local trade of the capital and, because of
their exemption from all Byzantine taxation, were able to
undercut Greek traders and caused serious losses to the
imperial treasury. This situation caused John V to demand
a comprehensive review of Venetian privileges, in 1359 and
1362 John drew up lengthy lists of complaints and grievances
against the Venetians, detailing the ways in which their
3





30 January 135&# ' ...hogamus eura (impera to rem) quatenus
consideratis predictis sibi placeat taliter cum effectu
landare quod nostri mercatores et fideles predict! non
recipiant ipsas gravitates et onera, sed potius iuxta
treuguaruffl fortaam in suis libertatibus et franchisiis
solitis conserventur' . A.S.V.Senato, Misti 27# f.57«
The concessions were introduced by clauses such ast * Quod
licet domlnus Dux et commune Veneciarura manifesto habeant,
ex forma treuguarum novarum et veterarum, quod suis Venetis
liceat eaiere^domos, campos, zardinos atque possessiones in
Constatitinopoli et in toto imperio nostro, tamen prediotus
dorainus Dux at commune Veneciarum, cognoscente statuiu
presenters imperii nostri, ut auam cogn.osca.nus Donam det>-
posicionoia ad nostram consox-vat ionem, providerunt per viaui
curialitatis et amoris conrplacere nobis in hunc .aoduu,
videlicet:...' i),V-L.Ii. d.225 ('treaty of 139t), Of.p.iv^
(1363). p.152 (OT.
The complaint0 of I35? are uartly publisned by J.bhrysosto-
ildes, 'Venetian prxvilegesr , doc.o, pp.333~33t>. ur 13^2
3ee Ii.V-L.X1. pp.82-»5»
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Anions the topics raised there were three which stood out
particularly and were a source of constant friction between
Byzantium and Venice. John V questioned the Venetians' right
to buy property in the empire and to refuse to pay the normal
Byzantine land taxes upon it. John complained that the
practice had become so widespread that the state was losing
not only its essential revenues but its legal powers also.
The right to acquire property was the basis of the Venetians'
position in Constantinople since they were thus able to inte¬
grate themselves into the general economic life of the empire.
Their success in doing this is illustrated by John' s ether
major complaints, he demanded limitations on the activities of
Venetians who sold retail to Greeks, especially in the wine
and corn trades. The Venetian response to such demands was
always to reiterate that they could not be deprived of their
privileges which successive emperors had confirmed, but
usually they were prepared to offer some voluntary limitations
on their rights in order to safeguard the Byzantine economy.
However, the number of their privileges remained undiminished^".
Xn addition to his attempts to limit the local activi¬
ties of the Venetians in Constantinople, John tried to extract
certain privileges for Byzantine merchants visiting ports under
Venetian control. Xn 1359 he asked Venice to order its offi¬
cials in Coron, Modon and Crete to stop de.uanding customs dues
on merchandise belonging to Greeks, He claimed that his
s^^bjects had enjoyed this freedom before the Genoese war of
1352. The right is not mentioned in any of the formal treaties
1. For a detailed examination of these and other Venetian
privileges see J. Chrysosto. ides, • Venetian privileges',
pp.267-336.
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between Venice and the empire. The Venetian authorities
were themselves uncertain whether the Byzantines were entitled
to the privilege they claimed, but they directed their colon**
ists to cease their demands for tax if it was true that the
Greeks were exempt"*". The matter was raised again in John
V* s next list of questions and complaints addressed to
Venice in 1362, He suggested in this document that the
Venetian officials in Coron and Modon had ignored the Doge* s
instructions and continued to exact the customs dues from
John*s subjects, but he admitted that the officials on Crete
had obeyed the orders from Venice and had granted Byzantine
traders exemption from customs tax. fhe Cretan authorities,
however, were not prepared to be more generous than those
of Coron and Modon# and John feared that they were about to
2
reiiupose the former dues . Mo further evidence concerning
1. A. 0»V • uenato, .-JLsti: 2o, f.9pv; ' xteu petit arabaxator
quad cum a sept em aimls citra in Motono, Corono et Greta
accepta sint suis Urecis comercla et ciatia de suis
mercibus de quibus ante non solverunt, scribatur et
mandetur rectoribus dictorum locorum quod habeant ipsos
Grecos deoetero llberos et francos secundum foruaa
pactoruu. , . . f.96v! Capta. Quod super quinto capitulo
continente quod Greci dominl imperatoris et sui imperii
sint liberi et f'ranchi a clatio in partibus Coroni,
Motoni et Crete, respondeatur quod tnandabimus castelanis
nostris Coroni et Motoni et duche et consilio Crete quod
si est varum quod non sit solitum ante guerrara Janue
solvi datium per ipsos Grecos in dictis partibus non
exigent amplitis ullo modo, et sconverso si soliti erant
solvere solvant, et ex nunc sit cap turn quod sic raandetur
dictis rectoribus' . This proposal and the decision taken
on it (c'apta) is found among the Senate deliberations of
19 March 1359*
2. ' ....Dummodo sunt tres armi vel circa, querella fuisset
vobis deposita de hoc, ducante tunc domino Joharme Delphyn
scriptum fuit otauibus vestris rectoribus deinde quod nullo
raodo accipere deberent dictis Grocis co ..ercluai aliquod}
sed ilii de Corono et Hothono, postponemtes litteras
vestras, neglexerunt mandatum, accipientes continuo
sicut consueveraiit; sed illi de Creta observaveruiit
forraaa litterarum ducaliu 1 usque modo, qui 10co voiunt
accipere, eo quia asserunt quod illi de Corono et xothono
etiarn acoipiunt dictum coraerclutn, ..• I),V-L.XI, p.d4.
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these claims is available but John' complaints, surviving in
the form of Venetian summaries, indicate that the Byzantines
enjoyed tenuous reciprocal privileges from the Venetians in
local eastern trade and that the esnperor campaigned vigor¬
ously to preserve these privileges, although with little
apparent success.
Another interesting point to emerge from these complaints,
which can be seen in many other disputes between Venice and
Byzantium, is the large measure of dovibt which persisted
throughout John V* s reign concerning the exact terms of the
treaties between the two powers. The reason for these doubts
and confusions in 1362 was made clear by John's letter to
Venice. The letter began with a request for copies of the
three previous treaties to be sent by the Venetians to
Constantinople. John confessed that the Greek versions of
the treaties had been lost in the course of the empire*s
domestic upheavals and he did not know which privileges had
been formally granted to the Venetians and tijhieh they had
simply usurped"*". in addition to this temporary difficulty
there was the constant danger that mistranslations from the
Latin text to the Greek version would sow serious doubts
in the minds of both parties about what had actually been
agreed2.
It is important to emphasise that despite the occasional
disputes there was a general atmosphere of co-operatio and
agreement between Venice and Byzantium. The Venetians' basic
privilege of using Constantinople as the centre of a far-
It d.v-l.u:. p.o3.
2. J.Chryaostomides, * Venetian privileges', p.291,n.4o;
p.320, n.122.
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flung commercial network without payx. amy customs dues was
never seriously challenged during John V's reign. The con-
Tlicts between Byzantium and the Venetians were exclusively
concerned with the local power of Venetian businesses operat¬
ing in the capital. This fact illustrates the importance of
Venetian retail trading in Constantinople and also the
Byzantines' acceptance of the Italians' domination of inter¬
national trade passing through the empire.
iii) international trade.
The local activities of the Venetian merchants in
Constantinople were of minor importance in comparison with
their international commerce which was the chief business
of the colony. Most of the foreign ships which visited
Byzantium were carrying goods destined for a more distant
port. The Bosphorus was a major channel for trade between
east and west, but Constantinople was only a stopping place
along the way, contributing little to the conduct of the trade
and deriving only nominal profits from it,
Constantinople was the centre of a Venetian colonial
organisation which extended over the whole empire and parts
of the Black Sea coastline. The smaller colonies used Con¬
stantinople as a marshalling point where their goods could
be collected for sending on to their final destination, VIthin
the empire the most important Venetian community outside
Constantinople was at Thessalonlca. This was of some i. >r-
tance until about 1340, as the centre of an international
trade in com from Macedonia and Thessaly and of a small
local trade .in commodities like wax and hides, A Venetian
consul was in charge of the colony. Although the consul is
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not mentioned in documents after 13^+0, the Venetian trade of
fhessalonica continued. The trading galleys of the official
Venetian convoy did not visit Thessalonica but unloaded goods
at Negropont to be taken onward in smaller private ships.
Other places where Venetian merchants operated included Varna,
esembria and Licostomo on the Black oea, and Histra7', The
Venetians in all these centres depended on the colonial organi¬
sation at Constantinople•
The nature of the international trade conducted by the
Venetians in Constantinople was very similar to that which
passed through Pera. Spices, corn, slaves, and precious
metals were carried from the Black Sea to the West, and manu¬
factured goods, chiefly cloth and weapons were taken in
exchange. Secondary occupations such as banking and ship-
broking, on which the daily workings of international trade
depended, ware as important in the Venetian colony as whey
2
were in Pera~, The merchants themselves often stayed in
Constantinople for several years as the representatives of
Venetian businesses. oome of them remained in the City perman¬
ently, especially in the fourteenth century when where was a
growth of trading houses which were independent of business
3
or^ ilsations in Venice .
1. Un the background to the Venetian community in Thessalonica
see F.Thiriet, • Les V^nitiens Sl Thessalonique dans la
premiere moiti^ du kXVe si^cle' , J* 22, (1952-53), 323-332.
V.hrochova, • La revolte des z£lotcs 5. Saloniquo et les
communes Italiennes* , B5«. 22, (1961), 1-15. also
V.lIrochovS, ' Le commerce v&iitien et les change tents
dans 1' importance des centres de commerce en reca du
13e au 15e slides' , otudi Veneziani. 9, (1967 ). 3-3^.
Thiriet, Uegestesf98. 156. 3^7. U55. 551. D.V-L.fl.p. 5i..
2. Anadeo of Savoy transacted most of his business in Pera,
where he was based, but he raised a couple of loans from
Venetians, Bollati, Xllustrazio.nl. no.L, LXV.
3. C. cuzzatto. Storia econoiaica di Vonezia dall' XI ol XVX
secolo. (Venice I96I), pp .133-135.
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It is not possible to determine precisely the volume and
value of Venetian trade passing through Constantinople• How¬
ever, some general trends can be discerned from the prices
which Venetian shippers offered at the auction of space on
the trading galleys sent regularly in convoy to Byzantium
and the Black Sea. These figures are particularly valuable
since they form an almost unbroken series for the whole of
John V*s reign'*'. It should be noted that the sums offered
fluctuated wildly and do not always reflect the general state
of Venetian coiitmerce as revealed in other evidence. Sometimes
the cause of an abnormally high or low price is not Immediately
2
clear . But as a general rule these figures are an indication
of the mood of Venetian traders and their confidence in secur¬
ing a profit. This is particularly true because the system
of official trading galleys removed the speculative element
from commerce as much as possible and attempted to make the
1. The figures for John V* s reign are set out in tabular
form by F.Thiriet, La Homania vdnitienne. pp.344-345.
Tor an assessment of the usefulness of these figures see
F.Thiriet, 'Observations sur Is trafic des gal^es v&ii-
tienu.es d* apr&s les chiffres des incanti (xiV-XVe slides)*,
Studi In onor© dl Amintore n'aataai. 3, (Milan 1962),493-522,
For a more critical view see G.Luzzatto, op.olt. pp.138-139.
One of the difficulties of the whole subject of Venetian
trade with Constantinople is the uncertainty about the
amount of trade carried in private ships, and consequently
not accounted for in the records of the convoy trade. It
seeuts likely that the private trade grew in the course of
the fourteenth century, while the convoy-Carried trade
certainly declined. But there seems to be no way of estab¬
lishing the proportions of the two systems until the early
fifteenth century (see below p.2X1.).
2. The number of galleys sent by Venice is sometimes more
instructive than the sums they raised at auction. hen few
galleys were sent the price per galley was relatively high
but the size of the convoy indicates a low level of commer¬
cial confidence. Also, an expression of the total sum
raised by the auction of space on the whole convoy may be
misleading since individual galleys raised very different
sums; e.g. the 1371 galleys raised between ten and three
hundred ducats each. Thiriet, Itegestes . 493 . jee also
1372, ibid. 508.
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conditions of trade stable and invariable. Thus the rise and
fall of the auction prices should reflect only the external
factors which could not be controlled, such as the danger
from foreign shipping, the difficulties of obtaining supplies
in the oast and the inescapable hazards of the sea.
The most obvious feature to emerge from an examination
of these figures is that the first forty years of the four¬
teenth century was the most active and profitable period of
Venetian trade based on Constantinople. A large convoy of
about ten galleys was usually assembled each year for the
journey to the Black Sea. However, even in this period of
relatively calm prosperity the sums bid at the auction of
galley space varied between five hundred ducats per ship in
1.339 to about one thousand two hundred ducats in 133^• I*10
relative importance of the Byzantine and Black Sea commerce
can be gauged from the fact that between 1332 and 13^5 fifty-
eight per cent of Venetian trade conducted by convoy in the
eastern Mediterranean passed through Constantinople"''.
In 1344 the number of galleys sent to tho Black Sea
dropped sharply to two and for the remainder of the century
the number never rose above five and was generally about three.
In 1344 tho.Venetian merchants in Constantinople and else¬
where in the empire were harassed by imperial officials, but
the major uncertainty affecting trading confidence concerned
the situation in Tana where the Tartars of Kiptchak under
Djanibelc molested Venetian colonists, imprisoned so ae and
caused such concern in Venice that the two trading galleys
1. On the period before John V s reign see F.ThirQLet,
'Observations sur le trafic des gal^es' , osp. p. ;C J .
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were forbidden to venture beyond Constantinople without the
bailo* s permission1. This crisis was temporary, but Venetian
trade never recovered to its eaiiier level, in. the course
of the 1340s Venetian commerce in Constantinople and beyond
was affected by a number of factors which influenced its long-
ter 1 prospects. The conditions of civil war in Byzantium
between 1341 and 1347 added political uncertainty to economic
disruption, in 1348 the Black Death reached Venice, liaving
spread from the Black Bea through Constantinople in two years,
it has been estimated that three-fifths of the Venetian popu¬
lation died of the disease causing great changes in the
2
domestic consumer demand and in Venice's other western aarkets •
Another general factor affecting Venetian trade was the gradual
decline of Mongol power. The trade routes bringing goods to
the Venetian colony in Tana became less secure and tne colony
itself was subject to increasing disruption . in audition,
while the conditions of trade in the Black Bea became more
difficult, the direct route to eastern goods through Syria
and iigypt was reopened by the lifting of the papal prohibition
of trade with the Moslems in 1344. Trade with Alexandria i*as
immediately popular with Venetian merchants and later Beirut
also became an important centre of Venice's eastern trade.
Throughout the second half of the fourteenth century the number
of galleys visiting the major Moslem cities was consistently
higher than the number sent through Constantinople, and i' e
prices they fetched at their auction were generally very much
higher. The gradual change of emphasis from the commerce of
1. Thiriet, Digestes 162. 164, 167, 170.
4. T.Thiriet, La hoaianie v4nitienne. p.160.
3* ibid, p.3^7. On the Venetian colony in Tana generally, see
B.C.Jkr^inskaja, ' btoria della Tana' , „,tudi Veneziani. 10,
(1968) 3-^5. C. Verlinden, 'La colonie de la Tana, centre
de la traite des eeciaves au XlVe et au debut du XVe si^cle',
Studl in onore di G.Luzzatto. 2,(Milan 1930), pp.1-25.
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Constantinople and Tana to that of Crete, Cyprus, Byria and
iSgypt is reflected in the changing proportion of Venetian
trade passing through Byzantium. In the first twelve years
of the fifteenth century fifty-one per cent of all Venetian
convoy trade with the east went through Alexandria, and.
Beirut accounted for another twenty-seven, per cent, while
only twenty-two per cent was carried through Constantinople3-•
However, these figures do not tell the whole story,
they merely indicate that the Venetian state was reducing
its dependence on trade passing through Constantinople for
reasons which had nothing to do with the Byzantine bmpire.
But although the trade carried by the state convoys never
returned to the level which had been norssal before 13^#
it is clear that Constantinople remained a flourishing centre
of Venetian commerce. The decline of the convoy gave greater
opportunities to the private, unarmed trading ships. The
Account book of Giacomo Badoer for 1436-1440, which is the
earliest detailed source concerning the private commercial
activities ob an individual Venetian merchant in the east,
shows that he sent sixty-five per cent of all his goods by
Venice's official convoys and the re3t by unarmed ships.
But if his trade with Constantinople and the negean ports
is considered by itself, it has been calculated that the
galleys accounted for only five to six per cent of his trade
2
and eighty-eight per cent was carried by private ships".
These figures show that the nature of Venetian trade in
Constantinople had undergone some changes, but the commercial
1. F.Tliiriet, • Observations sur le trafic des gale'es,
esp. p.5H«
2. ibid, p.322, n.60.
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importance of the colony was unaffected,. The luxury items
which were the particular concern of the galleys of the
convoy were more readily obtainable in the great Moslem
cities than they were in the Crimea, but throughout the last
years of the Byzantine Empire the Venetian colony in Constan¬
tinople remained an important centre of international
commerce in staple commodities and supported a considerable
local trade.
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G» The minor western communities in Constantinople and Pera.
The major centres of commercial activity and western
influence in Byzantium were the colonies of Venice and Genoa,
however, other western cities and nations also had a share of
the trade between east and west, and some had communities of
citizens in the empire with a settled organisation and sub¬
stantial. trading privileges* 1'agolotti, comparing the
respective taxes owed by the various groups of western traders
in the empire in the early fourteenth century, mentions
Genoese, Venetians, Pisans, Florentines, Provencals, Catalans,
Anconitans, Sicilians and 'other foreigners' L* oy the reign
of John V some of these communities seem to have disappeared,
or at any rate are no longer distinguished individually in
the fragmentary records which remain. Others, however,
continued to trade with the empire and maintained a colonial
organisation in Constantinople or Pera.
i) The Catalans.
The Catalan colony is one of the communities about
which details are relatively plentiful. In comparison with
the major Italian colonies, the Catalans were recent arrivals
in the empire, but by the beginning of John V* s reign chey
had been in close contact with Byzantium for about fifty years
p
as mercenaries, troublesome neighbours in Athens and merchants •
In 1296 the first commercial privileges were granted to the
Catalans who, by that date, had a consul in Constantinople•
jui October 1315 their privileges were brought into line with
those of the other second—rank western colonies and hence-
1. F.ii. Pegolotti, La pratica dell a mercntura, ec. A.rjvans,
p »4l.
2. For the background see K.M. betton, The Catalan domination
ox iLiaejia i311-13GG. ^ ambridge hass". 19^-b)j<*.. Laiou,
Constantinople and I'm Latins. The foreign noli.. ox'
■tindronicus -il (12b..-i T2d ), (uaxvard 19/x.).
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forth they paid customs tax. to the arapire at the rate of two
per cent ad valorem*",
xn the mid-fourteenth century the contacts were reinforced
by an alliance which bound the Greeks together with the
Catalans and the Venetians in opposition to the Genoese in
1351-13522. Although the joint military enterprise ended
in failure, the Greek and Catalan forces regarded each other
with mutual esteem and agreed that the Venetians were chiefly
responsible for their misfortunes# The Catalan fleet suffered
particularly heavy losses because of its inexperience in
yzantine waters and many of the Catalan sailors had no ship
in which to return home# John kantakouzenos arranged for
the repatriation of two thousand of these men overland, but
between three hundred and five hundred chose to remain in
3
his service in iiysantium . They gave iiirn enthusiastic service
in his struggle against the supporters of John V and were
largely responsible for the sack of Adrlanople in 1352. The
Catalans were selected as kantakouzenos' personal bodyguard
and they refused to surrender to John V in 1354 until Kanta-
k
nouzenos himself ordered them, in Latin, to do so . After the
civil war the Catalans drop from sight almost completely, but
one of their leaders, Juan do Per&lta, later distinguished
1. C. Marinescu, 'Notes sur les Catalans dans 1' empire byzan-
tin pendant le rfegne de Jacques XI (1291-1327)', Melanges
d'his to ire du raoyen 6?ge. offerts & Ferdinand Lot, (Paris 1925)
5C1-513. xext of 1296, M.M.iXX. 97-96 (Greek)j Marinescu,
•Catalans' , p.508 (Latin) . DOlger, lieges ten bt no. 216k,
iext of 1315» M.m.XXi. 98-IOO. Dttlger, Regesten k,
no.2360.
2. A.Luttrell, 'John Cantacuzenus and the Catalans at Con¬
stantinople: 1352-135^' » Martinez Porrendo, arc' ivero.
Miscelanea de estudios dedicados a su tnemoria. (Barcelona
1968), 265-277.
3. kantak. iv, 3O1XXX, 227-228. Gregoras, xxvii,30j XXX,151.
k. Kan talc, iv, 33*111, 2k3-2k5s iv, 39 * IH, 286 5 iv,kO: ill,
291-2931 iv,kl» XXX,300-30k.
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himself as an architect, helping to repair earthquake damage
to at. Sophia early in Join V s reign"'".
The survivors of the Catalan fleet may have stayed in
the empire after 1354 to form the nucleus of a permanent
Catalan community, however, Greek sources do not mention
this community and our knowledge of its nature and activities
is dependent on Catalan sources of a commercial nature.
These sources are very restricted, but there are a few docu¬
ments and incidents froia which some information about the
2
colony's organisation can be gathered . On 25 February
13d3 Manuel de Finar, a citizen of Pera, was appointed
Catalan consul by the city council of Barcelona. He was
given the same powers as the other forty-two Catalan consuls
stationed overseas, with jurisdiction over all Catalans
and other subjects of the king of Aragon who traded, lived
3
in or passed through * Pera in the land of Romania' .
However, on 26 August 13&3 John V wrote to Peter XV of
Aragon to protest against the appointment of Manuel de Finar
on the grounds that he was Genoese. Since Byzantium and
Genoa had been at war for six years until November 13&2
the appointment of a Genoese citizen to the office of
Cat;1' consul was impolitic, and in John V s view brought
no honour either to himself or to Peter IV. On 23 December
I3B3 Peter IV wrote to the councillors of Darcelona and to
John V suggesting that Manuel de Finar should be deprived
1. aantak. iv,4iIII,3Q. Peralta had also served kantaico -
zenos as the commander of the Catalan garrison in the
fortress of the Golden Gate, kantak. iv,4lj111,301.
2. Most of the documents cited below are published by
A.Rubio y bluea, Diolomatari de 1'Orient catalh: 1301-
l4o9» (Barcelona 19h7). The editor excluded much commer¬
cial material in the archives in Barcelona from this
collection. This material, when studied, will increase
our knowledge of Catalan trade with ^yzantium.
3* Diplomatari. no.542, pp.591-592•
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of office and that no Genoese should thereafter be chosen
as consul. He further declared that the new consul should
be a Catalan or alternatively that one of the many Greeks
who knew Latin should be appointed. Otherwise a * special
consul1 would be imposed upon the colony by the emperor"''.
The problems arising from the selection of a consul
suggest that the size of the Catalan colony in 1383 was not
great. In view of the disruption caused to international
trade by the war of Chioggia, especially to the commerce of
Pera which was tinder siege for over two years, the reduced
state of the Catalan colony in Pera is not surprising. These
documents concerning the office of consul provide ample
evidence of the close links which existed between the Catalan
and Genoese colonies. The date at which the Catalans trans¬
ferred themselves from Constantinople, where they were found
in the early fourteenth century, to Pera is not known, but
since they were in alliance with the Greeks and Venetians
against Genoa in 1352, the move to Pera probably happened
after this date.
Confirmation of the friendly relationship between the
Catalans and the Genoese at Pera is given by several docu¬
ments which reveal the harassment suffered by Catalan merchants
at the hands of Byzantine and Venetian officials during the
war of Chioggia. Often goods belonging to Catalans were
1. John V* s complaint is known only from Peter IV1 s letter
to the Council of Barcelona, Diplomatari. no.556, p.600,
* ...ell no haia per plaent que 1 consol dels Catalans
qui esta en Pera sia Genov^s, segons que vuy es,,,'
and also from Peter* s reply to John V, Diplomatari.
no.557» pp.600 -601, * ...placet vobis quod ipsi (merca-
tores Catalan! in Pera) consulem habeant Catalanurn vel
in Constantinopole unum Grecuni in consulem eligant que-
cumque voluorint, cum plures sint inibi sufficientes
et boni literas et lingam nostram scientes, aut si
maluerint, vos eis dabitis consulem specialem...*
L.Nicolau d'Olwer, 'Note sur le commerce Catalan "h Con¬
stantinople en 1380', B. 4, (1927-28 ), 193-19^» takes
*lingam nostram* to mean Catalan, noting that the Infant
Joan wrote a letter in Catalan to John V, Diplomatari.
no.426, p.504. however, Latin was the normal language of
international communication and would have siifficed for a
consul.
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sexzed on the suspicion that; they belonged to Ueaoase traders.
The correspondence which arose from these Incidents is a
valuable source of detail on the trading activities of
Catalans in the empire.
For example, on 8 iay 1379 a Catalan ship, loaded with
jooda belonging to several Catalan and foreign serchuiifca,
was surprised at the entrance to the Dardanelles on its way
to Constantinople by three Venetian galleys, it was forced
to put Into Xenedos where the goods were irax>ounded and the
merchants rnaltreated. Peter IV protested about the incident
to tiie ->oge of Venice and listed the goods taken from his
subjects as woollen cloth of various colours, aniseed, Greeic
wine and vermilion, all of which had been loaded at the
port of Pisa*'. A similar event caused Peter XV to write
to John v on 23 December 13^3 complaining that Byzantine
officials, who lvad confiscated eoRte Genoese good® In the
possession of the Catalan merchant Guillen l-tmy while he
was in Constantinople, Imd also seized some cloth which
belonged to t'ouy himself, ho attempt was made to deny tliat
much of i on^* e cargo wee being carried on behalf of the
2
Genoese • Further documents, which do not relate dix'ectly
to Catalan trade with .yaantiua, illustrate the general nature
of Catalari oom terce in the eastern Mediterranean. Peter XV
complained to the doge about the seizure, by the Venetians
of «odon, of goods bound for oyria. This merchandise - consist¬
ing of Florentine cloth, broadcloth, Irish woollen cloth,
1. hioiomatari. no.3t>7» pp.4o7-9t>9* A Luttrell, 'La corona
d© A ra ;o*t y la < recto cata Iana 1379-139^' » Anuarlb do
©studios •neqievalea. G,(1969)# 224.
2. Diplo natari. no.557, p.oGG. ' ...res et laeroes predictas
ablatas fuiaee tanquam bona Januensium guerra vigente' *
Catalan shipping also suffered confiscations by the
••eaoesa. A Luttrell, 'La corona', p.229.
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paper, leather, saffron and hazel nuts1,belonged to Catalan,
Pisan and Florentine merchants and had been loaded partly
at the port of Pisa and partly at Naples. Catalan merchants
are also known to have frequented the islands of Cephalonia
and Zakynthos and to have taken part in the silk trade of
2
the area . From these documents we can see that the Catalans
had a varied and widespread place in the commerce between
Constantinople and the West, chiefly as shippers carrying goods
belonging to merchants of all nationalities.
A letter of complaint sent by Peter XV to Manuel IX on
18 October 1386 reveals that Catalan traders visited Thessa-
lonica as well as Pera and Constantinople. A ship carrying
Catalan goods had sailed to Thessalonica where it was impounded
by Manuel in retaliation for a fraud committed by two other
Catalan merchants, Guillem Pon^ and i}n Canyelles, in Pera.
Manuel wrote to Peter XV inviting him to recompense the
injured merchants from the property of the two who had de-
3
frauded the empire . The exact nature of Manuel's complaint
is impossible to determine, but it was certainly a personal
one. The strained relationship between Manuel and his father
at the time precludes the possibility that Manuel's action
was requested by the authorities in Constantinople in response
to a breach of official trading practices by the Catalans.
Furthermore, in such a case the Byzantine authorities would
doubtless have seized another Catalan ship in Pera or Constanti-
1. Diplomatari. no.388, p.469-471•
2. Piplomatari. no.541, pp.590-591. Also no.508, pp.559-
5ol. bee above p.U8n.l,
3» Diploraatari. no. 596, pp.634-635. G.T.Dennis, Manuel XX.
pp.130-131. ™ —
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nople where Pon§ and Canyelles continued to trade\ rather
than making the arrest in Thessalonica. Therefore it must
be assumed that Manuel had commissioned the two Catalans
to act in some way for him at Pera, perhaps raising money or
arms or buying supplies for Thessalonica, and that they
failed to fulfil their promises, leaving Manuel no option
but to act against the next Catalans to visit his city.
The picture of the Catalan community in the empire,
presented by the sparse documentary records, is incomplete
in many details but its general character is discernible,
in the later fourteenth century the permanent colony was
small and loosely organised with none of the elaborate
governmental machinery which controlled the life of Venetian
and Genoese colonists. The consul of the Catalans was not
mentioned by Pseudo-Kodinos in his list of western digni¬
taries and office-holders who played a part in the court life
of Constantinople. The Catalan documents only refer to the
transient population of merchants, although it is reasonable
to assume the existence of a more permanent community after
1352. Pero Tafur, who visited the empire in 1437-1^38
mentions a considerable settlement of Spaniards in Pera and
2
the presence of a Castilian interpreter at the imperial court .
The Catalan merchants were great travellers and their trade
routes covered much of the east Mediterranean, Their sea
1. Ciplomatari. loc.cit. * ...cum per raulturn spacium tomporis
fuerint in vestro imperio ad quod postea redierunt et
inibi nunc cum suls mercaturis et bonis esse dicuntur* •
2. Pero Tafur. travels and adventures 1435-1439. Translated
and ©d. M.Letts ? (London 1926 ), pp.115,117 ,
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charts or portolaus were auong the ear .lest, and long; remained
the most accurate of their kind* They acted as individuals,
sharing ships which were sent singly wherever seemed profitable*
Official galleys end convoys, like those which carried much of
Venice* s trade, were not used* In comparison with the Geno¬
ese colony of Pera, where the Catalans v/ere based, the Catalan
colony was insignificant and its commercial life was com¬
pletely overshadowed, but on occasion the presence of Catalans
in the empire was of political importance and the existence
of the colony was a permanent link between east and west*".
ii) The Provenyals*
There is occasional evidence that the towns of southern
France came into contact with the Byzantine hmpire and were
represented among the merchants who visited Constantinople.
Three of the ships which made up Amadeo of Savoy's crusading
O
expedition in 1366 came from Marseilles * However, the only
Provencal city which enjoyed special commercial privileges in
the empire was Narbonne. The first treaty between Byzantium
and Narbonne was signed by Andronikos III on 21 April 1340-*.
John V confirmed the terras of the treaty, probably shortly
before April 1346^.
By the terms of these treaties the merchants of Narbonne
were given freedom to trade in Constantinople and elsewhere
in the empire, and were made subject to a customs tax of four
per cent ad valorem. Although these privileges were less iavour-
able than those of most westerners, they made Narbonne's trading
1* The Spanish Dominican who encouraged Demetrios Kydones*
conversion probably had contacts with the Catalan community.
See above 17
2. Bollati, Xilustrazioni. no.308.
3. C. Du Cango, Famlliae Augustas Byzantinae.(Paris 1680),
pp.237-238. M.P.G. 161, 1113-1115. Dfllger, Regesten.
4, no.2843.
4. Greek and Latin texts in C.du Cange, op.clt. pp.239-240.
Greek alone M.M.XIi. 120. Dfllger. Regesten.4. no.2908.
On this document and especially its dating see the comments
of P.Marc in BjZ.22, (1913), 558 -559.
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activities in the empire more profitable than the Greeks'
who paid ten per cent. There were a number of minor provi¬
sions in the treaty, including a prohibition against carry¬
ing goods belonging to other nationalities. The merchants of
Narbonne also received security against the looting of their
ships if they should be shipwrecked, and immunity from claims
for damages caused by the pirates of their town. The treaties
provided for the presence of a permanent colony under the
super-vision of a consul who was elected by the city's traders
in the empire. He had a scribe to assist him and an official
residence, he had jurisdiction in disputes which arose
between his compatriots, with the limitation that he could
not impose capital punishment. When John V renewed the
treaty the only clause which was added to the previous terms
forbade the alteration of the merchants' system of measure¬
ment except at the time of official treaty renewal*.
Additional roaterial on the trading activities of mer¬
chants from Narbonne is also provided by correspondence
preserved om Venetian and Genoese archives, arising from
the molestation of neutral shipping during the hostilities
between Venice and Genoa. One of the victims was Kaimond
beraller (beraxller) who had links with Montpellier and Cyprus
as well as Narbonne. He was twice robbed by Venetian ships,
in 1353 and 1355* which suspected that he was carrying Genoese
goods. He did not take his misfortune lightly but complained
1. W. lieyd, xiistoire du commerce . 1. 481. ' . . .ne ulla sibi
novitas inferatur de majoriiatc measure Pichi ( t<3v tctix^v)'.
C. Du Cange, op,cit. p.240. The measure referred to was
chiefly a measurement of cloth, S.Schilbach, Byzontinische
Metrologie.(Hunlch 1970), pp.43-44; cf. piquae, Dollati,
illustrazionij p.55. no.2, and nos.191,192,194,271* «c.
272
at length to all available authorities in Venice, Rhodes and
Chios. The regent of France, later Charles V, and Pope Inno¬
cent VI also intervened on his behalf. From the documents
thus producod it emerged that Seraller's goods were taken from
a Sicilian, ship as it was at the Dardanelles approaching Con¬
stantinople. The confiscated cargo consisted of Flemish and
French cloth, linen from Rheims and camlet. The Venetians
refused to settle beraller* s claim peacefully and an order of
confiscation was promulgated which prevented the Venetians
from visiting ports in the south of France"*".
iii) The Anconitans.
The commercial privileges of the merchants of Ancona were
2
set out by Andronikos XI in July 1308 . They were made subject
to customs dues at the rate of two per cent. The extent of
their activities and the importance of their community is
difficult to determine. The earliest evidence of a settled
colonial organisation appears in 13^8 » when two Anconitan
merchants were involved in a dispute with two Genoese over a
shipload of corn which was exported from I'era to Ancona, The
ensuing court case was brought before the podestli of Pera and
the Anconitans were represented by Vitalutio Martini of Ancona,
who is described as ' sindious at procurator communis univer-
3sitatis hominum de Aneona* . The work of Pseudo-Kodinos,
which was composed about 1350-1360, mentions an Anconitan.
consul in its description of the Christmas Day ceremonies in
which the foreign communities paid their respects to the emperor.
1. W. iieyd, op,clt. pp.^79-^81. * ffltaimondo Jeralerii di i.arbona
Abitante a dorupellieri, citadino di Cipro, d& facoltSi a,
Pietro Martini di Narbona e Stefano Arnaudi dl Moinpellieri* .
X libri coimae;uoriali dolla republica di Venezla. Hegesti.
ed. R.Predelli, 2, (1878),277. no.9.
2. Greek text, M_jM.HI, xvi-xix. Italian in Honurn.Hi st, SIav .
Merid.l (Warsaw 187^) ed. V.Makusev, pp.156-158. Dfllger,
Meresten . 4. no.2315*
3. L.Belgrano, * Seconda aerie', Attl oocletk hig-ure 13. 936-
9^7 •
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The consul and his entourage followed t e offioials of the
Genoese and Pisan communities, and on entering the emperor* e
presence they knelt and received his good wishes translated
by an interpreter*" *
Prom later western documents it is apparent that the
consul was appointed by the authorities in Ancona and was
assisted by a body of local merchants who were based, like
him, in Constantinople. Xn September I3&0 a new consul was
appointed, apparently after a vacancy, and special ambassadors
were sent to the emperor to protest about his introduction of
harmful and unreasonable novelties against Anconltan merchants
in the empire. The exact nature of their complaint is not
known but it may be assumed that the Anconitans were suffering
in common with other neutral Italian merchants from the uncer¬
tainties and suspicions caused by the war of Chioggia. Ixi
I38O the authorities in Ancona were particularly anxious to
clear up any outstanding difficulties with the empire since
a large number of their citizens were about to visit Constan-
tinople2.
Our knowledge of the minor western communities in Byzan¬
tium is largely derived from sources which relate to expeditions
1. Pseudo-Kodinos, Traiti des offices, ed. J.Verpeaux,(Paris
1966), p.209. Pseudo-kodinos ioc.cit. also mentions a
Pisan consul who precedes the Anconitan consul at this
ceremony. He is not known from any other source.
2. Honura. Illst.Slav. Merid. 1, ed. V. Maku&ev, pp.l6l-l63.
W.Meyd, iiistoiro du co^!iercei 1. 474. John V visited Ancona
in the course of his journey from Rome to Venice in I370.
A certain Conrad, 'Tov 'AykuSvoq Koppa&ov', encouraged the
citizens to give the emperor a warm welcome. In return
for this service Conrad was given imperial letters granting
him immunity from Byzantine taxes in Constantinople. He
presumably had commercial interests in the empire. See
Kydones, Correspondence, ed. R—J .Loeiiertz, letters 71»
line 9I 349» especially lines 9-10.
274
which suffered some misfortune or got into trouble with, foreign
officials'1". We know little about tiie successful enterprises
or about the daily workings of the colonial organisations,
it is therefore necessary to recognise that there was much
activity which has remained below the surface because of its
lack of extraordinary incident, hut it is clear, both from
the silence of the Greek sources and from the incidents which
are recorded, that the Catalans, froven^als and Anconitans
were far inferior in population and commercial activity to the
colonies of Venice and Genoa wnich, in the experieitce of most
iyaantines, represented the West.
1. The only evidence of Amalfitan trade with Byzantium in
John V*s reign is contained in a lengthy correspondence
which arose from the detention of two ships from Amalfi
on a voyage to Romania in 1352. See M. Camera, Memorie
atorico-diplomatiche dell'antica cittA e ducato di Amain,
1, (Salerno 1876), pp. 5^1-5^2 • Also _-T llbrl co.-n te;no rial! ,11.
especially v, 132, 139» 230j vi, I89.
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D. Venice and the political affairs of Byzantium.
The irasaediate Venetian reaction to the fall of the Latin
Empire of Constantinople was to work in any way possible for
its restoration. This attitude towards the Byzantines became
mitigated with time as the impossibility of ever actively
reconstituting the international force which had been so success¬
ful in 1204 became increasingly obvious^". By the reign of
John V the Venetians had given up ail ideas of re-establishing
the Latin Empire. The plan was impracticable arid also unneces¬
sary, since the trading privileges conceded by the Byzantines
were so sweeping that a Venetian government in Constantinople
would have done little to enhance them.
in 133^ the degree to which the Venetians had abandoned
their plans for ruling in Byzantium was illustrated most clearly.
The bailo of the Venetian colony in Constantinople reported to
the Senate in Venice that the citizens of the empire, worn
out by the struggles of the civil wars and unable to see advan¬
tages in either John VX Kantakouzenos or John V falaiologos,
were disposed to have neither of them, but to submit to the
authority of tho Doge of Venice in the hope that they might be
defended by his galleys. Co desperate were they that if the
Doge were unable to protect them they would turn to the King
of ilungary or the King of Serbia . This news was received in
Venice without any excitement} no reply seems to have been sent,
and certainly no action was taken. This incident is, however,
of considerable importance, not only because it illustrates
the radical change which had come over Venice* s own attitude
1. For a general aocount of Venetian policy towards Byzantium
^fter 1201, see F.TiJLriet, La Roman! e venitienne au rapyen
Sge, (Paris 1959).
2. 6 August 135^, M.S.H.S.ij. 3, ed. S.Ljubii, pp.266-267.
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also because
to the empire, but^it reveals that Venice was not the only
power which the emperors had cause to fear. All Byzantium's
neighbours saw the chance of profit for themselves in Constanti¬
nople! and Venice, whose prosperity had come to depend greatly
on the empire's independence and relative peacefulnese, had to
carry its policies beyond merely refraining from attacking
Constantinople itself. Its interests depended on the preserva¬
tion of the stability of the entire ares by maintaining, so far
as was possible, the status quo between Byzantium, Serbia,
Hungary and the Turks, and by abstaining from direct interven¬
tion in the internal political disputes of the empire.
i ) Venice an<i Byzantine politics.
On k October 139^, in reply to an embassy from John VII
requesting military aid against John V, the Venetian Senate
answered that the proposal could not be agreed to since it
would create a difficult situation for merchants and anyway it
was not Venice's practice to interfere in the internal affairs
1
of a foreign nation . One might suspect that the first part
of the reply -was more to the point than the second, and that
John VII*s evident insecurity in Constantinople and his back¬
ground as the son of Genoa's close ally, Andronikos IV, were
sufficient reasons to disqualify hlrn as a candidate for Venetian
aid. however, by 1320 Venice had established a record of non¬
intervention in dyzantine affaix's which, considering the
political upheavals of John V* s long and eventful reign, was
quite impressive.
Throughout the period from 13^11-1391, Venice showed
itself willing to deal with whoever held effective power in
1. The Venetian Senate's decision is partially published by
N .Iorga, * Venecia in :?iarea neagra' , Analele Acadeulei
iiouarie. <ae .-sorile sestinuii istorice, series 2, 36>, (1913-
191*0 1105• See also Thiriet, R^gostes, no.710; Dftlger,
Uegeston. 3» no.3192a.
277
Constantinople* During the six years of civil confusion which
followed the death of Andronikos XIX din 1341 John V* s mother
Anne of bavoy ruled as regent in the Byzantine capital* her
position was recognised by the Venetians who, on 21 August
1343» lent her 3b#t>00 ducats on the security of some of the
crown Jewels. The instrument of debt was drawn up in the name
of John V but contemporary Venetian records of the loan make
clear the influence of Axme of bavoy as regent"*" • even such a
■aatter as the arrest of a Venetian Jew by the Genoese of Para
resulted in the Senate writing to Aiuie, although there was
little she could do about it"* Also in 1343 the Venetians
received an embassy from Anno asking for help against the Turks
and for the use of Venetian influence to persuade the Serbs
3
not to intervene in the civil war on John Aantakousenos' side •
Although the Venetians were willing to grant the second
request, their appreciation of political realities was such
that, as Kantakouzerios* cause prospered, they were prepared to
recognise Ills ' promotio et exaltatio' and to express the hope
that the good relations between the two powers should continue
during his reign, however, the Venetian donate was composed
of cautious man, and in the same resolution of 14 July 1347
they instructed their ambassadors to visit the ' young emperor
4
and his mother1 if che bailo and his counsellors approved •
1. for a detailed account and many of the documents concerning
this loan and its influence on subsequent relations botxioen
Byzantium and Venice, see T.Bertelfc, *1 gioieili della
corona bisantlna dati in pegno alia Ilepubblica Voneta nel
sec. XXV e Mastino XX della Scala*, Studl In onore di
A ilntore Vanfa.nl. ed. A.Giuffre, 2, 19^2), pp,91-
177. For the instrument of debt see pp.144-149.
the first Venetian records referring to the loan, 5 April
1343# make it clear that the negotiations were conducted
• de parte Imperatricis Constantinopolls et eius fillii
domini Xjnperatoris* , ibid . p.139.
2. Thirlet, k^gestes. no.152.
3. d. S ,H«S ,.M»« 2, no.2dd, p.174. Thiriet, kJ,.;estes. no.155*
4 . xJ«V—b., 1, no * lb j, p . 31b .
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This caution also shows in the treaty between Venice and Byzan¬
tium of 9 September 1349, both emperors are mentioned in the
preamble and both put their signature to it. John V* s signa¬
ture is interestingly closely modelled on that of hi® father-in-
law. this is the only document since 1347 which bears the
names both of i'alaiologos and Kantakousenos, and the treaty
states that the clauses have been ratified by both emperors
1
together and singly •
In 1350 and 1351 it was to Kantakousenos as the effective
ruler of yzantium that Venice turned for aid in ito struggle
against Genoa. The Venetians sent two embassies to Kantakouzenos
in an attempt to make him support their cause, and their ally
Peter XV of Aragon sent a similar message. However, John VI
rejected the proposals for as long as he could and angered the
Venetians by his determination to remain neutral and to concen-
2
trato on his own domestic problems. Eventually he was forced
to accept the alliance because the Genoese of Pera began attack -
ing Constantinople with stones hurled from their colony. The
arrival of the first stone Kantakouzenos was prepared to regard
as accidental, but when another arrived the next day he declared
war on Genoa, recalled the Venetian ambassadors and, in May
3
1351, made a pact-with them .
1. i ext in ■-!.a 1» . XiX, pp. 114—12 J j D . V—b. . 1, pp. 341—343• See
also Jtilger, no;;eaiott. 3, 2952j and b.Verjanci6, 'Motes sur
ia diplomatique byzantine* , Zboraik hadova. 10, (1967),
255-256.
2. Kantak. iv, 18,25* XII, pp.118, 183-190. Gregoras, xviii,
2111,877.
3. Kantak. iv,2oi£Xi, lyG-iyl* Text of pact in Ii.V-L.. XX,
4-12. mttlger, negesten. 3# 2975* A letter written by the
Doge of Venice to the King of Aragon, 21 April 1332, reveals
that the Venetians also made an anti-Genoese agreement
with John V. 1 Imperator Xuvenis est concors cum Imperatore
Catacuseno, et fait in Gonstantinopoli, ac jurumonto
firmavit ot approbavit unionem nobiscum, et est similiter
bene Gispositus ad fellcent exitum agendorui i' . Cited
A.Luttrell, 'John Cantacuzenus and the Catalans at Con¬
stantinople* 1352-1354' , tartine/. Verrando. .1 rchivero.
^iscelanea de estndios deul'cado'g "a "sii 'ndnorSaT ('-'arcelcno»
1968), 277.
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Tlio alliance between Kantakouzenos and the Venetians was
not a success* The combined fleet was put under the command of
a Venetian admiral* N.iceol6 Pisani, who was not a dashing
leader and who allowed stany opportunities for decisive action
against the Genoeeo to pass* Finally* after a stow had
wrecked several of his ships, Pisani lost heart completely arid.
withdrew the Venetian and Catalan fleets without consulting
iiantakouzenos• after waiting forty days* and on hearing tliat
the Venetians had sailed across the Aegean, Kantakouzenos made
2.
peace with Genoa on 6 May 1352 * Venice arid Byzantium each
considered that the pact of May 1351 had been broken by the
other, the Venetians by sailing away, and the Byzantines by
making a separate peace with Genoa*
The coolness which existed between Kantakouzenos and
the Venetians after the Genoese war is illustrated by a pact
made by the Republic*s envoys with John V at Ainos on lO Octo-
2
her 1352 • <*y the terms of this agreement the island of Tenedos
was ceded to the Venetians for as long as they remained at war
with Genoa and in return John V was to receive 20,000 ducats
which xtfere also to be repaid at the end of the war. This must
be regarded as an attempt to foster the disaffection which
existed between. Kantakouzenos and John V and to promote the
latter' s cause by providing him with money. At this ti ie John V
was in open conflict with John and Matthew Kantakouz©nos and
1. The war is described by kantak. iv,26,26-32till, pp.190-
200, 209-237, Gregoras, xsvi, 16-23tXXI*8U-92, See also
P.Schrelner, * La chronique brWe de 1332', part 4, O.C.F.
3^» (1968),51-57; A.Luttrell, op.cit, pp,26p-277. Text of
treaty of 1352 in Liber Xuriun Uelsmbllcae Ge.auensis. 2,
ed, >i,Rico fctius, (Turin 1357) * pp.OUl-606, Dftlger,
Reuesten. 5, 2991.
2. The text of John V' s agreement in P,V-L,, XX, 17-16. Dttlger,
Regesten* 3* 3^05. Cn the general situation see Kantak.
±v,33JXXX*246-2^9; also D.i.Micol, The family of Kauta-
kouzenoH, pp • / 9--> 1.
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had already appealed for help against them from John Alexander
of Bulgaria and Stephen Dusan of Serbia. A civil war seemed
imminent which. would involve all the powers of the Balkans
including the Turks, whose support Kantakouzenos solicited,
and for willoh the Venetians had clearly taken sides, ifc>wever,
it is most unlikely that the pact between John V and Venice
was over Implemented. John V* e cause collapsed swif tly with
the defeat of his Serbian and Bulgarian allies by the Turks, and
in the winter of 1352-3 he was forced to come to terms with
Kantakouzenos• The Venetians gained no thing out of their
brief entry into the intrigues of Byzantine politics, and when
John V did succeed in ousting KantaJkouze.nos it was not with
Venetian help, but, on the contrary, the rewards for this ex¬
ploit went to a Genoese freebooter, Francesco Gattilusio^.
The change in government was accepted calmly enough in
Venice. On 15 August 1355 the senate drew up instructions for
an ambassador to Constantinople who was to salute John V in
the customary way and, it seems, treat him as though he
had always been in power, recalling past debts and regretting
p
the damage suffered by the empire in the war with Genoa". The
The next four treaties between Byzantium and Venice, in 1357#
1363, I37O and 13/6, were made with John V alone'1.
however, during this period of Jolm V* s personal rule the
Venetians continued to make political contact with those who
1. Bee below p^-3'3.
2. Thirlet, Rogostes, 275•
3. For the text of the treaty of 1357# see M»M.. XII, pp.121-
*26$ b.V—h.,XI, pp.39-^3. For 1363, see b.y-L.,11.*pp.87-
92. For 1370, see h.V-b., Li , pp.151-15b. The text of
1376 lias not survived, see R-J .Loenert:?;, * Motes d'his to ire
et de ciironologie byzantines' , R.b. .. 17# (1959), 166 a.Q.
Also J •Chrysostomides, •Studies on the Chronicle of Caroldo'#
O.o.P.» 35# (1969)^153, especially n.4.
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had influence with him. During the lapse of the treaty between
1 February 1375 and 1376 Venice* s increasing anxiety about the
dangers posed to their trade and privileges is easy to see. It
is also clear that at this time John V was seriously ill and
that this was holding up the negotiations. Therefore on 15
February 1375 Andrea Gradenigo, the ambassador to Constantinople,
was empowered to visit Manuel and pay hirn the respects custom¬
arily due to the emperor, if John V so wished*". A little later
two other envoys were also instructed to negotiate with Manuel,
On this occasion they were also told that if they considered it
worth while to their mission they could visit * the lord emperor
kantakouzenos1 and greet him with ' words of love and regard* ,
These negotiations were apparently successful in obtaining a
renewal of the treaty between Venice and the empire, but it
cannot be ignored that the achievement was not solely due to
the peaceful political counsel applied by Venice to John through
his son and father-in-law. The presence of ten Venetian galleys
in the harbour of Constantinople was certainly largely respon¬
sible for bringing the negotiations to a conclusion.
The usurpation of Andronikos XV from 1376 to 1379 was a
difficult period for Venice, He was little lore than a puppet
of the Genoese and it was not long before Venice was in open
conflict both with its Italian rivals and the empire. Venice
1. * Quia domlnus imporator Constantinopolis pro maiori parte
anni e3t multum gravatus de persona et propter dictara
causaia recusare posset quod noster a nbaxiator quando erit
in Uonstantinopoli iret ad prosentiam suaia, sod vellet
quod comparoret ad presentiaiji Cilii sui coronati et quod
ei faceret reverentiam solitaia* . A,.^,V. tienato, Ilisti 34,
f,l64. Thiriet, Mduestes. no.553•
2, • Xte-a suiaus content! et placet nobis quando vobi3 tompus
aptuoi et habile videbxtur, quod sit in libertato vostra
visitaudi dominuu iqieratorai Cantacuzino cum verbis aisorls
et dtleetionis et aicui vobis videbitur utilius et melius
pro faotis nostris' . 12 .larch 1376. A.S,V. banato, .iisti
33. f*99• Gee also O.iialeekx, lin ei.ooreur, p.321 n,l.
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was drawn into war with Andronikoe as a result of his cession
1
of Tenedos to Genoa on 23 August 1376 « soon after lids usurpa¬
tion and only about two months after Venice had finally succeeded
In obtaining tho island from John V, after negotiations which
P
had lasted intermittently for twenty-four years . Late in
1376, after Genoa had sent an expedition which was unable to
gain possession of the island owing to the opposition of tho
inhabitants who re rained loyal to John V and friendly towards
the Venetians, a Venetian fleot occupied bho island. Hie
Genoese wore furious at the loss of such an important prise
and forced Andronikos to prepare for war against Venice. ;ieaii-
whlle Venetian traders in Constantinople wore attacked, their
property was confiscated and their bailo was imprisoned together
width several merchants.
This situation called for the sort of positive action
which, the Venetians had studiously avoided in their dealings
with John V, •The Senate instructed two provvoditori to visit
Constantinople with a force of ten galleys to protest against
the imprisonment of the bailo and other Venetians, They were
further commissioned, in the event of Andronilcos refusing
their requests, to seek help among the Greeks for the deposition
of Andronikos XV and the restoration of Joim V, or els© the
elevation of Manuel Palaio logos or Matthew Caatakouaenos•
Moreover, should this fail, they were told to visit Murad and
to apply for his help in freeing the bailo end restoring poace
and freed© i of trade. Finally, once this had been achieved,
they wero instructed to make e. trea.ty with whoever should be on
1. Libor XtiriUi.1 Roipviblicae C~enuoasts, 2, pp.319-121.
2. jT Chrysostot.tldos, ' Studies on the Chronicle of Caroldo* ,
p.133. -'or a summary of tho earlier negotiations eonoora-
ing Teuedos, see F.ihxriot, *Venise et 1*occupation de
, 6...ado s •' <u .■ v o sr h c1 e' , _ " t<I a i. o s Me 1' 4eo .1 e franchise de
. Gone j ' »5 9 {19 :>3), 219—2-4 5 •
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the throne"'" • This is the only example of Venice actively
attempting to stir up political disaffection in the empire,
Xt vras the only occasion on which the Venetians found it
impossible to treat with the possessor of de facto power'#
JoJin V re-entered Constantinople with Turkish help on
1 Juno 1379# The last 'Genoese troops wore ejected from the
City on 4 August after the Byzantines had obtained the assist—
2
ance of some Venetian ships". However, Andronikos fled to
Pera, and the struggle between hi.i and his father was not
Tor-tally concluded until about April 1331, Peace between
Genoa and Venice was made at Turin on 6 August i3a1.
Alfchough the interests of Venice and John V had coincided
during the war and there had been limited military co-operation
between, tha i, there was a long period after John V regained
Constantinople when there was no treaty governing the relations
between Venice and Byzantium, The treaty signed in 1376 rati
for five years, and in 1331 John V, although reportedly well
disposed to the Republic, showed.no desire to renew the treaty
despite frequent requests. On 25 November 1384 John stated
that he was willing to regulate his affairs with Venice as
though there wore a treaty made on the customary modal in
operation, but ho insisted that he could not sign a treaty
with Venice's ambassador, Ludovice Contarini, who had caused
offence both by the political innovations he attempted to
introduce and by his 'harshness and dishonesty of speech' »
One of the major divisions between Venice and Byzantium was
the Venetian de iaiid for compensation for losses suffered by
1, J, Chrysostomides, op.cit. pp,154-157 •
2, D,di Chinazso, Crouica de la rnierra da Verieciani a ^.euovesi,
ed. riuratori, U.xTd,.15, 74bb-749a« Onthese events
generally, see G.T.Dennis, lannel XXf pp.39-4.5,
3 • D.Y-b . . XX, pp,192-193# 190-197 • Thiriet, Re-ostea, nos,
60'.', 66 5,
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the Venetian colony during Audronikos' usurpation.
The situation deteriorated sharply in 1390* The treaty
was still not renewed, and the Byzantines had arrested two
Venetian com ships in Constantir ople. On 9 April the Venetians
prepared for more positive action against the empire. The
possibility of abandoning the colony in Constantinople wae
considered and the Genoese were kept informed in case the
Venetians needed to take refuge in Pera. Two galleys were
sent to evacuate the merchants and their belongings to Modon
if necessary. The Venetians were clearly aware that they were
not the only people who were dissatisfied with John V. The
instructions of 9 April made provision for the possibility
that John would not be on the throne when the ambassador
arrived and they set out what should be dona if Jolui VIX or
1
the bultan 'ajezid was found lit possession of Constantinople •
The Venetian intelligence was pex-fect, for only X'ive days after
these instructions wore drawn up by the Cenate John VX1 entered
2
Constantinople .
The fact that Venice's contingency planning was so swiftly
proved justified, taken together with the facts that John V
had been exceptionally awkward over the renewal of the treaty,
and that John VJX was willing, within two months of entering
3
the City, to conclude a treaty with Venice , suggests very
strongly that the Venetians not only had a direct interest in
the replacement of John V, but also took a hand in bringing it
about. However, the only major source relating to this event,
1. The Jenate's decisions of 9 April 1390 are partially pub¬
lished by I.Xox-ga, ' Venecia in narea neagra' , p»1104.
fhirxet, ^dgeatos, no.772•
2* Jhort Jhr'ou tele 15# p.32 lines 2b-31; 52, p.J9 lines 41-43.
3» Text of treaty of 1390 in m.M. , XXi, pp.135-144; I).V-L., XX,
pp.224-229• hfllger, Hegester., 5, 3192.
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the account by Ignatius of Smolensk of his pilgriinage, makes no
suggestion that Venice was in any way involved* but stresses
the role xxlayod by the Turks in the usurpation1* similarly
the answer made by the Senate, on 4 October 139^» to an embassy
sent by John VII, suggests that the Venetians were unwilling
to become involved with John VXI in his struggle against his
grandfather. The reply stated as a general policy the Venetians*
desire to avoid the difficulties which would befall their mr-
chaute if they were to take up aras in an internal dispute,
and they further suggested that instead of fighting John VIX*s
battles, they would be very willing to negotiate a peace between
hi i and John V.'"
Xn deciding to make this principle the basis of their policy
towards John VXX, the Venetians may well have been influenced
by the knowledge that Manuel was visiting Rhodes to organise
western help against the usurper. Indeed on 17 Joptember 139Q»
three weeks before the Venetian Senate composed its reply to
John VXI*& embassy, John VII was expelled from Constantinople
3
by the force which Manuel had raised . Venice had been directly
involved neither in his usixrpation nor in his defeat, but it
had managed to profit from his brief occupatioii of Constantinople
be ueierjuiai,e <i' x^ace de m.uolausk. 1389-1^-03. ed. h.de
ihitrovo, Xtineraires raaaes en. Orient. (Geneva 1889)?
pp.129-137•
ihe deliberation of the senate 4 October 1390 is partially
published by if.Iorga, op.oit. p.UGj. Tliiriet, Regostes.
no.780. There is no clear justification for Thiriet* s
remark that this deliberation indicates Venetian collusion
in Joim VII' s usurpation, ibid, p.188 n.2. Also the asser¬
tion - iade by J .marker, iaauel Ix. p.73 n.199# tiiat the
embassy to which the Senate was replying x?as not sent by
John VJI, is impossible to reconcile with the fact that the
Venetians were refusing to take up arms ' contra imperatoren
Chaloianj, avusa ipsius dbmini iinperatorie* • Ceo . tOlger,
•-leges ten ,5",319 2a..
Ignatius of Smolensk, ed. -.de Khltrowo, p. Ik2j bliprt Chroni-
cle 32, p.89 lines }'h~k6; P.(Jharanis, 'An important short
chronicle', pp.358-337.
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to renew the treaty which Jolin V had been so urrw.illing1 to grant*
The events of 1390 reveal the basic characteristics behind
Venice's policies with regard to the Byzantine empire. By
being willing to deal with anyone in power the Venetians had
gained a treaty; by insisting on peaceful negotiations rather
than direct involvement they had safeguarded their position with
the old emperor and so demonstrated the belief they held through¬
out Jolm V*s reign, that whenever possible, the interests both
oi' Empire and Republic lay in the preservation of peace.
ii) The sourcee of Venetian influence in the empire*
Although Venice adopted a policy of preserving its position
in the ©spire as best it could by non-violent means, its concern
for dyssantium did not extend to allowing its rights ana privileges
to be infringed with impunity. Venice's fundamental considera¬
tion in determining its policy in Constantinople was how best
to obtain aaxi <u i benefit from its presence there, and. there¬
fore its privileges had to be protected* but the ultimate
weapon of direct physical intervention was denied to the Repub¬
lic because it would involve those very evils which the Venetians
were so anxious that the empire should avoid* The only occas¬
ion on which any force was tureateneci while John V ruled in
Constantinople was in 137b when John was being especially diffi¬
cult and when xanedos , the prize sought, was of such importance
and was so likely to inflame the rivalry of the Genoese, that
a military force would not be out of place anyway, on the other
occasions when there was clash of interest between nyzantiuci
and the Republic, other methods had to be employed to ensure
that the Venetian interest prevailed.
The technique most frequently exercised, for putting pres¬
sure on the enrperor was to remind him of the vast sums owed
by liiin in compensation for the losses sustained by Venetians
in his territory# These debts, mostly incurred before John V* s
full acquisition of imperial pover in 133^# were constantly
referred to throughout his reign. For instance in 1375~1376*
when Venice's anxiety to make the emperor renew the treaty was
unusually acute, Andrea Gradenigo, sent as Venetian ambassador
to John V, was instructed that nis first task after greeting
the emperor was to remind him of the 21,163 hyperpyra which he
still owed to the Republic in compensation .
however, there were two major drawbacks involved in the
application of such pressure on Byzantium. The first, of which
the Venetians became very conscious* was the 'weakness and
poverty of the emperor and his empire' which, by John V's reign
had become so severe that even the Venetians acknowledged that
the emperor might be unable to pay the debts even if he wished
o
to do so". Although every treaty between Venice and the empire
from 13^2-1390 calculated the amount owed by the Byzantines
and specified exactly how and when it was to be paid, usually
by means of five yearly instalments, only in 13^2 did Venice
receive more than the first instalment which was to be paid
to the ambassadors when the treaty was signed. On every other
occasion the payments lapsed immediately the ambassadors left
for home' .
The other major difficulty in using these debts as a weapon
against Byzantium was that if the emperor failed to pay the
1. Thiriet, Hegestos. nos.551» 575#
2. 12 taroh 1370, 'striata et deb.ilis condicio sua et i iporii
sui' , A.B.V. Senate, histi 33» f #93v. A very similar
expression was used, by th.o aenate on 21 April 1363, Vlsti
32, f.i22> Thiriet, hdgestes. no .4.59 • And again 13 Febru¬
ary 1375# tieti 34, f.lbl.
3# in 13o2 19VCRJ0""hyporpyra were owed, of which 4,000 hyperpyra
were paid an the first instalment; five annual, payments of
3#00u hyperpyra were promised, of which only the first was
made. -in IJbp the debt was still 12,000 hyperpyra and a
further 22,000 hyperpyra were owed for losses sustained
since 1342.
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required suras the Venetians could do nothing except wait.
They might refuse to renew the treaty, but this was likely to
hurt them more than the Byzantines, This was clear in 1368
when the Senate reversed an earlier decision insisting that a
new treaty should not be signed until the Greeks paid at least
one-sixth of the 25,663 hyperpyra owed for the damages suffered
by Venetians, The critics of the hard-line policy argued that
• in view of the very large quantity of goods to be sent to
those parts this year, it is not a good thing that the treaties
should not be confirmed for the sake of a trifle1*. in short,
the debts owed by the empire were at best a very uncertain
asset for Venice - one that could be tapped to the extent of
perhaps 5,000 hyperpyra every time a treaty was signed, but
not one which was a great source of strength to the Republic,
However, the debt owed by the empire, of which the gross
i 2
amount during John V's reign was 41,330 nyperpyra.•*
• ' •
- •" " • :4"". • - ;
**»' • '
: I— . -- -
.
slowly decreased as small and irregular portions were
After 13^9 the Venetians practically stopped adding to the
total sum of damages although they always reserved their
right to do so and doubtless had frequent justification for
it. The Venetians clearly did not think they were getting a
bad bargain when they exchanged their rights to all damages
sustained in Andrortikos XV* s reign for John's ' perpetual
silence' concerning the devastation of Tonedoa after the
1, 'Son sit bonura quod, pro una modiea re, treugue 11on confirm-
ontur habito respectu ati raaximuju havere quod est iturum hoc
anno ad dietas partes'. 21 Ax>ril 1366, Thiriet, lUfgestos.
110.459 and p.lid n.l,
2. The total debt in 1349 was 34,000 hyperpyra
/,000 had been paid since 1342
330 were added in 13U3
the damages debt 1341-91 « 41,330 hyperpyra.
i, Ph ,342-343; » PP ,31'—90,
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1
Peace of Turin . Although in John' s reign '/aaico received
24,16/ hyperpyra fron Byzantium as payment for past damages,
the effort required to extract the money from the emperor
was out of all proportion to the sums involved.
The weakness of the Venetian position in this.matter is
clearly seen in the instructions given to the envoys to
Constantinople on 12 March 1376. Their powers were much
greater than those of any other yssantine mission to ysantium.
They went not as ambassadors but as ' provisores' , military
inspectors, they went in company with the Venetian fleet
bound for frebizond, they were instructed to behave with
unusual haughtiness to the emperor to who.a they were to ;ake
it clear that they had corse not to negotiate but to ask
questions arid .rake demands. However, when their instructions
touched on the matter of the debts owed for damages their
tone was .nor© moderate. The subject was only to be raised
if the emperor seemed to be well disposed and if he were
unable to pay the whole sum he should he asked only for as
much as he could manage• The Venetians were scarcely using
2
the empire*s debts to put pressure on Jolm on this occasion .
1. ' _uia libenter veilemus quod poneretur perpetmim silentium
isti facto Tenedi, ita quod dominus liaperator sou success-
ores sui amplius non facerot nobis requisicion em do omenda
vol restitution© predictis, relinquiuius in libertate tua ...
quod... facieutibus nobis quietationon et liberationem
do dictis da.ua.is illatis nostrie tempore dhirandronici....
ipso luiperator similiter faceret nobis qui etat ionem et
liberation©?.! de dicto facto Tenedi' . 23 July 13<i9 •
h.Xorga, 'Venetia in marea neagrH' , p.llbO, fhiriet,
i6gestes« no .7^0. The Venetians were hoping for something
for nothing since on 20 April 1382 they had agreed that
nobody could be hold responsible for damages caused since
1376 s Thlriet, <ogee tea, no .619.
2. 'Si voro doutinus xmperator erxt beno ciispositus et vellet
attendere ad tractatuij tunc in bona gratia incipiatis a
daunts... . si vero diceret non posse cum in t©gritate solvere
ipsa daiuia projitor stricta:a ot debilou condicionom suam et
imperii sui, tunc procuretis quod solvat ad presets 111am
malorem quantitateui quant obtinore potezritis..pro bono nostroTuir^
A.s.V. Senato, list! 33# f ,9'>v. Thiriet, H^gestee. no.573*
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Another form of the empire*s Indebtedness to the Republic
which was vised on several occasions by the Venetians to exert
influence on John V, concerned the loan of 30,000 ducats made
by Venice to Anne of Savoy, The initial agreement of 13^3
lade this sum repayablo within three years, but the whole vae
still outstanding when John's |>©rsonal rule began. Since the
loan, was subject to an interest rate of 5'0» which was so ae-
tines interpreted by the Venetians as compound interest, it
1
provided Venice with a considerable hold over the empire .
This was all the sioro so because the surety for this loan
was the ' iocalia i mperii' or ' hocTvucx TT|Q PotO"tC0C.Q ' which
apparently, from their name at any rate, were of outstanding
importance to Byzantium,
The jewels were undoubtedly an important bargaining
counter in Venice's hands. So ir.uch is clear from the detailed
work which has been done on John V* s negotiations in Venice
in 137d-l371» in which the restoration of the jewels formed
a rajor part of the price Venice was to pay for the acquisi-
2
tion of Tenedoe , The exchange was not finalised however,
since the Venetians' refusal to remit the interest .incurred
on tho loan, required John to pay 9»500 ducats as well as cod©
Ten©dos to recover his jewels, hence the transaction held
little attraction for the emperor. In 1376 the positions
adopted by Venice arid ' yzaniiun had softened sufficiently for
the Island and the jewels to be regarded as of equal value,
and simple exchange would have taken place had John not been
deposed by Andronikos. Tven when the jewels were not considered
as part of a specific transaction they played an important
part in the general economic threat held over" the empire by
1, T.uerteli, ' X gioielli* , doc,29, p.1/3.
ibid, pp.91-177} U-J.Loeaertz, 'Jean V Pal4ologue \ Venise' ,
hhh, 16 (lppb) 217-232; J .Chrysosto: tides, ' Joiui V Palaeo-
logus in Voai.ce' , 0,g.P,,31, (1965), 76-34; J.darker, ilannel
II, Appendix 1, pp, hu3-b45, .....
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Venice. For example, in I36B the Venetians, by adding the
reparations due for damages to Venetian property, to the loan
on the jewels, the interest on the loan and another smaller
loan, arrived at the conclusion that Byzantium was indebted
to the Republic to the overwhelming extent of Bp,331' ducats
or 170,663 hyperpyra. Coupled with this crushing load of
debt Venice also had the power to threaten the sale of the
jewels. Xn 1360 the Venetians stressed their authority to
soil if they wished but promised that because of their love
for the errperor and the empire they would defer the move for
as long as possible 'not without much loss and Inconvenience*
to themselves, lite next year Venice's patience had run out,
and an ambassador was instructed that Joim should be invited
to send a representative to witness the sale of his jewels,
1
if he l'efusod to pay his debts ,
ilie thx'eat to sell the * crown jewels of the einpire*
sounded an impressive and powerful final sanction from which
Venice could extract considerable advantage. However, it
see, is to have iiad little effect on John V. Perhaps not
enough attention has been given to a letter from the emperor
to Venice in I3S2 at the end of which John. V acquiesced in
the sale of the jewels, hoping that tlie hogo would like to
buy the; himself, and he promised that any part of the debt
uurecioo: ted by the sale would be repaid also. it would appear
froxa tiie fact that the boge did not take advantage of this
offer that Venice*s oesiro to have its loan repaid was leas
than the advantage it saw in retaining the jewels as a bar-
i• *V erlel& * iololii* , pp*l7^-175f fhiriet, itt^aatos. ties,
h:/}9k7®» Venice had tlirea toned to sell the jewels twenty
yonrc earlier, Id July l[y , ' .axuuid. op«cit. ;>.! ■
».Mrlet, .;-6-Qaiqs, no.19% "*"* ' "
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1
gaining counter witli the e 10ire .
Another source of Venetian power over the empire, which
was occasionally employed when John V seemed to be .particu¬
larly intractable* was the possibility of threatening bo reuove
the Venetian colony froM Byzantine soil and to set up a similar
trading post in Turkish territory. in 1365 the bailo reported
that the er.peror and his subjects wei"e, despite the existence
of a treaty, beuavxng badly toitfards the Venetians who
were subject to lany innovations and extortions and whose
condition in Constantinople was ' feeble1 . iie drew a direct
contrast between this unjustified ill-treatment and the ' lany
advantages' which were available to Venice from iturad, The
next bailo was accordingly told, to obtain .more details from
')
iiurad if John should remain, obdurate".
ho thing ca ie immediately from those exchanges but in
1366 the bailo was told that since 1-iurad evidently wanted the
Venetians to operate from hi® territory, he should go to
inspect Ccutari, a town just across the Boaphorus from Constanti¬
nople, to see whether it was suitable as a port and could be
1. b.V-L,, XI, p.op. The overriding importance of the 'crown
jewels' is accepted by J. Chrysostomides, op.nit, p.80,
doubtless their cash value was greater than the 30,OOO
ducats of the loan, but nothing suggests that the
had great constitutional significance. Cregoras, xv,llj.XI,
73c, noted that the jewels on view at the banquet to cele¬
brate the coronation of John Kantakouzenos in 134/ were
glass imitations. .3van if this testi tony is accepted it is
cleai' that the validity of his coronation, and all subse¬
quent Jyzantiiio coronations, was not affected by the absence
of the jewels pawned in 13^3. The western tendency to
exaggerate in these matters is seen in J.Servion, Gaatoz et
cronlquns, P.133, where a jewel from John V s hat, pledged
in 1367, is described as 'sou riche chappei i iperial* .
2. Thiriet, ieq-estQs, no,423.
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defended with a boon. Scutari was to be defended at lurad* s
expeuae, for the safety of Venice' a merchants* so that they
could enjoy their accustomed tax free commerce. The Venetians
were determined not to .oaks the move unless the conditions
which ixad iJiado their stay in Constantinople so profitable
could be entirely reproduced elsewhere. They further demanded
that their privileges should apply not only in Scutari but
1
throughout iurad's territory generally • The Venetians were
being rather over-ambitious* They were dealing with a power
whicn could afford to refuse* and which apparently did* since
no more is heard of the matter for a while*
in 1,376 the Venetians again showed interest in a base
in Turkish territory, Taut in a rather .ore diplomatic .manner*
The 'provisores' sent to Constantinople were told that if
John V" refused to co ie to terms they were to visit Lurad
to enquire about his attitude to a Venetian colony on his
soil, to find whether he was disposed to grant the iorchants
a walled area with a port* and how extensive wore the privi¬
leges which he was prepared to concede. Although these
enquiries were to be completed oven if John accepted the
treaty quickly. it is clear that the main purpose of the pro¬
ject was that John should get to know about it and should
realise how determined the Venetians were. The result of
2
this mission to lurad is not i-ecordod •
1. The Venetians demanded the right to 'stare et nercari ad
bemeplacitum auu t libelee sine allquo datio vol coraorclo
persolvendo tarn intrando qua 1 exeundo et tam omendo quam
vedendo* at quod habeaaras etia n in aliis locis suis o ones
ilias francixisias, avantagia et iuridictionos ac lifcer-
tatos' . S.;!.b.:m.. 4, no*16.5* Thiriat, ft&yestes* no.46l*
2. ' lit quia posset occurrero quod in traccatu prodictorum in—
venirotis do linua imperatore 1 nolle condescendere ad in ten-
tiono-i no stroma predic -a. •.* tunc* • • sums contonti pro bono
nostro ec nostroruu quod vos? provieoros nostri. • • ire
debeat. is ad parlamentan&ura cu.a horato* Et.. . debeat is
invostig-are ot sentire de intention©* voluntate et diaposi-
(contd. )
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The sort of* privileges which the Venetians were demanding
from Murad are revealed somewhat by the instructions given to
ilarino Malipioro who was sent as ambassador to Murad and John V
in iyikt when Venice and the empire were again in conflict over
John* s refusal to renew the treaty. The important feature of
the instructions was that the Venetians' privileges should be
better than anyone else's. If possible they should Include
the right to buy and ©xjjort corn without any tax, but a charge
of up to half a hyporpyron per lodius would be agreed to if
Murad demanded it. The ambassador was further told that since
the Turks normally charged four hyperpyra per cantarium for
the export of alum to the West, the tax imposed on the Venetian
merchants should be less*'.
The force of Venice's threat to withdraw its colony from
the eaipire and seek another trading post on Turkish territory
was very strong, had the Venetians been able to find the same
economic advantages under a strong government as they enjoyed
in XXyzantiuia then the particular attraction of the empire
woiild have been lost and Venetian and western interest in the
fate of Constantinople would have declined rapidly. however,
since the Turks showed no sign of granting the Venetians the
sweeping privileges which they demanded, John V* s hand was not
forced unduly by the threat of the colony's transfer. The only
tione sua et si esset contentus dare nobis terram vel locum
amuraturn cum portu et cum quibus libertatibus et franchisiis
.... iit si in is to tempore quo tractaretis cum Morato, do/u-
inus imperator faceret vos roquiri quod vellet esse vobis-
cu.-a pro factis vobis commissis et pro imponendo eis fines,
....eatis ad presentiam suam' . 12 March 1376, A,b.V.Senato,
Mist! 331 f.99, Thiriet, hatestes, no.575*
h.V-L.. XX, pp. 193-196; W .Xorga, • Venejia in marea neagra' ,
pp.1094-1095$ Thiriet, legestes. no.67b.
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time John. V seems to have been influenced by Venetian pressure
of any sort was in 1376 when Venice, in its effort to secure
a new treaty and the cession of Tenedos, esaployed all its
threats simultaneously, damages, jewels, withdrawal of the
colony and also, uniquely, the possibility of direct military
intervention.
iii) Venice and the external threat to Byzantium.
The Venetian attitude to Byzantium went considerably
further than merely avoiding direct intervention in the empire's
internal affairs, in the area of the Balkans generally, where
ambitious eyes turned naturally to the crumbling empire in
the hope of some easy conquest, the Venetians consistently
pursued a policy designed to stabilise the situation, to keex>
conflicts local and the empire in Byzantine hands. Venice
was able to exercise this moderating influence since its eon-
power was constantly sought by those who wore planning attacks
on Constantinople. But by the second half of the fourteenth
century the Venetians had not only abandoned their own plans
for a re-enactment of the events of 1204, but they had fir?ily
decided that the prize should not be allowed to fall to anyone
else, in this sense the Byzantine character of the empire came
to be of Increasing importance to the Italian trading cities,
for they knew that as long as the Byzantine empire lasted their
trade routes, bases and, above all, privileges were secure.
Ottoman conquest or Serbian or Hungarian takeover would have
destroyed that characteristic weakness which made the Byzan¬
tine rulers so attractive to Italian traders.
a) Venice and Berbia.
The Venetian policy of promoting peace so far as was possible
between Byzantium and its external enemies is clearly seen in
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the relationship between Venice and Stephen Duean of Serbia.
The civil wars in Byzantium had given Serbia ample opportuni¬
ties to increase its territory southwards so that the empire
retained little more than Constantinople and Tlxessalonica.
The Serbian expansion was made easier since Uusau u&s sought
as an ally first by Aantakouzanos and later by John V. In
1343 Anne of Savoy asked Venice to intervene with Stephen
Dusan in an attempt to divert him from his alliance with
Kantakouzonos• in accepting this task the Venetian Senate
observed that * any change or evil which affects the empire
causes harm to our whole community* This was the thought
behind the whole of Venice' s policy towards Byzentium and
its neighbours.
Thus, when Busan*s ambitions turned to the possession
of Constantinople itself, and he sought naval help to achieve
this, Venice was consistently firm with him. On 3 march 1346,
in answer to an embassy from Du&an, Venice willingly rejoiced
in his coronation as C;aperor of the Romans but refused out¬
right to give him the help he needed to take Constantinople
and to add substance to the title he had claimed. Tactfully
Venice excused its inability to help on account of the rebel¬
lion it faced in Zara and the many other troubles with which
it was occupied, it also draw attention to the treaty it had
with the empire which could not be broken without loss of
2
honour in the eyes of God and the world .
1. 'Uabentes... respectua, quod omnia novitas et sinistrum, quani
at quod subiret lpsuu imperium, toti coiinunitati nostras
redundaret in damnum* • M.S.H.3.M#. 2. p.174. Thiriet,
Re,testes, no.133.
2. 'Ad factum unionis, qua a intor ipsum et nos fieri petit pro
aquisitione imperii Constantinopolis, respondeatur quod....
considerations treuguaruta existentiuia inter imperium Romanie
ot uos, finatarun cum iura lento, quae non esset fas violare
absque derogatione honoris et fidex nostra apud deum et
ittunaum, ad factum die to unionis intendero non posse ius' .
-i.s.n.c.h.. 2, no.540, P.326,
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Dusan was apparently deceived by the tone of the Vene¬
tians* rejection of his plan, since on 13 April 13 jO the
Venetian senate had once more to compose an answer to a similar
request. The Venetian summary of his letter states that Dulan
had already acquired * the whole of the Empire of Constantinople
except for the city of Constantinople' , which he could not
take without naval support. As an incentive, Du&an offered
Venice the freedom of Constantinople and also of Pera if
that could be taken as well, but the Republic refused utterly
to contemplate such an alliance. Dassan's ambassador was again
reminded that the Venetians were bound by an oath to the
emperor and his peo£>le to preserve • a pure and true peace' ,
which, if it were broken would cause offence to Cod and
damage to the honour of Venice*".
Mot only did the Venetians effectively prevent Du&an's
dreams from becoming realities by refusing to lend their
maritime strength in support of his designs, but they worked
actively to promote peace between Byzantium and Serbia. On
6 April 13^9 a Venetian ambassador was sent to ilusan charged
primarily with discussing the relations of Venice with the
inhabitants of Ragusa. However, lie was also told to address
bu&an politely in an effort to make peace between him and the
emperors of Constantinople, and lie was ordered to visit Con-
stantinople if he considered that this would be useful to the
2
establishment of concord.
1. m.m.ii.s.H., 3, pp.173-173. Thiriet, Regestes. no.241.
On 3 Hay 1330 Venice received another Serbian embassy with
a similar request, and replied * cum verbis quibus pridie
responsum fuit altori ambassatori... excusando nos a dicta
requisitions sua' , H.S,H,S,M«. 3, p.181.
2. ibid. p.119. Thiriet. 'Regostes. no.223.
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Venice again showed its willingness to exert its influ¬
ence in Serbia on Byzantium* a behalf in 13:51 • The Venetian
ambassador sent to Kantalcousenos to promote an alliance
against Genoa, found the emperor preoccupied by the need to
recapture the territory lost by Byzantium to Serbia. The
ambassador suggested to Kantakouzenos that Dusan could be
influenced in favour of Byzantium by Venetian pressure, since
1
he had been aade a member of the Republic* s Senate * Although
this argument failed to persuade Kantakouzenos to join the
alliance he was clearly impressed by this close link between
Du^an and Venice. Later, when he met Stephen Du&ari, lie asked
hia how it had been possible for a man with an empire more
glorious than the Venetians* to hear the shame of being en-
roiled in their benate. it must have been gratifying for
Kantakouzenos to hear that Dusan had been driven to taking
the step because his fear of Kantakouzenos was such that it
2
was keeping him awake at night '.
In May 1351» when Kantakouzenos was finally driven into
an alliance with Venice against Genoa, a clause in the agree¬
ment negotiated between the allies required the Venetians to
use their influence xv'ith Dusan to make him mitigate his
3
attitude towards the empire «
1. !T(5v 6e ^icacYyeWouevaiv, eu 5iot9fic£iv otutcp xct Kara Kp&\T|v,
Y£Yevf|a9oct y^P £va rrfc; auxujv 3ou\tiq nat av&YKTiv 7ce»0ea-
9at auTOLQkantak. iv,16 till,lib . The privile, in a granting
Venetian citizenship to Stephen Du^an arid his family is
published in .. u,.i.. 3, pp.165-186.
2. Kantak. iv,21tXXi, 152.
3. 1 its a, ut nostrum i iperiuai in quiet e et statu pacifico
remanent cum rege Raxie, cum quo ad presens discordiam
habet, offert et proaxttit prefatus dominus aabaxiator,
quod per ambaxatores sou nuncios predict! doraini duels et
communis Veneciarum tractabitur et procurabitur, in
quantum fieri poter.it, apud rege 1 prefatum quod se pacificot
cura nostro i tperio vel treugua a seu concordium faclat
saltern per totum teipus unionis predicte, si hoc ab ipso
rege haberi poterit' . D.V-L.. XX, pp. 4-12, especially
p. 10.
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b) Venice and Hungary.
A policy similar to that exercised with Stephen iiusan
may be observed in the relations between Venice and Hungary.
In 1365-1360 Venice was vsell aware that King Louis of Hungary
was planning a major military expedition. Mis intention of
going on crusade had been known for some time. On 2k January
1365 the Senate noted a rumour that Louis was intending to
hire a fleet of ten galleys from Nice and Provence, and
decided, because of the danger to Venetian interests which
these galleys .light represent, to ask Louis not to arm these
or any other galleys from those places'*". The Hungarian plans
were revealed by Louis to the Venetians in rather greater
detail some time before 10 March 1366 on wnich day the Doge
composed a reply. From this reply it is evident that two
Hungarian ambassadors had been in Venice asking for a fleet
of between two and five galleys to serve Louis at his expense
for six months as part of an expedition by land and sea to
help Byzantium against the Turks• The Doge was assured that
this plan had been made by the Hungarians at the request and
2
with the approval of the Bhnperor of Constantinople .
The Venetians expressed great willingness to supply
these ships and even offered to pay for them themselves, ask¬
ing only that Louis should let them know when they were 'required.
However, in a slight note of warning at the end of his letter,
the Dog© reminded Louis that Venice had a treaty with the
Emperor of Constantinople, and held jurisdictions, pacts and
1. 1.o,.j.o.■.,, k, no. 13k«
2. ' A sbaxatores predict! nomine sue regie maiostatis petierunt
a nobis de possendo araare duas galeas usque quinque in
Venetiis ad suas expensas per sex menses, dicentes esse inten-
tionem sue excellent!© de eundo personaliter cum magno exer-
citu per terra s et per snare in subsidium imperii Romanie
contra Turchoa, et quod istud erat de requisitione et bene-
placito domini i sporatoris Constantinopolis' . M,b.M..3.M.«
4, no.l4d, pp.33-66.
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franchises from hira which the Hungarians x*ere asked to respect
in all circumstances. Evidently it had already occurred to
the Venetians that Louis' expedition .night not have beon de¬
signed so exclusively for byzantium's benefit as the Hungarian
ambassadors had suggested, and it is likely that Venice' s
proposal to pay for its own galleys resulted from a desire to
keep them under its control and preserve its freedom of action.
On 20 September 13b6 Louis wrote again to the Venetians
thanking the.i for their offer to pay for the ships. However,
being aware of tho efforts, expenses and burdens which daily
afflicted Venice and not wishing to upset the pacts which it
had with the Turks, Louis asked only for the hulls, and said
that he would pay for tho galleys' equipment himself. Nego¬
tiations continued until March 1367 and the Venetian element
in the expedition was reduced atill further. Louis cut his
request to only two unequipped galleys and furthermore he
raised three hundred of his footsoldiars from Francis of
Carrara, a declared enemy of Venice*".
shortly after its su.rn.iary of Louis' letter of j march
I367t the Chronicle of caroldo mentions another letter from
the Hungarian King to the i>oge, in which lie revealed the true
objectives of his expedition. He no longer wanted the galleys
for the defence of Constantinople from the Turks but planned
to make war on the King of Serbia, the Emperor of Bulgaria
and perhaps on the Emperor of Constantinople, whom he accused
of plotting against Hungary. Now that Louis had openly stated
his genuine intentions, there was no question of Venice continu¬
ing to lend him any aid at all. The Doge's answer to Louis
stressed the treaties which Venice had with the empire, the
1. n» . 4, nos.lpl,lt53,134,15!5»156 (wrongly dated 1366),
157. pp.a:3-90.
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good relations it had with Serbia* whose king was a Venetian
citizen* and the peace which it enjoyed with the Bulgarian
empire where Venetian merchants operated securely. The chroni¬
cler concluded with, the observation that such divisions betxsoen
the King of Hungary and the emperor of Constantinople and the
other princes gave the 'fustics their best opportunity of increas¬
ing and expanding their power in i£urope •
c ) Venice and the 'Turkish threat to Constantinople.
The Venetians extended their policy of refusing assistance
to the ene:aies of Byzantium to include the Turks who* despite
their seemingly irresistible forces* were not above asking for
additional support* hoping to turn the strained relations
between Venice and Genoa to his advantage, shortly after the
end of the Chioggia war* the iSiair Murad proposed that Venice
should join in a combined attack on the Genoese of Pera.
however* on 10 March 13o4* the 'Turkish ambassador was flatly
told that the project could not be considered since* 'as
the whole world knew* * the Genoese .and the Venetians had
recently made peace at Turin which they did not intend to
break. The Venetians expressed their willingness to make
enquiries about replacing some dogs which Murad was evidently
upset at losing, but they were adamant that common action
2with the Turks against Pera was not possible •
1. ' J<\t risposto a sua maestS, che la republica Veneta liaveva
le loro convention! con 1' imperatore di Constantinopoli
formate con sacra:,lento, e che il r© di liassia over di
Servia era cittadln Venetot con il quale havova patti e
obligo di trattarlo amiohevolmente* e have eziandio pace
con l'imperator de Bulgari, nel paase delle quali li
mereanti Veneti convex'savcuio e negoclavano securamente.
Peri piacesse a sua laaesti., haverla iscusata' . The
Chronicle of Caroldo* cited by b.cteinherz, 'Die Bozie-
hungen Ludwigs I von Ungarn zu Karl XV (2)' , litthellungen
des ins li tuts i'ttr oestorreiohiselle Geschichtsforschun/^
!Tf {1666), 568 11.3.
2. h.iorga, ' Venetia in marea neagr&' * JJ.1Q93* Thiriet,
Hegeates* no.067•
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The dogs appeared again on 24 July 133d j Murad was
apparently very pleased with them, and the Venetians were
willing to send tore, however, in other ways the relations
between Venice and the Turks were less good# Murad still
held some Venetian prisoners, taken near uoron and aodon,
the conditions for whose release had been negotiated in 1334.
Moreover it appeared that Murad had failed to understand that
Venice was unwilling to consider Joint action with the Turkish
forces# Murad was under the impression that Venice had promised
to send an army to him at its own expense, but the Venetians
assured liisi that he must have misunderstood the ambassador
who not only was not empowered to make such arrangements,
but also knew perfectly well that Venice would not contemplate
such a project for a moment# In order, however, not to aggra¬
vate the situation with Murad mors than was necessary, the
Venetian ambassador was told not to raise the natter unless
Murad first mentioned it1.
uespite Venice's refusal of military alliance much
Venetian policy was directed towards gaining trading privi¬
leges from the Turks, a task which would surely have been
greatly eased if the Venetians had enjoyed the status of
allies# furthermore the honour of Venice in the eyes of God
and the world, would not perhaps have been too badly shaken
at the news of an alliance against the empire which had itself
p
• iado an 'unholy alliance' ~ with the Turks and was paying regu¬
lar tribute to them# However, the advantages of supporting
1, 'Ad auras nostras pervenit quod videtur in ymaginatione
tioiaini ioratj, ... quod promissua sit per ambaxiatorem
nostrum qui fuit ad pressntlam suam quod mittereraus axar-
citum nostra i ad nostras expanses ad subsiding domini
Moratjj do quo vaido rairati fuimus' • M.Iorga, op.cit.
pp .1096-1097 • Thiriet, to. ;estes. no.742.
2. This expression was used by Gregory XX in a letter to John
V, 13 December 13/4, T&utu 12, p.244.
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a weak :yzant±rie empire for as long as possible to the exclus¬
ion of a powerful and organised regime wore still obvious
enough to make active participation in the fall of Constanti¬
nople no part of Venetian policy.
iho delicate balance involved in Venice* s attitude
towards yzantium as tiie source of present prosperity and to
the Turks as the future arbiters of eastern Mediterranean
trade, is illustrated in the negotiations between Venice and
Manuel in 13d 5, At this tine Lanuel was ruling independently
of his father over the 'new empire* in Thessalonica. The
policy of active resistance and aggression against the Turks
which he liad inaugurated, had passed through its brief
successful stage, and the tide had turned against hi 1,
Thessalonica was under Turkish elege from the autumn of 13<3
until it fell in April 13^7. During this period of siege
Manuel sent an embassy to the Venetians to inform then of
the situation and the estre ie necessity of arms and support,
lie asked for two cavalry transport ships, two hundred sets of
armour, twenty thousand arrows and seventy crossbow men to be
hired for three months| he also requested a loan of six
thousand ducats, offering in pledge some of his territory and
fortifications, he further suggested joint action between
his galley and a Venetian galley from Negropont, iri defence
of both byzantine and Venetian territory, and he offered rewards
in the boroa if the Venetians would help his brother Theodore
against the Navarrese there. Finally Manuel asked for Venice
to intervene between mur&d and himself so that a trace could
be made between the t.
On i s April 13 >5 the seriate replied to Manuel's requests1.
in the loatter of supplying arms the Venetians agreed in princijjla,
1. Venice's reply, which summarises Manuel's requests, is pub¬
lished in full by (r,T.Dennis, Manuel II, pp,lo3-lo4j and
partially by M.iorga, op.cit. p.I'D£»'/'" "Thiriet, Rd'gestes.
no.633,
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but insisted that the money tor their hire should arrive in
Venice before the arras could be sent. Manuel's application
for a loan was turned down because his ambassador* s credentials
did not cover either the receipt of the money or the authority
to offer territory in pledge. A definite answer to the question
of Venetian help against the Mavarx-ese was not made because
the matter was still under x'eviex*. However, tho suggestion
that a Venetian galley should operate in conjunction with a
yaantina one was rejected outright on tho grounds that the
galley was at all times required for the defence of Negropont
and for other Venetian business. The only part of nanus!'a
list of requests that Venice showed complete confidence in
agreeing to concerned the possibility of the Venetians using
their influence to restore peace between Manuel and urad.
'fhe Senate informed manual that since Venice*wished partiou~
iarly for the peace and prosperity of the lord emperor*t the
next time that a Venetian ambassador was visiting tlurad he
would do his best to bring about peace between the Byzantines
and the Tuxks,
To be involved in direct action against the Turks on
Byzantium' a behalf was quite as impossible in Venetian eyes as
acting with the lurks against Byzantium or the Genoese of Para.
Venice, being anxious to take full advantage of the empire
so long as it lasted, was also interested in seeing that tho
empire Lasted as long as possible. But it was no part of
Venetian policy to slow the empire's faltering collapse by
antagonising its future masters with whom Venice hoped to have
a profitable trading relationship in the years to co io.
Thus although Dernetrios Aydoxies was certainly correct in
his belief that the commercial importance of Constantinople
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would assure continued Venetian concern in the fate of the
empire, his conclusion that this circumstance would result in
a flow of western aid to Byaantium was more questionable*
Indirect aid, such as the occasional dispatch of supplies
for the Byaantine navy, was as far as Venice would readily
go, and it never neglected to demand payment for the materials
provided*" • Positive intervention, striking at the established
power of the enemies of Uyasantium and Christendom at large,
could not be contemplated*
Venice* s attitude, which periodically aroused the anger
of the papacy, was excused on the grounds that since the
Republic was 'without fields, vines or any other possession
r>
than the exercise of commerce' , it could not enter lightly
into an enterprise which might undermine its livelihood* The
experience of the crusade led by Peter of Cyprus against
Alexandria, which Venice joined while ignorant of its ultimate
objective, and whioh not only caused groat losses to Venetian
merchants in the city but also made relations with the Moslems
very difficult, resulted in Venice seeking assurances from
aspiring crusaders that they would avoid the shores of Syria
3
and Egypt*',
Venice confined its military activities against the
lurks to participation in international enterprises, such as
the League of Smyrna* The justification for this project was
that it was a pre-emptive strike against a potential threat
1. Thiriet, H^gestes, nos.222,237,507,5V?,693*
2. The Chronicle of Caroldo, cited by N.Xorga, Philippe de
aozi&res 1327-140 5 et la croisade an XXVo si&cle* (Paris
1896) p.310 n.3.
3. Tlxe Venetians reminded Ring Louis of Hungary in a letter
10 larch 1366 that lie had stated that ho had no plans • de
eundo ad partes Corie et JSg-ipti, propter daapna maxima
qua sequerentur toti mundi si raercationes et exercitium
mortiuai deberent talitei- devastari' • -1* 8*11* o* L, . V,
no.148.
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to tiie trade of the eastern Mediterranean* kaports that Uaur
the emir of AyctLn was preparing a aassivo fleet to pillage
the coastal cities of hurope led to the formation of a confedera¬
tion of naval forces armed by the pope, tho King of Cyprus,
Venice and the hospitallers for the capture of Smyrna*-• The
expedition was fundamentally defensive, aimed at the protection
of trade, and it was a corporate effort which did not leave
tho participants exposed* Under such circumstances the Vene¬
tians were prepared to contribute forces, but generally they
sought to avoid involvement. instructions sent by the Senate
to the Castellan.! of Coron on 6 March 13**1 summed up the
2
Venetians* attitude towards crusading ventures generally *
The Senate saw crusading as a speculative business, man by
unreliable people, and discouraged the castellan! from supply¬
ing ships and provisions for ouch undertakings* Diplomacy
on the other hand was a less lethal weapon which Venice was
prepared to employ in defence of its own interests and to the
incidental benefit of the Dyzantine empire.
1. P.Lamerle* L* e. iirat d# Aydin. pp.180-203. 226-233.
2. Thiriet, .36'idstes. no.l?.3.-
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E• The Genoese anc>. the internal affairs of Byzantium.
i) The a/^ressivc attitude of the colonists In Pera and the
moderating influence of Genoa.
A cursory examination of the political events in the
empire in the reif^tx of John V gives the impression that the
Genoese protected and promoted their interests in Byzantium
by involving themselves directly in the domestic politics
of the empire# While the Venetians pursued a policy of non¬
intervention and relied on their diplomatic skills to further
their commercial position, the Genoese fought wars against
Byzantium in 13^ and 1352, and supported rival candidates
to John V* s throne in 1376 and 139^«
The apparent difference in the attitudes of Venice and
Genoa towards Byzantium* s internal affairs is surprising
since the position of the tx?o Italian republics in the eastern
Mediterranean and the Black bea xiras governed by factors which
applied equally to both of them. The Importance of Constanti¬
nople, situated on the Bosphorus and commanding the essential
link betxveen the food producing areas of the Pontic coastline
and the consumer cities of the West, was common to them both.
Similarly the e xpire contained their most important colonies
and afforded them trading privileges and concessions which
could not be matched elsewhere. In this connection the
interests of the trading cities were clearly to be served
most profitably by maintaining the empire for as long as
possible as a. haven of advantageous commercial conditions to
the exclusion of the growing power of the Turks who would
be unlikely to grant the same trading privileges in Constanti¬
nople that Venice and Genoa onjoyed under the empire.
However, there was one important respect din xdiich the
conditions of the Venetians and Genoese were not identical.
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Venice* s attitude towards the empire was dictated among other
things by the relative vulnerability of its colony, situated
in the centre of Constantinople and subject to the provisions
of a treaty which had to be renewed every five years. The
Genoese were limited by no such restrictions* Their security
was guaranteed by permanent treaties and by the position of
their colony across the Golden horn from the capital, with
its own deep water harbour and defended by its own consider¬
able walls, in tills position of independent strength the
Genoese of Pera were able to act towards the empire as an
equal and to protect their interests in a direct and often
aggressive manner'''. This difference in the local conditions
of the colonies was of great significance in determining the
attitude of fche Genoese to liyzantium, since although the
policy of the authorities in Genoa itself was largely governed
by considerations similar to those affecting Venice, the
Genoese of the colony of Pera showed a more independent and
self-confident spirit than their Venetian counterparts in
Gon s tan t itioplo,
The freedom of action of the Genoese colonists is
clearly visible in the war between Pera and Byzantium in
13^8-13^9• All the Byzantine commentators who record the
war agree on the essentially local nature of its causes,
Nikephoros Gregoras mentions the Genoese fear of the expan¬
sion of the Byzantine fleet and the danger it posed to their
trading revenues since it had been built not only to oppose
the Turks but also to help divert more sea trade into the
1, 'As these people (the Genoese of Pera) expanded and multi¬
plied, so their avarice increased, until they felt bold
enough to turn openly against their benefactor as the
devil turned against his maker* . Makrombolites, Logos
historikos. p,l46.
309
harbour of Constantinople . Kantakouzenos agrees that the
Genoese motive was to • rule the sea* and to oppose the in¬
creased fleet of merchant ships which the emperor had
2
constructed . Finally Makrembolites says that the Genoese
embarked on the war because of the ' long ships* which the
Greeks had built and ifiore specifically because their
commander x#as a certain Phakeolatos who in 1346 had inflicted
damage on Genoese merchant shipping and against whom they
liad ever since nursed an implacable hatred . The other griev¬
ance of the Genoese was also colonial in character, concern¬
ing the emperor* s refusal to allow them to expand and fortify
k
their district in Pera •
The war was fought by the Genoese of Pera with some help
from Chios and Rhodes, but although the colonists sent envoys
to Italy to rouse their compatriots to their assistance, no
5
reinforcements were forthcoming from Genoa • One of the most
interesting aspects of the war concerns the peace negotiations
which followed the resounding Byzantine defeat at sea in
61349 • The conflicting accounts of the Byzantine writers
make it imposgible to determine the exact course of the nego¬
tiations and the terms agreed. The most precise details
about the conduct of the poace talks are provided by Gregoras,
1. Gregoras, xvii, It IX, 842,046.
2. Kantak. iv.llt111,69.
3. iakreabolites, JLoros historikas. p.l46. Whan Byzantine
writers refer to Phakeolatos they often mention the
Genoese hatred of him e.g. Gregoras, xv,6jXX,766 and
xv,3 tll,773, Kantak.iii,95»XX,384 and Hi,97sXI, 599.
4. itantak.iv,litXXX,68 and 70.
3. Gregoras, xvii,3tXI,851.
'r^vvoua uev ouv t6Cou<; e\ovaoc. 0oq{>|3ouq vtoci y££T0V(*<;
liaxaQ axeCitato x£uxelv (3of|0ei<xv '.
ibid, xvii,4iiX,856.
6. A vivid description of the battle is given by lakrembolites,
Logos hiatorikoa. pp.136-153. 'Of this great (Byzantine)
fleet there was not so tmich as a bubble to be seem it came
and went with the speed of a lightning flash* • Cited
D.M.Nicol, Last Centuries, p.231. bee also Grogoras, xvii,
6 jXi,360-864; hantak, iv, 111 XXX, 76-70 ; and P •Schreiner,
•La chronique brdve de 1352*, part 4, 0.C.P.. 34,(1968),
38, 40-46.
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according to whom the negotiations were begun by representa¬
tives from Pera. on terms which ware favourable to the colony,
and after four days xi?©r© taken over by envoys from Genoa
itself. These ambassadors arrived from Genoa In a galley
and immediately concluded a peace settlement entirely satis¬
factory to the Byzantines^".
The terras described by Gregoras, involving the payment
by the Genoese of over 100,000 gold jaieces covering the
empire* s war expenses, may well exaggerate the mitigating
influence of the Genoese envoys. However, their intervention
in the peace negotiations is somewhat confirmed by a document
containing the instructions given to other Genoese ambassadors
2
to the empire in 1351 . These men were told to remind the
emperor of the cordiality of an embassy sent to Constantinople
some time previously under Lancelot d© Castro. The only
embassy known, from sources other than Gregoras, to have
visited Constantinople shortly before 1331, is one concerned
with the future of Chios, but the names of these envoys are
known, and Lancelot de Castro is not among them • Thus it
is probable that Lancelot was a member of a different embassy,
possibly the one described by Gregoras. He would have been
dispatched from Genoa while the Byzantines vers still effec¬
tively resisting the attacks from Pera, with instructions to
heal the breach between Constantinople and Pera as amicably as
possible.
1. Gregoras, xvli,7111,366. The terras described by Makrem-
bolites, Logos nlstorikos. p.159 and Kantak. iv,lljXIX,
79,are less favourable to the Byzantines but also suggest
that the negotiations took place in two phases.
2. G. ortolotto, ' iuova aerie' , Atti iocleth Li^are. 28, (1397)
pp.550-559# esp. p.552. Bee also the comments of C.ilanfroni,
'Le rolazioni fra Genova, 1' impero bizantino a i furchi*,
ibid, pp.705-706.
3. The envoys concerned with Chios wore Jacopo Lrainio arid Adaro
Spinola. Kantak.iv,12»XXI,81-82.
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Tii© actions of the Genoese of Pera were again in conflict
with the policies being pursued from Genoa in the war of
1352. Byzantium had no direct interest or relevance in the
dispute which Genoa had at the time with Venice, arising out
of a merchants' dispute at Tana at the mouth of the Don and
concerning the domination of Black Sea trade. However, the
strategic position of Constantinople caused both sides to
solicit the empire's aid, but the Venetian and Genoese
embassies were rebuffed by John kantakouzenos who x*efused to
be diverted from his own problems by involving himself in a
1
foreign dispute . Genoa accepted this position and even sent
ambassadors to the emperor to thank him for his neutral
attitude and to encourage his resistance to the Venetians*
2
offer of alliance . However, by the time the ambassadors
arrived in tho empire the situation had changed dramatically.
They found that Byzantium had entered the war and was firmly
allied to the Venetians and the Catalans.
This sudden change in Xantakouzenos' attitude was not
caused by any alteration in his policy, but by an unprovoked
attack on Constantinople by the Genoese of Pera who hurled
rocks into the City and forced the emperor to seek security
3
in the Venetian alliance . The motive of the colonists for
this attack is unclear but, as in 1348, it was probably a
reaction to renewed attempts to Kantalcouzenos to build up
the Byzantine merchant fleet, immediately after the Byzantine
defeat in 1349 the emperor had attempted to rejuvenate Greek
trade by cutting the tax paid by the empire's ships from
ten per cent .ad valorem to two per cent ', a level which made
1. Xantak. iv, lb 11X1,118 and iv. 25 sHI* IU0-I90. For the
background /to the war see ibid, iv,26»111,191-193* Also
Thirlet, Heresies. 244.
2. G. ertoloito, ' Uuova serie' , p.552.
3. Kantak, iv, 26 t ill, 190-191. bee above p.2.78 .
4. "his information, given by Kantak.iv,12>111,81, has been
differently interpreted. dee especially D,A .Zakythirios,
(contd.)
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their activities more competitive with the Genoese traders
who were exempt from Byzantine charges and were subject only
to a local colonial tax at a basic rate of one and a third
per cant"1'* Kantalcouzeaos, in his own account of these tensures,
claimed that thoy had an immediate success in building up
the merchant fleet to almost two hundred ships*
After Byzantium had been deserted by its allies * Kanta-
kouzenos made his peace with the Genoese who were represented
in the negotiations by their admiral* who had been appointed
by the Commune of Genoa* and by the ambassadors who had been
sent to Constantinople in 1331 with instructions to be
pleasant to tho emperor* The Genoese of Pora* who had pro¬
voked Kmitakoxizenos to enter the war* were not represented*
and the negotiators set about re-establishing peace as far
as possible in conformity with the instructions given, in 1331*
The terms were for the most part confined to preventing the
Byzantines from providing the Venetians and Catalans with
further aid for the duration of the war, and no attempt was
2
made to humiliate or weaken the empire *
Another example of local Genoese involvement in the
polities of Byzantium may perhaps be found in the restoration of
Jo?m V in 1354. The contribution made by Genoese arms, under
the direction of Francesco Gattilusio, in assisting John V
to enter Constantinople has been taken as an established fact
since it appeared in contemporary Italian chronicles and
later works based on the same tradition, notably the history
3
of Doukae j who worked on Lesbos for the Gattilusio fa ally in
Criso tonetaire, pp.94-95. For a summary of the question
seo C.P.Kyrris, * John Cantacuzenua and the Genoese 1321-
13^0' , Miscellanea otartoa Li;:ure. 3 (1963) 43 and n,17B.
1. J.hay, b'e's itouanes "de 'Gates' 1374-1377. (Paris 1963), p.vii.
2. Liber l!ur£u-ir"'U'expul)i'ic'ae^remien3is, 2.* od. U.iticottius,
Historian Patriae Moaumenta," "9'. (Turin 18 57 ), pp.601 -606.
3• "laTteo' Villani. 'CronxclxeT' Buracori, h.i.C. 14, {17.29), 268-269.
Doukas, xstoria TCTgoBrrf' antina Iod.y.Grecu
(litxcarost xi,l-3, pp.OO-7i, ed. t.Cekker (Bonn 1834)
pp.40-43.
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tii© oiid-fifteenth century. According to his account Francesco
Gattilusio aet John V on 'fenedos while on a journey fro a
Genoa with two merchant ships which he offered to John to
help him regain his throne* Doukas makes Gattilusio the
central figure in John*s entry into the capital, duping the
guards into deserting their posts and then leading acclama¬
tions in John's iionour until the people assembled to welcome
him* Francesco was later married to John*s sister .laria, and
received the island of besbos as her dowry.
hookas* s assertion that Gattilusio was chiefly responsible
for setting John V upon the throne has only recently been
questioned^, on the ground that neither of the contemporary
Greek chronicles mention Genoese involvement, indeed Grogoras
makes a point of emphasising that John entered Constantinople
2
without the help of any foreign ally", and Jfantaicouasenoa
reports that he told his am not to resist since their oppon-
ents were not foreigners-'. Here again there is a conflict
of evidence which cannot be satisfactorily resolved. On the
whole it seema likely that Gattilusio did play a part in J aim
V*s restoration, but he was acting on his own initiative and
dantakoussenos may formally be right in saying that John had
no foreign ally. Dven Doukas indicates the casual nature of
Francesco's employment, making out that he was seeking his
li
fortune wherever opportunity presented itself . The forces
which supported John V were meagre according to all the accounts "'
and suggest an individual rather than fin official enterprise.
1. b.rl.dicol, ' The abdication of John VI Gantacuzene* ,
'Vzantinisohe Forsclmngea. 2. (Polychordia. Festschrift
IkiidlGer7l907)l 273^27U .
2. 'auiiuaxCcxQ wdatiQ dWocpOXou Gregoras,xxix,27«XIX,
2kl line 20,
3. Kantak. iv,39iiil.237.
k, Goukae,xi,3, p.67 (Grecu) p.4b (bonn).
5. D.ri .Nicol, op .cit. . pp.27^-2?5.
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After Francesco received the island of Lesbos he showed his
independence of the authorities in Genoa on moro than one
occasion* persisting in counterfeiting Venetian coins after
being ordered to stop* and generally putting his personal
interests and those of his adopted nationality before those
of Genoa^. ills activities on behalf of John V in 135^ would
be an early example of his independent attitude and cannot
be taken to indicate official Genoese approval for his action.
Thus in the wars of 13'hi and 1352 and the restoration
of John V in 133^* the interventions and aggressive actions
of the Genoese are attributable to the independent action of
Genoese forces not iasaediately under the control of the metro¬
politan government and often acting in clear contravention
of its policies. The only occasion when the Commune of Genoa
came into prolonged and bitter conflict with Byzantium was
between 13/6 arid 1379 when the Genoese supported the usurpa¬
tion of Andronikos IV. This intervention was only a part of
a much wider conflict between Genoa and Venice throughout
the mediterranean, in which Byzantium became Involved as an
almost inevitable consequence of the treaty between John V and
the Venetians in 137b • By the terms of this treaty John
agreed to cede to Venice the island of Tanedos* which had long
been coveted by the Italian trading cities since it commanded
the route from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. By tliis
agreement John V not only affected the balance of power
between Venice and Genoa in such a manner that renewed hostili¬
ties between them could scarcely be avoided, but he seemed to
1. W.Miller, * The Gattilualj of Lesbos (1355-1^62)' B.Z..
22, (1913), *K>9. See above pp. 175"'176.
2. On the treaty of 1376, the text of which has not survived,
see R—J.Loenertz, *Hotes d'histoire et do chronologic
byzantln.es' , li.B.B.. 17, (1959), 166 n,9. Also J.Chrysosto-
mide3, 'Studies on the Chronicle of Caroldo', 0.0.P.. 35*
(1969)^ 153 especially n.4. Bftlger, -o,,esten. 5, 3130.
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be placing himself and the empire squarely in the Venetian
camp. liven had Andronikos not been available as an alterna¬
tive candidate for the imperial throne, Venice and Byzantiua
as its ally would have faced the certainty of Genoese revenge.
The presence of Andronikos, imperfectly blinded and
loosely confined in a monastery, disgraced and disinherited
for his attempted usurpation with Saudji in 1373# made the task
of the Genoese much simpler. Andronikos was able to escape
to Para where he was given military assistance for the capture
of Constantinople and the deposition of his father. He also
had the support of a Turkish army which seems not to have taken
part in the fighting in which one hundred and sixty Genoese
died'*, having gained the throne, Andronikos set about reward¬
ing his allies, ceding GalliTjoli to the Turks and Tenedos to
2
the Genoese • But when the Genoese attempted to take their
prise they were resisted by the island* s inhabitants who
remained faithful to John V and the Venetians whom they allowed
to occupy the island, This was precisely the situation which
the Genoese had sought to prevent by supporting Andronikos'
usurpation, and the conflict widened inexorably into general
war. liemetrios Kydones reported on the situation in Constanti¬
nople*
the Genoese cannot bear to keep the peace while
their rivals hold Tenedos, for they believe that
they would thus be deprived of access to the sea
and of the profits of maritime commerce, a thing
which is more terrible to them than if they were
driven out of their own country. Therefore, they
aim at investing the island with triremes, ships,
engines of war and everything else that those who
go to war invent. And they compel the emperor to
co-operate with them, for otherwise, they say, he
1. On Andronikos' usurpation see J .Barker, ianuel XX, pp.25-
35. ohort Chronicle 15, lines 15-22} 47# lines 52-56.
Ciiron. Vat.gr.162. ed. R-J .Loenerts, E.E.B.S... 28, (193S),
pp.203-209.
2. Liber -Curium Reipublicae Genuensls. 2, pp.819-821.
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would connive with, the Venetians in their robbery
and prefer them to the Genoese. The emperor, in
order to avoid all suspicion, has agreed to ally
himself with them and now, in the midst of so
touch misery, he is preparing arms, munitions,
engines of war and ships, and is forced to hire
troops, a thing which for him is more difficult
than flying .
The Genoese attempt to prevent Venice acquiring a domin¬
ant position in maritime commerce involved them in heavy
losses, not only in Pera which suffered a long siege exacer¬
bated by plague, but in the west as well which, after the
initial exchanges, became the main theatre of the war.
however, the Peace of Turin which brought the hostilities to
an end in 1381 showed that the Genoese effort had not been in
vain. Under the terms of the Peace Tenedos was denied to
both the Republics and to Byzantium, its inhabitants were
transported and its buildings destroyed. A central feature
of the Peace was that Andronikos IV and his son John VXX were
reinstated as the rightful heirs to John V to the exclusion of
iianuel' s claim , The assumption was that John V and ifanuel
were Veil ice's men, and Andronikos and John VXX if©re Genoa's
men, and that control of Byzantium should alternate between
the two trading cities. On the surface this was a consider¬
able victory for Genoa, since it appeared to guarantee the
republic a substantial future influence in Byzantine politics.
But this was not the cause for which Genoa had supported
Andronikos' usurpation. The Genoese were aware of the dangers
of polarizing Byzantine politics between Andronikos and John V,
between themselves and the Venetians. Andronikos had served
his function as a tool with which excessive Venetian influence
in the empire could be countered, but he and his son could
1. Demetrios Tydones, liorrespondance, ed. R-J .Loenertz, letter
167 lines 26-35, translated G.I.Dennis, .ianuel XX, p.39»
2. The text of the Peace of Turin, Liber Xurium Relpublicae
Genuenels, 2, pp.dJJ—9^6.
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not rely on continued Genoese support to briny John V1 s reign
to a premature end.
After the revolt of Andronikos Genoa reverted to its
natural policy of maintaining the peaceful conditions within
the empire on which its prosperity depended. fhls was illus¬
trated in the spring and summer of 1385 when Andronikos renewed
his struggle with his father and attacked a castle between
Selymbria and Constantinople*". it was a serious situation,
not least since it appeared to bo reopening the conflict of
1376. Cut on this occasion the Genoese took no paid;, it was
a purely internal dispute in which one of the most significant
features was that the Genoese appeared in the rule of peace¬
makers# On John V's own testimony the Genoese kept aloof
from the fighting and the podesta of Pera took active steps
?
to reconcile the parties ". He could not, however, prevent
a pitched battle between the two Greek forces which John V won,
although at great danger to his life^, but the podest^' s action
is a striking illustration of the Genoese concern that the
empire sliould not be weakened further by internal disputes and
that the Italians should not become parties to the 1,
The events surrounding John VII's usurpation of the Hyzan-
tine throne in .1390 provide further evidence both of the Genoese
government's commitment to the preservation of peace in the
empire and also of the difficulty of making the colony of Pera
follow the policies of its metropolis. The actions of John VII
i iiuediately before his revolt are by no means clear and all the
sources relating to this period show manifest confusions'.
1. Short Chronicle 15, lines 22-25, U-J.Loenertz, 'Fragment
d'une lettre de Jean V Paleologue h. la co:;iuuine de Genes
1387-1391; b.z.. 31, (195«)> 37-40.
2. ' i'otestates Peyre i'uerunt ibidem quaerentes pace.a s(icut)
ipsi ostendebant* . h-J .Loenertz, op.clt. p.37.
3. De.ietrios hydones, Uorrespon den c e. ed, U-J .Loenertz, letter
309, lines 83-89.
4. J .Bo xicer, 'John. VII in Genoa; a problem in late : -yzan tine
source confusion' , 0.0.P .. 2:;, (19b2)5 213-23J .
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however, there is considerable evidence that John VXX prepared
for his attack on his grandfather by visiting Genoa in search
of assistance. The fifteenth century historian Clialkokondyles
mentions John VXi's presence there, and a short chronicle
records his return to the euiplre from Genoa in 1390* • From
western sources it is also clear that John VII's mother was
in Italy in 139b and it is a reasonable assumption that she
visited the west with her son to get help, and remained there
to await results. Furthermore it is known that an imperial
procurator, representing John V, was in Genoa in 1390 and it
has been suggested that his presence was designed to counter
the influence of John VXI£".
It is impossible to be certain whether John VXI himself
visited Genoa, but the likelihood is strong since the Genoese
had made his rights of succession part of their terms in the
Peace of Turin in 1331, and so appeared, to John VXX, to be
his natural champions. It is certain, however, that when
John VII presented himself before the walls of Constantinople
in April 1390» his forces did not include a large official
contingent of Genoese troops. All the accounts agree that
his army was chiefly composed of Turks and even they were
not required to fight since John VII* s sympathisers inside the
walls opened one of the gates and admitted the usurper without
his Turkish followers-^.
1. Challcokondyloo, ed. Darko, I, 77-78? ed. Bonn p.83. Short
Chronicle lj line 2o .
2. Documents edited and discussed by J.Darker, loc «cit.
3. Clxort Chronic 1 e 15» lines 2C—31 • Ignatius of Smolensk,
ed. I3.de Khitrowo, Xtinoraires Russes. p.lUo. On John
Vxi.* s usurpation generally see C-.^olias, "H avTocpdCot
'Icotivvou Z' naXaioXoyou IvotvrCov 'loactvvov E' naXaioXoyou
(1390),' 'EXXHvikoc. 12, (1951), 36-64.
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It would seei, therefore, that the authorities in Genoa
rejected John VII*s request for aid. The Genoese of Pera
were less circumspect. They had already given grave offence
to John V by paying his grandson imperial honours to which he
was not entitled and by neglecting the customary acclamations
when Johxi V himself sailed past the colony. In a letter to
the Commune of Genoa John V complained that the colonists had
been responsible for a number of plots against his life, and
that one conspirator, although confessing his guilt, had gone
unpunished"*". As soon as John VTI had gained entry into Con¬
stantinople, it was to the Genoese of Pera that he turned for
help in besieging John V in the fortress of the Golden Gate
2
where ho still held out »
John V succeeded in resisting the besieging forces and his
son Manuel was able to escape from the City to seek help out¬
side. After the stalemate in Constantinople had lasted about
four months the policy of the Genoese underwent a sudden change,
A series of expense accounts from Pera reveal that the Genoese
made contact with John V in his fortress and attempted to
arrange a truce between the two factions'*. In the light of
1. K~J .Loenertzs, ' Fragment d'una lettre', B«%., 51* (195&)
37-3b, John V* s complaint that the Genoese of Pera. had
iionoux-ed John VII 'sine vo imitate grechorusi (et contra
r±tuni) occlesie ipsorum* is additional evicionce that John
VII was not crowned by Androniicos IV in 1377* see J .Darker,
I ianuel XI. p.29 n.70.
2. PcxctiAeuq o tc&icxoq ocutou e£ar)\0e.... elq to kccot^Miov
tt[q XpuaeCag xoXiopxouuevoQ uico tou £yy6vou oc&tou Hat
T£5V rocXat-nvcov '.
Short Chronicle 15* lines 31-32.
3. b August 139G.' Pro .... expeusi.5 factis .... in barchis,
pro transitu equorura cibo et potu quaxido doiinus Potestas
ivit ad Creseaia (the Golden,XpOdn * Gate) pro ponendo acor-
diuin inter Imperatores* • L. Belgrano, 'Prima eerie*,
Atti Jocietb. Ligure. 13* p• 151 • Several other' entries
testify to contacts with John V and John VII after the
latter' s expulsion from Constantinople on 17 September
139C • Co id. pp.151-152 and also N.Inrga, botes et extraits
pour servii' a 1' J'istoire des crolsadaa au XVe slecle. 1,
(Paris 1399), PP • 41-50 .
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previous such reversals of Genoese policy it seems likely that
this change from aggression to conciliation was the result of
instructions from the government in Genoa, which can have had
little faith in the stability of John VII* s regime and little
liking for a government in Constantinople which was even more
subservient to the Turks than the previous one. The extent to
which John VIX considered himself betrayed by those whom ho
took to be his traditional allies is revealed by the fact that
lie sent an embassy to Venice about August 1390 seeking assist¬
ance against his grandfather. The Venetians, however, proved
no more willing than the Genoese to become involved in Byzan—
tine internal affairs*".
In the event John VII*s brief reign was brought to an end
by the forces which Manuel had managed to raise from Rhodes,
Le;.m.os, Ghristopolis and Constantinople. A sudden sally from
the fortress of the Golden Gate caught, John VII unprepared,
and he was driven from the City to find teGij>orary refuge in
Pera before fleeing finally to the Turks. The only resistance
encountered by Manuel's men came from Francesco IX Gattilusio
who was displaying the same individual enterprise and dis¬
regard for official Genoese policy that his father had shown
2
nearly forty years previously ,
ii) Genoa arid the Turks.
Underlying Genoa* s attitude towards the empire was the
realisation which grew as John V* s reign progressed, that Con¬
stantinople and eastern trade generally would soon become
subject to Turkish power. Genoa therefore, like Venice, was
at pains not to prejiidice its future trading prospects either
by allowing its existing privileges to slip from its hands,
1. U .Xorga, * Venelia in marea.neagra* , p.1105# see above p.£&f.
2. 'J-ort- Ghron-icle 15, lines 33-39? 52,lines 44-46. Ignatius
of Smolensk, ©d. B.d© Khitrowo, p.142.
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or by antagonising the Turks. The forwarding of these aims
necessarily led to extrewiely tortuous policies on all sides,
but while Venice restricted its relations with the Ottomans
to polite diplomatic exchanges, the Genoese often had closer
contacts and active alliances with them.
Following the battle of the Bosphorus in February 1352»
the Genoese mado plans to press hone their advantage by bring¬
ing Orchaa, the Emir of Blthynia, into the war on their side.
An alliance between the Genoese admiral and Orchan was arranged
through the mediation of Philip Beloraede and Boniface de
baulo, two Genoese from Pera who had been expelled froa the
colony by tneir compatriots and had entered Orchan' s service.
John Kantakouzeno s states that Orchan was promised money and
a prominent place on the roil of benefactors to the Genoese
Senate and people. This promise, together with a grievance
of his own against the Venetians, persuaded Orchan to send a
large force of infantry and cavalry to help in the protection
of Pora*", The value of the Turkish intervention was acknow-
1edged in letters froa Genoa to Fera and to Grehan himself,
in xtfhich Philip and Boniface were readmitted, to the colony.
Orchan had been press ig for the restoration of their colonial
privileges for some years, perhaps in order that he could use
them as commercial agents, and his request, ' although hard,
2
serious and harmful' to the Genoese was granted . The letter
1. kantak. iv,31*XXX,228-229• Of. Gregoras, xxvi,33»XXX,99*
See also M. Ealard, 'A propos de la bataille du Bosphore,
L'expedition g&uoise de Paganiuo Boria & Constantinople
(1351-1332)', xrayau* .et mempirep. h, (1970), 443-445, 449-450.
2. Letter from Genoa to aera 21 iarcu 1336, L.Delgrano, 'Prima
borio' , Atti Societa Ligure. 13, 126-127. The privileges
were co iraed 2C November 1353, '.... recollentes grata
et laagnifioa servltia per viros providos Philippuu Belomode
et . onifatium de aulo biu'gonses civitatis Peyre exhibita
circa inaundum conoordiur.i inter Go aune J finite ... et tagni—
fiewn dominum Orcambech magnum anxiratum vurchie, •••• ex
quo quanta solus quantusque robur Comuni Jaime et ianuensi
natioui additus' . XLid. p.120. The privileges were revoked
in 1361.
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sent to Orchan, informing him of the decision, refers to him
as 'our brother avid father to our people in Pera' ^,
The Genoese, however, could not rely on lasting peace and
favour with the Turks. When Pera was besieged in 1379-1331#
2
the forces which blockaded the landward side ware Turkish .
hen the commune of Genoa signed a commercial treaty with
the Turks of iiurad in 13B7, the earliest document of the type
which has survived, it is apparent that the Genoese enjoyed
no special trading privileges in Turkish territory, While
Turad's traders were allowed complete exemption from customs
dues in Fera, and paid only a small sales tax, the Genoese
trading in Turkish territory were subject to the same charges
as * Saracens, Creoles and Venetians' . By the terms of the
treaty the Corvaune of Genoa was held to make sure thai the
podestJk of Pera and his council observed all the articles
agreed with the Turks. However, the colony's dissatisfaction
1. * ... nostra frai o chi e stao payro do 11 nostri de i'eyra
.... E si reconunandemo li noatri de Peyra cSie sum vostri
figi e servioi e veraxi' * ibid, pp,125-126, Genoa also
had good relations with Mizir, Umur' 3 successor as B.air
of Aydin. On 26 May 1331 a Genoese ambassador on his way
to Romania was instructed to go 'ad altrm locum (Bphesua)
.... quia ille dominus ihalabi (hiair) sicut scitis multuia
bene ss habuit et ostemiit voluntatem erga omnea Januenses
etiaa et multum curialiter scripsit nobis per suas litteras
se offerendo ad omnia que posslt pro nobis.' The ambassa¬
dor was told to make contact * cum console ot -sereatoribus
nostris existentibus ibi' . G.Bertolotto, • Wuova aerie',
Atti Jocieta hii'Mre, 25, 351. Cited P.Lemorle, L' Quirat
d* Aydin. p. 233 n»o.
2. » B tenevano 1* assedio a Pera per la via di ciare; e da terra
il Turco le aveva at torno il carnpo, effando in lega coll'
JMiperadore Calojanni, e avevano posti siangani appresso la
Citta, che facevano gran danno' • Chronicon Pataviriuni,
i-iuratori, M.x.C., 17, 350c. Of, banieie di Ghinazzo,
Gronica de la Ruerra da Vejieciani a Genovesi, ed.
V.Laazarini, toim ..enti storici. Deputazione di Storia
Patria per le' Veneaie, n.e.ll, {Venice 1956)217 . G. Stella,
Annulea Q cuienses. Muratori, R.X, 0.< 17, 1113a,
3. L,..olgrano, • Prima eerie' , Atti .-ociote. Lirvire. 13, pp.l46~
149. ~
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with, the trading conditions imposed upon it by the treaty
Tound expression in an anti-Turkish alliance concluded in
November or heco-iber 1333*". Pera associated itself with the
iisain powers of the alliance, Chios, Rhodes, Lesbos and Cyprus,
making no reference to the Commune of Genoa but acting as an
independent entity. This is a further illustration of the
manner in which the policies made in Genoa to safeguard the
long-tern interests of Genoese traders clashed with the
immediate ambitions of the colonists who, whan thwarted, showed
instant aggression. .
1. ibid, pp•953-9«3» The alliance wa© formed 'contra ilium
Turcum filiutn iniquitatia et nequicie, ac sancte Crucis
niraicum, noraturn .ey et elus sec tarn' . ho action was
taken by the allies causing the Genoese of i'era to
complain. --ee letter of francesco 11 Gattiluslo to
Pera 13 June 139^» Ibid, p.966.
CONCLUSION
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The three main topics which have been discussed above
were the chief areas of contact between Byzantium and the West
in John V* s reign. The negotiations about Church reunion,
which were the central feature of his foreign policy, had
produced some original and hopeful plans for bringing East and
West closer together, but despite the personal conversion of
the emperor, the practical assistance of Araadeo and John V's
visit to Rome* no firtn agreements were reached. The differ¬
ences dividing the two sides were too great for a solution
sought along such formal lines to be fruitful. The personal
conversion of the emperor was too narrow a basis for persuading
either the Byzantine ChurcA- to follow his example or the best
to take an active interest in the fate of the eastern empire*
More important than the official negotiations, was the
success of a few individuals in personally bridging the gulf
between East and West and creating an atmosphere of under¬
standing and conciliation at least in intellectual and court
circles. A number of Byzantines, not all of them committed to
the Roman Church, began to look at the Latins in a new light
and to seek common ground in a way which had not been possible
before the influence of the Fi-iars, the translation of western
theological works and the individuals began to be felt. This
was the area of the greatest novelty and interest in the
relations between Byzantium and the West in John V's reign.
The commercial relationship was also moving the two sides
closer together. Economically the empire had become no more
than an outpost of the West in the eastern Mediterranean by the
beginning of John V's reign. Although this fact was financially
the ruin of Byzantium and exposed the empire to the dangers of
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Venetian and Genoese rivalry to exploit the eastern trade, the
growing political and commercial identity of interest between
the Vest and Byzantium offset the economic threat. Increasingly
the i>olitical importance of the empire in the world depended
on the presence of the western commercial colonies. The failure
of these colonies to provide Byzantium with substantial military
aid was largely due to their pessimism about the empire* s
ability to survive under any circumstances and their realization
that the Turks were the future masters of the area.
Given time the individual contacts and the commercial
relationship might have played a more important part in bringing
Bast and Vest towards mutual understanding, religious union and
practical co-operation. But there was no time. The territorial
losses of Byzantium between 13^1 and 135^ &ad totally altered
the empire* s situation and had transformed it from a workable
political unit to an embattled fortress under immense outside
pressures. Time for the gradual change of long-held attitudes
was not available, as John V recognised in his persistent and
energetic pursuit of a negotiated settlement. Xt was not simply
disillusionment with the West but political realism which forced
him into a rapprochement with the Turks shortly after his return
from Italy in 1371• It vas a decision for which he has frequently
been reproached by modem historians who perhaps have understood
his situation less clearly than did the Italian trading cities,
which looked to the Turks for commercial concessions, or Pope
Gregory XX, who accepted that the Vest shared the blame by its
slowness in offering assistance to Byzantium.
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APPENDIX
THE COINAGE OF CONSTANTINOPLE AND PERA IN THE REIGN OF
JOHN V
TsiE COXNAtJiv OP CON s INOl'bf AND PteRA
AN illfc. HCiGiV OF JOHN* 'V.
327
In recent years much has been written on the coinage
of the ayzantine empire In the era of the Palaiologoi*". 10
a larje extent this has been due to the substantial finds
of into Byzantine coinage which have been made in Bulgaria
and Homania* As a result the late thirteenth and early
fourteenth centuries are now much better represented by
Byaantin© coins than they were, but the new discoveries have
also re—emphasised the paucity of gold coinage in the empire
fro i about 133d onwards.
die disappearance of gold coins after the usurpation of
Androniiios IV has been convincingly explained by Oertelo
who drew attention to tlx© introduction, about 1370, of a
monometallic currency based on the silver half-hyperpyron•
Although the hyperpyron continued to survive in financial
records until the end of the empire, it ceased to refer to
a single gold coin and was represented by two large silver
pieces instead. •ertclo considered that this new .-.iiver
coinage had achieved dominance in Constantinople by lldu
when it appeared in frequent use in the accounts of tho Heno-
2
esse notary in i era, donate do Clavaro .
1. Important contributions have been made by 1 • l ortele,
*L* iporporo biseantino dal 1261 al l'rvj* , hivista ifcal hum
dl i;-i m.. mtlca, '»•), ( 1937) , 'i . : ortelo, 'Linea¬
ment! principal! della numismatics biseantinn*, divleta
itnli.-3.aa di nm iismatica. mm. (Ib66) 33-1 id. » • Oorasimov,
*bes hyperperes d'Andronic XI ©t d'Andronic ill et
leur circulation on uul -mrio*, ■yzantJLnobnlgarica, i,
{19b2} 2I3—23«. U.Xliesou, 'L*hyperpore byaantin
au oas manubo Xle-XVe ©10010*, uevue dos etudes nuri-
eat garoijooimos. /'. (Ida 7 ) iu^-ll'j, A. Voglory and
A. iillas, * old and silver coinage of the time of
J oiu 1 V (13**1 -13d1) * , ihe n i iis. iatic circular, / Jf (l'J/O)
and 79 (1971) 2—9. m. l. iotcalf, Colnn.-ro in
the .aligns -igu-i'j > ,, Aristitrnte for mal »au .-tndloa,
no.du, ( 71 lessalon iHi 190 3) •
2. •erfcelc, *L* iperporo' , 7b—39.
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However, there remains a long gap from about 133^ to
about 1376 for which no substantial Byzantine gold coinage
existed and during itfhich no substitute for gold is known.
There are some isolated examples of gold coins in the names
of two groups of rulers, Andronikos XXX and Anne of Savoy
with Jolm V, and also John V with John Kantakouzenos, but
neither of these coin types is sufficiently common to suggest
that it formed the basis of Byzantine coinage for any length
of time"''. The only gold coin attributed to John V alone is
known from only one example and is of such an unusual design
2
as to cast doubt on whether it was really a coin at all".
Xn tlxis period some issues of silver coinage in small denomi-
3
nations are common , but no coinage has survived from tliis
period which can be identified as the currency of Constanti¬
nople's trade.
liiis lack of numismatic material is all the more surpris¬
ing since there is a large amount of documentary evidence
which suggests that trade in Constantinople was based 011 the
gold liyperpyron until the last quarter of the fourteenth
century and that Byzantine gold coins were used by merchants
of all nationalities for transactions as far afield as the
Black bea coast of Bulgaria.
1. A, Veglery and A. Mlllas, 'Gold and silver coinage',
486-487.
2. A. Blancliet, 'Les denieres monnaies d'or des empereurs
de iyzance' , Revue numismatique. 14,(1910) 87.
D.A. Zalcythinos, Crise raon^taire et crise 4cono linue
a Byzance du XXXe au XVe sieclef(Athens 194o) pp.19-20.
■ertele, *L• iperpero' , 76-77 and Pl.IX/4.
3. L. Brunetti, 'Bulla quantita di ruonete d'argerito emesse
sotto Anna di bavoia imperatrice di Bisaneio (1341-
1347)'» hivista italiana di numlsi latica. 11. (1963)
143-168. bee also the comments of D.M. iletcalf, Coina,yo
in the Balkansfp.246.
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The outstanding problem of using written sources for
mediaeval numismatics is tvhether the units of money mentioned
in the texts refer to actual identifiable coins; when, for
example, a Genoese merchant uses the torn hyperpyron does
he mean a gold coin belonging to the Byzantine family of
solidus/noi.iisma/hyperpyron? This cannot be assumed since,
as has already been mentioned, the use of the hyperpyron as
a money of account is evident by the end of the fourteenth
century. The first task of this study is to decide whether
this development took place earlier than 1376, which is the
date when the silver half—hyperpyron can be shown to have
come into existence as the normal medium of exchange.
The documents which help to shed light on the nature
of the currency used in Constantinople are all western, yet
they are sufficiently numerous and varied in character to
suggest a clear picture of the coinage even for the mid-
fourteenth century when the information from the numismatic
sources is most scanty.
The first is an official document of the Commune of
Genoa concerning the regulations for the sale of the tax
farms which covered the customs paid by Genoese shipping in
Pera for the year 1343-1344. It states that 'in Constanti¬
nople and Pera, where for the most part the tax should be
collected, hyperpyra and no other sort of money (non alie
monete) from diverse provinces is used (expenduntur)'^.
The use of the words moneta and expendo show that the docu¬
ment is describing the actual business process in which the
1. L. Belgrano, 'Prima aerie di document! riguardenti la
colonia di Pera', Attl della socleta ligure di storia
patriaJ131(lB77-l88'l)T 28Q.
coins are weighed out before being handed over^; they would
be out of place if hyperpyra wore only a lonoy of account.
The second document dated 12 Pocersber 13^3, is also
Genoese. it contains the judicial decision of the podestK
of iera in an action between two Anconitans and two Genoese
ivho were in dispute over • a large quantity of good gold
hyperpyra of the weight of Pera received in cash'*".
The third source was written in 1352j it forms part
of the accounts of the Catalan naval expedition in the weeks
after the battle of the Bosphorus against the Genoese. The
Catalans were able to recoup some of their heavy losses by
the sale of equipment and captured goods in Crete, Con¬
stantinople and elsewhere on their way homewards• The
entries show clearly tJmt the treasurer reduced nil the sums
he received to a single currency for ease of accounting! he
n
chose gold ducats for this purpose • Thus when he was paid
in ducats he made a simple entry, for example, 'item, sold
to rero Tfrarutiecho, one basin for the price of one ducat' •
if the payment was not made in ducats, the sum was trans¬
lated into t.ho;ai 'Item, four empty pots sold to a creek
grocer for the price of Li ps. iiii q. which are worth i
ducat x q.* That ps. stands for perpres or hyperpyra and
q. for carats is clear from the exchange rate sot out in a
later entry! 1 mid in Constantinople on Monday 13 arch
to ser dimitrio Verdali, a Greek, one horse transport shijj
which had been Genoese, for the price of 1,130 perpres
1. * in Gostaatinopoli e in i'era ...... il pagamonto di
perperi si fa a peso e non a novero di conto'• T.d. Pego
lotti, La frantic a. -'oil-; ore..-) Lira, ed. A. ovans, p.4o.
2. L. sol .rario * oecon-Ja serio di docu. ionti rlguardentl la
colonia di Pera'r Atti uolla sodot a li; ,uro. 13. (lb /
937• '... recepisse in peounia tantam quantitaio i
suoruii bonorum perperorum auri ad sagium Peyro' .
3 • A. Ituoio y Liuen, .;i,To ijuarx '.:e i'Orient Oatalh j i }vl~
iW)T (Barcelona 1*94/ )f pp.269*286.
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which are worth, at the rate of kl carats to a gold ducat,
661 ducats and 19 carats' . It is evident from both these
last two entries that the treasurer received hyperpyra from
some of the men who bought his goods and ho translated the
suras into ducats in order to have a common unit of coinage
for all the sales made on the journey home*'.
The fullest and most exciting literary source, which
contains a wealth of information on the financial and trading
affairs of Constantinople and Pera, is the Account Book of
Barberius, the treasurer of Arnadeo of Savoy during his crusade
P
of I366-I367 • it is in two sections, receipts and expenses,
which account for all the money which passed through Barber¬
ius' s hands. Since the army travelled from oavoy to Venice,
Goron, Negropont, Constantinople and Bulgaria, and returned
via halmatia, northern Italy and Rome, it is not surprising
that one of the most striking impressions given by the
Account Book is of the vast variety of coins with which the
treasurer had to deal, nor is it surprising that he, like the
Catalan treasurer, found it necessary to express the value
of each sort of coin in one standard currency for ease of
reckoning. His choice for this purpose was also the gold
ducat and the gold florin which were of equal value. Thus at
the end of his first section, adding up all the receipts he
had made in 'parpari' , he calculated that he had been given
'132,661 gold hyperpyra and 7 carats of the weight of Con¬
stantinople or Pera, reckoning 2h carats to a parpero and
two parperi to a gold ducat* . Similarly Barberius added up
Ills receipts of coinages whose actual existence is undeniable,
1. ibid, pp. 272-273.
2. F. di St. P. Bollati, Xllustrazioni della spedizione in
Orlente di Amadeo VI. jjblloteca storica italianay 5 .
(Turin 1900). ~
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sucli as gross! of Tours which he valued at twelve and a half
to a florin"''. Finally at the end of his work, having added
up all his payments made in all coinages with the words
•facto cambio monetarum modis superius declaratis . .
he proceeded to estimate by how much his expenses had
exceeded his receipts, reducing each denomination of coins,
p
including 95#659 gold hyperpyra, to ducats'".
Three further examples can be given which show iarber-
ius using hyperpyra in such a way that they can only be
gold coins. There are a number of entries in the Account
book which include several payments for various articles
under one heading. One of these entries records that the
treasurer bought bean flour from one man and paid in silver
aspers, from another merchant he got com, paying in florins,
and finally from the same man he bought bacon for which he
3
gave gold hyperpyra .
Secondly, when Amadeo required a loan, as he frequently
did, he generally turned to the Genoese of Pera. in the
Accounts the technical asnount of the loan was usually
expressed in florins or ducats while the money actually
received was invariably expressed in hyperpyra. On a
number of occasions, although payment did not become due
until Antadeo reached xtaly, he chose to pay off the loan
in Pera. Thus John bassas who had given Amadeo 3OO0
hyperpyra against a letter of debt for 2100 florins,
received his money early; he was not paid in florins but




ibid.. nos. LXVI, 531.
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Finally the relations which Amadeo had with the money
changers (campsores) of Pera must be mentioned. On one
occasion some of them had made a payment on Amadeo' s behalf
which they had made in ducats because they did not have any
hyperjiyra. This was evidently considered unusual and Amadeo
was charged an extra carat per ducat on the exchange^".
The meaning of these entries is unmistakable; gold
hyperpyra were, just like the ^rossi of Tours» coins which
had been actually received and handed out. This is made
additionally clear by the fact that Amadeo, during his first
stay in Constantinople from 2 September to 11 October 1366,
used hyperpyra only very rarely and in small quantities but
2
nearly always spent florins . The reason for this was simply
that his treasury had not yet received a significant number
of hyperpyra and he was dependent on the coins which he had
brought with him from Italy. This removes the suspicion
that all payments made within the orbit of the Byzantine
Esiipire were recorded in hyperpyra regardless of the coinage
actually used. Mien a standard coinage unit was required for
accounting purposes both Barberius and the Catalan treasurer
used the gold ducat or florin; many examples of this are
found in the loan transactions where the money which actually
changed hands was expressed in hyperpyra while the florins
appeared only on paper.
If it is accepted that gold hyperpyra were circulating
in large quantities in Constantinople and Pera in the mid-
fourteenth century, there remains the problem of attempting
to identify them. None of the more or less contemporary issues
• ibid.. nos. 49b, 604. 'Quia... parperos non habebant pro
solucionibus faciendis pro Do:a±no' .
2. The dates are given by Short Chronicle 47, p.SI. i'ollati,
illustmzioni. nos. 222, 243, 266, 267.
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of the Byzantine mint was large enough, to judge from the
surviving examples, to forra the basis of the empire's
currency. if Amadeo alone was able to receive 132,881
hyperpyra they iausi have belonged to an issue much larger
than any of those produced jointly or severally by Androni-
kos XXI, Airne of Savoy, John V and John Kantakouzenos•
The last substantial series of gold coins issued in
the name of any Byzantine emperor was the one which featured
Andronikos il and Andronikos ill together. indeed thex'e
are so many of these coins and the period of the joint-
rule of these two emperors is so short that they aire worth
a close examination * They have been studied most fully,
though with an unfortunate amount of confusion, by Gerasimov
who has published an analysis of fifty-three coins of this
1
series from at least eight Romanian hoards « The most start¬
ling of his discoveries is that there is no instance of die-
duplication among his examples. The coins also show a con-
sidei'ablo amount of stylistic variation among their number,
with both colujrtnar and circular inscriptions and a wide
range of dots, stars, letters and other marks. Altogether
no less than fifty-three distinct types can be distinguished
among the fifty-three coins examined by Gerasimov. These
facts can only indicate that many different dies of
slightly differing types were used in minting coins bearing
the names of the two Androniicoi together, and this in turn
suggests that a very large number of these coins was pro¬
duced, certainly far too many for them all to be accommo¬
dated within the restricted range of tlieix* joint-rule
1. T, Gerasimov, • Les hyperperes d'Andronic XJ. et d'Andro iic
IXX et lour circulation -en Bulgaria' , Byzaritluobu1garxba .
X,(l962) 213-236. See also the comments of O.M.Metcalf,
Coinage in tho Balkans, pp.2^3-2h6.
335
which lasted from 132.5 to 1328. The inevitable conclus¬
ion must be that they became a type Immobilise, continuing
to be struck long after the period of joint-rule had ended.
Exactly how long the minting of these coins continued
is very hard to estimate. The information about the hoards
in which they were found is unfortunately too scanty and
too confused to give reliable dates for xheir deposit
which would help to indicate hoti? long the issue remained in
circulation. Many of the hoards have been incompletely
recorded and some xvera dispersed before they had been
studied at all. Xt Is clear,, however, as the number and
variety of the coins has already suggested, that the hyper-
pyra of Androaikos XX and XXX \*ere in use long after 132J .
The hoard from Alexandrovo, to the north-west of Trnovo,
contained thirteen silver grossi of John Alexander so that
the three hyperpyra found with them must have circulated
after 1331* The hoards at Plovdiv and Markovo, in western
and north-easter! Bulgaria respectively, both contained
coins bearing the effigies of Andronikos XXI, Anno of Savoy
and John V together which were probably struck between 13^1
and 13^7 as well as hyperpyra of the two Andronikoi. We may
therefore conclude that the gold hyperpyra in the joint names
of Andronikos XX and XXX were in circulation at least as late
as 13^1, but the lack of detailed study of these hoards makes
it Impossible at present to suggest, on the basis of the
coin evidence alone, the date at which this archaic coinage
ceased to be struck. The literary evidence examined above,
however, provides strong reasons for thinking that it was
in full use at least as late as I367.
'iho existence of a substantial gold ooinu:•„•© of what¬
ever ioouo in Constantinople and Vera at least as late as
A iofloo* a visit in 136/, together with the continued issue
of coins attributed to Androuiltos IX and iiX, raises the
puzzling question of who was striking the coins* iho
byzantines themselves can bo ruled out since there is 210
reason by John V should Imvo struck coins without his own
head upon tho 1. The use in lid-fourteenth century yzan-
tiu 1 of coinage iconography to proclaim legitimacy and
assort eovcreignty is clearly visible in coins of John V
associated with his doad father and in issues showing John
-antakouzonoa alone, which date from 1353*1351>J • tf Jo!in V
had been ablo to strike a personal gold coinage he would
certainly have followed these examples and placed his own
head mid name upon it*
the obvious explanation is tiuit, although the coinage
was modelled on tho ysantin© hyporpyron, it was trie product
of a niat outside imperial control* if this was tho case,
the Latins are the most obvious source. 1ho probability
chat the Venetians were striking coins on a Hysantine
pattern during their occupation of Conetantinople is
radunlly gaining acceptance despite the lack of any coins
which can bo positively attributed to them* iho mention
by regolotti of * Latin gold hyperpyra' a song the coins
current in Constantinople about 1320 certainly suggests
that such minting had taken place, and tho treaty between
Theodore and the Venetians in 1219 which forbade cither
party to strike * yperpori, lanuelati or stamens* on the
other* 9 model would not have been necessary if it had not
1. x * bornsimov, * boux ..oimaies i* argent do J o.v. V
i'aleoiopuo* , aioU,! do 1' LmttLui arc:, oolu., Lnne *
(bofia) , m, (1965), 259-261.
X* artolo, * 0:10te dell* 1 pomtore iovnuni VI
Cantacuaeno' . • olangos bM,r-u . >rskyf 1 f (Pelgrade 19b'})
33-56 and l'l.IV/15.
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already been done or at least planned*". The striking of a
saracen-like besant by the Kingdom of Jerusalem is one
example of many which show the Latins* capacity for produc-
2
ing imitative coinages . In this regard it is interesting
that the only form of coinage known so far to have been
struck by the Genoese of Pera was a counterfeit of the
3
Venetian sequin,'
iowever, the most powerful reason for suspecting the
Latins is that they more than anyone else needed a currency
of stable value, which the Byzantines had shown themselves
unable to produce, for their trade in and around Constantin¬
ople. The trade passing through the dosplxoros was now out
of Byzantine control and in the hands of the Italian trad¬
ing cities whose dominance enabled and their trade required
them to guarantee the striking of gold coinage. The reign
of John V was a period of relative stability for the hyper-
pyron whose gold content had fallen from sixteen carats to
eleven between 1261 and 1340^ and whose exchange rate
against the ducat then remained at about two to one until
the last years of John's life. This suggests that in these
years the striking of the hyperpyron was in the hands of
some power which was not so vulnerable to daily economic
strains and stresses as were the Byzantines *.
1. 1.F. iiendy, Coinage and money in the Byzantine Empire
10 i 1-12~> 1, . Ju; iiaarton Uaua" studies .12 .( JaahiugtJn .1 yu9).
pp.252-254. See also the review by C. dorrison,
.;u iismatic Chroniclof7th. aer., 11 (1971) 362-363.
2. P. iialog and J. Yvon, ' Honnaios a logendes arafaes de
1'Orient latin* , lievue riunils aatique 5th. aer., 22 (1956)
3. P. Larnbros,,'A.v£K&OToc vouiauooTa, woTtevra ev Ilepav utco tt)c;
ocuto6i anoiviaq tu5v FevouT.aimv', vaiov, 1 , ( I 3?3)
4. Pachy.aeres, De Andronico Pal, vi, 7tIX, 493-494. F.B. Pego-
lotti, La pritica dolla lercatura. ed. A. Ivans, p.269,
* perperi nuovi nuovi a carati 11' . Cited M.F. hendy,
op. cit. pp.24?, 256.
5. D.A. Zakythinos, Criso monetaire. pp. 23-29.
Exchange rates: 1343: 1 hyporpyron 13 carats - 1 Genoese pound
(a little less than a florin. Atti Soc, Lig.13. C1877) 269.
1352: 4l carats (c. 1:' hyp.) - 1 ducat in Constantinople
2 hyperpyra- 1 ducat in Crete, Rubio y Lluch, Diplomatari.
pp.271, 275. 7 ' , . "•
We may ask, however, why the Latin colonists should
have met their need for a stable coin by striking Byzantine
counterfeits instead of coins modelled on their native
florins or ducats or actually imported from Venice or
Genoa. The first part of the answer lies in their need
for a coinage recognised throughout the eastern Mediterran¬
ean, Although the florin and ducat had become popular in
some areas of eastern commerce, especially Egypt, those
places which had remained under direct Byzantine control
or influence until more recent years continued to recognise
and use for preference coins of a Byzantine type. The
Venetians accepted this fact in Crete where the name hyper-
pyron lived on in a coin of Byzantine appearance long after
political control had passed to the Republic. The trading
co.maunities of the Slack Sea for example, which only compara
tively recently had become accustomed to the appearance in
strength of Italian merchants, would have missed their
traditional Byzantine trading coin even more.
A second reason which was certainly of considerable
force was the unwillingness of the metropolitan governments
to allow their distant colonies any minting rights which
might result in the production of coins imitating their pres
tigious dotnestic florins and ducats .and endangering their
universal acceptability by unsupervised minting and perhaps
debasement. This is certainly the interpretation to be put
upon the clause, which appeared among the regulations drawn
up by the Commune of Genoa for the administration of its
colony in Vera in 1304, forbidding any Genoese official or
individual to strike any form of coinage anywhere in the
I367: 2 hyp.- 1 ducat. Liollati, illustrazioni. p.278.
1374: 2 hyp.- 1 ducat. Diehl, Etudes Byzantines. p.249n
1382: 2 hyp.- 1 ducat. Muratori.tt.I.S..22. col.744.
1391: 2 hyp. 7 carats - 1 ducat. Atti boc. Lig.«13.
p.I65•
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world"*"* This provision was clearly designed for the pro¬
tection of the minting rights of metropolitan Genoa from
colonial competition. Jy the raid-fourteenth century the
situation had changed somewhat and the Genoese could no
longer rely on Jysantine coinage for their eastern trading
currency as they had in 13^4* Jut while some colonial
minting for trade purposes was clearly necessary the need to
protect the florin remained as great as svor and encouraged
the production of a non-Genoese coin type* Furthermore the
copying of a iyzaritine coin had the particular advantage that
it was much easier to counterfeit the coinage of an empire
too weak to retaliate than to invite the hostility of the
metropolitan or some other strong government.
There is some evidence to suggest that the minting of
gold hyperpyra after 133^ was more likely to be the work of
the Genoese than the Venetians, but the documentary sources
unfortunately are nowhere explicit on the question of minting
and we have to rely on very inconclusive material. There are,
for example, many references to transactions involving
ry
hyperpyra ' of the weight of Pera' , (ponderis Pere or ad
sagium Peyre ) which might seem to indicate the origin of
the coins. In Amadeo' s Accounts mention is also made of
hyperpyra ' of the weight of Constantinople' ^ and ' of the
5
weight of Koiaania' ", but from the manner in which the terms
are used it seems that they all refer to the same coins;
1» jtatuti di pera, ed. V. Promis, iscellsnea di storia
Italian*.11.t1870} no. 2/1, p.77b.
2. 'ollati, illustrazioni. no.454.
3. L. belgrano ,* Prima eerie', Atti societa llgure, 13f P . 158.
4. Jollati, 111ustraziotii, no.433.
3 • ibi'J . » no.430.
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certainly they were of the same value1, The most likely
explanation of these names is that they indicate the place
2
where the sum of money was officially weighed . Thus hyper-
pyra of the weight of Pera are most commonly used since
Attiadeo conducted most of his business in the Genoese
colony, and the hyperpyra of Constantinople or Romania appear
when the transaction took place in the capital or in the
provinces. The apparent confusion which arises when Amadeo
receives hyperpyra of Pera from the Emperor of Constantinople
while in <*ese.ibria on the Glaclt sea, is explained by the fact
that the money was raised from Genoese bankers, and so was
3
weighed in Pera .
However, while the bulk of the evidence strongly suggests
that this interpretation of the expression * of the weight of
Pera' is the correct one, there are a couple of facts which
are rather puzzling. The expression does not appear in the
4
acts of the notaries operating in Pera in 12b1 . Their acts
usually specify ' ad sagium Constantinopolitanum* , occasionally
merely ' de sagio' and sometiiaes omit any : iontion of sagium
at all. The earliest appearance of ' perperi ad sagium
Poyre' known to le is in the judgement delivered by the
\ 5
Genoese podesta of Pera in 134b . The sparsity of the
sources suggest that the term must have been in use earlier,
but it would be surprising that the thirteenth century
1. * Perperi auri ponder!s Pere seu Romania'v Rollati,
illustrazioni, no.459 ' Parperi auri ponderis Constan-
tinopolis seu Pere' , ibid.. p.25« There were also
'Parperi auri ad pondus Mesembrl' , ibid.. no.423.
These presumaoly were the same coins but weighed on
local scales - seventeen of them exchanged for eight
florins, ibid.. p,27&, but of. nos.437,423.
2. T. uerteleT, 'Lineament! principal!', p.103 n.&9.
3. tollnti* XIlustrazioni. no. XLvXX. .
4. G.l. »ratxaim I A!cies 'des notaires genois de Pera et de
Caffa a la fin <ln xrexzxbme slScfe^ Academie
Roumaiuo, Etudes et recliorchog,no•2, (BuoareSt 1927 } •
5. L. Helgrano, ' beconda serie', Attl societa llgure 13,
P.937.
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notarial acts do not use the expression at all if it merely
indicated where the money was officially weighed for each
transaction. Similarly, if the expression signified an
official weighing which was part of ever)' large business deal,
it is difficult to explain, how Amadous on his first visit to
Constantinople was able to use hyperpyra with no mention of
their pondus in the Accounts'®'.
Moreover1, while the use of the term is easy to under¬
stand when it concerns large sums of money used in payment
for goods received in a business deal, since the only satis¬
factory method of estimating the value of a pile of coins of
unequal weight is to weigh them as a whole, the purpose of
such an official weight guarantee is harder to see in the
2
case of single coins given in alms or as a gift . rot these
payments also are entered in the Accounts with the certifi¬
cation of *ponderis Pore* when it is clear that they would
not have been weighed at all. These few points arouse suspic¬
ion that there was something more Peran about the hyperpyra
than merely the scales on which they were weighed.
The differing characters of the colonies of the two
Italian republics is another factor which causes the suspicion
over the minting of hyperpyra to fall more heavily on the
Genoese than the Venetians, The Genoese colony situated
outside the walls of Constantinople on territory over which
the dyzantinos had surrendered their sovereign rights, was
accustomed by the reign of John V to deal with the hyzantine
Empire on terms of equality. The wars of 1346-1349 and 1352
had brought home to the Greeks their inability to prevent the
Genoese colonists from doing very much as they liked. The
1. iollati, J.11ustrn.zioni. nos. 222, 243, 266, 267.
Ibid., nos. 429, 523, 566.
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Venetians' attitude towai'ds the Byzantine Empire, on the other
hand, is symbolised by the presence of their colony within
the capital city. They were no less successful than the
Genoese in getting their way in commercial matters, but the
methods they employed wore less violent and they strictly
honoured their treaties with the Empire. The direct challenges
to imperial authority which punctuate the relations between
Pera and Constantinople were rarely attempted by Venice and
so it would have been most uncharacteristic of" the Venetians
to counterfeit Byzantine hyperpyra.
The extent to which the Genoese used hyperpyra for
their colonial trade can be seen in many commercial documents,
however, the most striking illustration of it is found in a
financial record which only indirectly concerns Constantin¬
ople. This is the xiegister of acts kept by a Genoese notary
in Kilia, Antonio de Podenzolo^. About a hundred acts
remain in the surviving part of this Register, covering a
joeriod from 27 November I36Q to 12 May 1361. They concern all
kinds of business conducted both in Kilia, on the Jlack Bea
coast of Bulgaria, and inland, but of particular interest
are the thirty-three letters of exchange concerning loans
made to merchants. Xn every case the amount of the loan is
expressed in silver, usually silver soami of the weight of
ivilia, sometimes aspers and occasionally in uncoined metalj
the exact number of somini is not always specified. The two
invariable features in the letters are that the loan is to
be repaid in Pera within twelve to fifteen day3 of the mer¬
chant' s arrival rhere, and the sum to be repaid is always
expressed in gold hyperpyra of the weight of Pera. This pro-
1. The Register of Podenzolo has not been edited but forms
the basis of an article by 0. Xliescu, 'Notes sur 1'apport
roxpnain au ravitaillement de Cyzance d* apr&s une source
inedite du XXVp siecle' , Nouvelles etudes d' histoire .
(iiucarest 1965), 105-116 . —
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cess resulted in the transfer of 7,770 hyperpyra from Pera
to Bulgaria in the period covered by Podenzolo's Register.
It must be borne in mind furthermore that the months covered
by these acts were not the peak months of the Black Sea
trade. So much is clear from the fact that nearly half the
acts come from the 1-12 May when trade was beginning to
pick up again after the winter. Also Podenzolo reveals that
he was not the only Genoese notary operating in Kilia. He
several times mentions Dernaho de Carpina who, since he was
Genoese consul in Kilia, was doubtless a more important
notary than Podenzolo himself.
Podenzolo* s evidence reveals that the Genoese exported
a large volume of hyperpyra for their trade with Bulgaria.
This strengthens the identification of these coins with the
issue bearing the names of Andronikos XI and Androniiios XXX.
All the major finds of coins from this series have been made
iii north-eastern Bulgaria, south of the Danube, in the fertile
food-producing areas which the Genoese merchants visited to
purchase corn. Xt Xs also interesting that the hoards which
contained coins of the joint emperors, although producing a
large mixture of other coin types, held no florins1. This is
another indication that the currency of international trade
in Pera was hyperpyra.
On the other hand the local trade in Bulgaria was con¬
ducted in silver sorami, which suggests the reason why in the
end the archaic gold currency of international trade at Con¬
stantinople and Pera succumbed to the use of silver which
was the medium of exchange not only in Bulgaria but also
generally to the north and east of Byzantium. The relative
values put upon gold and silver in the east and the west from
the mid-thirteenth century onwards caused a flow of gold
1. T. Uoraeimov, 'Les hyporperes1. Uyzantinobulgarica.l ,
(19G2) 222. "
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westwards from areas where it was relatively undervalued.
Conversely silver, both in the form of metal and coin,
found its way to Moslem lands where its value against gold
was relatively high. Byzantium stood near the centre of
these streams of precious .netals, relatively unaffected by
the violent fluctuations ih value which occurred in east and
west, but influenced by the general process nevertheless.
The empire traditionally belonged to the eastern bloc so
far as precious netals went, tending to be closer to the
Moslem lands in the relative values given to gold and silver
than to the Christian West. In this sense the gold coinage
of Constantinople and Pera was by the last quarter of the
fourteenth century a growing anachronism and it was only a
question of time before the empire joined its immediate
neighbours in adopting an exclusively silver and bronze
1
currency .
There were in addition more immediate reasons for the
re-establishinent of the -yzantlne mint which help explain why
the Genoese, if they had once started to produce gold hyper-
pyra, ware ultimately not in a position to protect the minting
rights which they had usurped. Although the cx-edit for the
revival of minting in Constantinople and the innovation of
a silver-based Byzantine currency has boon given to Androni-
kos LV, it cannot be forgotten to what an extent he was him¬
self a pawn in Genoese policy. His accession was merely the
result of Genoese fears that John V was too much under the
influence of the Venetians, and having received his throne
with their assistance he was obliged to reign as their
puppet, pursuing an anti-Venetian policy which he could not
*♦ I* ',\sn-m.- -nyynH.
20/(1967), 1-3^.
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afford. his situation at the hands of the Genoese was, in
the words of Demetrios Kydones, • More difficult than flying' .
Furthermore, Andronikos had to bear the cost of buying
protection from the Turks who • exacted such a sum of money
that nobody could easily count it'"*". These are not the cir¬
cumstances which one would expect to form the background to
the re-establishment of Constantinople's minting independence.
The critical factor which led to the changes was cer¬
tainly not an improvement in Byzantium's economic position.
Xt was on the contrary the major financial crisis which
faced Uenoa as a result of its war \?ith Venice, Both
republics saw the war of Chioggia as a fight to the death,
as a war which was finally to end their ancient rivalry,
and to this end they poured all their financial resources
into the battle. in Genoa ten forced loans were levied
between 1376 and 13^1 which yielded an average of 1UG,00(J
florins. This crushing burden of taxation, together with
the total disruption of trade in the eastern mediterranean,
brought the city close to ruin. The colony of Pera suffered
particularly badly, being subjected to a long seige by land
and sea which naturally brought all commercial activities
2
to a standstill . in this situation of blockade and economic
stagnation the hyperpyron ceased to be a coin of international
trade and became merely a local currency under domestic
Byzantine control. To fulfil this function a silver coin
1. On the monetary reforms of Andronikos XV see T. Bertele,
' L' iperpero' , /0-69. On his usurpation and indebtedness
to the Genoese spe D.M. Niool. The last centuries of
Byzantium 1201-1$ ->3 JLondon 1972) ft ?■>. 9-B92. iVr.'Hennis,
The reiYin~~"*oT" ■fanucvl Xi irt Thessalonica. 1362-1307,
Orientalia Christiana Analects ,1 59»' (Home i960) pp . 37-^0 .
■e ietrio- y -: ■■> ■ mm- , ;orro»un dnfic o „ : X« eel. .'.-J. hoenertz ,
Letter 167 •
2. . Luzzatto, Btox-ia Gcononica di Venozia dall' Xl al
B/._ secoio, ( Venice 1961), p .lTl.
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was quite sufficient and indeed brought byaantium in to line
with its neighbours and trading partners in such a way that,
with the revival of oo ;s.-.terce after the war* the silver half-
liyperpyroa became the standard coin of the trade passing
through the ospores.
iiie final question which must be answered is why John V
should have allowed apparently oyssantino hyporpyra to be
.'tinted ay outsiders. oeftlumberger considered it utterly
1 iprobaole that the Genoese would have struck, money in Pern
since ' tne lyaarifcine court would never have put up with such
an attack on its rights by foreigners settled in the vory
suburbs of the capital' . Xf the arguments sat out above
are acceptable, they would show that the Genoese colony
enjoyed far greater independence than ->ehlu jbergor imagined,
and this would conform with the practical freedom which it
undoubtedly possessed in other areas such as legal adminis-
2,
tration, land ownership and taxation . surprising though
it may seem at first sight that John V could not prevent the
issue of an unauthorised coinage on his doorstep, there is
nothing in the situation to suggest that ho could <io any thin :
about it. .-4or aid it diminish perceptibly his already exig¬
uous political or ocoao sic authority; the coins wore lar gely
usod by foreigners for a trade which involved only a few
yzantines and which brought little profit to the imperial
treasury. x.f the traders chose to produce coins themselves
rather than to com© to his mint for coins he was powerless
to prevent the. i unless he was able to produco a coinage him¬
self whicn would meet their needs better.
Xt May have been an attempt to make such a coin which led
to the production of the one gold coin which has been attri-
l. g, ..ciiiu,nborger, i-iunianntlnuR do 1* orient latin, (Paris
lf>7 ) p.'+33*
2 • .ee above pp« 2-13 - 2.31.
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buted to John ¥• s personal rule". This issue, which, is known
irorn only one example, differs fro i the traditional Byzantine
iiyperpyron in almost every particular. it is small, absolu¬
tely flat, and on the reverse, instead of the Virgin tjith
her ar '.s raised encircled by the walls of Constantinople
which appeared on all hyperpyra. after 1261, it bears the
figure of John the Baptist. However, the most significant
features of this coin are its weight and its fineness; it
weighs 1.88 grams of which 1,6k are pure gold. This amount
of gold is very close indeed to the amount contained in the
last debased hyperpyra which John V issued with his parents'
effigies. The purity of the coin and its western appearance
suggest that the issue could represent an attempt by John V
to improve the acceptability of the Byzantine hyperpyra
without altering its basic value. if this was an effort to
win the western merchants back to the imperial mint it clearly
failed; the likely fato of any pure gold coin in Constantinople
was rapid export to the west - perhaps that is why only one
survives today.
Once again the question has retiarnod to the poverty of
the numismatic sources for tho reign of John V. An attempt
has been made in those pages to explore the reasons why no
issue of gold coins directly attributable to any Byzantine
emperor after 1330 exists in substantial numbers and to
suggest what might have replaced them as the basic trading-
currency for tue empire and its environs• tio more than a
hypothesis can be offered until coins ar© found in such
circumstances that it can be proved that they circulated in
mid-fourteenth century Byzantium. Until they are discovered
1. T. ertele, 'L' iperpero* , pp.7^-77 and PI. ll/h.
it would be unwise to close our mind to the possibilities
outlined above, which take account of* the record sources
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